BENEDICT FEJOKU VS. PRUDENTIAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, INC. LINDA GUYDEN VS. LEEDS, MORELLI & BROWN, LLP (L-3393-10 AND L-3571-10, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED) ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1026-15T2
A-1027-15T4
BENEDICT FEJOKU,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PRUDENTIAL LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY OF AMERICA, INC.,
n/k/a PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL,
INC., LEEDS, MORELLI & BROWN,
LLP,1 LENARD LEEDS, STEVEN A.
MORELLI, JEFFREY K. BROWN,
and MARK FABER,
Defendants-Respondents.
________________________________
LINDA GUYDEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant/
Cross-Respondent,
v.
LEEDS, MORELLI & BROWN LLP,
LENARD LEEDS, ESQ., STEVEN A.
MORELLI, ESQ., and JEFFREY K.
BROWN, ESQ.,
Defendants-Respondents/
Cross-Appellants.
1
According to the record, this defendant should be denominated
"Leeds, Morelli & Brown, P.C."
_______________________________________
Argued April 9, 2018 – Decided June 11, 2018
Before Judges Sabatino, Ostrer and Rose.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Bergen County, Docket Nos. L-
3393-10 (A-1026-15) and L-3571-10 (A-1027-
15).
Kenneth S. Thyne argued the cause for
appellant in A-1026-15 (Roper & Thyne, LLC,
attorneys; Kenneth S. Thyne, on the briefs).
Angela M. Roper argued the cause for
appellant/cross-respondent in A-1027-15
(Roper & Thyne, LLC, attorneys; Kenneth S.
Thyne, on the briefs).
Evan H. Krinick (Rivkin Radler, LLP) of the
New York bar, admitted pro hac vice, argued
the cause for respondents Leeds, Morelli &
Brown, PC, Lenard Leeds, Steven A. Morelli,
and Jeffrey K. Brown in A-1026-15 (Rivkin
Radler LLP, attorneys; John J. Robertelli and
Janice J. DiGennaro, on the brief).
Janice J. DiGennaro (Rivkin Radler, LLP) of
the New York bar, admitted pro hac vice,
argued the cause for respondents/cross-
appellants Leeds, Morelli & Brown, PC, Lenard
Leeds, Steven A. Morelli, and Jeffrey K. Brown
in A-1027-15 (Rivkin Radler LLP, attorneys;
John J. Robertelli, Janice J. DiGennaro, and
Michael C. Mulè, on the briefs).
David W. Field and Liza M. Velazquez (Paul,
Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP) of the
New York bar, admitted pro hac vice, argued
the cause for respondents Prudential Life
Insurance Company of America and Mark E. Faber
in A-1026-15 (Lowenstein Sandler LLP and Liza
M. Velazquez and Amy L. Barton (Paul, Weiss,
Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP) of the New
2 A-1026-15T2
York bar, admitted pro hac vice, attorneys;
David W. Field, Liza M. Velazquez, and Amy L.
Barton, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
These related appeals2 by two plaintiffs in this legal
malpractice matter arise out of the broader setting of employment
discrimination claims brought by them individually and by over 300
other employees against Prudential Life Insurance Company of
America. Both plaintiffs ceased being represented by the law firm
("the Leeds firm") that had initially represented them, after
learning the full details of a fee arrangement with Prudential
that rewarded the law firm for steering its clients into
alternative dispute resolution processes.
Ultimately, with the assistance of substitute counsel, and
after moving in federal court to set aside an unfavorable
arbitration ruling, plaintiff Linda Guyden obtained a monetary
settlement from Prudential. Guyden then sued the Leeds firm and
three of its partners in the Law Division, alleging various acts
of malpractice and malfeasance. Plaintiff Benedict Fejoku, who
procured no settlement or favorable outcome on his own
discrimination claims, sued the Leeds firm on similar grounds,
naming Prudential and others as co-defendants. The two lawsuits
2
We consolidate these appeals solely for purposes of this opinion.
3 A-1026-15T2
were administratively assigned to the same trial court vicinage,
along with comparable lawsuits by other former Leeds clients.
In successive rulings, the trial court granted summary
judgment to all defendants, dismissing the lawsuits of both Guyden
and Fejoku. Fundamentally, the court concluded that, by
discontinuing the services of their original law firm (Leeds) long
before their cases had ended, plaintiffs extracted themselves from
the sphere of any initial wrongdoing or malpractice, and thus
could not demonstrate proximate causation of compensable injury.
The court made other various rulings, some of which are challenged
in the present appeals.
For the reasons that follow, we uphold the trial court's
rulings, except we remand for further proceedings solely with
respect to Guyden. On remand, the court shall develop the record
definitively and resolve the critical factual question of whether
Prudential, before settling, offered Guyden the opportunity to set
aside the arbitration award and allow her to litigate her
discrimination claims in court. If such an offer was never made,
then the court's dispositive finding of a lack of sufficient proof
of proximate causation as to Guyden was mistaken, and summary
judgment shall be vacated in her case. If the court on remand
finds there is a genuine factual dispute as to whether such an
4 A-1026-15T2
offer was extended, that factual question shall be resolved by a
jury.
The summary judgment issued against Fejoku, however, is
affirmed. We also uphold the trial court's other challenged
rulings.
I.
In 1999, the Leeds firm entered into a written agreement with
Prudential to attempt to have clients agree to take part in
Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR") processes of mediation and
arbitration, in lieu of litigating their claims in court. 3
Prudential agreed to pay the Leeds firm a non-refundable $5 million
in counsel fees, consisting of a $3.5 million advance, with an
additional $1.5 million to be paid to the firm by August 1999 or
when the first one hundred claims settled. According to
plaintiffs, the Leeds firm did not tell them contemporaneously the
terms of this fee arrangement; they only knew Prudential would be
paying the fees of their lawyers as part of the ADR process.
Guyden is an African-American certified public accountant who
was hired by Prudential in September 1997. She eventually resigned
in March 2001. She claims she was paid a lower salary, given a
3
This agreement has already been described in this court's related
published opinion in Lederman v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 385
N.J. Super. 324, 334 (App. Div. 2006), which we incorporate by
reference here.
5 A-1026-15T2
lower bonus, and denied promotions three times because of her
race, in comparison with non-minority employees who allegedly
received better treatment.
Fejoku is a native of Nigeria who was hired as a staff
accountant by Prudential in 1992. He claims he was denied
promotions, harassed, and had to work in a hostile work environment
due to his race.
Both Fejoku and Guyden, and many other claimants, met at
Leeds' New York offices in May 1999 and signed an agreement which
specified their claims would be pursued exclusively through an ADR
process. Eventually the Leeds firm's representation of Guyden and
Fejoku discontinued.
Guyden retained new counsel, who filed suit against
Prudential in federal court. The matter was referred to
arbitration pursuant to the ADR agreement. After several days of
hearings, the arbitrator found Guyden had not proven
discrimination. Guyden moved to set aside the arbitration result.
Federal District Judge Katharine S. Hayden did not resolve the
merits of the motion, but instead granted Guyden discovery
concerning her claim that she had been fraudulently induced to
sign the ADR agreement.
Thereafter, Guyden mediated with Prudential a settlement, the
terms of which are confidential. Meanwhile, Fejoku opted not to
6 A-1026-15T2
participate in the ADR process. He was terminated from his
employment by Prudential and obtained no recovery.
Guyden and Fejoku filed legal malpractice cases against the
Leeds firm and several of its partners, which were consolidated
in the Law Division with those of similar claimants. Fejoku named
Prudential as a co-defendant.
Among other things, plaintiffs contend: the Leeds firm had a
conflict of interest; it improperly engaged in the practice of law
in New Jersey without being admitted in this State; it wrongfully
failed to disclose to them in a timely manner the details of the
$5 million fee arrangement; and the fees should be disgorged as a
wrongful payment made to induce a breach a fiduciary duty. They
also challenge the allocation of legal fees charged by a Special
Discovery Master whom the trial court appointed.
The trial court granted summary judgment and dismissed
plaintiffs' claims largely for lack of causation, finding both
Guyden and Fejoku had extricated themselves from the Leeds firm's
initial representation and thereafter proceeded with their
discrimination claims on their own. They contend those and other
rulings against them were erroneous, and that their lawsuits should
be reinstated. They also contest the court's approval of the fees
paid to the Special Discovery Master, who is now deceased.
7 A-1026-15T2
II.
We first address the dismissal of Guyden's claims. In doing
so, we focus on the trial court's pivotal finding that Guyden
extricated herself from the Leeds firm's initial representation
and thus cannot prove that she proximately suffered any harm from
its alleged breaches of duty. As we consider the issues posed on
summary judgment, we view the record in a light most favorable to
Guyden as the non-moving party. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.
of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995); see also W.J.A. v. D.A., 210
N.J. 229, 238 (2012).
Although her complaint identifies several different legal
theories, the gravamen of Guyden's lawsuit against the Leeds firm
is an action for legal malpractice. To prevail on a legal
malpractice claim, a plaintiff must establish the existence of an
attorney-client relationship creating a duty of care by the
attorney, breach of that duty, and proximate causation of damages.
Jerista v. Murray, 185 N.J. 175, 190-91 (2005). A plaintiff must
demonstrate proximate cause by showing his or her former counsel's
negligent conduct was a "substantial contributing factor" in
causing damages. Lamb v. Barbour, 188 N.J. Super. 6, 12 (App.
Div. 1982).
Where, as here, a legal malpractice case arises out of alleged
failures by a plaintiff's former litigation counsel, the plaintiff
8 A-1026-15T2
must establish a likelihood of success of the so-called "case-
within-a-case." Conklin v. Hannoch Weisman, 145 N.J. 395, 417
(1996). Specifically, plaintiffs here must show in their
malpractice lawsuits that they would have prevailed, or otherwise
obtained a favorable outcome in the cases that their former
attorneys handled, had counsel not deviated from professional
standards of care. Ibid.; see also Jerista, 185 N.J. at 191. So
here Guyden must prove not only that lawyers at the Leeds firm
breached their duties to her, but also that she would have obtained
a larger recovery on her underlying discrimination claim against
Prudential if those breaches had not occurred.4
Guyden alleges the Leeds firm breached its duties to her in
several respects. Principally, she claims the law firm acted
improperly in advising her to enter into the ADR agreement with
Prudential without disclosing to her that it had a financial
incentive under its fee arrangement with Prudential to steer its
clients into ADR. Guyden claims the firm had a conflict of
interest by virtue of the fee arrangement, which she characterized
as a "commercial bribe" paid to induce the law firm's breach of
fiduciary duty to clients. She further contends the firm deviated
4
The amount of Guyden's settlement is confidential. Any verdict
in her favor in the legal malpractice case would need to be molded
accordingly to treat the settlement as an offset.
9 A-1026-15T2
from the standards of care for lawyers who represent clients with
employment discrimination claims, by advising her to give up her
right to litigate those claims in court, where she would have had
broader discovery, the right to a jury trial in a public forum,
and the potential to recover punitive damages. She also asserts
the Leeds firm, which is based in New York, engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law in New Jersey without being admitted
to practice here.
To support her contention of proximately-caused injury,
Guyden tendered an expert report from a New Jersey attorney who
frequently represents plaintiffs with employment discrimination
and wrongful discharge claims. The expert opined that Guyden was
placed at a substantial disadvantage by forfeiting her rights to
litigate in court and limiting herself to the ADR process. The
expert maintained that it is widely known that business employers
generally prefer to keep employment cases out of court and to have
such matters instead resolved in private binding arbitration and
that, conversely, plaintiffs' lawyers resist doing so for
legitimate tactical reasons. The expert supported Guyden's
contention that she would have had more leverage against Prudential
if her claims were litigated in court, and the opportunity to
recover higher damages, including punitives, if she proved her
claims before a jury.
10 A-1026-15T2
The expert calculated Guyden's total wage loss at over
$800,000, which he opined would be potentially enhanced by a jury
award in the range of $125,000 to $250,000 for "personal
hardships." He estimated Guyden, if she proved Prudential's
liability for employment discrimination, would be awarded total
compensatory damages of approximately $1 million, plus or minus
$150,000. In addition, the expert projected that Guyden would
have recovered three to five times that sum in punitive damages,
if she established the flagrancy of defendant's conduct as required
by the Punitive Damages Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.9 to -5.17.5
In its April 8, 2015 oral decision, the trial court found
Guyden's legal theories generally untenable. It rejected her
premise that discrimination claimants are usually better off
litigating their claims in court rather than in arbitration or
other ADR processes.
The trial court also rejected Guyden's argument that damages
must be presumed if she established that the Leeds firm had been
tortiously induced to breach its fiduciary duties to her. The
court noted that no New Jersey precedent has adopted such a
"presumed damages" principle for such cases. The court declined
5
Our discussion of these figures should not be construed as a
finding they are reasonable or likely. We simply accept them for
the sake of discussion, viewing the record in a light most
favorable to Guyden.
11 A-1026-15T2
to follow an opinion from another jurisdiction supporting such a
theory in a case coincidentally involving the Leeds firm and a
different fee arrangement. See Johnson v. Nextel Commc'n Inc.,
660 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2011).6 Moreover, the court noted the opinion
in Nextel did not reach questions of proximate cause.
The court found that a genuine issue of material fact existed
over whether the Leeds firm had allegedly engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law in New Jersey, denying an earlier
motion for partial summary judgment that the plaintiffs in the
consolidated case had filed. Moreover, the Rules of Professional
Conduct have been construed to allow out-of-state attorneys to
engage in ADR activity for New Jersey clients in certain
circumstances. See RPC 5.5(b)(3)(ii) and Opinion 43, 187 N.J.L.J.
123 (Jan. 8, 2007).
We concur with the trial court's rulings with respect to
Guyden's claims seeking recovery based on the unauthorized
6
The counsel fee arrangement in Nextel provided that the employer
defendant would pay the Leeds firm counsel fees on a sliding scale,
depending upon how quickly claimants represented by the firm
settled, with an additional $2 million enhancement if all of them
settled. Id. at 140-43. Here, although there are some
similarities, the fees payable by Prudential to the Leeds firm
involved no sliding scale and no ultimate fee enhancement tied to
getting all of the clients with claims to settle.
12 A-1026-15T2
practice of law and seeking presumed damages from an induced breach
of fiduciary duty. We need not embellish those rulings here.7
We respectfully differ with the trial court's "per se" premise
that the standards of care of a lawyer representing clients in
employment discrimination matters cannot include the viewpoint of
Guyden's expert, i.e., that such lawyers should refrain from
advising their clients to agree to binding arbitration or ADR and
waive their rights to a jury trial. Although the court is right
that statutes and case law generally favor such dispute resolution
processes – where chosen with the mutual consent of the parties –
it is not always in a litigant's best interests to submit to them
and give up the procedural and substantive rights they have in
court and the pretrial provisions of the Rules of Court. The
right to a civil jury trial is enshrined in the United States
Constitution and our State Constitution and continues to be a
meaningful entitlement. U.S. Const. amend. VII; N.J. Const. art.
I, § 9. The broad right of litigant access to pretrial discovery
in our civil courts also generally surpasses the more limited
7
As a side note, we do not adopt the court's application of "law
of the case" principles in extending to Guyden a prior unpublished
and unappealed opinion the trial court issued in dismissing the
claims of another claimant. Defense counsel at oral argument on
the appeal agreed that it would be inappropriate to bind Guyden
and Fejoku to that unpublished opinion as "law of the case,"
although they think the court's reasoning was sound and logically
applied to the present plaintiffs as well. See R. 1:36-3.
13 A-1026-15T2
ability of parties to obtain facts and evidence within arbitration
and other ADR processes. See Capital Healthcare Sys. v. Horizon
Healthcare Servs., 230 N.J. 73, 80 (2017). Punitive damages
recoverable in appropriate civil cases involving flagrant conduct
are not ordinarily recoverable in arbitration. The right to obtain
plenary appellate review of a final judgment issued by a court
contrasts with the far more limited grounds on which to set aside
an arbitration award. N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 to -32.
Given these many differences between civil litigation and ADR
processes, it is not unreasonable, as Guyden's expert opines, for
an attorney representing a claimant alleging she was the victim
of discriminatory practices to favor and recommend litigating the
matter in court instead of some other forum. To be sure, at times
ADR can be swifter and less costly than traditional litigation.
But reasonable persons can differ about the standards of care for
attorneys who represent claimants of discrimination about the
proper choice of forum. The trial court erred on this discrete
point. The standards of care are fairly debatable.
That said, we now turn to what turns out to be the crux of
the appeal: proximate causation. The trial court concluded that
all of Guyden's claims should be dismissed because of one common
flaw, i.e., her alleged failure to present adequate evidence that
the initial representation by the Leeds firm caused her any
14 A-1026-15T2
ultimate injury. As we have already noted, the court reasoned
that Guyden's discharge of the Leeds firm and her retention of
different counsel, who handled her claims for many years thereafter
to completion, broke the alleged chain of causation tied to any
actual harm. The court noted that an arbitrator had found her
claims to lack merit, and it is therefore speculative to think her
claims were worth any more than the sum her successor attorneys
were able to negotiate in settlement with Prudential.
We generally agree with the trial court's analysis on this
causation point, subject to one major caveat. The caveat concerns
whether, in fact, after Federal Judge Hayden authorized discovery
to delve into the issue of fraudulent inducement, Prudential
offered Guyden the opportunity to set aside the arbitration award
and to litigate her claims in court. The record is disputed and
inconclusive on this key question.
Defendants present a certification from an attorney who had
been involved in the federal matter, had represented Prudential,
and recalls that he made such an offer orally during a telephone
conference with counsel and a United States Magistrate. The offer,
if it was made at all, apparently was never memorialized in a
confirmatory writing. Nor was the telephone conference
transcribed. Guyden, meanwhile, denies she was ever told about
such an alleged offer.
15 A-1026-15T2
There is clearly a genuine issue of material fact on this
critical question, which makes summary judgment inappropriate.
If, in fact, Prudential made such an offer to Guyden to, in effect,
wipe out the arbitration and the ADR agreement and litigate her
discrimination claims instead in court, and she or her then-counsel
rejected that offer, then she cannot establish proximate
causation. That scenario would signify that Guyden was not
ultimately, as she alleges, "trapped" in arbitration, having
declined an offer to exit that process. Her claims of injury
would be untenable, under the well-established doctrine of
"avoidable consequences." See Komlodi v. Picciano, 217 N.J. 387,
412 (2014).
Conversely, if Prudential never made such a definitive
proposal, then Guyden's claims were prematurely dismissed on
summary judgment. Proximate causation would be a proper question
for the jury, viewing, as we must, the record in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Although Guyden settled her
case, she claims she did so under the unfavorable conditions – her
ADR agreement – that the Leeds firm caused her to enter.
For these reasons, summary judgment for defendants in
Guyden's case with respect to her legal malpractice claims must
be vacated without prejudice, pending the development of the record
on remand concerning Prudential's alleged offer. If conclusive
16 A-1026-15T2
proof on that subject does not emerge, then the factual dispute
must be resolved by a jury.
In sum, we affirm the trial court's disposition as to Guyden
in part, and vacate and remand in part limited to the issues we
have specified.
III.
We turn to the summary judgment order dismissing Fejoku's
claims. In doing so, we repeat and incorporate by reference what
we have already said respecting Guyden's various claims.
There are two important differences between Fejoku and
Guyden. First, as we will elaborate in more detail, infra, Fejoku,
unlike Guyden, did not litigate his claims with new counsel after
he was no longer a client of the Leeds firm. Second, unlike
Guyden, Fejoku has no expert report quantifying any proximately-
caused damages. These differences are critical shortcomings for
Fejoku.
Here is the pertinent procedural history as to Fejoku. Like
Guyden and others with discrimination claims against Prudential,
Fejoku initially agreed to be represented by the Leeds firm and
he signed the ADR agreement.
In February 2000, the Leeds firm sent a letter to Michael
Young and Kathleen Roberts, arbitrators and mediators with JAMS
Endispute ("JAMS"), describing class members' claims. In July
17 A-1026-15T2
2000, claimants represented by the law firm began to present their
claims to the mediators.
In early 2001, Fejoku participated in mediation with JAMS and
demanded from Prudential a sum to settle his claim, but soon
reduced his demand to $4 million plus a promotion. As of March
2001, he requested $500,000. Prudential counter-offered him
$10,000 if he stayed at the company or $60,000 if he left. In
June 2001, Prudential increased its offer to $75,000 if Fejoku
would leave employment with the company.8
In September 2001, Prudential made a global settlement offer
of $10.5 million to resolve all outstanding claims in the matters,
but Fejoku opted to proceed to arbitration. By October 2001,
Prudential and the Leeds firm agreed to the final global settlement
terms.
On November 14, 2001, Fejoku told attorney Jeffrey K. Brown
of the Leeds firm that he wanted a different arbitrator to handle
his claim because JAMS had unsuccessfully mediated the matter.
Another attorney at the Leeds firm, Deirdre Kamber Chisari
("Kamber"), responded that a JAMS arbitrator would be more
sympathetic to Fejoku, having handled numerous other claims by
8
The parties have not argued these figures are inappropriate to
discuss here under N.J.R.E. 408.
18 A-1026-15T2
other clients. In any event, Kamber agreed to set up arbitration
with the American Arbitration Association.
In November 2001, Fejoku appeared at a pre-arbitration
conference with Kamber and JAMS arbitrator Young. At the
conference, Fejoku did not mention his request for a new arbitrator
and instead agreed to attend arbitration on January 17 and 18,
2002. That same day, Fejoku e-mailed Brown informing him that he
had changed his mind about the arbitration dates. The firm
requested a changed date but Arbitrator Young denied it.
In January 2002, Fejoku told Kamber that he would not attend
arbitration because the process was not, in his view, fair. He
further informed Kamber that he would not appear for arbitration
because: January 17 and 18, 2002 were inconvenient dates for him;
he did not trust JAMS; the ADR agreement had expired; and he wished
to file a lawsuit, not to submit to arbitration. Kamber responded
that the ADR agreement required him to participate in arbitration.
On January 17, 2002, Fejoku did not appear at arbitration and
Arbitrator Young ordered him to appear January 25, 2002. Fejoku
then informed Prudential's counsel that he would not appear, but
instead, would withdraw from the settlement process and seek
"outside" counsel. On January 31, 2002, Arbitrator Young dismissed
Fejoku's complaint without prejudice. On February 6, 2002, the
19 A-1026-15T2
Leeds firm withdrew from representing Fejoku and informed him that
he was free to arbitrate or go to trial if he wished.
Notably, Fejoku never retained any successor counsel to
address his discrimination claims. He received no settlement from
Prudential. In August 2008, Prudential terminated him.
In September 2011, Fejoku filed a pro se lawsuit (Docket No.
ESX-L-7444-11) against Prudential for claims related to his August
2008 termination, but it was dismissed as time-barred. Fejoku
filed an appeal but eventually withdrew it.
Meanwhile, Fejoku filed the present legal malpractice case
against the Leeds firm, making allegations similar to those of
Guyden.
In a comprehensive written decision dated July 7, 2014, the
same motion judge who presided over Guyden's claims granted summary
judgment to defendants in Fejoku's matter. A core aspect of the
judge's analysis was Fejoku's failure to present viable proof of
proximate causation or harm.
We affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment in
Fejoku's case, substantially for the reasons expressed in its
written opinion, and subject to the few analytic caveats we have
already noted in Part II solely with respect to Guyden.
The critical difference between Fejoku and Guyden is that the
latter retained new counsel and endeavored to extract some recovery
20 A-1026-15T2
from Prudential. Fejoku, by contrast, refused to participate in
arbitration and declined to retain new counsel to protect his
interests. He only belatedly tried to file a pro se complaint
against Prudential when it was too late to do so.
In essence, Fejoku's losses, if any, are substantially self-
inflicted. We discern no basis to reinstate his claims in the
present case, even viewing the record in a light most favorable
to him. We affirm the summary judgment order as to him.
IV.
The remaining issues raised on appeal, including the
arguments concerning the late Special Discovery Master's approved
fees and the trial court's decision to appoint such a master in
this complex, multiparty litigation, do not have sufficient merit
to warrant discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed in part and remanded in part as to Guyden; affirmed
as to Fejoku. We do not retain jurisdiction in Guyden.
21 A-1026-15T2