State of New Jersey v. Christoph F. Adams , 436 N.J. Super. 106 ( 2014 )


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  •                    NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-1640-12T4
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,              APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
    June 17, 2014
    v.
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    CHRISTOPH F. ADAMS, a/k/a
    CHRISTOPH J. ADAMS, CHRISTOPH
    ALBERT and CHRISTOPH ALLEN,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ____________________________________
    Submitted January 29, 2014 – Decided June 17, 2014
    Before Judges Grall, Waugh and Accurso.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New
    Jersey, Law Division, Union County,
    Indictment No. 11-05-0606.
    Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
    for appellant (Michael B. Jones, Assistant
    Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on
    the brief).
    Grace H. Park, Acting Union County
    Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Sara B.
    Liebman, Special Deputy Attorney General/
    Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and
    on the brief).
    The opinion of the court was delivered by
    GRALL, P.J.A.D.
    Defendant was arrested for a new crime while participating
    in the Intensive Supervision Program (ISP) following
    modification of a custodial sentence on a prior conviction to
    permit that participation.   R. 3:21-10(b)(6).   The precise
    question presented is whether defendant is entitled to jail
    credits pursuant to Rule 3:21-8 against the sentence for the new
    crime from the date of his arrest for that crime until the date
    he was either sentenced by the judge for the new crime or
    resentenced by the three-judge ISP panel for "fail[ure] to
    perform satisfactorily following entry into" ISP, R. 3:21-10(e).
    We conclude that a defendant in this circumstance is entitled to
    jail credits for days in confinement from the date of arrest to
    the date the first sentence is imposed.1
    1
    The appeal was argued without briefs in conformity with Rule
    2:9-11, but the panel transferred the case to a calendar for
    disposition after full briefing. In the brief submitted on
    defendant's behalf, the issues are stated as follows:
    POINT I
    MR. ADAMS IS ENTITLED TO THE TIME BETWEEN
    HIS ARREST AND THE REIMPOSITION OF HIS ISP
    SENTENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW. HERNANDEZ
    REQUIRES THAT CREDIT BE ALLOCATED FOR TIME
    SPENT IN CUSTODY AND MR. ADAMS HAS NOT BEEN
    CREDITED WITH ANY TIME FOR THAT PERIOD.
    POINT II
    MR. ADAMS IS ENTITLED TO THE TIME BETWEEN
    HIS ARREST AND THE REIMPOSITION OF HIS ISP
    SENTENCE BECAUSE IT WAS A TERM OF HIS PLEA
    AGREEMENT, AT LEAST AS HE REASONABLY
    UNDERSTOOD IT.
    2                           A-1640-12T4
    Our decision is informed by State v. Hernandez, 
    208 N.J. 24
    (2011), which addresses jail credits in a case involving
    multiple charges, R. 3:21-8; N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5b.   And it is
    informed by State v. DiAngelo, 
    434 N.J. Super. 443
    (App. Div.
    2014), which applies Hernandez in a case involving resentencing
    for a violation of probation.
    I
    The essential facts are procedural.   In February 2010,
    defendant Christoph Adams was convicted of second-degree
    eluding, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b, and second-degree receipt of stolen
    property, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7, and in July 2010 he was sentenced to
    concurrent four-year terms of imprisonment.2   Defendant's
    subsequent motion to change that "custodial sentence to permit
    [his] entry into [ISP]" was granted by the three-judge ISP panel
    pursuant to Rule 3:21-10(b)(6).3
    While participating in ISP, on February 16, 2011, defendant
    was arrested and subsequently indicted for crimes committed on
    that date.   The indictment charged defendant with second-degree
    aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1), and third-degree
    2
    The judgment of conviction is not in the record on appeal, but
    according to defendant's pre-sentence report (PSR), it was
    imposed in July 2010.
    3
    The order changing the sentence entered by the ISP panel is not
    in the record on appeal. Defendant's PSR states that he entered
    ISP on December 30, 2010.
    3                         A-1640-12T4
    terroristic threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3a-b.     Defendant was also
    subject to pending accusations charging disorderly persons
    offenses committed during the same incident — harassment by
    offensive touching, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4b, and criminal mischief,
    N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3b(2).    Nothing in the record indicates that the
    ISP panel reimposed defendant's custodial sentence the day after
    his arrest.4   Quite obviously, defendant was not participating in
    ISP following that arrest; he was held in jail in Union County,
    where the new charges were pending.
    On November 28, 2011, defendant pled guilty to second-
    degree aggravated assault in return for the State's agreement to
    recommend a term of imprisonment within the range appropriate
    for a third-degree crime — three years, subject to terms of
    parole ineligibility and supervision required by the No Early
    Release Act (NERA) for second-degree assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-
    7.2.   The State further promised to dismiss the second count of
    the indictment and the pending accusations.    In addition, the
    State agreed to recommend that the three-year sentence run
    4
    The pre-sentence report prepared for defendant's sentencing on
    his conviction for second-degree aggravated assault states that
    defendant was "charged with a Parole Violation" on February 17,
    2011, but defendant was participating in ISP and the PSR does
    not indicate that he was on parole for any other prior sentence.
    The PSR also states that defendant "violated ISP within one and
    a half months by committing" the aggravated assault on February
    16, 2011.
    4                          A-1640-12T4
    concurrent with any custodial sentence the ISP panel might
    impose.
    The ISP panel acted first.       On January 13, 2012, 331 days
    after defendant's arrest, the ISP panel resentenced him in
    conformity with Rule 3:21-10(e).      On January 13, the ISP panel
    entered an order stating that it "reimposed original sentence
    and returned [defendant] as a violator." (capitalization
    omitted).   The panel awarded defendant 48 days' "ISP TIME
    CREDIT" — from December 30, 2010 to February 16, 2011, but it
    did not award defendant ISP credit or jail credit for the 337
    days between his arrest and its reimposition of the custodial
    sentence.
    Sentencing on the aggravated assault conviction was
    initially scheduled for February 17, 2012.     Because of a dispute
    about jail credits, defendant was not sentenced until September
    14, 2012.   Thus, defendant was sentenced on his new conviction
    246 days after the ISP panel resentenced him and 210 days after
    his initial sentencing date.
    The judge awarded defendant one day's jail credit for the
    date of his arrest.   That credit is not in dispute.    On the
    ground that defendant's pre-sentence confinement from February
    17, 2011 forward was attributable to defendant's failure to
    satisfactorily perform on ISP, the judge denied defendant jail
    5                           A-1640-12T4
    credits for the 377 days he was confined from the day after his
    arrest until the ISP panel resentenced him on January 13, 2012.
    Nevertheless, considering the plea agreement for concurrency of
    the sentences to be imposed by the ISP panel for the prior
    convictions and by the judge for the aggravated assault
    conviction, he awarded defendant 210 days' jail credit for the
    delay in defendant's sentencing for aggravated assault from
    February 17 to September 13, 2012.   In fact, the State agreed
    that award of the 210 days' jail credit was consistent with the
    plea agreement and does not challenge that award.
    II
    In Hernandez, the Court so significantly clarified "the
    manner in which jail credits, which are earned prior to the
    imposition of the first custodial sentence, are to be awarded
    with respect to multiple charges," that the Court determined the
    decision should be applied "only prospectively to sentences
    imposed as of" the day following issuance of its 
    decision. 208 N.J. at 50-51
    (recognizing that Hernandez "may be deemed
    inconsistent with" prior interpretations of Rule 3:21-8).
    Because Hernandez was decided on June 8, 2011, 
    id. at 24,
    it
    governs the jail credits awarded against defendant's sentence
    for aggravated assault on September 14, 2012.
    6                            A-1640-12T4
    Perhaps because the State framed its argument about credits
    on the assumption that those credits could be awarded on either
    but not both of the sentences, the judge did not consider
    Hernandez.   After all, Hernandez does not mention pre-sentence
    confinement pending a resentencing by the ISP panel for
    "fail[ure] to perform satisfactorily following entry into" ISP,
    R. 3:21-10(e).     The State's narrow focus is improper.
    Hernandez establishes general principles that are
    applicable here.    As recently explained in DiAngelo, "[p]rior to
    Hernandez, when a defendant in custody faced multiple charges,
    [Rule 3:21-8] was interpreted to provide credit 'only for such
    confinement as is attributable to the arrest or other detention
    resulting from the particular offense.'     State v. Black, 
    153 N.J. 438
    , 456 (1998) (citations and internal quotation marks
    omitted)."   
    DiAngelo, supra
    , 434 N.J. Super. at 452.      Thus, the
    parties' effort to identify the sentence to which the jail
    credits would apply was in line with those prior decisions.
    The quest to identify a single sentence to which jail
    credits apply is inappropriate under Hernandez.     The Court made
    it clear that "[w]hen a defendant is confined prior to
    sentencing on multiple charges, the defendant is entitled to
    'credits against all sentences "for any time served in custody
    in jail . . . between arrest and the imposition of sentence" on
    7                           A-1640-12T4
    each case.'"   State v. Rippy, 
    431 N.J. Super. 338
    , 348 (App.
    Div. 2013) (quoting 
    Hernandez, supra
    , 208 N.J. at 28 (quoting R.
    3:21-8)) (emphasis in original), certif. denied, 
    217 N.J. 284
    (2014).   Under that principle,
    A defendant is entitled to jail credits on
    all cases for all days of confinement after
    his arrest in that case and prior to
    imposition of the first sentence, and that
    is so even if a subsequent period of
    confinement is on an arrest for a new charge
    and regardless of matters of happenstance .
    . . such as whether bail on one or more of
    the prior charges has been revoked.
    [Id. at 348; see 
    Hernandez, supra
    , 208 N.J.
    at 48-49.]
    Where a defendant is entitled to jail credits under Rule
    3:21-8 as interpreted in Hernandez, they are "mandatory, not
    discretionary."   
    Hernandez, supra
    , 208 N.J. at 37.   Jail credits
    authorized by Rule 3:21-8 "were conceived as a matter of equal
    protection or fundamental fairness and a means of avoiding the
    double punishment that would result if no such credits" for pre-
    sentence confinement were awarded.    
    Hernandez, supra
    , 208 N.J.
    at 36.
    Because jail credits provide day-for-day credits for time
    spent in custody between arrest and imposition of sentence, R.
    3:21-8; 
    Hernandez, supra
    , 208 N.J. at 28, discretionary grants
    or denials of jail credits "can promote sentence disparity" and
    contravene "the very equal protection [Rule 3:21-8] was designed
    8                        A-1640-12T4
    to promote."   
    Id. at 49.
      Thus, the Hernandez Court held, "there
    is no room for discretion[ary]" decisions on jail credits.      
    Id. at 48-49.
    In this case, defendant was facing conviction and
    sentencing on a new charge and resentencing on prior convictions
    for which his custodial sentence had been changed to permit his
    participation in ISP pursuant to Rule 3:21-10(b)(6).    After that
    change in sentence, defendant was not serving a custodial
    sentence.   He was serving a sentence in the community subject to
    intensive supervision and could do so only for as long as he
    "perform[ed] satisfactorily."    R. 3:21-10(e); see State v. Clay,
    
    230 N.J. Super. 509
    , 516-17 (App. Div. 1989) (discussing ISP
    procedures for addressing violations and resentencing
    procedures), aff'd o.b., 
    118 N.J. 251
    (1990).
    On defendant's failure to meet that standard, "[t]he three-
    judge [ISP] panel [had] the authority to resentence [him], in
    accordance with applicable statutes . . . ."    R. 3:21-10(e); see
    State v. Cannon, 
    128 N.J. 546
    , 554 (1992) (discussing ISP and
    observing that all ISP participants who do not graduate are
    returned to prison).   Thus, under the terms of Rule 3:21-
    10(b)(6), (e), following his arrest and pending resentencing by
    the ISP panel, defendant was not subject to or serving a
    custodial sentence.    He was confined, without custodial
    9                           A-1640-12T4
    sentence, pending resentencing on his 2010 convictions and
    sentencing on his 2011 plea of guilty to aggravated assault.
    During that period of confinement, he was not in the community
    participating in ISP in conformity with his modified sentence,
    and he was not "receiving day for day credit for time spent
    under supervision of the program identical to the credit [he]
    would be receiving if [he] had remained within the custody of
    the Department of Corrections."    
    Clay, supra
    , 230 N.J. Super. at
    520.
    Circumstances material to the jail credits changed
    following the ISP panel's resentencing on January 13, 2012.
    Thereafter, defendant was in custody and serving a custodial
    sentence for his 2010 convictions.     In DiAngelo, a panel of this
    court concluded that a defendant confined pending resentencing
    on an allegation of violating the conditions of probation was
    entitled to jail credits for confinement pending resentencing as
    a consequence of the 
    violation. 434 N.J. Super. at 462
    .   The
    panel rejected the State's contention that a failed probationer
    pending resentencing for violation of the conditions falls
    outside Rule 3:21-8 because the failed probationer is simply
    continuing service of a sentence imposed.     Instead, the panel
    concluded that a resentencing following a violation of probation
    10                         A-1640-12T4
    is a new custodial sentence, one replacing a violated
    probationary sentence.   
    Id. at 454-57.
    We see no reason to reach a different conclusion here.       The
    ISP pamphlet discussed in Clay set forth a resentencing
    procedure and provides that proceedings on violations will
    conform to statutes governing violations of probation,
    specifically N.J.S.A. 2C:45-3 and N.J.S.A. 2C:45-4.     230 N.J.
    Super. at 516-17.
    A failed probationer and a failed participant in ISP are
    similarly situated pending resentencing.    Prior to failure to
    comply with the conditions of the non-custodial sentence, both
    were serving a sentence in the community subject to supervision,
    albeit differing levels of supervision.    After their respective
    failures to comply, they both faced resentencing that could lead
    to a custodial sentence that can be imposed under the law.     R.
    3:21-8; N.J.S.A. 2C:45-3b.   In contrast, they are not similarly
    situated to a parolee who violates the conditions of his or her
    release.   A parolee is released while compliant with parole
    conditions for the uncompleted duration of a custodial sentence.
    The parolee is subject to reincarceration for violation of a
    condition, and upon revocation continues to serve the custodial
    sentence from which he or she had been released.
    11                          A-1640-12T4
    The State's reliance on State v. Black, 
    153 N.J. 438
    (1998)
    and State v. Carreker, 
    172 N.J. 100
    (2002), is misplaced.     As
    the Supreme Court stressed in Hernandez, the defendants seeking
    jail credits in those cases were serving custodial 
    sentences. 208 N.J. at 44-45
    .    Under Hernandez, a defendant who is serving
    another custodial sentence is not entitled to relief under that
    rule, because jail credits do not accrue while a defendant is
    serving a 
    sentence. 208 N.J. at 47
    .
    But this defendant was not serving a custodial sentence
    when he committed, and was arrested for committing, aggravated
    assault in 2011.   Although defendant had previously been serving
    a custodial sentence on the 2010 charges, at the time of the
    aggravated assault and his arrest for it in 2011, this
    defendant's custodial sentence had been changed to permit his
    participation in ISP.     R. 3:21-10(b)(6).
    Rule 3:21-8 requires an award of credits between arrest and
    the imposition of a sentence.    Defendant simply was not serving
    his custodial sentence on any conviction while confined prior to
    the first of his 2012 sentencings — the January 13, 2012 ISP
    panel resentencing.   Under Hernandez, the fact that defendant
    was confined pending resentencing on his 2010 convictions did
    not change the fact that he was also confined pending
    12                        A-1640-12T4
    disposition and sentence on his 2011 guilty plea to aggravated
    assault.
    For all of the foregoing reasons, defendant is entitled to
    331 days' jail credit against his conviction for aggravated
    assault from his arrest on February 16, 2011 to the day before
    he was resentenced by the ISP panel, January 13, 2012.     Whether
    or not defendant was "violated" or detained by authority of the
    ISP is a matter of happenstance.      See 
    Hernandez, supra
    , 208 N.J.
    at 45-49.   He was confined during that period pending
    resentencing on the 2010 conviction and pending sentencing on
    the 2012 conviction.    As the judge awarded defendant one day's
    credit for the date of his arrest, we remand for an award of an
    additional 330 days' jail credit for the period from February
    17, 2011 to January 13, 2012.
    Although the State does not raise the issue, it is
    appropriate for this court to correct an award of jail credits
    made contrary to law.    See 
    Rippy, supra
    , 431 N.J. Super. at 347-
    48.   As previously noted, Hernandez leaves no room for doubt
    that after the first sentence on one of multiple pending charges
    is imposed, jail credits no longer 
    accrue. 208 N.J. at 47
    .    As
    of the day following the issuance of Hernandez, June 9, 2011,
    judges had no discretion to award or deny jail credits where
    none are due under Rule 3:21-8 as interpreted by the Court in
    13                          A-1640-12T4
    that 
    case. 208 N.J. at 48-51
    .   Accordingly, the 210 days' jail
    credit awarded defendant from February 17, 2012 to September 13,
    2012 must be vacated.5
    Given our resolution of the jail credits awarded in this
    case, defendant's remaining arguments have insufficient merit to
    warrant any additional discussion.     R. 2:11-3(e)(2).   To the
    extent that defendant argues that he understood the agreement to
    provide credit for all pre-sentence confinement against his
    sentence, we do not understand Hernandez to authorize a plea
    agreement for jail credits that is contrary to law.       In any
    event, because defendant did not move to vacate his guilty plea,
    the question is not properly before us.
    Affirmed as modified and remanded for adjustment of jail
    credits in conformity with this opinion.
    5
    Defendant does not seek gap-time credits against his sentence
    for aggravated assault, which includes a NERA parole
    ineligibility term. As the Supreme Court noted in Hernandez,
    gap-time credits awarded to a defendant on a sentence subject to
    NERA parole ineligibility are likely to have no 
    benefit. 208 N.J. at 38-41
    .
    14                          A-1640-12T4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-1640-12

Citation Numbers: 436 N.J. Super. 106, 92 A.3d 675

Filed Date: 6/17/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014