State of New Jersey v. Wedpens Dorsainvil , 435 N.J. Super. 449 ( 2014 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0879-10T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent, APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
May 2, 2014
v.
APPELLATE DIVISION
WEDPENS DORSAINVIL,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________________
Submitted October 2, 2013 – Decided May 2, 2014
Before Judges Fuentes, Fasciale and Haas.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Union County, Indictment No.
07-11-1010.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Karen E. Truncale, Assistant
Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on
the brief).
John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General,
attorney for respondent (Jennifer E.
Kmieciak, Deputy Attorney General, of
counsel and on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FUENTES, P.J.A.D.
Defendant Wedpens Dorsainvil was indicted by a Union County
Grand Jury and charged with first degree murder of Jamillah
Payne, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1), (2); first degree conspiracy to
commit murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3; first
degree attempted murder of Khalid Walker,1 N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and
N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(c); third degree unlawful possession of a
weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); second degree possession of a
weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); third
degree conspiracy to distribute cocaine and/or heroin, N.J.S.A.
2C:5-2, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1), and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(3); and
second degree possession of a firearm during the commission of a
drug-related offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1(a).2
Tried before a jury over a period of eight days, defendant
was found guilty of first degree conspiracy to murder Payne, 3
second degree aggravated assault of Walker, as a lesser-included
offense of first degree attempted murder, second degree
possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, second degree
1
The indictment initially listed Jamillah Payne as the victim of
this crime. The court amended the indictment once the error was
detected.
2
Phillipe Barthelus was charged as a co-defendant with
committing the same crimes. Barthelus was tried separately and
convicted on all of the charges. The trial court sentenced
Barthelus to an aggregate term of forty-five years, with an
eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility and five
years of parole supervisions as required under the No Early
Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. We affirmed the
conviction and sentence on direct appeal in an unpublished
opinion. State v. Barthelus, No. A-5012-10 (App. Div. Oct. 11,
2013).
3
Despite this finding of culpability on the conspiracy charge,
the jury found defendant not guilty of murdering Payne.
2 A-0879-10T2
possession of a firearm during the commission of drug-related
offense, third degree unlawful possession of a weapon, and third
degree conspiracy to distribute cocaine and/or heroin.
The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of
forty-five years, subject to the eighty-five percent parole
ineligibility restriction and subsequent five-year period of
parole supervision mandated by NERA. We have opted not to
describe in detail the analysis employed by the trial court to
arrive at this aggregate sentence because we are satisfied
defendant's conviction cannot stand.
Our decision to set aside defendant's conviction is
predicated on two interconnected events. The first concerns a
physical altercation between two deliberating jurors that
occurred during jury deliberations. Physical violence between
jurors during deliberations is toxic to the environment of
rational discourse we associate with the deliberative process
and fundamentally inconsistent with any notion of ordered
liberty. A jury verdict contaminated by such violence is
inherently unreliable. The trial court thus committed
reversible error in denying defendant's motion for mistrial.
Independent of this error, the coercive measures employed
by the trial judge in an attempt to preserve the integrity of
the deliberative process were not only ineffective but, in our
3 A-0879-10T2
view, exacerbated the menacing environment caused by the violent
episode between the two jurors. No reasonable juror can be
expected to perform his or her duties as impartial judges of the
evidence adduced at trial under the sweeping court-ordered
civility code imposed by the trial court in this case.
We derive the following facts from the record developed
before the court, including the evidence presented to the jury
at trial.
I
CORE OF OPERATIVE FACTS
A
From the State's perspective, this case is about the
dangers associated with the business of illicit drug trafficking
at the retail level. Jamillah Payne, the nineteen-year-old
woman whom the State alleged was shot and killed by defendant
and then thrown out of her own fourth-floor apartment window by
his co-defendant, was actually part of defendant's own "crew" or
drug distribution operation. Payne allowed defendant to use her
apartment as a storage and local distribution site and assisted
him in packaging the drugs for street-level distribution. As
the prosecutor acknowledged in his opening statement to the
jury, "Jamillah Payne was part of the drug conspiracy."
4 A-0879-10T2
In order to provide the jury with an explanation for the
events that led to Payne's death, the State called as a witness
a man who had been incarcerated with defendant in the Union
County jail in 2007 before this case went to trial.4 This
witness also knew Payne socially, independent of defendant, as
"his ex-girlfriend's cousin." According to this witness,
defendant told him he was upset with Payne because she was using
the apartment as her residence with her son and for other social
activities unrelated to the apartment's dedicated purpose as a
place to store, package, and distribute illicit narcotics.
More importantly as it relates to this case, the witness
said defendant also believed Payne was "hanging around with,
basically, her gang member friends, Bloods,[5] if you want to call
4
In response to the prosecutor's questions on direct
examination, the witness acknowledged he had previously pled
guilty to first degree distribution of heroin and cocaine. He
was sentenced to a term of six years with two years of parole
ineligibility, which is a sentence within the range of a second
degree offense, in exchange for agreeing to testify "truthfully"
as a witness for the State in this case.
5
The "Bloods" is a criminal gang described by the New Jersey
State Police as a franchise with numerous smaller gangs taking
the "brand name" of the gang and adopting the gang's symbols,
ideology and terminology. The extent to which Bloods "sets"
cooperate with each other or respect territory, members or
financial resources varies widely, with the result that open
competition and conflict between Bloods "sets" (or among local
factions of the same set) is not uncommon. See New Jersey
Department of Law & Public Safety Division of State Police,
Intelligence Section, Gangs in New Jersey: Municipal Law
(continued)
5 A-0879-10T2
it." The witness claimed defendant was particularly troubled by
Payne's association with Khalid Walker, who defendant believed
may have previously broken into the apartment with other gang
members "and stolen some money and some drugs." Defendant told
the witness he wanted to change the locks in the apartment "to
avoid all situations." In response to the prosecutor's question
as to whether defendant "actually . . . beg[a]n to change the
locks in the apartment at some point," the witness testified:
"Yes . . . [t]he same night all hell broke loose, if you want to
call it Jamillah [Payne's] death, let's say."
Thus, under the State's theory of events, Payne's untimely
death was the result of conflicts between local drug "crews"
operating in the same apartment building and sharing the same
territory. Payne unintentionally set in motion the chain of
events that caused her death by socializing with rival gang
members and raising defendant's suspicions by using the
apartment as an actual residence, not just a drug warehouse.
The first link of this chain was forged when Payne phoned
W.S.6 on the evening of July 13, 2006, and asked him to come to
(continued)
Enforcement Response to the 2010 NJSP Survey 26, 52 (2010),
http://www.njsp.org/info/pdf/gangs_in_nj_2010.pdf.
6
We use initials in referring to witnesses and other individuals
related to this case to protect their privacy.
6 A-0879-10T2
her fourth-floor apartment. W.S. was a member of the "Bloods,"
and operated a rival illicit drug crew in an apartment located
on the third floor in the same building. He testified Payne
sounded "disturbed" when she spoke to him on the phone that
evening. According to W.S., when he arrived, Payne, defendant,
and four other men were already in the apartment.7 Payne did not
respond to W.S.'s inquiries about what prompted her to ask him
to come to the apartment. W.S. testified that at some point
shortly after his arrival, defendant went into the kitchen area
of the apartment and quickly returned with a handgun in his
hand. Defendant then fired one shot into the floor.
As a reflexive action, presumably based on an instinctive
reaction or as a last desperate measure to avoid being shot,
W.S. jumped out of one of the windows of Payne's fourth-floor
apartment; he fractured his pelvis, punctured a lung, and
fractured a hand. W.S. heard three more gunshots while on the
ground. He thereafter saw Payne plunge from one of the windows
of the apartment. We note W.S.'s perception of events may have
also been impaired by other factors in addition to his injuries.
7
W.S. gave inconsistent accounts about what he saw when he first
arrived at Payne's apartment. Initially, he did not identify
defendant as being inside the apartment that night. He later
explained that he lied because he was "afraid for [his] life."
7 A-0879-10T2
Specifically, W.S. testified he was under the influence of
alcohol and illicit narcotics at the time.
The State called as witnesses a number of other individuals
who were also in the apartment building on the night of the
shooting. D.K. testified he saw Payne "hanging from a window,"
and saw Barthelus push Payne out of her apartment window. On
cross-examination, however, D.K. conceded to giving conflicting
accounts of what he saw regarding the incident. Although he
testified at trial to seeing Barthelus's face as he pushed Payne
out of the window, he had previously stated he did not see
Barthelus's face that night and was only able to identify him by
the unique marks on his arms.
M.M. was also a resident of the building where Payne had
her fourth-floor apartment. M.M. testified to hearing multiple
gunshots, "loud noises and flashes, and a lot of commotion" on
the evening of July 13, 2006. She saw a number of individuals
running down the building's fire escape. M.M. identified
Barthelus as one of the individuals she saw run down the fire
escape and head toward her apartment.
B
Khalid Walker, a man identified by the State's jail house
informant as "a high ranking member" of the rival crew that
intended to move into the fourth-floor apartment, was inside
8 A-0879-10T2
Payne's apartment on the night of the shooting and was himself
shot in one of his legs. His testimony proved to be
problematic, however, because by the time this matter reached
trial, Walker had recanted his previous statements and was
unwilling to cooperate with the State. Making matters even more
difficult, Walker, who was at the time serving a sentence in
State prison on an unrelated matter, refused to wear the
civilian attire provided to him by the State and insisted on
taking the stand as a witness wearing his inmate garb.
Defense counsel did not object to Walker testifying while
wearing his inmate uniform; she believed Walker's attire would
likely undermine his credibility as a witness for the State
because it would provide the jury with visual evidence of his
past criminal transgressions. After discussing the matter with
the attorneys in the case, the trial judge decided to permit
Walker to testify wearing prison garb.8
8
In reaching this decision, the judge specifically noted State
v. Kuchera, 198 N.J. 482, 486 (2009), in which the Court held
that a prosecution witness who testifies in prison garb "likely
does not affect" the fairness of the trial "as a whole."
However, consistent with the reasons that animated the Court's
decision in State v. Artwell, 177 N.J. 526 (2003), "unless
otherwise permitted by the trial court in the exercise of its
discretion, witnesses in criminal cases -- both for the
prosecution and for the defense -- should not testify in prison
garb." Kuchera, supra, 198 N.J. at 486.
9 A-0879-10T2
Despite this accommodation by the court, Walker refused to
testify. The record reflects the judge explained to Walker the
consequences of his refusal to testify outside the presence of
the jury. Specifically, the judge apprised Walker that he would
be held in contempt, remanded to the county jail until
compliant, and the time spent in the county jail on the contempt
citation would not be credited to his unrelated State prison
sentence. After this explanation, the prosecutor asked Walker a
series of basic questions to lay the foundation for his trial
testimony. Walker's answers were either unresponsive or clearly
indicative of his continued refusal to testify.
After further discussion with the attorneys, the judge once
again engaged Walker directly. The judge again made clear the
consequences of his behavior. When Walker made clear his
willingness to remain defiant, the judge held him in contempt.
The judge again emphasized to Walker he would remain in the
county jail "until you testify under oath." After some
reflection and interaction with the judge, Walker acceded.
Walker testified that on the night of the incident, he was
shot in the leg while he was in the bathroom talking on his cell
phone. He did not know who shot him. Police records show that
Walker stated individuals in the apartment were arguing about
drugs and that "Cam" (a nickname used for defendant) had shot
10 A-0879-10T2
him. Walker also provided the police with a description of his
assailant. At trial, Walker testified that none of the
information he provided to the police in 2006 was correct and
claimed the police "coerced" him into giving a statement. After
considering the relevant standards and applicable legal
principles,9 the trial judge granted the State's motion to play
to the jury the videotaped statement Walker gave the police in
2006 as a prior inconsistent statement.
C
City of Elizabeth Police Officer William Deegan was one of
the officers who responded to the shooting incident that night.
Immediately upon his arrival, Deegan saw a woman, later
identified as Payne, lying dead on the sidewalk.10 He was
compelled to use force to enter apartment 4H because the door
was locked. Deegan described the interior of apartment 4H as
"barren," with "blood on the right-hand side of the wall by the
9
Applying the standards endorsed by the Court in State v. Brown,
138 N.J. 481, 543-45 (1994), the trial judge found Walker's
claim of a "lapse of memory" concerning the circumstances that
led the police investigators to videotape his statement was
feigned and tantamount to an implicit denial of his prior
statements. The judge thus admitted the videotaped statement as
a prior inconsistent statement under N.J.R.E. 803(a)(1)and (3).
See also State v. Gross, 121 N.J. 1, 10 (1990).
10
The Union County medical examiner testified as an expert in
forensic pathology. He classified Payne's cause of death as a
homicide. She died from a single gunshot wound to the chest.
Payne also had injuries consistent with being pistol whipped.
11 A-0879-10T2
doorway." He also entered apartment 4A, the next apartment over
from 4H, and observed that the screen looked forced in, and
there was blood on the counter, the door, and a set of keys he
found on the floor.
Forensic investigators who processed the crime scene in
Payne's apartment recovered three pieces of ballistic evidence
in the form of a spent casing found in the kitchen, and two
projectiles — one found in the bathroom and one in the "mid-
room." Detective Gary Mayer was admitted by the court as an
expert in field of forensic ballistics. Mayer classified the
spent projectiles as .38 caliber and the spent casing as
discarded by a .25 caliber round.
R.G., her daughter, and G., the child's father, resided in
another fourth-floor apartment located in the same building.
All three were home on the night of July 13, 2006. R.G.
testified that the child's father was addicted to heroin and had
used heroin that night. G. had been incarcerated on past
occasions due to his addiction and related problems.
R.G. found herself "in a really, really financial bind"
during the times G. had been detained. In a misguided attempt
to ameliorate her financial problems, R.G. worked for defendant
during her difficult times by holding his drugs in her apartment
and packaging the drugs for retail sale. Her involvement was
12 A-0879-10T2
limited to handing the drugs to other "guys" who "would come or
call."
According to R.G., defendant called her at approximately
ten o'clock in the evening on the night of the shooting and
asked her to open the door. She heard "a lot of commotion" as
she approached to open the door. She described defendant as
"very scattered, like, out of breath, like nerves, and he wanted
to come in, and he had blood on his shirt" when she opened the
door. Defendant also "had guns with him." When R.G. asked him
what happened, defendant allegedly responded: "I had to do it. I
had to do it." Pressed by R.G. to elaborate on what he meant by
"it," defendant responded: "Milla," meaning Jamillah [Payne] . .
. . I had to do it." R.G. testified defendant told her Payne
"knew too much and that if it didn't go down that way that she
would have took (sic) everybody down." Defendant was not
visibly injured.
R.G. gave defendant "a blue shirt and jeans" for a change
of clothes and "discarded" what he was wearing. R.G. also saw
defendant "discard" two guns he placed on her kitchen table by
wrapping them in a garbage bag and placing them inside R.G.'s
garbage can. She threw the garbage bags away on her way to a
restaurant. R.G. gave a statement to police on June 6, 2007,
13 A-0879-10T2
and identified defendant as the person who had come to her
apartment on the night of July 13, 2006.
Defendant also called S.W. on the night of the shooting.
S.W. had known defendant for approximately six years and knew he
kept drugs at Payne's apartment. S.W., as a witness for the
State, said defendant told her to go to his house and "get rid
of anything that didn't belong there." She removed his Social
Security card and identification documents from his home.
S.W. and defendant bought a Jeep Cherokee from a used car
lot early the next morning. S.W. put the title to the car in
her name. After buying some "stuff for the car" and getting a
tune-up, defendant, S.W., Barthelus, and two other individuals
drove out of New Jersey on their way to Georgia. According to
S.W., defendant did not have any extra clothes with him, and the
other passengers did not have big suitcases.
On the morning of July 15, 2006, South Carolina Police
Officer Brock Horton stopped a 1998 Jeep Cherokee with temporary
New Jersey plates on Interstate 95. The vehicle was travelling
at approximately ninety-two miles per hour, which was above the
local speed limit. The parties stipulated at trial that
defendant was a passenger in the vehicle and intentionally
misidentified himself as "Ken Mathews." The driver and the
other men in the car were unable to provide Horton with
14 A-0879-10T2
appropriate identification. Horton identified defendant as a
passenger in the vehicle he stopped. Co-defendant Barthelus was
also in the car at the time of the stop.
II
JURY DELIBERATIONS
After the alternate jurors were selected and segregated,
the jury began deliberating sometime in the afternoon of July 8,
2009. The court received the first note or question from the
jury later that afternoon. Although the record does not reflect
any other communication from the jury before this one, the trial
judge marked this note "C-10."11 As read into the record by the
judge, the jury asked for
clarification regarding Page 45 of the
charge. Does this page, act of a co-
conspirator, apply to only the conspiracy to
commit the murder of Jamillah Payne charge
but does Page 45 also apply to the other
charges, including the murder charge?
The record before us shows the judge responded to the jury's
query in C-10 without first consulting with the attorneys to
11
Following the customary practice of identifying written
communications from the jury as "C" exhibits, C-10 implies there
were nine other previous notes or questions from the jury that
were not marked into evidence or otherwise identified for the
record. The quality of appellate review depends upon a complete
and accurate record of the proceedings before the trial court.
The trial judge is responsible to ensure that all written
communications from the jury are properly identified and
preserved for appellate review.
15 A-0879-10T2
obtain their input and determine whether they had any objections
to the manner the court responded to the question.
The next communication from the jury, marked C-11, was also
sent on the afternoon of the first day of deliberations. As
read into the record by the judge, C-11 stated:
"According to Page 45,[12] if a person is
legally accountable for the conduct of
another person" -- then they are saying,
"including murder" -- that is a reference to
my prior instruction to them, "when he's
engaged in a conspiracy, does this mean the
person is accountable or guilty of murder"?
In contrast to the manner in which the judge proceeded in
responding to the question raised in C-10, the record shows the
judge ultimately responded to the question in C-11 after he
solicited comments and suggestions from the attorneys outside
the presence of the jury and considered their concerns. Because
it was almost 4:00 p.m. by the time the jurors' question was
addressed, the judge decided to excuse the jury for the day.
The judge instructed the jurors not to discuss the case with
anyone and not to resume deliberations until they were all
together the following morning at nine o'clock.
12
As authorized by Rule 1:8-8(a), the judge provided the jury
with copies of the legal instructions and permitted the jurors
to take copies of the instructions with them to the jury room
during deliberations.
16 A-0879-10T2
Although technically the second day of deliberations, July
9, 2009 was actually the first time the jurors had a full day to
deliberate. Shortly after the jury began deliberating that
morning, the judge acknowledged the receipt of a note from Juror
16, which the court marked C-13. As read by the judge, the note
indicated Juror 16 had "scheduled vacation for 7/10/09. So I
would be grateful if I can be excused from the jury." Because
the attorneys were not yet present, the judge told Juror 16 he
would discuss the issue with the lawyers and directed him to
return to the jury room and resume deliberations until otherwise
instructed by the court.
Defense counsel was the first attorney to comment on this
issue. She noted that Juror 16 did not mention anything about a
possible vacation conflict during voir dire. Both the judge and
the prosecutor concurred with defense counsel on this point. The
prosecutor noted, however, that based on what was said to the
prospective jurors during voir dire about the possible length of
the trial, it was reasonable for Juror 16 to have expected the
trial to have ended the previous week. The judge nevertheless
emphasized that it was clear from the manner in which the case
progressed that the case would continue beyond the previous
week.
17 A-0879-10T2
The judge was particularly concerned about Juror 16's
ability to consider the evidence carefully and fairly. As the
judge noted, "[s]uppose he says, 'I'm leaving. I have a prepaid
vacation with my whole family and I should be home packing,
doing this, that. I can't concentrate, I can't focus.'"
Without objection from counsel, the judge brought Juror 16 back
to the courtroom to inquire further about his vacation plans.
In response to the judge's request to explain "a little
more," Juror 16 said: "I'm going away on vacation tomorrow . . .
[to the] Bahamas." The judge then asked the juror whether
"that, in any way, interfere with your deliberating today?"
Juror 16 answered: "No." The judge nevertheless persisted:
THE COURT: But I want to make clear what is
in that question, and that is, you are going
to be able to stay focused and concentrate
and not, in any way, feel rushed?
JUROR [16]: No.
After conferring with counsel at sidebar, the judge directed
Juror 16 to return to the jury room and stated: "[W]e'll deal
with it in the afternoon, if necessary."
Violence In The Jury Room
At 2:27 p.m. on July 9, 2009, the judge received another
written communication from the jury. We pause here to note that
the record reflects the judge did not discuss the jury's note
with the attorneys before deciding to take this course of
18 A-0879-10T2
action. The judge brought the jury into the courtroom and made
the following statement:
THE COURT: I'm going to read the note[13] you
sent me for the benefit of the alternates.
The note reads, "Your Honor, at this point
the jury is hopelessly deadlocked. The jury
is finding it impossible to make further
progress to make a unanimous decision on any
Count."
I'm, basically, going to ask you to go in
and try again. I would -- I'm going to read
to you from Page 71 and 72 of the jury
instructions.
[(Emphasis added).]
The judge then reread to the jury the section of the
standard model charge on "deliberations," which, inter alia,
admonishes each juror to consider the evidence impartially and
deliberate "with a view to reaching an agreement, if you can do
so without violence to individual judgment." After reading this
two-paragraph long statement, the judge addressed the jury as
follows:
So what I'm asking you to do is go back into
the jury room, reexamine your positions,
listen to what the other jurors have to say,
and give it another try. All right? I'm
13
This note from the jury announcing the inability to reach a
unanimous verdict was not identified by the judge with the
customary "C" exhibit designation. The failure to identify for
the record a written communication from the jury is not a
trivial oversight. This kind of omission needlessly makes the
appellate process more difficult and time consuming.
19 A-0879-10T2
asking you deliberating jurors to go back in
the jury room.
The entire event took three minutes, including the time consumed
by the judge reading the jury's note announcing it was
"hopelessly deadlocked."
After the jury left the courtroom, the judge asked a
Sheriff's Officer the following questions:
THE COURT: Sergeant, I want you to describe
for the record what you observed, what you
heard, and what happened.
THE SHERIFF'S OFFICER: There was a knock on
the door. Officer Karlick (Phonetic)
entered the jury room ahead of me. I
believe one of the jurors -- I'm not sure
who it was -- handed him a note.[14] There
was a heated argument between two jurors. I
asked them to please just sit down, calm
down. The argument escalated.
One of the jurors, I believe it was the
young lady -- one of the jurors sitting
outside wanted to go for a cigarette. It
sounded like a good idea because she was one
of the parties involved in this argument.
In the best interests -- in the interests of
all these women, I told Officer Karlick to
take them for a cigarette, and then the
other jurors sat down.
It was a heated, heated argument. They were
both standing up.
14
Because the trial court did not mark this note as "C" exhibit,
nor read what it said into the record, we are unable to
determine its significance.
20 A-0879-10T2
THE COURT: This is the note that I have. We
don't know who wrote it.[15]
THE SHERIFF'S OFFICER: The two jurors are
still sitting outside.
THE COURT: Have those two jurors go back in.
[(Emphasis added).]
All twelve jurors returned to the jury room without any
instructions from the court as to whether they should resume
deliberations. At this point, the judge addressed the attorneys
on the record about how he planned to respond to the report of a
"heated argument" between two deliberating jurors.
THE COURT: I propose the following: Bring
the jurors out, tell them that I want them
to fully deliberate and fully discuss any
and all issues that they think are to be
discussed, but they are to treat each other
with respect and courtesy, and send them
back to continue deliberating.
Anybody want to be heard on that?
I'm also -- I've also told the Sheriff's
Officers that they are not to go into the
jury room to collect a note, or something
like that, unless they come to me, first.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, Judge.
THE COURT: My proposal acceptable to
everybody?
[PROSECUTOR]: Yes, your Honor.
15
Again we are compelled to highlight the court's failure to
identify this "note" as a "C" exhibit with a corresponding
number.
21 A-0879-10T2
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Does the Court -- the
Court is not going to inquire as to who
wrote the note, or it doesn't matter?
THE COURT: I wasn't -- well, you know,
there was a heated discussion going on and
-- I wasn't going to inquire because, you
know, I'm concerned about inquiring into the
deliberative process and what people are
thinking about . . . but I'm willing to
listen to suggestions to the contrary, but
my feeling is what they need to be told is
they should fully discuss everything that
they think needs to be discussed here, but
they should treat each other with respect
and courtesy, and listen to what everyone
has to say, and in a respectful manner, and
proceed in that kind of way.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I would only
ask -- I know the Court did it before -- is
the Court inclined to give the modified
Allen[16] charge, again?
THE COURT: They have not come back -- you
know, first of all, they have it in the
charge, I charged it to them originally.
They have the written document. I referred
it to them again, and I read it to them.
I'm not sure that is the issue at this point
in time.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay.
[(Emphasis added).]
In response to the judge's question, the Sheriff's Officer
indicated that the argument appeared to involve a personal
disagreement between the jurors "rather than a substantive
16
Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S. Ct. 154, 41 L. Ed.
528 (1896).
22 A-0879-10T2
discussion about the issues of the trial." The judge did not
ask the Officer to elaborate on this characterization.
Following this interaction with the Sheriff's Officer, the judge
brought the jury back to the courtroom, had them line "up along
the back[,]" and again instructed them on the need to be
respectful to one another. The judge emphasized that this did
not mean "you can't strongly disagree, but you need to treat
each other in a respectful and courteous way." The record shows
in was 3:36 p.m. when the jury returned to deliberate.
Sometime thereafter, the jury sent out a note (again not
marked as a "C" exhibit), which read: "Your Honor, we would like
to stop today at 4:30 [p.m.]." This prompted the judge to bring
to the attorneys' attention the need to address Juror 16's
vacation plans. However, as the judge himself noted, he was
distracted by the "argument" between the two deliberating
jurors, who the judge identified for the record as Jurors 7 and
8. With the consent of the attorneys, the judge decided to
create a record of what the Sheriff's Officer actually saw and
heard concerning the "heated argument" between these two jurors.
THE COURT: [Addressing the Sheriff's
Officer] Were you there.
THE SHERIFF'S OFFICER: I was there.
THE COURT: Maybe I don't need him.
23 A-0879-10T2
THE SHERIFF'S OFFICER: Officer Karlick,
Sheriff's Department. Loud knocking on the
jury door.
THE COURT: This is after the note[17] came?
THE SHERIFF'S OFFICER: Correct. Less than a
minute later a lot of knocking on the door.
We go in. An argument between three
parties, separated the parties, brought
Juror Number 7 outside and --
THE COURT: When you say "arguing" --
THE SHERIFF'S OFFICER: Verbally. Juror
Number 7 said somebody tried to take her in
the bathroom and wanted to fight her in the
bathroom -- 8, sorry.
At that time we separated the parties,
brought Juror Number 8 out, and everybody
else on the jury was getting along, so we
shut the door and left them.
THE COURT: All right.
THE SHERIFF'S OFFICER: I'm sure of the
numbers of the other jurors.
THE COURT: Now, suppose -- let's say [Juror
16] says he can't deliberate tomorrow
because he's leaving -- let's say he has
prepaid vacation. Right?
THE SHERIFF'S OFFICER: Judge, this Officer
-- I believe Officer Swick should address
both parties present about what happened.
THE COURT: Is anybody talking to the lady
outside?
17
We infer the "note" mentioned by the judge here is the note
announcing the jury was "hopelessly deadlocked."
24 A-0879-10T2
THE SHERIFF'S OFFICER: She is sitting there
by herself.
THE COURT: Go ahead.
THE SHERIFF'S OFFICER: I was the first
person in the back and when I got there they
were separated. And then the lady, I don't
know what juror [number] she is, I guess 8,
was the one outside.
THE COURT: I think she is Number 8, but we
will find out in a minute.
THE SHERIFF'S OFFICER: She said that she
slapped her and then the lady, I guess -- I
don't know. What lady in the pink shirt?
THE COURT: Juror Number 8 said somebody
slapped her.
THE SHERIFF'S OFFICER: The juror with the
pink shirt slapped her.
THE COURT: Is that a man or a woman?
THE SHERIFF'S OFFICER: That would be a
woman. She was involved in the first thing
that happened. This was with a different
juror.
So when she said she slapped her she went
back in to try to get back in her face,
calling her a liar, and that's when Officer
Karlick took the lady in the pink and I took
her outside, and we separated her.
THE COURT: I'm going to ask Juror Number 8 -
- I'll bring her in and ask her what
happened.
But before I get to that, supposing [Juror
16] says he can't deliberate tomorrow? Then
what?
25 A-0879-10T2
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, if [Juror
16] says he can't deliberate tomorrow, given
what has transpired in the course of this
day, I would submit that I don't think the
Court could submit -- or substitute a juror
in.
THE COURT: I might have to tell [Juror 16]
he has to move his trip.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The problem that -- I
think that has arisen now, I think the Court
would have to inquire of Juror Number 8. I
think that they have created, within the
jury room, a very hostile and volatile
situation because I would just submit
whatever incident occurred before -- Juror
Number 1 and Juror Number 8 were the two
smokers and they just had to leave.
When I was in chambers with yourself you
said you were going to come out. I didn't
make it from the door over here and you
heard the loud banging on the doors and the
officers ran to the back.
When the door was opened you could see the
people like, here, at the door. I don't
know what took place, but clearly there is a
volatile situation, and the banging on the
door wasn't like a knock, it was a
significant amount of banging like, "We need
somebody in here right away."
I'm concerned right now with the composition
of -- the jury is already, I think, may be
compromised and they may not be able to
focus because I think there is a volatile
situation that is occurring in that jury
room.
THE COURT: We don't know what is going on
in there because I have not asked anybody
yet. I've been reluctant, to the extent
that I didn't want to interfere with the
deliberative process.
26 A-0879-10T2
You were asking me to do what?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I understand that, but -
-
THE COURT: What are you asking me to do.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: This is a totally -- a
situation -- I'm kind of, at a loss for
words. I think the Court has to, first,
inquire to [Juror 16] can he deliberate
tomorrow, and also inquire as to Juror
Number 8.
I guess what took place -- you have an
officer that made representation on the
record that someone slapped her. I know
there is, at least, two women in there that
has on a pink shirt. Juror Number 7 has a
pink shirt and a jacket.
THE COURT: Suppose -- [Prosecutor], what do
you propose I do?
[PROSECUTOR]: I think first thing is to
find out about [Juror 16's] situation for
tomorrow.
The second thing, if he is able to come back
tomorrow then I think the best course of
action is to break now, let them go home,
let them calm down, bring them back
tomorrow.
THE COURT: Suppose [Juror 16] says, "I have
my trip. I'm leaving on a plane at 8
o'clock tomorrow morning."
[PROSECUTOR]: Then I think we make a pointed
inquiry as to why it is all of a sudden
today when he never mentioned it during voir
dire. I could recall, and Counsel could
recall, and your Honor could recall that he
never mentioned the trip; and then he was
well aware of the fact that when the case
27 A-0879-10T2
was going to end even earlier this week or
what was going on earlier this week and it's
only today there is some mention of it.
I think given the gravity of the case, I
think there would be grounds to say to him
-- because you didn't advise -- I think the
interest of justice sometimes have to
prevail and he should be instructed that he
needs to make every effort to reschedule
that trip.
THE COURT: Suppose I do that. Either he
says, "I'm available to deliberate," or I
order him -- well, under these circumstances
you are just going to have to forego that
trip. All right? What do you propose I do
with the other jurors?
[PROSECUTOR]: I think you have to be very
careful about inquiring as to what was going
on in that jury room. We can't intrude on
the deliberative process.
[(Emphasis added).]
The prosecutor suggested the judge bring the deliberating
jurors back to the courtroom and instruct again on the need to
be respectful to one another. The prosecutor cautioned the
judge against asking individual jurors to describe in detail
what transpired between the jurors involved in the physical
altercation. According to the prosecutor, such an approach is
"liable to get answers about what is going on in the
deliberations, and I think that is clearly inappropriate."
Alternatively, the prosecutor suggested the judge order the
28 A-0879-10T2
jurors to deliberate in a respectful manner under penalty of
being held in contempt. In the prosecutor's own words:
[I]f your Honor was to order them and say to
them, "You are instructed . . . if you
violate the order you are going to be
subject to a contempt charge, if you violate
my order, and you want to get -- have
physical altercations or inappropriate
verbal shouting in that jury room" -- then I
think they will understand that that this is
inappropriate behavior, it's not something
that is to go on in that jury room, and
avoids the possibility that they are going
to somehow divulge what is going on in terms
of the deliberations.
. . . .
And I think at that point they understand,
listen, they need to knock it off and they
need to act in a civilized manner and reach
a verdict or not reach a verdict, whatever
may happen, but do it within a manner that
is completely within the bounds of what is
expected of a juror in the County -- in this
State.
THE COURT: [At this point the judge
addressed defense counsel by name and
implicitly asked for her response to the
prosecutor's suggestion.]
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I would agree with [the
prosecutor], except for the fact that at 3
o'clock there was a situation that occurred
and a little over an hour later after you
had them out here directing them to
deliberate in a respectful manner to each
other, and so forth, that an hour later you
have a volatile situation with the same
juror from before, also with a juror making
representations to the officers, not about
where they stand in their deliberation
process, that somebody inflicted physical
29 A-0879-10T2
harm on her. I think that is something very
serious and the Court could inquire as to
what took place or what happened without
divulging where they are in the deliberation
process.
My concern is that it's a volatile situation
in there, whereas people are not allowed to
openly speak their mind or freely express
their views in there, especially if you have
a juror saying that somebody else struck
them in there.
THE COURT: Well, let's start with [Juror
16] and see where we go from there.
[(Emphasis added).]
The record reflects that Juror 16 "was brought out into the
courtroom." At this point, we note the judge did not instruct
the remaining jurors to cease deliberating until Juror 16
rejoined them.
THE COURT: [Addressing Juror 16 by name], I
got a note from the jury that -- I assume
you are aware of it -- says, "We would like
to stop today at 4:30 and we would like to
resume when you deem appropriate."
Are you able to deliberate tomorrow?
JUROR 16: No. No, sir.
THE COURT: You have to speak up louder.
JUROR 16: No, sir.
THE COURT: When are you leaving?
JUROR 16: Tomorrow morning at 6 a.m.
THE COURT: Why is it that this morning was
the first time I heard about this?
30 A-0879-10T2
JUROR 16: Because when we first started the
case was supposed to stop two weeks ago. I
said no sense [sic] because I thought the
case was going to finish two weeks ago.
THE COURT: Why didn't you tell me last week
or why didn't you tell me before the jury
started deliberating?
JUROR 16: Well, I thought, as I said, I
thought the case was going to be finished
before tomorrow.
THE COURT: What if I told you you have to
come back here tomorrow and continue to
deliberate?
JUROR 16: I guess I would have no choice.[18]
THE COURT: All right. Go back in the jury
room for a minute.
18
We have described in some detail the conflict with Juror 16 to
illustrate our awareness and appreciation of the fluidity of
events and the multiplicity of issues that often arise in jury
trials. We appreciate the pressure associated with managing
these events as they arise in real time. However, it is
absolutely imperative for trial judges to appreciate how their
most "subtle behavior" can have a great and unintended coercive
effect on a juror. State v. Figueroa, 190 N.J. 219, 228 (2007).
Here, Juror 16's reluctant acceptance of the court's authority
to disrupt his vacation plans may have had the unintended
consequence of making him angry against a perceived inflexible
and insensitive judicial system. In our view, more information
should have been gathered before determining that Juror 16 could
continue to deliberate. For example, we do not know: How long
had Juror 16 planned this trip? Did this trip have any special
significance to Juror 16? Was this associated with a wedding
anniversary or some other special event? Were there any
economic consequences to Juror 16 for postponing or cancelling
the trip? This and other similar information would have given
the trial judge a better means of ascertaining whether forcing
the juror to continue deliberating may affect the juror's
ability to perform his duties consistent with his oath.
31 A-0879-10T2
At this point the record reads: "Juror excused from the
courtroom." We again note the absence of any instruction from
the judge directing Juror 16 not to discuss this matter with his
fellow jurors. With respect to the jury, given the lack of any
instructions from the court on what they should have been doing
while Juror 16 was being questioned, we also do not know if
deliberations were affected by Juror 16's absence from the jury
room.
With these observations in mind, we now return to Juror
16's vacation conflict.
THE COURT: All right. Let's talk about
[Juror 16] for a moment.
Seems to me that if I tell him he has to
come back tomorrow he's going to come back
here and do his duty.
Anybody disagree with that? You want to be
heard?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: He said he would come
back. The only thing I would ask of the
Court is the same way you inquired this
morning would he be able to focus, would the
fact you are making him change his trip, or
anything like, that impact on his ability to
properly deliberate in the back in the jury
room. I think the Court would have to make
that inquiry.
THE COURT: All right. I'll do that. Now,
as far as the rest of the jury is concerned,
I would like each of your input on what I'm
proposing to do.
32 A-0879-10T2
You are correct [addressing defense
counsel], that I told this jury that. I
told them that I was directing them to go
and deliberate and thoroughly discuss
whatever it is they thought they needed to
discuss, and that I wanted them to treat
each other with respect and courtesy. But I
didn't say -- I could have said it a lot
more forcefully. And suppose I bring them
all in the box and tell them that I am
ordering them under no uncertain terms,
Court order, ordering them to come back
tomorrow and deliberate, and they needed to
treat each other with courtesy and respect
and no yelling, no screaming, no resorting
to any threats, either implicit or explicit,
and no way were they to, in any way, get
physical or insinuate, in any way, they were
going to get physical with each other, and
then ask them each individually would they
be able to follow that direction without any
reservation. If they each said yes to that,
tell them to go home, relax, come back at 9
o'clock and give it one more shot tomorrow
morning.
Is that acceptable to you?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Two things. If the
Court is going to do that -- I would ask if
you do that take each juror individually and
have them answer those questions and then
afterwards, after you have a consensus that
everybody could do that, ask if you re-
instruct them again on the Allen charge,
whereas they continue to deliberate -- and
all that other stuff – to give them the
modified Allen charge that you read before,
recharge them on that.
The prosecutor concurred with defense counsel's suggestions
for the most part, but deferred to the court's discretion on
whether to address the jury as a group, or speak to each juror
33 A-0879-10T2
individually. Although not showing a distinct preference, the
judge ultimately acceded to defense counsel's request and
addressed each juror individually. The following instructions
the judge gave Juror 1 illustrate, for the most part, the
instructions the judge gave to all of the deliberating jurors.
THE COURT: [Addressing Juror 1] Basically, I
called you first because you are Juror
Number 1, but I plan to call out each juror
individually and tell them the following,
and then ask the follow-up questions. So
what I'm telling you what I'm going to ask
you at the end of it I'll do it with every
juror afterwards.
I'm going to order you and each and every
juror in the back who is deliberating --
this is a Court order -- it's not a
suggestion, it's not a directive, it's a
Court order, and I'm going to order you to
come back tomorrow at 9 o'clock. I want you
to fully deliberate on any issues that you
think are appropriate that you think need to
be discussed to come to a resolution of this
case, but I'm also ordering each and every
one of you that you are to treat each other
with courtesy and respect. That means no
yelling at each other, no screaming at each
other, no threats -- no implicit or explicit
threats or anything physical is going to go
on either implicitly or explicitly, would
you be able to follow that direction and
continue to fully deliberate in this case?
JUROR 1: Yes.
THE COURT: I'm going to ask you, number
one, to go back into the jury room for a
couple more minutes and I'm going to ask you
to ask [the next juror] to come out.
34 A-0879-10T2
THE COURT: [Addressing the attorneys] Is
that satisfactory, the way I did that?
[PROSECUTOR]: Yes, Judge.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes.
[(Emphasis added).]
The judge repeated the instructions he gave to Juror 1 to
the next juror who reported to the courtroom. When the judge
asked this juror whether he would be able "to follow those
directions and continue fully deliberating the matter[,]" this
juror responded: "Your Honor, if I could? I believe that it
would be extremely difficult for the jury to do that." (Emphasis
added). This prompted the following colloquy:
THE COURT: I'm asking you -- I'm asking --
I'm not asking that question.
THE JUROR: Yes, I could.
THE COURT: I'm asking, would you be able to
follow those directions and continue to
fully deliberate and discuss the case?
THE JUROR: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. I'll ask you to go
back into the jury room and ask [identifying
the next juror by her last name] to come
out.
The next two jurors listened to the judge repeat his "order"
setting forth the civility code he expected each juror to follow
during the deliberations, and answered "yes" to the ultimate
question about their ability to follow the "order."
35 A-0879-10T2
The most significant deviation from what the judge expected
occurred after he finished instructing Juror 8. We will recite
the actual instructions the judge gave to Juror 8 because these
instructions did not contain the same compulsory language the
judge emphasized when he addressed the previous jurors.
THE COURT: [Addressing Juror 8] Have a
seat somewhere at the end wherever you are
comfortable, just at the end of the jury
box.
I'm calling each juror out individually and
basically saying the same thing to them,
asking them the same question. So you are -
- you are Number 8, and then I'll call
[N]umber 9, and so forth.
Basically what I am ordering each of you
jurors, deliberating jurors, to do is
ordering you to come back tomorrow at 9
o'clock, to continue to fully deliberate on
the case, all go back and discuss whatever
you believe is necessary to talk about. I'm
further ordering each of you in your
deliberations to treat each other, in this
process, with courtesy and respect, not to
scream, or yell, or raise voices. Not to in
any way, either implicitly or explicitly,
threaten anyone.
Would you be able to follow those
directions?
JUROR 8: Honestly? No, not after I just
got hit in there. I can't do it.
THE COURT: Counsel, let me see you at
sidebar.
[(Sidebar discussion)]
36 A-0879-10T2
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, . . . I'm not
going to declare the jury a deadlock, but
what I said -- this lady [referring to Juror
8] is the same lady involved with both
incidents and she said she was hit which, to
me, would mean she is not able to openly
speak her mind in that jury room and
somebody, I don't know, who has resulted in
violence against this juror, and she openly
said she could not continue. And then now
say, for example, you wanted to remove her
and get rid of her and substitute another
juror and have this other juror come in -- I
think given what took place you couldn't do
that.
Second, in addition, you technically would
only -- for example, if the Court remotely
wanted to do that you have -- when they come
back tomorrow and don't reach a decision
then you have a problem again because you
will lose one of the other alternates
because he's leaving to go away on Sunday.
And you also have to make the inquiry of
Juror Number 16 as to is he able to focus
even after you order him to come back.
THE COURT: Push him to the side.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You have a whole lot of
issues, and I would think that at this time,
given what she has said and what we have
seen in the courtroom and have heard in the
courtroom, that this juror and, even Number
2 . . . Juror Number 3 started to allude to
the fact he thought they would not be able
to reach -- and the Court stopped him before
he was able to finish. I think you have a
whole lot of issues going on with the jury.
THE COURT: I'm not concerned about [Juror
3. He] says he has no problem continuing to
deliberate and following my orders. I'm not
worried about [Juror 3].
37 A-0879-10T2
[Juror 16], I'm going to ask him those
follow-up questions you want, but for
purposes of this discussion I'm assuming
that [Juror 16] will need to do what he
needs to do and follow the rules.
What about this lady?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: This is a problem.
THE COURT: I heard her say --
[PROSECUTOR]: I think -- I understand this
has been an emotional day for them.
I think if you ordered her to go home,
return tomorrow morning, that -- and given a
chance to cool down, I think, before they
begin deliberations tomorrow morning that
you instruct her that you are going to ask
these questions again tomorrow, but she is
to go home and resume deliberations in a
proper manner, as she was sworn to do. That
while there may be things that upset her in
that room that they need to be put to the
side so she could perform her duties fairly,
without emotion, without any interference,
and then you give her a chance to cool down
and come back tomorrow morning and --
THE COURT: If I go through the rest of these
jurors what happens if one or two more --
their reaction is her reaction?
[PROSECUTOR]: We have to see what happens.
But I think the same thing would apply.
I think if you give them overnight and then
re-instruct them in the morning and then --
THE COURT: I'm willing to go through the
remaining other jurors and see what kind of
answers I get and then we will speak again.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I know the Court will
wait to see what happens, but I think the
38 A-0879-10T2
Court has to inquire -- she already said she
couldn't come back, and if you -- if what
you are saying is true, if you order them to
come back and deliberate, all but for the
fact that she was the one that was hit, she
wasn't the aggressor, there is a problem. I
think it's like really volatile in there.
THE COURT: Well, let me see what the rest of
them say.
[(Emphasis added).]
This lengthy sidebar discussion occurred while Juror 8 sat
in the jury box. At this point, without further explanation to
Juror 8, the judge asked her to "have a seat outside for a
moment[;]" the judge then asked that Juror 9 be brought into the
courtroom. Once Juror 9 was in the courtroom, the judge ordered
him to deliberate in a respectful manner, using an abridged
version of the "civility order" similar to the one he gave to
Juror 8. Juror 9 indicated he was able to deliberate under
those conditions and he returned to the jury room without
further incident. The same process was repeated with the
remaining jurors, producing the same result.
With respect to Juror 16, in addition to instructing him on
his duties to deliberate and interact with his fellow jurors in
a respectful manner, the judge asked him if he "would be able to
fully concentrate, give all your attention that is necessary to
the case?" Juror 16 responded: "Yes, I would be." We presume
the judge asked Juror 16 this question in response to defense
39 A-0879-10T2
counsel's earlier request that the court inquire about his
ability "to focus even after you order him to come back."
At the end of this process, the trial judge decided to
bring Juror 8 back into the courtroom.
THE COURT: [Addressing Juror 8 by name] I
brought, like I brought you out of court,
each and every juror who is sitting in the
back deliberating, I brought each of them
out here and I told them that they were each
under a court order, not a suggestion, not a
directive, a court order, with all that that
implies, ordered to come back here tomorrow
at 9 o'clock to continue to fully deliberate
and discuss anything that anybody on the
jury thought was appropriate or relevant to
discuss in the case.
I further ordered each and every juror that
they were under court order to treat
everyone else in that room with courtesy and
respect, and I further ordered them that --
that that meant specifically no yelling, no
screaming, no raising of voices, no threats,
whether they were implicit or explicit,
whether it was verbal or physical, and that
nobody was to have any physical contact with
anyone else. I ordered each and every one
of them that.
With that being said, would you be able to
continue deliberations in this case?
JUROR 8: If you're ordering me back, yes, I
will do it, but --
THE COURT: Well, but --
JUROR 8: I can do it fairly. That's not --
that's not my problem.
THE COURT: No, no, no, that's not what I'm
-- but -- what I'm asking you is would you
40 A-0879-10T2
be able to continue your deliberations and
fully discuss anything that you think is
appropriate to discuss, would you be able to
take and stand by any position that you
think that you need to stand by? Yes?
JUROR 8: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. Counsel, what I plan
to do is to bring all of the jurors out to
give them those instructions that you
suggested that I give on -- out of the jury
charge that I gave earlier and then send
them home and tell them to come back at 9
o'clock tomorrow and continue with their
deliberations as soon as the 12 of them are
here, that they can start to deliberate.
Does anybody want to be heard further on
anything?
[PROSECUTOR]: No, Your Honor. Thank You.
[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: No, Judge.
The jury then returned to the courtroom. After some
preliminary remarks about scheduling matters unrelated to the
case, the trial judge again instructed the jurors assembled by
repeating the model charge on deliberations. The judge also
reminded the jurors that when they returned the next day to
resume deliberations, each one of them were
under court order, not a suggestion, not a
directive, a court order and all that it
entails, and each of you told me
individually that you will have no problem
following this order and you will follow
this order, and the order is once again that
you will fully deliberate the issues in the
case, that you will fully discuss whatever
you or any other juror think is important to
41 A-0879-10T2
discuss in trying to reach a consensus and
fulfilling your oath and your duties as
jurors, that you are -- each have agreed and
you understand you're under court order to
treat each other with courtesy and respect,
and more particularly, that means that
there's to be no yelling, no screaming, no
raising of voices, no threats whatsoever,
either implicitly or explicitly, and no
reference, nobody is to touch anybody,
nobody is to get physically near anyone.
And I am telling you all that if there is a
violation of that court order I am going to
take appropriate action. You all took an
oath to, and I expect you each to fulfill
that oath, and that oath is to be fair and
impartial and fully discuss the issues in
this case and to decide the case on the
evidence, on the merits.
[(Emphasis added).]
The following day was the third day of deliberations. The
record of this day began with the trial judge apprising the
attorneys that "somebody passed me a note and said somebody
wanted to put something on the record." (Emphasis added). This
prompted defense counsel to acknowledge that she had written the
note. After waiving defendant's right to be present in the
courtroom "for purposes of this request," defense counsel moved
for the court to declare a mistrial. Counsel argued that "in
light of what took place yesterday . . . one of the jurors being
assaulted by another juror during deliberation, I feel . . .
this juror's will may be overborne." Defense counsel further
argued the court's measures were insufficient to overcome the
42 A-0879-10T2
"hostile environment" created in the jury room by this
altercation.
In response, the trial judge noted for the record that he
had followed "the procedure" defense counsel herself had
recommended "to a T." The judge emphasized that he had
specifically questioned
the juror in question, [to determine] . . .
whether she was able to continue to
deliberate fully and completely about all of
the issues in the case that she felt were
important to her and, furthermore, . . .
asked her, more specifically saying, that
what I mean by that is that will you be able
to fully and completely express all your
opinions, and positions, and stand by any
position that you think is appropriate? And
she unequivocally, said yes.
The prosecutor agreed with the judge's characterization of
Juror 8's disposition and willingness to continue deliberating.
We note, however, that in his remarks endorsing the measures
employed by the court, the prosecutor noted the court had not
taken any action to discover the identity of the juror who
"actually, did the striking." At the conclusion of the
prosecutor's comments, the judge noted "it's now 10:20 [a.m.]
and they've been deliberating since 9 o'clock with --
apparently, without any problems." The court denied defendant's
motion for a mistrial, finding "[e]ach and every juror indicated
they could fully, completely, freely, and thoroughly deliberate,
43 A-0879-10T2
and I have no reason to believe that that is not what they are
doing."
The record shows the jury deliberated for the rest of the
day, during which the jury sent out additional notes seeking
instructions on substantive legal questions and other matters
that are not before us.19 The jury reached a verdict at 3:50
p.m. on July 10, 2009, after two and one-half days of
deliberations.
III
Against this record, defendant now appeals raising the following
arguments.
POINT I
A MISTRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN DECLARED WHEN
TWO JURORS ENGAGED IN A PHYSICAL ALTERCATION
DURING DELIBERATIONS.
19
Our review of the record revealed that defense counsel
objected to the trial court's unilateral decision to have
certain ex parte communications with the jury. Specifically,
without counsel's knowledge or consent, the judge permitted two
deliberating jurors to ask him permission to take a break "to
get some air, and buy some coffee." This resulted in the court
allowing the jury to take a twenty-minute break without
informing the attorneys. Although our decision to set aside
defendant's conviction is not based on this issue, because we
are remanding this case for new trial, we take this opportunity
to remind the trial court of our Supreme Court's unequivocal
condemnation of any kind of ex parte communication between the
judge and the jury. As the Chief Justice recently reaffirmed on
behalf of a unanimous Court: "Judges should not engage in ex
parte communications with jurors, even on innocuous scheduling
matters." State v. Morgan, 217 N.J. 1, 17 (2013).
44 A-0879-10T2
POINT II
WALKER'S OUT-OF-COURT IDENTIFCATION OF THE
CO-DEFENDANT, WHICH HAD BEEN SUPPRESSED AS
IMPERMISSIBLY SUGGESTIVE AND UNRELIABLE,
SHOULD HAVE ALSO BEEN EXCLUDED AT THIS
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL. (Not Raised Below)
POINT III
THE COURT FAILED TO CHARGE ALL THE
APPROPRIATE LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSES OF
ATTEMPTED MURDER THAT AROSE FROM THE FACTS.
(Not Raised Below)
POINT IV
THE DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED OF CONSPIRACY TO
COMMIT MURDER ON AN ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY
THEORY THAT WAS NOT PRESENTED TO THE JURY.
(Not Raised Below)
POINT V
THE SENTENCE OF 45 YEARS WAS MANIFESTLY
EXCESSIVE AS IT REPRESENTED THE MAXIMUM
LEGAL TERM PERMISSIBLE ON EACH OF FOUR
COUNTS, ALL OF WHICH RAN CONSECUTIVE TO EACH
OTHER.
The dispositive issue raised by defendant concerns the
reliability of the jury's verdict. Defendant argues the trial
court should have granted defense counsel's motion for a
mistrial after the altercation in the jury room. Defendant
claims the judge did not properly investigate the nature of this
violent incident between jurors, forcing two or more combative
jurors to continue deliberations in order to obtain a verdict.
The State claims the judge properly exercised his discretion in
45 A-0879-10T2
responding to the problems that arose among certain jurors and
appropriately determined that "each juror could continue to
fully and completely deliberate." According to the State, the
"nuanced" verdict returned by the jury is indicative of the
jurors' ability to deliberate effectively.
We agree with defendant's arguments and reverse. On the
second day of jury deliberations, the Sheriff's Officers charged
with the jury's security and safety responded to loud banging on
the jury room's door. Once inside, the Officers were forced to
intervene and physically separate three jurors, one of whom
reported being threatened, accosted, and assaulted by a fellow
juror. This intervention by the Sheriff's Officers occurred
immediately after or contemporaneous with the jury's report that
it was "hopelessly deadlocked." Under these circumstances, no
reasonable juror could have been expected to remain unaffected
by the violence and chaos that permeated the deliberative
process.
We also conclude the judge's efforts to ascertain what
occurred in the jury room were inadequate and did not provide
the court with the information necessary to determine whether
there was a way of salvaging this legally moribund trial.
Finally, the supplemental instructions issued by the judge to
restore order and civility were ineffective and served only to
46 A-0879-10T2
exacerbate the coercive atmosphere created by the violence that
preceded it. Because these issues are sufficient, in and of
themselves, to overturn defendant's conviction, we need not, and
specifically do not, reach the remaining arguments raised by
defendant in this appeal.
We begin our analysis by highlighting that the right to a
jury trial in criminal matters is one of the founding principles
of our Republic and is guaranteed by both the Sixth Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States, United States v. Gagnon,
470 U.S. 522, 526, 105 S. Ct. 1482, 1484, 84 L. Ed. 2d 486, 490
(1985), and Article I, Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey
Constitution, State v. A.R., 213 N.J. 542, 557 (2013). As the
guardian of that guarantee, the trial judge is entrusted with
the responsibility of controlling courtroom proceedings and is
bounded by the law and the rules of the court. State v.
Tedesco, 214 N.J. 177, 188-89 (2013).
A jury verdict must be guided by correct legal instructions
from the trial judge and unaffected by matters extraneous to the
evidence presented at trial. Thus, "[e]rroneous instructions on
matters material to the juror's deliberations are presumed to be
reversible error." State v. Allen, 308 N.J. Super. 421, 431
(App. Div. 1998) (quoting State v. Grunow, 102 N.J. 133, 148
(1986)). Although granting a mistrial in a criminal case "is an
47 A-0879-10T2
extraordinary remedy[,]" the trial judge is bound to grant this
relief when it is necessary "'to prevent an obvious failure of
justice.'" State v. Yough, 208 N.J. 385, 397 (2011) (quoting
State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, 205 (1997)).
The role of the jury as the judges of facts is predicated
on the integrity of the deliberative process. State v. Corsaro,
107 N.J. 339, 346 (1987). In those cases where the jury
announces an inability to reach a unanimous verdict, the
decision whether to grant a mistrial turns on whether the
duration of the deliberations balanced against the length of the
trial and the complexity of the proofs shows the jury has made a
good-faith effort to reach a sustainable verdict. See State v.
Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 300-05, (1987), cert. denied, 508 U.S.
947, 113 S. Ct. 2433, 124 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1993). Beyond this,
any further direction from the judge to continue deliberations,
especially in the absence of a reminder of the right to return a
non-unanimous verdict, could be viewed as coercive. See
Figueroa, supra, 190 N.J. at 236 (citing State v. Hunt, 115 N.J.
330, 382-85 (1989)).
In determining the propriety of a trial court's response to
a jury's inability to reach a unanimous verdict, our Supreme
Court has identified two principal concerns: (1) whether the
supplemental instruction has the capacity to improperly
48 A-0879-10T2
influence the dissenting jurors to change their votes; and (2)
whether "the weighty role that the judge plays in the dynamics
of the courtroom" improperly coerced the jury into returning a
verdict. Id. at 237-38.
Thus, when instructing a jury that reports being
deadlocked, a trial judge must be especially vigilant to avoid
communicating a results-oriented message that could be perceived
as intolerant of dissent and antagonistic to the free expression
of strongly held beliefs that may not be shared by a majority of
the deliberating jurors. As the Court emphasized in Figueroa,
"'juries may accord great weight and deference to even the most
subtle behaviors of the trial judge.'" Id. at 238 (internal
citation omitted).
In State v. Czachor, 82 N.J. 392, 405 n.4 (1980), our
Supreme Court approved the modern version of supplemental
instructions trial judges now use in response to a jury's
announcement of being deadlocked.
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with
one another and to deliberate with a view to
reaching an agreement, if you can do so
without violence to individual judgment.
Each of you must decide the case for
yourself, but do so only after an impartial
consideration of the evidence with your
fellow jurors. In the course of your
deliberations, do not hesitate to re-examine
your own views and change your opinion if
convinced it is erroneous. But do not
surrender your honest conviction as to the
49 A-0879-10T2
weight or effect of evidence solely because
of the opinion of your fellow jurors, or for
the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
You are not partisans. You are judges --
judges of the facts.
[Ibid. (internal citation omitted)
(emphasis added).]
These instructions envision a deliberative process guided
by reason and integrity. The admonition to guard against
reaching an agreement that may do "violence to individual
judgment" is a metaphor for what we now refer to as "bullying."
The instruction warns against majoritarian bullying and
permitting expediency of results to justify intellectual and
moral dishonesty. The corrosive effect "violence to individual
judgment" may have on the deliberative process pales in
comparison to the chilling effect actual physical violence can
have on the ability to freely and honestly express controversial
or unpopular views.
A physical altercation between two or more deliberating
jurors constitutes an irreparable breakdown in the civility and
decorum expected to dominate the deliberative process.
Physical violence among jurors is the antithesis of the rational
discourse embodied in the Court's admonition in Czachor. A
jury verdict tainted by such an inherently coercive and chaotic
50 A-0879-10T2
environment is an affront to any notion of civilized justice and
cannot stand as a matter of law.
It is particularly important to emphasize that the violence
that erupted in the jury room here occurred immediately after,
if not contemporaneous with, the announcement by the jury that
it was "hopelessly deadlocked . . . finding it impossible to
make further progress to make a unanimous decision on any
Count." It is thus reasonable to conclude that the violent
episode may have had some causal relationship to the impasse.
Although we do not know what caused these belligerent acts, we
know that what occurred was not merely a passionate exchange of
conflicting views. Jurors 7 and 8, and possibly a third
unidentified juror, were involved in an act of violence so
serious and disruptive, that it prompted the remaining jurors to
seek immediate assistance by summoning the Sheriff's Officers
responsible for their safety.
As described by defense counsel, an unknown number of
jurors began "banging on the door . . . [not] like a knock, it
was a significant amount of banging like, 'We need somebody here
right away.'" The Sheriff's Officer who responded also
indicated hearing loud banging on the jury room's door. One of
the Officers who entered the jury room described seeing "a
heated argument between two jurors." Although he "asked them to
51 A-0879-10T2
please just sit down, . . . [t]he argument escalated." (Emphasis
added). Unfortunately, the trial judge did not ask the Officer
to elaborate or explain what he meant by "the argument
escalated." Despite the absence of these crucial details, we
are nevertheless troubled by the fact that the intervention of
law enforcement officers not only failed to stop or reduce the
intensity of the argument, but the quarrel actually "escalated"
after their response.
The Sheriff's Officers who responded to the jury room were
also uncertain about the number of jurors involved in the melee.
One Officer described witnessing an argument "between three
parties." After the Officers were able to physically separate
the belligerents, one Officer reported to the judge that Juror 8
said "somebody tried to take her in the bathroom and wanted to
fight with her in the bathroom." Juror 8 also told the Officer
that: "The juror with the pink shirt slapped her." When the
judge asked the Officer to identify the gender of the juror who
had allegedly "slapped" Juror 8, the Officer responded:
That would be a woman. She was involved in
the first thing that happened. This was
with a different juror.
So when [Juror 8] said she slapped her
[Juror 8] went back in to try to get back in
her face, calling her a liar, and that's
when Officer Karlick took the lady in the
pink [(the alleged assailant)] and I took
[Juror 8] outside, and we separated her.
52 A-0879-10T2
From this record, it is clear the trial judge had
sufficient grounds at the time to find probable cause that one
juror had threatened to commit physical harm against a fellow
juror, and another juror may have actually physically assaulted
a fellow juror, all in the course of deliberations. Although
the decision of the Sheriff's Officers to separate the jurors
involved avoided the potential for further escalation of the
violence, we can reasonably assume the chaotic tension created
by this event lingered on in the jury room like menacing storm
clouds. Under these circumstances, it defies common sense to
expect a reasonable juror to be able "to deliberate with a view
to reaching an agreement without violence to individual
judgment."
Supplemental Instructions
The trial judge's attempts to restore order and respect to
the deliberative process through supplemental instructions were
in our view wholly and facially ineffective given the level of
violent discord that had occurred up to that point. However,
our concern here with respect to these instructions runs far
deeper. We are satisfied that the judge's instructions actually
exacerbated the problem. These instructions were nothing short
of a sweeping, judicially imposed "civility code of conduct."
53 A-0879-10T2
Regarding the civility restraining order, the court
emphasized: "it's not a suggestion, it's not a directive, it's
a Court order" enjoining the jurors "to fully deliberate on any
issues that you think are appropriate that you think need to be
discussed to come to a resolution of this case." However, the
jurors engaged in these court-ordered "discussions" were also
"ordered" to "treat each other with courtesy and respect." The
judge then elaborated on the kind of conduct he expected the
jurors to follow: "no yelling at each other, no screaming at
each other, no threats -- no implicit or explicit threats or
anything physical is going to go on either implicitly or
explicitly." (Emphasis added). The court concluded with the
following admonition:
And I am telling you all that if there is a
violation of that court order I am going to
take appropriate action. You all took an
oath to, and I expect you each to fulfill
that oath, and that oath is to be fair and
impartial and fully discuss the issues in
this case and to decide the case on the
evidence, on the merits.
[(Emphasis added).]
Not surprisingly, when the trial judge asked Juror 8 if she
would be able to abide by this court-ordered civility code, she
responded: "Honestly? No, not after I just got hit in there. I
can't do it." This prompted the court to direct Juror 8 to sit
outside, while he engaged in a lengthy discussion with the
54 A-0879-10T2
attorneys about what should be done with Juror 8. Defense
counsel reminded the court that Juror 8 was the alleged victim
of the assault, not the aggressor. The prosecutor, however, was
unmoved by this distinction, and insisted the court make clear
to Juror 8 her obligation under the civility code to deliberate.
After instructing the remaining jurors with the court-
ordered civility code, and addressing the vacation conflict with
Juror 16, the judge brought Juror 8 back before him and repeated
the court-ordered civility code. At the conclusion of which, he
once again asked her if she was willing to abide by it. When
she responded: "I can do it fairly. That's not -- that's not my
problem," the judge seemed baffled and frustrated by her
response:
THE COURT: No, no, no, that's not what I'm
-- but -- what I'm asking you is would you
be able to continue your deliberations and
fully discuss anything that you think is
appropriate to discuss, would you be able to
take and stand by any position that you
think that you need to stand by? Yes?
JUROR 8: Yes.
This colloquy between Juror 8 and the trial judge captured
the essence of the futility of any attempt to impose civility
and respect in the deliberative process by the threat of
judicial sanctions. As a starting point, the court's
prohibitions of "implicit or explicit threats or anything
55 A-0879-10T2
physical . . . either implicitly or explicitly," are so facially
ambiguous, any attempt at enforcement is rendered virtually
impossible. What one juror may perceive as an implicit threat
to intimidate, may be viewed by another juror as nothing more
than a passionate, yet ultimately innocuous expression of
opinion about the evidence in the case.
Second, this approach ironically places the judge in the
middle of an intentionally cloistered environment. Any alleged
violation of this court-ordered civility code would require the
judge to adjudicate the dispute and impose the appropriate
sanction if warranted. This would presumably require the judge
to conduct some kind of hearing to determine the veracity of the
accuser. Rudimentary notions of due process would entitle the
accused juror to call other jurors as witnesses in his or her
own defense. In short, this is a completely impractical,
utterly unworkable approach that impermissibly transforms the
judge into an interloper at the center of jury deliberations.
This approach is in direct violation of one of the Supreme
Court's principal concerns in Figueroa, avoiding "the weighty
role that the judge plays in the dynamics of the courtroom" to
improperly coerce the jury into returning a verdict. Figueroa,
supra, 190 N.J. at 237-38.
56 A-0879-10T2
As a final matter, we are compelled to comment on the
limited investigation conducted by the trial judge. This case
involved extremely serious charges against defendant. The State
alleged defendant, a member of a notoriously violent street
gang, murdered a nineteen-year-old woman by shooting her nearly
at pointblank range, in the living room of her own apartment.
He and his co-defendant thereafter allegedly threw this young
woman out of the fourth-story window of her apartment. Other
occupants in the apartment also allegedly escaped being shot by
jumping out the same fourth-story window. According to the
State, defendant committed these extreme acts of violence as
gang-related acts of retaliation.
Against this backdrop, when the trial judge became aware of
a violent altercation between two, possibly three jurors, on the
first full day of jury deliberations, the judge should have
officially reported the incident to a senior ranking Officer of
the Sheriff's Department, the law enforcement agency entrusted
for the safety and security of the deliberating jurors. 20 The
record before us is grossly inadequate to make any kind of
informed determination about the root cause of this altercation.
20
This law enforcement investigation would follow a judicial
determination that a mistrial is warranted. Absent such a
finding, the judge has complete and exclusive authority over the
management of the trial.
57 A-0879-10T2
When violence intrudes into the deliberative process in any
form and to any degree, a trial judge must take immediate action
to investigate what occurred, not only to determine whether a
defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial has been
compromised, but also to ensure the safety and security of all
involved. Our courthouses are the citadels of justice. A
courtroom is a forum governed by reason and invulnerable to
intimidation because of it. Jury duty is both a right and
obligation of citizenship. Jurors who report to our courthouses
in response to this obligation and to exercise this right are
entitled to feel safe and secure.
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
58 A-0879-10T2