DCPP VS. L.M.A. AND A.C. IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF A.L.C. AND S.M.C. (FG-07-0157-16, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)(CONSOLIDATED) ( 2018 )


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  •                              RECORD IMPOUNDED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NOS. A-4929-15T3
    A-4931-15T3
    NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD
    PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    L.M.A. and A.C.,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    _________________________________
    IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP
    OF A.L.C. and S.M.C., Minors.
    _________________________________
    Submitted May 15, 2018 – Decided June 11, 2018
    Before Judges Reisner, Hoffman, and Mayer.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County,
    Docket No. FG-07-0157-16.
    Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
    for appellant A.C. (Victor E. Ramos, Assistant
    Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the
    briefs).
    Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
    for appellant L.M.A. (Ruth A. Harrigan,
    Designated Counsel, on the briefs).
    Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney
    for respondent (Jason W. Rockwell, Assistant
    Attorney General, of counsel; Jaclyn Parks and
    Lisa J. Rusciano, Deputy Attorney Generals,
    on the briefs).
    Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law
    Guardian, attorney for minor (Todd Wilson,
    Designated Counsel, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendants L.M.A. (Lisa)1   and A.C. (Anthony), appeal from a
    June 29, 2016 order terminating their parental rights to their
    children A.L.C. (Andrew), born in April 2014, and S.M.C. (Sarah),
    born in April 2015.    Lisa also appeals from a January 16, 2018
    order, entered after a remand from this court, denying her motion
    to vacate the guardianship order pursuant to Rule 4:50-1.         The
    children's Law Guardian, and the Division of Child Protection and
    Permanency (Division), contend that we should affirm the orders
    on appeal.
    After reviewing the record, we affirm the June 29, 2016 order,
    substantially for the reasons stated by Judge Stephen J. Bernstein
    in his oral opinion issued on the same date as the order.      Judge
    Bernstein's factual findings are supported by substantial credible
    evidence, including his evaluation of witness credibility, and
    based on those findings his legal conclusions are correct.
    1
    We use initials and pseudonyms to protect the parties' privacy.
    2                          A-4929-15T3
    Finding no abuse of the trial court's discretion in denying
    Lisa's Rule 4:50-1 motion on remand, we affirm the January 16,
    2018 order substantially for the reasons stated by Judge David B.
    Katz in his opinion of the same date.2
    I
    For purposes of this opinion, we summarize the most pertinent
    trial evidence.      Both defendants have multiple children – with
    multiple partners - in addition to Andrew and Sarah.          Neither
    defendant has been able to care for any of those children; they
    are all either living with another biological parent or in foster
    care.3
    Anthony   has    a   significant   criminal   history   and   was
    incarcerated for over a year while this case was pending.          His
    history includes a 2005 arrest for allegedly molesting a male
    child.   In his testimony at the guardianship trial, Anthony did
    not deny touching the child inappropriately, although he asserted
    that the charges were dropped because there was no "penetration"
    2
    Because Judge Bernstein was unavailable to handle the remand
    within the time frame set forth in our remand order, the case was
    reassigned to Judge Katz.
    3
    As noted later in this opinion, defendants had a third child
    together after the Division obtained custody of Andrew and Sarah.
    The Division filed a separate guardianship action concerning that
    child, which resulted in termination of defendants' parental
    rights.
    3                         A-4929-15T3
    and the parents did not cooperate with the prosecution.      Anthony
    also admitted beating one of Lisa's other children with a belt,
    although he denied the child's allegation that Anthony punched
    him.    Significantly, Anthony also has a documented history of
    domestic violence.     He admitted assaulting his ex-wife, and he
    admitted assaulting Lisa when some of their children were present.
    At the time of the guardianship trial, Anthony had no concrete
    plans to parent his children.    Instead, he planned to move out of
    state and reunite with his ex-wife.4         The Division presented
    unrebutted expert testimony that Anthony was not a psychologically
    fit parent and had no bond with the children.       The trial judge
    credited that testimony.
    The record supports the conclusion that Lisa was unable or
    unwilling to protect the children from Anthony, and she was
    unwilling to end their relationship.        Initially, she abetted
    Anthony in his efforts to conceal his identity and thus conceal
    his criminal record, including the 2005 sexual assault charge and
    convictions for aggravated assault and weapons possession.     Later,
    she minimized and denied his acts of domestic violence, and brought
    4
    In his trial testimony, Anthony asserted that, in the
    alternative, he might move with the children to Ohio, using money
    he would purportedly obtain from cooperating with criminal law
    enforcement authorities.     The trial court later described
    Anthony's plans as "pie in the sky."
    4                           A-4929-15T3
    the children to visit Anthony despite a court order that he have
    no   contact   with   them.   She   lied   about   her   own   continued
    relationship with Anthony, even concealing the fact that she had
    another child (Anna) with him, after telling the Division that
    their relationship was over.5
    Lisa also failed to deal with her drug problems. She attended
    several drug treatment programs but relapsed in January 2016.
    Thereafter, even as the June 2016 trial approached, she repeatedly
    tested positive for drugs, including oxycodone, oxymorphone, and
    marijuana.     She gave birth to Anna, her sixth child, on April 20,
    2016, and tested positive for marijuana at the birth.
    Some additional details will further illustrate Anthony and
    Lisa's toxic relationship and Lisa's inability to protect the
    children.    On August 8, 2014, Anthony brutally attacked Lisa.       The
    police found Lisa wandering in the street with one of her older
    children and Andrew, who was then a baby.      Lisa was bleeding and
    bruised.     She had a bite mark on her face, and bruises and bite
    marks on her body. Nonetheless, Lisa initially denied that Anthony
    had assaulted her and refused to sign a complaint.             She later
    refused to acknowledge to the Division that their relationship was
    5
    Anthony participated in the deception as well, denying that
    Anna was his child until the court ordered him to take a paternity
    test. We granted the Division's motion to supplement the record
    with that information.
    5                            A-4929-15T3
    marked by domestic violence, and she repeatedly refused to attend
    domestic violence counseling.        In October 2014, the Division
    obtained custody of Andrew and all of the other children living
    with Lisa, due to evidence of a continuing pattern of domestic
    violence and Lisa's persistent failure to keep Anthony away from
    the children.
    Despite a court order precluding Anthony from having contact
    with any of the couple's children, when Lisa was eventually allowed
    unsupervised visitation with the children, she brought them to
    visit Anthony at a halfway house where he was incarcerated.      She
    then denied doing this, until the Division confronted her with the
    institution's security video showing that she was present with the
    children.
    When Lisa became pregnant with Sarah, she tried to conceal
    the pregnancy from the Division. Due to concerns about the child's
    safety, the agency took custody of Sarah on April 29, 2015, three
    days after her birth.
    Lisa's pattern of deception continued as the case was pending.
    During a February 22, 2016 psychological evaluation with Dr.
    Singer, Lisa minimized her drug problem and denied that she was
    pregnant.   At that time, Dr. Singer recommended that the Division
    give Lisa another four months to address her problems.    When the
    Division notified Dr. Singer that Lisa had relapsed into drug use,
    6                          A-4929-15T3
    and that she recently had a sixth child while testing positive for
    marijuana, he recommended a re-evaluation.      Dr. Singer's second
    evaluation, on May 19, 2016, led to his recommendation that Lisa
    was unable to safely parent Andrew and Sarah.   Notably, Dr. Singer
    opined that, even if Lisa successfully completed a drug treatment
    program, she would need at least a year of complete sobriety before
    she could possibly safely regain custody of the children.        Dr.
    Singer also testified that Lisa suffered from depression and
    appeared to be self-medicating with illegal drugs instead of taking
    her prescribed psychiatric medication.
    Sarah has been living in foster care since two days after she
    was born.    On April 4, 2016, a few months before the guardianship
    trial began, she was moved to the same resource home where Andrew
    was living.    Sarah has no parent-child relationship with either
    Lisa or Anthony.    She was still a baby when Dr. Singer performed
    a bonding evaluation with the resource parents        in 2016, but
    according to Dr. Singer, she had the beginning of a bond with
    them. She has now lived with the resource family for an additional
    two years.
    Andrew has been with the same resource family since 2014, and
    they have become his psychological parents.       According to Dr.
    Singer, although Andrew has a bond with Lisa, it is not the same
    as his parent-child connection with the resource parents.       They
    7                         A-4929-15T3
    could mitigate any harm that would occur if Lisa's parental rights
    to Andrew were terminated.        Anthony was incarcerated or subject
    to a no-contact order for most of Andrew's life, and Andrew has
    no parent-child relationship with him.
    In his oral opinion, Judge Bernstein found that the Division
    had satisfied the four prongs of the best interests test, N.J.S.A.
    30:4C-15.1(a), and that termination of defendants' parental rights
    was in the children's best interests. He found that the children's
    need for a stable and permanent home was paramount and neither
    parent could provide that home.
    The judge found that Anthony was Lisa's "kryptonite" – a
    destructive force in her life – but she could not disentangle
    herself from the relationship.           He also found that Lisa was
    persistently   deceptive,   and    her    refusal    to   acknowledge    her
    problems stymied the Division's many attempts to provide her with
    services.   The judge accepted Dr. Singer's opinion that Lisa could
    not safely act as a parent and was unlikely to be able to do so
    in the future.
    The judge likewise found that Anthony could not safely parent
    the   children.    He   found   that     Anthony    had   no   parent-child
    relationship with the children, and had no realistic plan to care
    for them.   The judge also found that Anthony could not safely care
    for the children due to his lack of stability, his history of
    8                               A-4929-15T3
    violent conduct, and his failure to cooperate with the Division's
    multiple efforts to provide him with drug treatment.
    II
    To obtain termination of parental rights, the Division must
    satisfy all four prongs of the following test:
    (1) The child's safety, health or development
    has been or will continue to be endangered by
    the parental relationship;
    (2)   The parent is unwilling or unable to
    eliminate the harm facing the child or is
    unable or unwilling to provide a safe and
    stable home for the child and the delay of
    permanent placement will add to the harm.
    Such harm may include evidence that separating
    the child from his resource family parents
    would cause serious and enduring emotional or
    psychological harm to the child;
    (3) The Division has made reasonable efforts
    to provide services to help the parent correct
    the circumstances which led to the child's
    placement outside the home and the court has
    considered alternatives to termination of
    parental rights; and
    (4) Termination of parental rights will not
    do more harm than good.
    [N.J.S.A. 30:4C:15.1(a).]
    These four prongs are neither discrete nor separate, but
    overlap "to provide a comprehensive standard that identifies a
    child's best interests."         N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v.
    F.M.,   
    211 N.J. 420
    ,   448   (2012)       (citation    omitted);      In   re
    Guardianship      of   K.H.O.,      
    161 N.J. 337
    ,    348   (1999).    "The
    9                               A-4929-15T3
    considerations involved are extremely fact sensitive and require
    particularized       evidence       that         address[es]       the    specific
    circumstances in the given case."                N.J. Div. of Youth & Family
    Servs. v. R.G., 
    217 N.J. 527
    , 554 (2014) (citation omitted)
    (alteration in original).           The Division must prove by clear and
    convincing evidence all four statutory prongs.                   
    Ibid.
    Our    review   of     the   Family     Part      judge's    decision     in    a
    guardianship case is limited.              R.G., 217 N.J. at 552.             "[T]he
    trial court's factual findings should be upheld when supported by
    adequate, substantial, and credible evidence."                   Ibid.   We accord
    deference   to    factual    findings       of   the   Family     Part   given    its
    "superior ability to gauge the credibility of the witnesses who
    testify before it and because it possesses special expertise in
    matters related to the family."             F.M., 211 N.J. at 448.         We will
    not overturn a family court's findings unless they were "so wide
    of the mark that the judge was clearly mistaken."                    N.J. Div. of
    Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L., 
    191 N.J. 596
    , 605 (2007).
    We will not disturb a trial court's ruling on a Rule 4:50-1
    motion, absent "a clear abuse of discretion."                      Hous. Auth. of
    Morristown v. Little, 
    135 N.J. 274
    , 283 (1994).
    III
    On    this   appeal,    Lisa    presents       the   following      points     of
    argument:
    10                                    A-4929-15T3
    POINT I:     THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ITS
    CONCLUSION THAT TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
    WAS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILDREN
    BECAUSE THE FOUR PRONGS OF THE BEST INTERESTS
    TEST WERE NOT PROVEN BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING
    EVIDENCE.
    (A)
    REVERSAL IS WARRANTED BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE
    PRESENTED DID NOT SUPPORT THE LOWER COURT'S
    CONCLUSION THAT ANDREW AND SUSAN'S SAFETY,
    HEALTH OR DEVELOPMENT WAS OR WILL CONTINUE TO
    BE ENDANGERED BY THE PARENTAL RELATIONSHIP.
    (B)
    THE COURT'S CONCLUSIONS THAT LISA WAS UNABLE
    OR UNWILLING TO ELIMINATE THE HARM FACING HER
    CHILDREN AND UNWILLING OR UNABLE TO PROVIDE A
    SAFE   AND  STABLE   HOME  ENVIRONMENT   WERE
    ERRONEOUS.
    (C)
    THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN HIS DETERMINATION
    THAT DCPP SATISFIED THE REASONABLE EFFORTS
    STANDARD BECAUSE IT FAILED TO PROVIDE SERVICES
    THAT   WERE    REASONABLE   UNDER    ALL   THE
    CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE COURT DID NOT EXPLORE
    ALTERNATIVES TO TERMINATION.
    1.   THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN HIS
    DETERMINATION      THAT      DCPP'S
    UNREASONABLE      COOKIE     CUTTER
    APPROACH,   RATHER   THAN  TAILORED
    SERVICES, SATISFIED THE THIRD PRONG
    OF THE TEST.
    2.   THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN HIS
    DETERMINATION THAT DCPP SATISFIED
    THE THIRD PRONG OF THE BEST INTEREST
    TEST BECAUSE IT PROVIDED SERVICES
    THAT WERE NOT APPROPRIATE UNDER THE
    CIRCUMSTANCES AND THAT VIOLATED THE
    11                          A-4929-15T3
    PROVISIONS OF THE AMERICANS WITH
    DISABILITIES ACT. (
    42 U.S.C. § 12101
    ET SEQ.) (NOT RAISED BELOW)
    3. THE TRIAL JUDGE FAILED TO MAKE
    A    DETERMINATION    THAT   DCPP
    CONSIDERED     ALTERNATIVES    TO
    TERMINATION.
    (D)
    REVERSAL IS WARRANTED BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE
    PRESENTED DID NOT SUPPORT THE LOWER COURT'S
    CONCLUSION THAT TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
    WOULD NOT DO MORE HARM THAN GOOD.
    We   decline   to   address   Lisa's   arguments   directed   to   the
    Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 12101
     to 12213,
    because they were not presented to the trial court.          See Zaman v.
    Felton, 
    219 N.J. 199
    , 226-27 (2014).         However, even if we consider
    the arguments they are without merit, because the Division's
    failure to comply with the ADA is not a defense to a guardianship
    action.    See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.G., 
    344 N.J. Super. 418
    , 442 (App. Div. 2001).          Lisa's related argument, that
    the   Division   failed    to   provide    services   "tailored"    to   her
    psychological needs, was not supported by any expert                or lay
    testimony.    In fact, Lisa did not present any witnesses at the
    trial.
    Contrary to Lisa's arguments, substantial credible evidence
    supports the judge's findings as to the first three prongs of the
    best interests test. Lisa contends that the Division did not do
    12                             A-4929-15T3
    enough to convince her to attend domestic violence counseling.              We
    disagree.    The Division repeatedly referred Lisa for counseling.
    She chose not to attend.       The agency is not required to force a
    parent to accept services.         Lisa attempts to present her drug
    problems in a positive light by arguing that she was "making
    progress toward sobriety" at the time of the trial.                 However,
    viewed in the light most pertinent to her children's welfare, even
    as the trial date approached she was still abusing oxycodone and
    other drugs and was not able to safely parent the children.
    The    record    also   supports    a   finding   that   the   Division
    appropriately considered possible relative placements.                A few
    months before the trial, Lisa put forth her mother as a possible
    alternate placement.      At that point, Andrew had been with the same
    resource family for nearly four years, and Sarah was thriving in
    the same pre-adoptive home.          There was no evidence that the
    grandmother was ready, willing or able to adopt the children.
    Likewise,       substantial   credible    evidence   supports     Judge
    Bernstein's finding that the Division satisfied the fourth prong
    of the best interests standard.              Lisa's appellate arguments,
    presented prior to the remand, are without sufficient merit to
    warrant further discussion.        R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
    Lisa's post-remand arguments, relating to her Rule 4:50-1
    motion, are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion beyond
    13                               A-4929-15T3
    that set forth in the trial court's opinion and these brief
    additional comments.     Her belated completion of a drug treatment
    program and an eight-session domestic violence program does not
    warrant vacating the order terminating her parental rights to
    these children.    There is no evidence that Lisa has made the kind
    of   dramatic   turnaround      in   her   life,    as   occurred    in    In    re
    Guardianship of J.N.H., 
    172 N.J. 440
     (2002).
    As importantly, unlike the child in J.N.H., there is no
    evidence that Andrew and Sarah are suffering from severe adjustment
    problems in foster placement.         
    Id. at 479-80
    .      At the time of the
    guardianship    trial,   both    children    were    thriving   in    a    stable
    placement with resource parents who were committed to adopting
    them.   Lisa presented no evidence that those circumstances have
    changed.    Hence, there was no basis to re-visit the trial court's
    original findings as to the children's best interests.               
    Ibid.
          Nor
    was there a need to hold a plenary hearing on the remand.                        As
    Judge Katz noted, after a recent guardianship trial involving yet
    another of Lisa's children, the court terminated her parental
    rights despite the current evidence of her drug treatment and DV
    classes.
    IV
    In his appeal, Anthony presents the following points of
    argument:
    14                                  A-4929-15T3
    I. TERMINATION OF A.C.'S PARENTAL RIGHTS WAS
    NOT WARRANTED UNDER THE "BEST INTERESTS TEST"
    OF N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1A.
    A. The Court Erred In Deeming The First Prong
    Of The Test Satisfied By Clear And Convincing
    Evidence Where A.L.C. Was Not Endangered By
    The Circumstances That Resulted In His Removal
    And S.M.C. Was Born Several Months Thereafter,
    Where The Basis Of A.C.'S Incarceration Would
    Not Have Endangered The Children, A.C. Worked
    And Assisted L.M.A. With Household Expenses
    Prior To Incarceration And A.C. Pursued
    Services While Incarcerated.
    B. The Court Erred In Deeming The Second Prong
    Of The Test Satisfied By Clear And Convincing
    Evidence Where A.C. Engaged In Services While
    Incarcerated,    Maintained     Housing    And
    Employment By The Time Of Trial And Provided
    Alternate Permanency Plans For The Two
    Children.
    C. The Court Erred In Finding Prong Three Of
    The Test Satisfied Where DCPP Was Aware Of
    Services   Recommended    By   An   Evaluating
    Psychologist But DCPP Did Not Provide, Discuss
    Or Encourage A.C. To Avail Himself Of Those
    Services And Where The Court Failed To
    Consider The Merits Of R.A. As A Potential
    Relative Caretaker.
    1.   The Record Does Not Support a
    Finding That DCPP Made Reasonable
    Efforts to Provide Services to
    Reunify The Family.
    2.   The Record Does Not Establish
    that the Court Below Considered
    Alternatives   to  Termination  of
    Parental Rights.
    D. The Court Erred In Deeming the Fourth Prong
    Satisfied by Clear and Convincing Evidence
    Where The Bonding Evaluation Represented
    15                          A-4929-15T3
    A.C.'S First Contact With His Children in Over
    a Year, DCPP's Expert Could Not Conclude a
    Bond Existed Between S.M.C. and the Foster
    Parents, And the Expert Prioritized Parenting
    Capacity, Which A.C. Had Clearly Demonstrated,
    Above the Bonding Evaluation.
    Those contentions are without sufficient merit to warrant
    discussion,     beyond   the   following   comments.   See   R.     2:11-
    3(e)(1)(E). Anthony minimizes the extent of his domestic violence,
    which resulted in Andrew being placed in foster care.        Like Lisa,
    Anthony also fails to acknowledge the harmful effect on children
    of remaining in foster care because their parents cannot get their
    lives in order.     See In re Guardianship of D.M.H., 
    161 N.J. 365
    ,
    379 (1999).     He blames the Division for his own failure to take
    advantage of services the Division tried to arrange for him.             To
    the extent that the Division focused greater effort on providing
    services to Lisa, it acted reasonably, because Anthony told the
    Division that he planned to move out of state and let Lisa parent
    the children.
    Affirmed.
    16                             A-4929-15T3