JACQUELINE JALIL VS. PILGRIM MEDICAL CENTERET AL. (L-7913-13, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )


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  •                         NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-2906-15T4
    JACQUELINE JALIL, LUISA
    ROJAS, and TANIA MENA,
    Plaintiffs-Respondents,
    v.
    PILGRIM MEDICAL CENTER and
    DR. NICHOLAS CAMPANELLA,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    _________________________________
    Submitted May 2, 2017 – Decided May 9, 2017
    Before Judges Fasciale and Sapp-Peterson.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-7913-
    13.
    Crew Schielke, attorney for appellants.
    Deutsch   Atkins,    P.C.,   attorneys  for
    respondents (Adam J. Kleinfeldt and Kathryn
    K. McClure, of counsel and on the brief;
    Michael Malatino, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Pilgrim Medical Center (PMC) and Nicholas V. Campanella, M.D.
    (Dr. Campanella) (collectively defendants) appeal from a March 4,
    2016 order denying defendant's cross-motion to vacate default
    judgment, quash an information subpoena, reinstate an answer, and
    extend discovery.         Judge Dennis F. Carey, who was thoroughly
    familiar with the case, entered the order and rendered an oral
    opinion.       We affirm.
    In October 2013, Jacqueline Jalil, Luisa Rojas, and Tania
    Mena    (collectively        plaintiffs),        filed   a     complaint      against
    defendants alleging violations of the New Jersey Law Against
    Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49.                      In February 2014,
    defendants filed an answer.            Thereafter, the parties proceeded to
    pre-trial discovery.
    In April 2014, plaintiffs propounded interrogatories and a
    notice to produce documents.              Defendants failed to respond.              In
    September 2014, plaintiffs' counsel notified defendants' counsel
    about the deficiency.           Defendants ignored the notice.            Plaintiffs
    then   filed    a   motion      to    suppress    defendants'        answer   without
    prejudice pursuant to Rule 4:23-5(a)(1) for failure to answer
    interrogatories.
    In   November      2014,       defendants    served         plaintiffs     with
    interrogatory       answers     and   responses    to    plaintiffs'      notice     to
    produce.       Plaintiffs' counsel withdrew the motion, but wrote
    defendants'     counsel     a    letter   identifying        the    deficiencies     in
    discovery.
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    Defendants' counsel did not respond to the letter.                In May
    2015, plaintiffs' counsel sent a sixteen-page deficiency letter
    itemizing the inadequate responses that went to the foundation of
    the cause of action.         The letter provided specifics as to the
    discovery    problems       and    stated     that    defendants   responded
    "ambiguously"       to   "nearly   every    [d]ocument      [r]equest,"     and
    explained    that    many   requests   went    unanswered.      Once    again,
    defendants' counsel did not respond.
    In May 2015, plaintiffs filed a second motion to suppress
    defendants' answer without prejudice pursuant to Rule 4:23-5(a)(1)
    for failure to answer interrogatories.               Plaintiffs also filed a
    motion to compel production of the outstanding documents pursuant
    to Rule 4:23-5(c).          In June 2015, defendants'         first counsel
    withdrew and a new attorney filed a substitution of attorney. Both
    lawyers received notice of the motions.
    On June 26, 2015, the judge granted both motions, which were
    unopposed.   He suppressed defendants' answer without prejudice for
    failure to answer interrogatories pursuant to Rule 4:23-5(a)(1)
    and (2); and on the same date, he compelled defendants to provide
    by July 12, 2015, more specific responses to plaintiffs' document
    request pursuant to Rule 4:23-5(c).           Plaintiffs' counsel properly
    served the orders on the new attorney, which defendants duly
    ignored.
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    On July 21, 2015, plaintiffs moved to suppress defendants'
    answer pursuant to Rule 4:23-2(b), not Rule 4:23-5(a)(2), arguing
    that   defendants     failed       to    comply   with    the    June     2015     order
    compelling production of documents by a date certain.                         Defendants
    did not oppose the motion. On August 7, 2015, the court suppressed
    defendants'       answer    with        prejudice.        The        record    reflects
    plaintiffs' counsel properly served that order on defendants' new
    attorney.
    In September 2015, and on notice to counsel,                           the court
    scheduled a proof hearing for October 15, 2015.                         At the proof
    hearing, which defendants and their counsel failed to appear,
    plaintiffs testified about their employment, termination, and
    economic    and    emotional   distress        damages.         In    November     2015,
    plaintiffs' counsel filed a motion for attorneys' fees and costs.
    On the return date of that motion, defendants' counsel filed
    opposition only to the fee application.                 On December 4, 2015, the
    court entered final judgment by default.                 Thereafter, plaintiffs
    recorded a lien on their default judgment under Docket No. J-
    021645-16.
    Plaintiffs engaged in supplementary proceedings by serving
    several information subpoenas.                 Defendants failed to respond,
    which resulted in plaintiffs filing a motion to enforce litigants'
    rights   in   January      2016.        That   month,    a   third      attorney      for
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    defendants filed a partial substitution of attorney and entered
    an appearance as defendants' co-counsel. In March 2016, co-counsel
    filed another substitution of attorney after defendants' second
    counsel withdrew.
    On February 10, 2016, defendants filed a cross-motion to
    vacate default judgment, quash plaintiffs' subpoenas, reinstate
    defendants' answer and reopen discovery for a period of 120 days.
    On March 4, 2016, the court denied defendants' cross-motion, and
    in a separate order, the court granted plaintiffs' motion to
    enforce litigants' rights.
    The   judge   denied   defendants'   motion   to   vacate   default
    judgment and wrote on the order that defendants did not show a
    meritorious defense or excusable neglect pursuant to Rule 4:50-1.
    The judge stated in his oral opinion that defendants did not oppose
    the motion to suppress with prejudice and did not oppose the
    request to schedule a proof hearing. In denying defendants' cross-
    motion, Judge Carey considered the arguments and stated further
    that
    [a]s far as excusable neglect goes, it is
    clear to this court, without question, that
    the   attorneys   representing   the  --   the
    defendant throughout the course of this
    litigation ha[ve] been extremely neglectful,
    dilatory and has just basically ignored the
    file. But plaintiff[s'] counsel have gone out
    of their way to notice them, to try to contact
    them and despite all of the notices and
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    contact, no action was taken, and this court
    is satisfied without question that there is
    no excusable neglect here.
    On appeal, defendants argue generally that they are entitled
    to relief pursuant to Rule 4:50-1.         Defendants also contend that
    the judge failed to follow the two-step process of suppressing an
    answer pursuant to Rule 4:23-5(a)(1) and (2).         They contend that
    plaintiffs    circumvented   this   rule    by   prematurely   moving    to
    suppress the answer with prejudice.
    We conclude that defendants' arguments as to the suppression
    of their answer with prejudice are untimely and without sufficient
    merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.               R. 2:11-
    3(e)(1)(E).
    Turning to defendants' Rule 4:50-1 contentions, we review the
    trial court's decision on a motion to vacate a default judgment
    for abuse of discretion.     Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Russo,
    
    429 N.J. Super. 91
    , 98 (App. Div. 2012).            "'The trial court's
    determination under [Rule 4:50-1] warrants substantial deference,'
    and the abuse of discretion must be clear to warrant reversal."
    
    Ibid.
       (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v.
    Guillaume, 
    209 N.J. 449
    , 467 (2012)).        "[An] abuse of discretion
    only arises on demonstration of 'manifest error or injustice[,]'"
    Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 
    194 N.J. 6
    , 20 (2008) (quoting State v. Torres,
    
    183 N.J. 554
    , 572 (2005)), and occurs when the trial judge's
    6                             A-2906-15T4
    "decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably
    departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible
    basis."    Milne v. Goldenberg, 
    428 N.J. Super. 184
    , 197 (App. Div.
    2012) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cty. Prosecutor, 
    171 N.J. 561
    , 571
    (2002)).
    We will not disturb a default judgment unless the failure to
    appear or otherwise defend was excusable under the circumstances
    and unless the defendant has a meritorious defense to both the
    cause of action and damages.    Guillaume, 
    supra,
     
    209 N.J. at
    468-
    69.   Attorney carelessness or lack of proper diligence does not
    constitute excusable neglect unless "attributable to [an] honest
    mistake" that is compatible with due diligence or reasonable
    prudence.    Baumann v. Marinaro, 
    95 N.J. 380
    , 394 (1984) (quoting
    In re T, 
    95 N.J. Super. 228
    , 235 (App. Div. 1967)); see also
    Quagliato v. Bodner, 
    115 N.J. Super. 133
    , 138 (App. Div. 1971)
    (holding that excusable neglect under Rule 4:50-1(a) does not
    include an attorney's tardiness on the day a motion he was opposing
    was listed and consequently argued and disposed of in his absence).
    Even assuming that defendants have a meritorious defense,
    which defendants have not established on this record, there exists
    no excusable neglect attributable to an honest mistake that was
    compatible with due diligence or reasonable prudence.    We reject
    any suggestion that defendants' attorneys did not receive notices
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    on the various motions or proof hearing.            Such an assertion is
    belied by the record.
    Defendants fare no better under Rule 4:50-1(f), which permits
    courts to vacate judgments for "any other reason justifying relief
    from the operation of the judgment or order." The Court has stated
    that "[b]ecause of the importance that we attach to the finality
    of judgments, relief under Rule 4:50-1(f) is available only when
    'truly exceptional circumstances are present.'"              Hous. Auth. of
    Morristown v. Little, 
    135 N.J. 274
    , 286 (1994) (quoting Baumann
    
    supra,
     
    95 N.J. at 395
    ); see also Guillaume, 
    supra,
     
    209 N.J. at 484
    .    The rule is limited to "situations in which, were it not
    applied, a grave injustice would occur."          Little, 
    supra,
     
    135 N.J. at 289
    .    Defendant's inexcusable failure to repeatedly respond to
    ongoing discovery deficiencies and an order to compel production
    of   documents     does   not   qualify   as   exceptional    circumstances
    warranting relief under this subsection.
    Affirmed.
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