STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. RAHSJAHN COURTNEY (15-06-0324, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2805-17T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
RAHSJAHN COURTNEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Submitted March 19, 2019 – Decided April 3, 2019
Before Judges Gilson and Natali.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Somerset County, Indictment No. 15-06-
0324.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Daniel S. Rockoff, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Michael H. Robertson, Somerset County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Paul H. Heinzel, Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief.
PER CURIAM
Defendant Rahsjahn Courtney appeals from his sentence following his
2017 conviction for first-degree possession of heroin. Defendant, who pled
guilty, argues the sentencing court improperly rejected his request for
imposition of a lesser sentence than the one recommended by the State because
the court mistakenly determined it was obligated to impose the recommended
sentence. We disagree and affirm.
I.
Defendant was charged in an indictment with a single count of first-degree
possession of heroin with intent to distribute, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1)
and (b)(1). The charges were based on the seizure of approximately 7000 folds
of heroin, some of which were laced with fentanyl, from defendant's vehicle.
In 2010, defendant was convicted of third-degree possession of cocaine
with the intent to distribute, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1), for which he
successfully completed three years of probation. As a result, if defendant was
convicted of the possession with intent to distribute heroin charge, he was
eligible, upon application by the State, to a mandatory extended term sentence
and minimum period of parole ineligibility under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f).
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Defendant negotiated a plea agreement with the State. In exchange for
pleading guilty to the first-degree possession and distribution charge, the State
agreed to recommend a fourteen-year custodial sentence with a
sixty-three-month period of parole ineligibility. The State also agreed not to
request a mandatory extended term sentence under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f), which
would have exposed defendant to a sentence of twenty years to life and a period
of parole ineligibility of between one-third and one-half the base term.
It is clear from the record that defendant understood that his conviction
for first-degree possession with intent to distribute exposed him to a mandatory
extended term sentence and period of parole ineligibility under N.J.S.A.
2C:43-6(f). For example, before he entered his plea, the State prepared a Plea
Negotiation Worksheet in accordance with the Attorney General guidelines,
issued pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in State v. Brimage, 153 N.J. 1(1998). The worksheet showed defendant's "[m]ost serious Brimage-eligible
offense" was for first-degree distribution, and defendant's conviction subjected
him to a mandatory extended term sentence under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f).
In addition, defendant's plea form expressly provided that the "State and
defendant agreed that defendant will be sentenced to [fourteen] years in [New
Jersey State Prison] with [sixty-three] months to be served without parole." It
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further stated that the "plea agreement is based on the State's agreement not to
file [for] an [e]xtended [t]erm pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f)." In a
supplemental plea form "for non-negotiated pleas" executed by defendant, the
State, and the sentencing judge, defendant acknowledged that the court would
sentence him as stated in the plea form. 1
Further, consistent with the Plea Negotiation Worksheet, the State set
forth its plea offer in a written communication to defendant. The State tendered
a graduated plea offer with an initial offer (which expired after the arraignment
status conference) of twenty years with a fifty-four-month parole disqualifier;
followed by a second offer (which expired two weeks after the conference) of
twenty-two years with a sixty-month parole disqualifier; and a third offer (which
expired at the pre-trial conference) of twenty-four years with a parole
ineligibility period of sixty-three months. This third offer was still in effect
when the State agreed to a ten-year reduction in defendant's base term to
fourteen years with a sixty-three-month parole disqualifier.
1
Despite the court using the "non-negotiated" plea form, the parties do not
dispute that defendant entered a negotiated plea as confirmed by the
aforementioned record and a March 14, 2018 Rule 2:5-1(b) supplemental
statement submitted by the trial judge.
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Finally, during the plea proceeding, the court confirmed with the State and
defendant the terms of the negotiated plea as evidenced by the following
colloquy:
Court: And so you understand what the plea
recommended sentence is. It is going to be [fourteen]
years in New Jersey State Prison. You are going to get
– to be sentenced to a [sixty-three-month] parole
stipulation, meaning five years and three months before
you are eligible for parole. Do you understand that?
Defendant: Yes.
Court: And that plea agreement is in exchange for the
State not seeking an extended term, which would have
put you to [twenty] years to life. Do you understand
that?
Defendant: Yes
Court: And I have indicated to counsel and I have
indicated on the record and I have indicated by signing
this form that the court will impose and go along with
that agreement, [fourteen] years with [a] [sixty-three]
month parole stipulation. Do you understand that?
Defendant: Yes.
At sentencing, defense counsel, while acknowledging the parties' plea
agreement, nevertheless requested a reduced sentence, stating, "well an
agreement is an agreement – [but] if the Prosecutor agrees that [defendant] was
just a mule, [then], perhaps, your Honor might consider a lower sentence." After
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considering defendant's request, and the aggravating and mitigating factors, the
court sentenced defendant consistent with the plea agreement. This appeal
followed.
Defendant raises the following issue on appeal:2
BECAUSE THE SENTENCING COURT
ERRONEOUSLY PRESUMED THAT A PLEA
AGREEMENT FORECLOSED JUDICIAL
IMPOSITION OF A LOWER SENTENCE THAN
RECOMMENDED BY THE STATE, THIS MATTER
REQUIRES A REMAND FOR RESENTENCING
II.
Before we address defendant's argument, we discuss the relevant
principles governing sentencing for offenses under the Comprehensive Drug
Reform Act of 1987 (CDRA), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-1 to 36A-1. The Legislature
enacted the CDRA to "provide for the strict punishment, deterrence[,] and
incapacitation of the most culpable and dangerous drug offenders." Brimage,
153 N.J. at 8 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:35-1.1). Accordingly, the CDRA provides
for mandatory sentences and periods of parole ineligibility for certain offenses.
Ibid.; see, e.g., N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f); see also State v. Bridges, 252 N.J. Super.
2
In a pro se supplemental submission, defendant asserts that in considering the
aggravating and mitigating factors, the sentencing court incorrectly noted that
his previous conviction was for possession of heroin, rather than cocaine.
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286, 291 (App. Div. 1991) (listing the CDRA provisions that establish ordinary
and extended term sentences and periods of parole ineligibility).
However, the CDRA provides an exception to the imposition of a
mandatory sentence and period of parole ineligibility when the parties negotiate
a plea. In that circumstance, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12,3 a prosecutor is
permitted to "waive the minimum mandatory sentence specified for any offense
under the CDRA." Brimage, 153 N.J. at 3. As a result, a defendant accused of
a crime under the CDRA may be relieved of a mandatory sentence and period
3
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 provides in pertinent part:
Whenever an offense defined in this chapter specifies a
mandatory sentence of imprisonment which includes a
minimum term during which the defendant shall be
ineligible for parole, [or] a mandatory extended term
which includes a period of parole ineligibility, . . . the
court upon conviction shall impose the mandatory
sentence . . . unless the defendant has pleaded guilty
pursuant to a negotiated agreement . . . which provides
for a lesser sentence, [or] period of parole ineligibility
. . . . The negotiated plea . . . agreement may provide
for a specified term of imprisonment within the range
of ordinary or extended sentences authorized by law,
[or] a specified period of parole ineligibility . . . . In
that event, the court at sentencing shall not impose a
lesser term of imprisonment, [or] lesser period of parole
ineligibility . . . than that expressly provided for under
the terms of the plea or post-conviction agreement.
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of parole ineligibility. State v. Thomas, 253 N.J. Super. 368, 373 (App. Div.
1992).
"[T]he purpose of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 is to permit the prosecutor to make
an agreement 'which provides for a lesser sentence or [lesser] period of parole
ineligibility' within the 'range of ordinary or extended sentences authorized by
law' for violating the [CDRA]." Bridges, 252 N.J. Super. at 290-91 (second
alteration in original) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12). A negotiated waiver of the
CDRA's mandatory sentencing requirements provides "incentives for defendants
to cooperate with law enforcement authorities," "encourage[s] plea bargaining,"
and promotes "the prompt disposition of drug-related criminal charges and . . .
imposition of punishment." State v. Thomas, 392 N.J. Super. 169, 178 (App.
Div. 2007) (citing Brimage, 153 N.J. at 9).
The Attorney General guidelines, mandated by our Supreme Court in
Brimage, govern plea agreements under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12. Brimage, 153 N.J.
at 24-25; see Revised Attorney General Guidelines for Negotiating Cases Under
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 (July 15, 2004). The guidelines provide uniform standards
for plea offers for CDRA offenses, and aim to reduce the occurrence of
inconsistency in sentencing. Brimage, 153 N.J. at 13. Thus, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12
A-2805-17T4
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negotiated plea agreements must be made in accordance with the Brimage
guidelines. Id. at 24-25.
Under the plain language of the statute, a court's sentencing discretion is
limited where a plea agreement recommends a custodial sentence or minimum
period of parole ineligibility less than otherwise mandated by the CDRA. "[A]
trial judge who accepts a plea agreement in which the State recommends a
sentence less severe than the sentence mandated by the [CDRA] may not impose
an even lesser sentence." Thomas, 253 N.J. Super. at 373; see also Brimage,
153 N.J. at 9 ("N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 requires the sentencing court to enforce all
agreements reached by the prosecutor and a defendant under that section and
prohibits the court from imposing a lesser term of imprisonment than that
specified in the agreement"). "However, unless the prosecutor's
recommendation is for 'a lesser sentence or period of parole ineligibility' than
the [CDRA] mandates, [N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12] does not limit the judge's sentencing
discretion to accepting or rejecting the recommendation." Thomas, 253 N.J.
Super. at 374.
III.
Here, defendant argues the sentencing court improperly rejected his
request for imposition of a lesser sentence because it mistakenly determined
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N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 required the court to impose the negotiated sentence. Relying
on State v. Warren, 115 N.J. 433, 442 (1989), defendant contends that "[a]
sentencing court always retains sentencing discretion to impose any lesser legal
sentence." Defendant also maintains that because the State agreed not to move
for an extended term under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f), he was not subject to a
mandatory CDRA sentence, and therefore, the court's discretion to impose a
lesser term was not limited pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12, because the
fourteen-year prison term was not lesser than the ordinary sentencing range of
ten to twenty years. We disagree.
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 applies "[w]henever an offense defined in [the CDRA]
specifies a mandatory sentence of imprisonment . . . [or] period of parole
ineligibility . . . ." "Words and phrases shall be read and construed with their
context" and "be given their generally accepted meaning, according to the
approved usage of the language," "unless inconsistent with the manifest intent
of the legislature or unless another or different meaning is expressly indicated."
N.J.S.A. 1:1-1. "'Specify' means to name in a specific or explicit manner; to
state precisely or in detail, to point out, to particularize, or to designate b y words
one thing from another." Carteret Properties v. Variety Donuts, Inc., 49 N.J.
116, 124 (1967).
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N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f), is included as a part of the CDRA, State v. Lagares,
127 N.J. 23, 35 (1992), and specifically identifies the CDRA offenses which are
subject to the imposition of mandatory sentences and periods of parole
ineligibility upon the prosecutor's request. See State v. Patterson, 435 N.J.
Super. 498, 516 (App. Div. 2014) (discussing the "list of offenses eligible for a
mandatory extended term" in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f)). Specifically, N.J.S.A.
2C:43-6(f) provides that where a defendant has a prior conviction for possession
of CDS and is convicted of a second offense, the court "shall upon application
of the prosecuting attorney be sentenced . . . to an extended term . . . ,
notwithstanding that extended terms are ordinarily discretionary with the court."
Additionally, the statute requires the term of imprisonment, "except as may be
provided in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12," to include the imposition of a minimum term,
"fixed at, or between, one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed . . . or
three years, whichever is greater . . . ." N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f). As such, we are
satisfied that defendant pleaded guilty to an offense for which the CDRA
specifies a mandatory extended term and parole ineligibility period. See
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 and N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f).
The plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 does not require the State to
formally move for the imposition of a mandatory extended term sentence and
A-2805-17T4
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parole ineligibility period, a request it would otherwise be required to make
under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f). Rather, the statute applies only where the State and
a defendant enter into a plea agreement involving an offense for which the
CDRA specifies a mandatory sentence or period of parole ineligibility. As
discussed, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f) specifies both a mandatory extended term
sentence and parole ineligibility period for first-degree possession of CDS.
Therefore, we reject defendant's assertion that he was not subject to
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f)'s mandatory sentencing requirements. Pursuant to N.J.S.A.
2C:35-12, the State is expressly permitted to negotiate away its right to require
imposition of mandatory sentences. The statute permits the State to waive
mandatory sentences for CDRA offenses in order to incentivize drug offenders'
cooperation with law enforcement and to allow for the efficient disposition of
CDRA cases. See Thomas, 392 N.J. Super. at 178; Bridges, 252 N.J. Super. at
290-91. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 was not rendered inapplicable simply because the
State agreed not to request the imposition of an extended term under N.J.S.A.
2C:43-6(f).
As we have concluded N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 applies, we must next consider
whether the court properly sentenced defendant in accordance with the statute's
requirements. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f), the mandatory extended term
A-2805-17T4
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sentence specified for defendant's conviction for first-degree possession offense
is from twenty years to life imprisonment. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7(a)(2) and -7(c).
Additionally, the mandatory period of parole ineligibility is between eighty
months and, for a sentence of life imprisonment, twenty-five years. N.J.S.A.
2C:43-7(c). Defendant's plea agreement provided for a lesser custodial sentence
of fourteen years and therefore, the court was required to impose the
fourteen-year sentence pursuant to the plea agreement. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12; see
also Thomas, 253 N.J. Super. at 373 ("A trial judge who accepts a plea
agreement in which the State recommends a sentence less severe than the
sentence mandated by the act may not impose an even lesser sentence.").
To the extent not specifically addressed, defendant's remaining arguments
are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.
2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
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