New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. K.N. and K.E. in the Matter of T.E., a Minor ( 2014 )


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  •                        RECORD IMPOUNDED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-4847-12T1
    NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD
    PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,
    APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                  March 20, 2014
    v.                                       APPELLATE DIVISION
    K.N. and K.E.,
    Defendants-Respondents.
    ___________________________________
    IN THE MATTER OF T.E.,
    A minor.
    ___________________________________________________
    Submitted February 4, 2014 – Decided March 20, 2014
    Before Judges Messano, Hayden and Rothstadt.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New
    Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part,
    Ocean County, Docket No. FN-15-130-13.
    John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General,
    attorney for appellant (Melissa H. Raksa,
    Assistant Attorney General, of counsel;
    Stephanie Anatale, Deputy Attorney General,
    on the brief).
    Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law
    Guardian, attorney for minor T.E. (Noel C.
    Devlin, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on
    the brief).
    Respondents K.N. and K.E. have not filed briefs.
    The opinion of the court was delivered by
    MESSANO, P.J.A.D.
    By our leave granted, the Division of Child Protection and
    Permanency (the Division) appeals from those provisions of the
    June 10, 2013 order of the Family Part that, over the Division's
    objections,       awarded      physical    custody    of   six-year-old      T.E.
    (Tommy)    to     his    "maternal      grandmother   as    a   paid    resource
    placement," and denied the Division's request for psychological
    evaluations of Tommy's maternal grandparents, Charlotte and Carl
    H.1   The litigation commenced on May 9, 2013, when the Division
    filed a verified complaint and order to show cause seeking care
    and supervision of Tommy pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12.                   At the
    time, Tommy was in the "physical legal custody" of his mother
    K.N. (Kara), and both had resided in Carl and Charlotte's home
    for several months.
    We   need    not   set    forth     the   contents   of   the    Division's
    complaint at length, because they are largely irrelevant to the
    1
    We have fictionalized the names of those involved to maintain
    their   privacy.   Carl  is  referred  throughout   the  record
    interchangeably as the "maternal grandfather" and "maternal
    step-grandfather."
    2                              A-4847-12T1
    issues presented on appeal.         However, to place the controversy
    in some context, we reference the more pertinent allegations.
    Tommy was born in March 2007 to Kara and K.E. (Kevin).
    That year, upon receiving referrals of domestic violence between
    Kara and Kevin, and after Kara tested positive for marijuana and
    opiates, the Division filed an order to show cause and verified
    complaint    in   the   Family   Part.       In   November   2007,   the   court
    granted the Division custody of Tommy, who was placed "in a
    relative care home."2        In November 2008, after Kara and Kevin
    actively participated in services, the litigation was terminated
    and the family reunited.
    The Division continued to provide services, since Kara was
    participating     in    substance   abuse     counseling,     and    additional
    referrals were made in December 2009 and September 2011.                       In
    April and May 2012, the Division investigated allegations of
    domestic violence between Kara and Kevin, and that Kara had
    stolen prescription painkillers from her sister.                    Kara denied
    the allegations and agreed to visit the Division's office for
    urine screening.        She failed to appear.         During the balance of
    2012 and into 2013, Kara and Kevin participated in separate drug
    and alcohol counseling programs, and the Division continued to
    monitor their progress.
    2
    The record does not set forth with whom Tommy with placed.
    3                             A-4847-12T1
    During a February 2013 visit, the Division's caseworker was
    advised that Kara was sixteen weeks pregnant.                      After Kara failed
    to attend a substance abuse evaluation, the caseworker visited
    Carl and Charlotte's home on March 27, 2013.                    Carl reported that
    Kara,    Kevin   and   Tommy   had    moved         into   their   home,    but     after
    Kevin's    continued     verbal     abuse      of    Kara,   Carl    told   Kevin        to
    leave.     The entire family left for a few days but were evicted
    from a motel in Belmar for failing to pay their rent.                       Only Kara
    and Tommy returned to the H.'s home.                   Carl told the caseworker
    he had discovered that eighteen of his pain pills were missing
    and was concerned Kara had taken them.
    During an April 1, 2013 visit, Tommy told the caseworker
    that Kara takes a pill "sometimes in the morning and at night."
    Tommy showed the caseworker where he kept his toys and said that
    Kara would sometime keep her pills there.                    Kara denied using any
    drugs and claimed Tommy was speaking of the pre-natal vitamins
    she was taking.        However, on April 3, Kara tested positive for
    opiates.    The Division's caseworker met with Carl and Charlotte
    and advised that Kara would need to be supervised whenever she
    was with Tommy.        On April 9, Kara submitted another urine sample
    that was positive for opiates.
    On May 10, 2013, the judge granted the Division's request
    and   entered    an    order   to   show       cause   against     Kara    and    Kevin,
    4                                     A-4847-12T1
    returnable   June    6.    Although       the   Division   sought   an   order
    placing Tommy in its "care and supervision," the Law Guardian
    apparently urged the judge to grant the Division custody.3                 The
    order provided that
    [Tommy] be immediately made a ward of the
    court and placed in the immediate custody,
    care and supervision of the Division with
    authorization for the Division to consent to
    routine and emergency surgical or medical
    treatment to safeguard the life or health of
    the child.
    The order did not explicitly provide for Tommy's placement with
    Carl and Charlotte; however, later proceedings revealed that the
    Division agreed to this as an initial placement.               At the time,
    Kara's sister and her four children were also living with Carl
    and Charlotte.      The order further provided:
    [Kara] shall be permitted to reside with the
    maternal grandmother for [five] days (while
    DCPP has custody) so she can try to obtain
    in-patient treatment.   If [Kara] needs more
    time[,] then counsel shall conference.
    [Kara] shall be supervised by the
    maternal grandmother on a [twenty-four]
    hour/[seven] day per week basis and the
    birth mother is not permitted to drive the
    child in a car.
    On the return date of June 6, the Law Guardian immediately
    brought to the Court's attention that Tommy had been removed
    3
    This was revealed in the transcript of the next proceeding on
    June 6.
    5                              A-4847-12T1
    from Carl and Charlotte's home by the Division and placed with
    his   maternal   great    aunt,    C.S.   (Celeste).      The   Law   Guardian
    reported that Tommy believed the removal was "his fault," and
    his behavior had changed as a result of leaving his mother,
    aunt, cousins and grandparents.
    When the judge asked why the Division had removed Tommy,
    the Deputy Attorney General (DAG) directed the judge's attention
    to a "court report" dated May 29 that indicated Tommy "had to be
    moved due to [Carl] being on the perpetrator list" as the result
    of a "[domestic violence] incident where [Carl] held a gun to
    [Charlotte's]    head."       The     judge,   however,     indicated     that
    pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-26.8, licensure of a placement home
    could be withheld as the result of a criminal conviction, but
    "no one is convicted of domestic violence. . . .                It's a civil
    proceeding . . . ."       The judge directed court staff to ascertain
    the results of the prior domestic violence complaint against
    Carl and obtained a report that it had been dismissed.
    The Law Guardian urged the judge to return Tommy to Carl
    and Charlotte, but the Division objected, noting that Kara had
    not entered an in-patient substance abuse counseling program and
    was still in the home.            Kara indicated she would immediately
    vacate the home to facilitate Tommy's return.             The judge entered
    an order that provided in part that Tommy would be returned to
    6                               A-4847-12T1
    Charlotte the following day, and that Kara would "vacate the
    . . . residence immediately[.]"
    The next day, June 7, the judge held a hearing apparently
    in    response         to     the    Division's        emergent     request        for
    reconsideration.            The judge stated that the Division "removed a
    child from where the [c]ourt had placed [him] . . . without
    notice    to    the    [c]ourt,     Law   Guardian     or   any   defense    counsel
    . . . .    There was absolutely no due process . . . whatsoever."
    The judge further explained:
    [A] request was made today for the Court to
    revisit this.      The Court denied that
    request. It made its decision regarding the
    placement of this child. It issued an order
    to that effect but, once again, we run into
    a situation where the Division does not
    agree with the Court's decision and has
    engaged, again, in a constant attacking of
    the Court's decision.   The Court made its
    decision.
    All right.   The Court denied a request
    for a rehearing today. Period.
    The   judge     did,    however,    grant      the   Division's    request     for    a
    hearing to stay the June 6 order.                    Noting that he wanted the
    parties to brief the issue, the judge asked rhetorically:
    And why does the Court want that?    Because
    it just went through this with the Division
    in which many things were misrepresented to
    the Appellate Division in the context of the
    request for the stay.
    Also, because of the lack of due
    process that the Court is very concerned
    7                                 A-4847-12T1
    with in this case, it will give the parties
    an opportunity to respond to the Division's
    submission on a request for a stay so that
    we can have an accurate [a]ppellate record
    in this case.
    The judge also referenced an "amended court report" dated
    June 7.       That report revealed that the Division substantiated a
    finding of neglect against Carl in 2004 stemming from a referral
    by the Family Part domestic violence judge.                         One of the victims
    of the neglect finding was Kara, who was present in the home
    when Carl displayed a gun and threatened Charlotte.                            The amended
    court report also indicated that Kara's sister, now living in
    the    home    with       her    children,     had      "current    child      endangerment
    charges" filed against her.                    Additionally, the report stated
    that    Carl        was     "verbally        hostile"         towards    the      Division's
    caseworkers when Tommy was placed on May 10, initially refused
    to    sign    any    of    the    documents        in   the    "resource    packet,"      had
    "swastika      flags        hanging     in    his       office"    and     made     racially
    derogatory remarks.              However, the judge concluded:
    [T]here's nothing in this [amended] report
    that the [c]ourt feels is an imminent risk
    of harm to this child's health, safety or
    welfare such that the child should not be
    placed there as ordered by the [c]ourt since
    the child shouldn't have been removed in the
    first   instance,  particularly   without  a
    hearing or any due process being afforded
    any of the parties in this case, as well as
    the child who has rights.
    8                                    A-4847-12T1
    The Division filed its formal motion for a stay, supported
    by   a    certification      and    attachments,      including       copies    of   the
    police report from the 2004 incident involving Carl.                      The report
    revealed that during a family argument, Carl retrieved a gun
    from his home office and threatened to kill Charlotte and other
    family members.        Charlotte said that he had made similar threats
    in the past, but she never reported them to police.
    The   certification       also   included     the      Division's     contact
    sheets detailing the May 10 placement.                 It suffices to say that
    the caseworkers claimed Carl was "verbally abusive" toward them
    in   front      of   the   children       in    the   home      and   made     racially
    derogatory remarks.          When asked to review the resource placement
    materials and sign the case plan, Carl initially refused.                            The
    Division placed Tommy with Celeste on May 13.                           There is no
    indication in the record that the Division provided notice to
    anyone about Tommy's removal and placement with Celeste.
    At the start of the hearing on the Division's request for a
    stay, the judge expressed his "hope that this would be taken up
    to a higher court for two legal issues to be resolved."                               He
    described      those   as:    (1)    "the      treatment   of    domestic      violence
    findings and how that pertains to the Division's ability to
    license a home"; and (2) "whether a substantiation, in and of
    9                                  A-4847-12T1
    itself,    would      require        the    removal          of     a    child       because   the
    Division could not license a home."
    The      court      heard        from    Carl,           who        explained      that    his
    frustrations      with    the    Division             were    directed          solely    at   the
    process.     He stated that he and Charlotte were currently raising
    four other grandchildren, who were loved and well-cared for.                                    He
    wanted Tommy to be part of the family.                        Carl also explained that
    the swastika was a "souvenir[]" his father brought back from
    fighting "under General Patton in World War II."                                     He admitted
    using a racially derogatory term in front of the workers, but
    stated    that    he     did    so    only        in    the        context      of    discussing
    "political    correctness."                The    Division's            caseworker       provided
    some testimony in rebuttal.
    The judge denied the Division's request for a stay, stating
    [T]he child should have never been removed
    in the first instance without hearing to all
    of the parties [and the court] disagrees
    that the home can't be licensed under the
    reasons stated by the Division. . . . [The
    court] finds no basis to grant the stay,
    which is denied . . . .
    The judge refused the Division's request to order psychological
    evaluations      of    Carl    and     Charlotte,            noting       the    substantiated
    neglect finding was "[n]ine years ago."                            The judge also refused
    the Division's request to include "language in the order that
    indicates . . . the placement . . . is not a paid placement."
    10                                      A-4847-12T1
    The     Division       sought    leave       to     appeal    and     a    stay    of    the
    judge's order.           The judge filed a written statement of reasons
    for his decision.             R. 2:5-6(c).       He noted that under New Jersey
    law, domestic violence proceedings were civil in nature; thus,
    there   could      be    no     "conviction"      for     domestic        violence,         and,
    hence, that could not be a basis for disqualification of Carl
    and Charlotte as resource family parents.                        The judge also noted
    that even if a resource family parent or household member was
    the subject of a substantiated finding of abuse or neglect, the
    Division could license the family if it determined there was no
    continuing risk of harm and licensure was in the child's best
    interests.
    Although        we    granted    the     Division's          motion       for    leave   to
    appeal, we refused to stay the June 10 order.
    I.
    The     Division       contends       that    the     judge    did        not    have    the
    authority     to        order    Tommy's     placement           "in    an      unlicensed,
    dangerous     home,"       or     order    the        Division     to     "pay        for    the
    placement."        The Division also argues that the judge "abused
    [his]   discretion        in     enjoining       [the    Division]        from      obtaining
    evaluations of the proposed caregivers."
    The      Division's           overarching           contention        is        that     the
    Legislature has granted to it alone the statutory and regulatory
    11                                        A-4847-12T1
    authority   to   select   appropriate     placements   and    license   them.
    The Division argues that the judge's decision in this case,
    therefore, violates the separation of powers clause of the State
    constitution.     See N.J. Const., art. III, ¶ 1 ("The powers of
    the government shall be divided among three distinct branches,
    the legislative, executive, and judicial.          No person or persons
    belonging to or constituting one branch shall exercise any of
    the powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as
    expressly provided in this Constitution.").
    The Division concedes that the Family Part may exercise its
    jurisdiction and order a particular placement "as between two
    fit, licensed homes."       See, e.g., In re C.R., 
    364 N.J. Super. 263
    , 283 (App. Div. 2003) (recognizing the court's jurisdiction
    to resolve disputes "between competing [permanency] plans that
    are reasonably plausible"), certif. denied, 
    179 N.J. 369
    (2004).
    However, it argues that the Family Part cannot order a placement
    in a home which, in the reasonable, discretionary exercise of
    its   statutory     powers,    the      Division   has       determined    is
    inappropriate.     The Division argues that the sole remedy to its
    licensing decision is an administrative appeal brought by Carl
    and Charlotte.
    The Law Guardian argues that whether Carl and Charlotte's
    home was a "reasonably plausible" placement required resolution
    12                             A-4847-12T1
    of disputed facts, and the judge's determination, based upon the
    evidence presented, should be entitled to our deference.4
    We have considered these arguments in light of the record
    and    applicable      legal     standards.            We     reverse    and   remand    for
    further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    A.
    We begin by reviewing the statutory and regulatory regime.
    "The    Legislature       has    established       the        Division    as   'the   State
    agency    for    the    care,     custody,        guardianship,          maintenance     and
    protection of children[.]'"                 N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Svcs.
    v. D.P., 
    422 N.J. Super. 583
    , 593 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting
    N.J.S.A. 30:4C-2(a)).            "In that role, the Division is authorized
    to temporarily remove children from the home of their parents or
    guardians . . . when the child's best interests are not secured
    by their parents who are in need of services[.]"                             
    Ibid. (citing N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12).
    The     Division    may    accomplish           this    by     "identif[ying]     and
    approv[ing]       a    child's    placement        with        a    resource    family    to
    provide day-to-day care."              Ibid.; and see N.J.S.A. 30:4C-26(a)
    ("Whenever the circumstances of a child are such that his needs
    cannot    be    adequately       met   in    his       own    home,    the   division    may
    4
    Kara and Kevin did not file briefs.
    13                                   A-4847-12T1
    effect his placement in a resource family home, with or without
    payment of board . . . .") (emphasis added).                  A "resource family
    parent" is any person "with whom a child in the care, custody or
    guardianship       of   the     [Division]    is    placed   .   .    .   for    care."
    N.J.S.A. 30:4C-27.1.5             Resource family parents are entitled to
    notice of and a right to be heard at any court review or hearing
    involving the child.            N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12.2; and see 
    D.P., supra
    ,
    422 N.J. Super. at 594 (noting this notice provision reflects
    the   Legislature's        recognition       of    "the    vital     role   resource
    parents     play[,]       [p]articularly          recognizing      their    superior
    knowledge     of    the    child's     physical      and     emotional      status");
    N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.19a (requiring notice to resource family parents
    of all proceedings brought under Title Nine).
    In    enacting      the    Resource     Family      Parent     Licensing        Act
    (RFPLA), N.J.S.A. 30:4C-27.3 to -27.15, the Legislature declared
    "it [was] in the public interest to license resource family
    parents and regulate resource family homes in order to ensure
    the safety, health and proper development of children placed in
    resource family care."           N.J.S.A. 30:4C-27.4.         Under the RFPLA, a
    "'[r]esource family parent' means a person who has been licensed
    . . . to provide resource family care . . . ."                       N.J.S.A. 30:4C-
    5
    We have frequently substituted "the Division" for                                  the
    Department of Children and Families (DCP) throughout                                  our
    discussion of the statutory and regulatory scheme.
    14                                     A-4847-12T1
    27.5.   Therefore, "[a] person shall not provide resource family
    care to a child unless the person is licensed," and is "of good
    moral character."   N.J.S.A. 30:4C-27.6(a),(c).
    N.J.S.A. 30:4C-27.9 provides that a license may be denied
    "for good cause, including, but not limited to":
    a. . . . ;
    b. . . . ;
    c. The conviction of a[n] . . . applicant or
    any adult member of the . . . applicant's
    household   of  a   crime  enumerated  under
    [N.J.S.A.] 30:4C-26.8);
    d. A determination that an incident of child
    abuse or neglect by a[n] . . . applicant or
    any adult member of the . . . applicant's
    household has been substantiated, except
    that the department may issue the license if
    the department determines that the . . .
    applicant or adult household member poses no
    continuing risk of harm to the child and the
    issuance of the license is in the child's
    best interests;
    . . . .
    i. Any conduct, engaged in or permitted,
    which   adversely  affects   or  presents a
    serious hazard to the education, health,
    safety, general well-being or physical,
    emotional and social development of the
    child residing in the resource family home,
    or which otherwise fails to comply with the
    standards required for the provision of
    resource family care to a child and the
    maintenance of a resource family home.
    [And see N.J.A.C. 10:122C-2.5(b).]
    15                       A-4847-12T1
    While    the     RFPLA     seemingly         leaves     licensure   to    the
    discretion     of    the   Division,    subject      to     disqualification    for
    "good cause," the Legislature spoke more emphatically elsewhere
    in Title 30.        Thus, "[a] person shall be disqualified from being
    a resource family parent . . . if that person or any adult
    residing in that person's household" was convicted of any of
    several listed offenses, including "domestic violence pursuant
    to   [N.J.S.A.]      2C:25-17    et    seq."        N.J.S.A.     30:4C-26.8(d)(9)
    (emphasis added); and see N.J.A.C. 10:122C-2.5(a) (same).
    Before   denying     a    license,     the    Division    must   notify   the
    applicant and afford an "opportunity to be heard and . . .
    contest the department's action."              N.J.S.A. 30:4C-27.10.       Review
    of the Division's decision is by way of appeal to this court.
    N.J.S.A. 30:4C-27.11.
    However, Title 30 contemplates that the Division may place
    a child with a relative who is not a resource family parent, nor
    wishes to become one.           For example, under the Child Placement
    Review Act (the CPRA), N.J.S.A. 30:4C-50 to -65 (the CPRA), the
    definition of a "'[c]hild placed outside his home' . . . does
    not include a child placed by the court in the home of a person
    related to the child who does not receive any payment from the
    [D]ivision for the care of the child[.]"                    N.J.S.A. 30:4C-52(b).
    Under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12.2, the right to notice of all hearings
    16                                A-4847-12T1
    involving a child in the Division's "care or custody" extends
    not just to the child's "resource family parent," but also to a
    "relative providing care for the chil[d]."                      And see N.J.S.A.
    30:4C-54 (requiring that written notice of proceedings following
    a voluntary placement agreement must be given to "the child's
    caretaker,"       whether    "a     resource    family       parent,      preadoptive
    parent or relative") (emphasis added).
    The   distinction      between       placement    with       a    relative      and
    placement with a licensed resource family parent is made clear
    by    N.J.S.A.    30:4C-12.1,       Title    Thirty's     requirement         that     the
    Division first look to place a child with a relative.                                 That
    statute provides that once the Division accepts a child "in its
    care or custody, including placement," within thirty days it
    "shall initiate a search for relatives who may be willing and
    able to provide the care and support required by the child."
    N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12.1(a).             If after conducting an assessment of
    the    "relative's       ability     to   provide      the   care       and     support,
    including placement," ibid., the Division "determines that the
    relative     is   unwilling    and    unable    to     assume   the      care    of    the
    child,"      it   must   inform     the     relative    of    its       determination.
    N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12.1(b).            Notably, one of the things the Division
    must tell the child's relative is "that termination of parental
    17                                    A-4847-12T1
    rights may occur if the child remains in resource family care
    for more than six months[.]"          N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12.1(b)(3).
    Similar      distinctions    are    implicit      in   Title   Nine.     For
    example, following a dispositional hearing, see N.J.S.A. 9:6-
    8.51,   "the    court   may   place    [a]   child    in   the   custody   of   a
    relative or other suitable person or the division . . . ."
    N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.54(a) (emphasis added).               As the Court has noted,
    "[a]lthough 'placement' is not defined in Title Nine, . . . the
    Legislature intended to include a non-custodial parent . . . as
    'a relative or other suitable person' with whom the Division was
    authorized to place the child."              N.J. Div. of Youth & Family
    Servs. v. G.M., 
    198 N.J. 382
    , 403 (2009) (quoting N.J.S.A. 9:6-
    8.54(a)).      N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.19a requires notice of all Title Nine
    proceedings be given to "the child's resource family parent or
    relative    providing     care   for     the   child,      as    applicable[.]"
    (emphasis added).
    We conclude that under both Title Nine and Title Thirty,
    the Legislature intended that the court have the authority to
    place a child with an appropriate relative, independent of any
    licensing decision made by the Division.
    Under the broad authority conveyed by the Legislature in
    Title 30, the Division has adopted a comprehensive regulatory
    scheme governing the removal of a child after a placement is
    18                              A-4847-12T1
    made.        For    example,    N.J.A.C.     10:122E-1.1       provides    that     "the
    Division has the discretionary authority to remove a child in
    placement      from    a   resource     family    home    at    any   time    with   or
    without the consent of the resource family parent, parent or
    child in placement."             In emergent situations, "[t]he Division
    representative shall remove a child in placement from a resource
    family home when the Division determines that the child is not
    safe    in    the    resource    family     home."       N.J.A.C.     10:122E-2.1(a)
    (emphasis added).
    In "non-emergency situations," the Division "may remove a
    child    in    placement"        for    a   variety      of    reasons,      including
    "documented         evidence     that   the      resource      family     engages    in
    behavior[] which is detrimental to any child in placement in
    that    resource        family     home."          N.J.A.C.      10:122E-2.2(a)(3)
    (emphasis added).          Prior to a non-emergent removal, the Division
    "shall" conduct interviews of the child and the resource family
    parent and shall also inform the child, the resource family
    parent and the parent "at least [thirty] days prior" to the
    removal, "or as soon as possible when a court order is being
    followed."         N.J.A.C. 10:122E-2.3(a) and (b).
    Whether in an "emergency [or] non-emergency situation[],"
    the Division "shall consider" a variety of "points when deciding
    whether to remove a child in placement."                        N.J.A.C. 10:122E-
    19                                A-4847-12T1
    2.5(a).       One of these is "[t]he resource family's history with
    the Division . . . ."            N.J.A.C. 10:122E-2.5(a)(7).
    When    a   child       is    removed       or       will   be    removed      from     a
    placement,      the    Division       must       provide      notice     of    its    actions.
    N.J.A.C. 10:122E-2.6.                Relevant to this case, "[t]he Division
    representative        shall      notify      .     .    .    the   family      part    of    the
    Chancery Division of the Superior Court, and the child's Law
    Guardian . . . when there is a change in placement of any child
    in    placement    known        to   the     court."          N.J.A.C.        10:122E-2.6(c)
    (emphasis added).          "If there is a difference of opinion between
    the    resource       family     parent      and       the    Division        representative
    regarding the removal," the Division "shall inform the resource
    family parent" of his or her right to an administrative appeal.
    N.J.A.C. 10:122E-2.6(e).
    B.
    We   have   in     the    past      discussed         the   tension      between      the
    Division's statutory and regulatory authority, and the court's
    inherent parens patriae jurisdiction over children who are wards
    of the court pursuant to Title 30.                          In In re E.M.B., 348 N.J.
    Super. 31, 32-33 (App. Div. 2001), we reviewed orders from the
    Family      Part   that     directed         the       Division     to    develop      a     new
    placement plan subsequent to a termination of parental rights.
    The dispute there centered on whether the Division's permanency
    20                                      A-4847-12T1
    plan   –   foster   parent    adoption    —   or   an   alternative   plan     —
    adoption    by   the   maternal    grandparents     —   better    served    the
    child's best interests.           
    Id. at 33.
          The Division argued on
    appeal that the court lacked jurisdiction to modify a placement
    after a termination of parental rights; it also contended that
    the grandparents' sole means of challenge was an administrative
    appeal.    
    Id. at 42.
       We rejected both arguments concluding
    that the statutory scheme for review of a
    permanent   placement   plan   by    the   child
    placement review board and the Family Part,
    as provided in the [CPRA], cannot be
    transmogrified into an administrative agency
    review process, effectuated through a change
    in the permanency planning goal by [the
    Division] that essentially coincided with
    the decision to terminate the parental
    rights   of   the   birth    parents    in   the
    guardianship case. Moreover, the [CPRA]
    contemplates an independent judicial review
    of [the Division's] permanency placement
    plan, separate and apart from any rights the
    grandparents may possess to contest the
    internal administrative decision of [the
    Division].
    [Id. at 48 (emphasis added).]
    In another CPRA case, In re 
    C.R., supra
    , 364 N.J. Super. at
    266, the controversy centered upon the Division's refusal to
    consider placement of a child in a home in which three of her
    siblings    already     had   been    adopted      because   of   regulatory
    "population limitation[s]."
    [T]he Family Part judge determined that he
    lacked   jurisdiction  to   entertain  the
    21                               A-4847-12T1
    dispute, concluding that [the Division]
    ha[d] sole discretion in placing children in
    foster care and moving them from one foster
    home   to   another,  subject   to  internal
    Division review and administrative appeal,
    and subject to judicial review only in the
    Appellate Division.
    [Id. at 267.]
    We ultimately rejected arguments made by the Division, similar
    to those it advances now, and concluded
    [Division]   policy   cannot   supercede   the
    paramount authority of the Family Part,
    imbued with its traditional parens patriae
    responsibility and vested by the Legislature
    with the task of finally approving the
    permanency   placement   plans   of   children
    removed from their homes.      If the Family
    Part   possesses    the  responsibility    and
    authority to approve such plans, . . . it
    follows logically that when a bona fide
    dispute   is   presented   by   parties   with
    standing,   between competing plans that are
    reasonably plausible, it is the Family Part
    that must resolve the dispute.
    [Id. at 283.]
    II.
    We   return   to   this   case.          Initially,     we    reject    the
    Division's   argument    that       the    Family    Part's   review    of    its
    placement decision violates the separation of powers clause of
    the   Constitution.      As   the    preceding      discussion     reveals,   the
    Family Part has the inherent jurisdiction to review placement
    decisions made by the Division with respect to a child who has
    been made a ward of the court.
    22                            A-4847-12T1
    Indeed, the Division's own regulatory scheme anticipates
    such a result.           N.J.A.C. 10:122E-2.6(c) requires that "[t]he
    Division representative shall notify . . . the family part of
    the Chancery Division of the Superior Court, and the child's Law
    Guardian . . . when there is a change in placement of any child
    in placement known to the court."                   It would be nonsensical and
    contrary to the regulatory scheme to require the Division to
    provide notice, yet deny the Family Part judge an opportunity to
    assess whether a change in placement was in the child's best
    interest.
    In our opinion, the judge's frustration with the Division's
    failure     to     abide      by      its    own    regulations      was      entirely
    understandable.          The Division's decision to remove Tommy from
    Carl and Charlotte's home was done without any notice to the
    court, and it is unclear whether any notice was provided to the
    affected parties as required by the regulations.
    Having said that, we agree with the Division that the judge
    could   not    require     it    to    pay   Carl   and     Charlotte    as   licensed
    resource      parents.        The     Legislature     has    determined       that   the
    licensing of resource parent homes is delegated to the broad
    regulatory       power   of     the   Division.       Denial    of   a   license      is
    subject to administrative review as outlined above.
    23                                A-4847-12T1
    "Courts have only a limited role to play in reviewing the
    actions of other branches of government."                       In re Musick, Dep't
    of Corrections, 
    143 N.J. 206
    , 216 (1996).                         "[O]ur review is
    circumscribed, lest we violate the Constitution's separation of
    powers."     In re Veto of Minutes of New Jersey Racing Comm'n, 429
    N.J.    Super.    277,    291    (App.      Div.       2012)    (citation      omitted),
    certif.    denied,      
    214 N.J. 116
      (2013).        We    find    no    authority
    suggesting       that    the    Family      Part's      jurisdiction      to    resolve
    disputes over the placement of children already deemed wards of
    the court permits the judge to compel the Division to grant a
    license to a particular home.
    Notably,    in    
    C.R., supra
    ,         364    N.J.    Super.   at     283,   we
    specifically did not resolve whether the Division's placement
    plan, or the alternative proposed by the adoptive parents of the
    child's siblings, should prevail.                      Instead, we held that the
    Family Part "shall consider the matter from a clean slate."
    
    Ibid. As such, we
    did not conclude that the Division's refusal
    to grant a waiver of its occupancy guidelines was improper.6
    In sum, while we agree that the Family Part had inherent
    jurisdiction to review the Division's decision to remove Tommy
    from Carl and Charlotte's home, we reverse that part of the
    6
    Additionally, in C.R., we stayed the adoptive parents'
    administrative appeal pending resolution of the remand in the
    Family 
    Part. 364 N.J. Super. at 283-84
    .
    24                                  A-4847-12T1
    order that required the Division to treat the child's return to
    Carl and Charlotte's home as a "paid resource placement."
    III.
    While   the    judge    properly      exercised        his     jurisdiction        in
    deciding Tommy's best interests were served by his continued
    placement with Carl and Charlotte, we conclude he failed to
    appropriately       consider     all   relevant           statutory    and    regulatory
    factors.       We    therefore       reverse    the       order     requiring    Tommy's
    continued      placement      with    Carl     and    Charlotte       and    remand    the
    matter for further proceedings consistent with the balance of
    this opinion.
    Initially, we address the judge's stated concern regarding
    "the    treatment     of   domestic      violence          findings    and     how    that
    pertains to the Division's ability to license a home."                               While
    the Division's licensing decision is beyond the purview of the
    Family Part's review, it is quite clear that the Legislature,
    not    the   Division,     has   concluded           no    person    may     serve   as   a
    resource family parent "if that person or any adult residing in
    that person's household ever committed a crime that resulted in
    a conviction for" a variety of enumerated offenses, including
    "domestic violence."          N.J.S.A. 30:4C-26.8(d)(9).
    In 1999, the Legislature amended Title 30 to include this
    "domestic violence" disqualifier as part of an overall effort to
    25                                     A-4847-12T1
    "conform State law to the provisions of the federal 'Adoption
    and Safe Families Act of 1997,' (ASFA)[,] Pub.L. 105-89."                               Bill
    Statement    to    S.     1705    (1999);       L.       1999,    c.   53,   § 34.       The
    Legislature       noted    that    "ASFA     .       .    .    prohibits     approval    of
    applicants    who       have     committed       certain          crimes[,]"    and     the
    amendment was intended "to identify . . . specific crimes that
    prohibit approval."         
    Ibid. ASFA requires a
    state receiving federal funding to
    provide procedures . . . , including
    procedures requiring that . . . in any case
    involving a child on whose behalf such
    payments are to be so made in which a record
    check reveals a felony conviction for child
    abuse or neglect, for spousal abuse, for a
    crime against children (including child
    pornography), or for a crime involving
    violence, including rape, sexual assault, or
    homicide, but not including other physical
    assault or battery, if a State finds that a
    court   of    competent   jurisdiction   has
    determined that the felony was committed at
    any time, such final approval shall not be
    granted[.]
    [42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a)(20) (emphasis added).]
    The language used by Congress in enacting ASFA does not fit our
    existing Criminal Code with precision.                         For example, ASFA uses
    the term "felony conviction."               
    Ibid. However, the adoption
    of
    the New Jersey Criminal Code in 1979 (the Code) eliminated the
    use of the terms "felonies" or "misdemeanors."                         N.J.S.A. 2C:1-4.
    26                                    A-4847-12T1
    Nor does the Code include a specific offense labeled "spousal
    abuse."
    This    imprecision       carried        forward     somewhat      when      the
    Legislature passed the 1999 amendments to Title Thirty.                        All of
    the   disqualifiers        listed    in    N.J.S.A.      30:4C-26.8(d)       involve
    convictions        for   offenses    defined    as   crimes    under     the    Code,
    except subsection (9), which involves domestic violence.
    Proceedings        brought     under     the   Prevention     of    Domestic
    Violence     Act    (PDVA)   N.J.S.A.     2C:25-17    to    -35,   are    civil      in
    nature, and the burden of proof is by a preponderance of the
    evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt, the standard required
    for a criminal conviction.             J.D. v. M.D.F., 
    207 N.J. 458
    , 474
    (2011); Crespo v. Crespo, 
    408 N.J. Super. 25
    , 40 (App. Div.
    2009).     Under the PDVA, "domestic violence" is defined as the
    "occurrence of one or more" predicate "acts."                   N.J.S.A. 2C:25-
    19(a).     While all domestic violence predicate acts are offenses
    under the Code, they are not all crimes.                     See e.g., N.J.S.A.
    2C:25-19(a)(13)          (defining     harassment,         generally     a      petty
    disorderly persons offense, see N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, as a predicate
    act of domestic violence).
    "Although committing one of the predicate acts may also
    expose the offender to criminal prosecution, the Act did not
    create a new class of criminal offenses[.]"                    
    J.D., supra
    , 207
    27                                 A-4847-12T1
    N.J.    at    474    (citations      omitted).       Separate    from    the     relief
    available to a plaintiff in a hearing under the PDVA, N.J.S.A.
    2C:25-27 provides that "[w]hen a defendant is found guilty of a
    crime or offense involving domestic violence," the court may
    impose restrictions on the defendant's ability to contact the
    victim as "a condition of sentence."                 See 
    J.D., supra
    , 
    207 N.J. 474
    .
    The judge here seemingly concluded that because an action
    under the PDVA is civil in nature, the exclusion from licensing
    contained      in    N.J.S.A.     30:4C-26.8(d)(9)        did    not    apply.        We
    disagree.
    In enacting the PDVA, the Legislature declared
    that domestic violence is a serious crime
    against society;      . . . that there is a
    positive correlation between spousal abuse
    and child abuse; and that children, even
    when they are not themselves physically
    assaulted, suffer deep and lasting emotional
    effects from exposure to domestic violence.
    [N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18 (emphasis added).]
    Additionally, the Court has said "there is no such thing as an
    act    of    domestic   violence      that   is    not   serious."       Brennan      v.
    Orban, 
    145 N.J. 282
    , 298 (1996).                  In our view, the Legislature
    determined that "spousal abuse" as used in AFSA, should include
    all    offenses      listed     in    the    PDVA,   whether     crimes    or      not.
    Moreover,      the    Legislature      determined     that   a   "conviction"        for
    28                                 A-4847-12T1
    domestic    violence     necessarily       required       the    rejection      of    any
    resource parent license application.                     While an actor is not
    "convicted" of domestic violence under the Code, we believe the
    Legislature clearly intended that entry of a final restraining
    order under the PDVA, which necessarily presumes a finding that
    the defendant committed an act of domestic violence, meets the
    requirements for disqualification under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-26.8(d).
    This is the only interpretation consistent with both an implicit
    purpose of Title Thirty's licensing provisions, and a stated
    purpose of the PDVA, i.e., to insure to the extent possible that
    a child will not suffer the "deep and lasting emotional effects
    from exposure to domestic violence."               N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18.
    In this case, however, there was no final restraining order
    issued    against   Carl      as    a   result    of     the    incident   in      2004.
    Although    the   statutory        prohibition     did    not    apply,    the     judge
    still should have considered all the facts and circumstances
    surrounding the 2004 incident in deciding whether Tommy's best
    interests favored his return.             Although the events occurred nine
    years    earlier,   they      involved    a     violent    expression      of    Carl's
    anger    that   arose,   in    part,     from    the   family     dynamics       in   the
    household at the time.          On remand, the judge should consider all
    of the circumstances surrounding the 2004 incident in deciding
    29                                    A-4847-12T1
    whether placement with Carl and Charlotte is in Tommy's best
    interests.
    The        judge   also      expressed      concern        as    to     "whether     a
    substantiation [of neglect], in and of itself, would require the
    removal of a child because the Division could not license a
    home."      Under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-27.9, the Division is authorized to
    deny a license to an applicant for "good cause."                               Good cause
    includes a finding that "an incident of child abuse or neglect
    . . . has been substantiated."                 N.J.S.A. 30:4C-27.9(d); and see
    N.J.A.C. 10:122C-2.5(b)(7).               However, the Division may issue the
    license if it "determines that the . . . applicant or adult
    household member poses no continuing risk of harm to the child
    and   the    issuance        of    the    license     is    in    the       child's    best
    interests[.]"        
    Ibid. As previously discussed,
           the    judge      may    not    order     the
    Division     to     reach    any   particular        decision     in    exercising       its
    discretion to grant or deny a license in such situation.                                  In
    other words, if the Division concludes there is good cause to
    reject      an     application      for    a     license      based     upon     a    prior
    substantiated finding of abuse or neglect, the Family Part may
    not   compel       the   Division    to    issue     the   license.           However,   in
    ordering a placement, the judge must consider whether the prior
    substantiated finding of abuse or neglect evidences a continuing
    30                                    A-4847-12T1
    risk to the child such that the placement is not in the child's
    best interests.
    In     this      case,        the    judge      seemingly    concluded        that    the
    passage    of       nine      years,     the   lack     of    any     referrals     in    the
    intervening years and Tommy's residence with Carl and Charlotte
    for several months before the Division filed its complaint all
    militated      in    favor        of    returning     Tommy     to    his    grandparents.
    However, on remand, the judge should also consider the serious
    nature    of        the       allegations        that    led     to     the      Division's
    substantiation of neglect, and that the incident arose out of
    the family dynamics at the time, and while children, including
    Kara, witnessed the events.
    Lastly,          N.J.S.A.          30:4C-27.9(i)     also        provides     that    the
    Division's denial of a license for good cause may be based upon
    "[a]ny    conduct         .   .   .    which   adversely      affects       or   presents    a
    serious hazard to the education, health, safety, general well-
    being or physical, emotional and social development of the child
    residing in the resource family home . . . ."                               Although this
    reflects the Legislature's determination that certain factors
    should guide the licensing decision, the statute has relevance
    to the court's consideration of any placement.                              The judge did
    not make specific findings regarding the incidents between Carl
    and the caseworkers that allegedly took place during the initial
    31                                   A-4847-12T1
    placement    on   May   10.   On    remand,     the   judge   should     consider
    whether, if true, the reports made by the Division's workers are
    evidential of circumstances that adversely affect Tommy's best
    interests.
    Because       we    are   remanding        the     matter      for    further
    proceedings, we do not consider the Division's argument that the
    judge   abused    his    discretion       in   not    ordering     psychological
    evaluations of Carl and Charlotte.               The Division is free to
    pursue its request at the remand hearing.
    Additionally,       months     have    passed     since   we    granted    the
    Division's motion for leave to appeal.                We have no information
    as to what may have transpired in that intervening time.                         Of
    course, we cannot know whether immediately removing Tommy from
    his maternal grandparents' care pending the remand hearing would
    be in his best interests.           Therefore, despite our decision to
    reverse the June 10 order, we leave that decision to the judge's
    discretion.
    Reversed and remanded.          We do not retain jurisdiction.
    32                                 A-4847-12T1
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-4847-12

Filed Date: 3/20/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021