STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. LORETTA C. BURROUGHS (14-04-0789, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4590-14T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
LORETTA C. BURROUGHS,
a/k/a LORETTA D. DOYLE,
LORETTA DOYLD, LORETTA
THOMAS, LORETTA C. TOKASH,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
Submitted March 16, 2017 – Decided May 24, 2017
Before Judges Lihotz and Hoffman.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Atlantic County, Indictment No.
14-04-0789.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Rochelle Watson, Assistant
Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the
brief).
Damon G. Tyner, Atlantic County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Courtney M.
Cittadini, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel
and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Following a jury trial, defendant Loretta C. Burroughs was
convicted of the murder of her husband, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and
(2) (count one), and third-degree hindering apprehension, N.J.S.A.
2C:29-3(b)(1) (count two). She was sentenced to a prison term of
fifty-five years, subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA),
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. Defendant now appeals from the May 13, 2015
judgment of conviction, arguing:
POINT I
THE PROSECUTOR EXCEEDED THE BOUNDS OF
PROPRIETY DURING OPENING STATEMENTS WHEN HE
COMPARED DEFENDANT TO THE CONNIVING WOLF IN
"LITTLE RED RIDING HOOD" AND DURING SUMMATION
WHEN HE IMPLORED THE JURY TO DENY DEFENDANT
"ONE LAST FAVOR," I.E., AN ACQUITTAL.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT TWO
NINETEEN-YEAR-OLD CONVICTIONS, FOR WHICH
DEFENDANT WAS RELEASED FROM CONFINEMENT
SEVENTEEN YEARS AGO, WERE ADMISSIBLE TO
IMPEACH DEFENDANT'S CREDIBILITY.
POINT III
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING AGGRAVATING
FACTOR SIX AND IN FAILING TO FIND MITIGATING
FACTOR SEVEN, ON THE BASIS OF NINETEEN-YEAR-
OLD CONVICTIONS.
We affirm.
I.
Daniel Burroughs, defendant's husband, was last seen alive
by next-door neighbor Ronald Roberts on August 2, 2007. At that
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time, defendant told people the couple had been discussing a move
from Mays Landing to Florida. Defendant expressed the move was
imminent and related her reluctance to leave her daughter Nicole
DiDomizio and grandchildren, who lived in New Jersey. DiDomizio
testified defendant told her she would not move to Florida and
believed Daniel would move without her. Defendant asked DiDomizio
not to reveal her intentions to stay in New Jersey until after
Daniel left for Florida.
DiDomizio wanted to wish Daniel well, but did not want to
betray defendant's confidence. She purchased a card expressing
the sentiment "good luck on your trip." She gave it to Daniel
when defendant was not home, and he seemed confused, asking,
"[W]hat is this for?"
Earlier, in June 2007, defendant, who worked in an assisted
living facility, met Enid Hyberg, the daughter of a resident.
Defendant solicited Hyberg, an attorney, to prepare Daniel's power
of attorney, which authorized defendant to act for him in the sale
of their home. Defendant told Hyberg Daniel would be out of town
at various points during the sale and it was more convenient for
her to handle any paperwork. As Daniel's attorney-in-fact,
defendant was empowered to "execute the contract, to attend
closing, to sign closing papers, and to deal with the proceeds of
the sale of the home." Hyberg recognized this as "really a very
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standard and routine circumstance[,] under which you would have a
power of attorney."
During this same period, Ed Dwyer's mother was a resident of
defendant's assisted living facility. Defendant told him she
needed a power of attorney notarized because her husband left for
Florida and although they sold their house, the "deal wasn't
finished." She asked Dwyer if he knew anyone who could notarize
the document for her. Dwyer agreed to present Daniel's power of
attorney to his sister-in-law, who was a notary. During trial,
the notary testified she did not date the document. Reviewing the
document marked for identification, the notary stated someone
added the date after she completed the notarization.
DiDomizio, who was not familiar with Daniel's signature,
thought the signature and date affixed on the power of attorney,
resembled her mother's handwriting. On the other hand, Daniel's
close friend and neighbor, Robert Valiante, thought Daniel would
execute a power of attorney because he was not a detailed
"paperwork guy." In addition, Daniel's brother, Raymond
Wantorcik, stated he thought the signature on the power of attorney
appeared to be Daniel's.
DiDomizio also related events occurring after Daniel
disappeared. On August 3, 2007, defendant, DiDomizio, and her
family were scheduled to attend a three-day pre-arranged trip to
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Sesame Place. Defendant arrived at the DiDomizio's home several
hours late. While waiting for defendant to arrive, DiDomizio
called defendant's cell and home phones numerous times and received
no answer. When defendant finally arrived, she was frantic, crying
and "completely emotional." Initially, defendant offered no
reason for her late arrival; eventually, she admitted she fought
with Daniel. DiDomizio recalled during the three-day trip,
defendant excused herself stating she was going to her room to
call Daniel. DiDomizio heard defendant talking to someone,
although she did not hear the conversation and could not confirm
it was Daniel.
Shortly after they returned from Sesame Place, defendant
revealed additional details regarding her alleged difficulty with
Daniel. Defendant told DiDomizio Daniel "left her, he had just
gone and left everything behind because he was angry." Later,
defendant stated Daniel went to Florida with another woman, who
drove a yellow Hummer. DiDomizio testified defendant never told
the same story regarding Daniel's departure, and it was difficult
to keep track of all the variations.
DiDomizio also discussed the couple's past relationship
difficulties. For years, defendant expressed her feeling Daniel
would leave her because defendant had an affair in the 1990s.
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Therefore, DiDomizio was not surprised Daniel left, but she was
surprised he left without his belongings.
In the ensuing weeks, defendant asked DiDomizio to help her
sell Daniel's tools and construction equipment, stating she was
in "dire financial strai[]ts." With DiDomizio's help in drafting
ads, defendant sold "everything that she could" through sites like
Craigslist and Ebay, including Daniel's drum set, amplifiers,
model airplanes, and a jet boat. The title to Daniel's pick-up
truck was later transferred to DiDomizio, who stated, "there was
pretty much nothing that remained of Dan's by the time everything
was done and said."
Defendant also solicited help from Roberts to sell Daniel's
tools, which another friend estimated were valued at $10,000 to
$12,000; his construction equipment valued between $5,000 and
$6,000; and his boat, worth approximately $2,500. Roberts assisted
defendant in the sale of many of Daniel's tools, and she gave him
a compressor and a model helicopter for his son.
While Roberts was helping defendant catalogue the various
tools, he noticed a smell "like a roadkill." Defendant told him
the odor emanated from a dead groundhog Daniel killed, but left
beneath a tarp. When Roberts returned the next day, the tarp was
gone and he saw mothballs spread along the ground.
6 A-4590-14T2
Defendant asked Roberts, and he agreed, to cut open a home
safe. When the open safe's contents revealed a few documents,
defendant yelled, "Oh my [G]od, he took my money." Finally,
Roberts noted defendant said she injured her back moving a trellis
that had blown over. Roberts never saw the trellis down.
Daniel's brother, Wantorcik, also testified. He explained
in late July 2007, Daniel suffered a shoulder injury, which
required surgery. He often called to check on Daniel's recovery.
Wantorcik noted Daniel seemed "very lethargic" and "slow" and
defendant was overseeing administration of his medication since
he was home.
During an August 10, 2007 call, defendant told Wantorcik
Daniel left for Florida. Wantorcik questioned defendant, who
replied, "he left me for a younger woman, Raymond, he left me, he
left me." Wantorcik was skeptical. He knew Daniel wanted to sell
his home and move to Florida, but did not believe Daniel would
ever leave without selling the house.
Wantorcik's suspicions led him to visit defendant's home
unannounced the following weekend. He found defendant in one of
Daniel's sheds with a notepad, appearing to take an inventory of
the tools and equipment. When she saw Wantorcik, defendant seemed
startled, then "turned on the tears." She told him how upset she
was because Daniel left her and said neighbors saw a yellow Hummer
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with a Florida license plate in front of the house. Wantorcik
noted two pieces of heavy equipment were missing and defendant
explained Daniel sold them before he left town and took all of the
money in the family safe.
Wantorcik returned the next weekend. He noted more tools
missing. Defendant asserted Daniel sold them before he left. Over
the ensuing weeks, defendant repeatedly told Wantorcik Daniel
called and instructed his brother could have any of his belongings.
Wantorcik requested defendant record her next phone call, then,
"all of a sudden[, Daniel] didn't call anymore."
Wantorcik became very suspicions because "nothing added up,
nothing made sense." He told defendant he intended to file a
missing persons report. Defendant retorted: "Why the fuck do you
gotta do that? I just told you he called this morning." Wantorcik
went to the Hamilton Township Police Department (HTPD) on September
1, 2007, because he "knew [his] brother was dead."
HTPD Officer James Jacobi took Wantorcik's report and entered
Daniel's name into the national missing persons database. In his
report, Officer Jacobi recorded comments from his interview with
defendant. She stated she last saw Daniel on August 14, 2007, and
repeated that Daniel ran off with a younger woman driving a yellow
Hummer. She insisted Daniel took his personal belongings and
their money, which they kept in a home safe. She acknowledged
8 A-4590-14T2
Daniel left his cell phone and insisted he called twice using a
private number. Defendant related, Daniel told her he intended
to return in a couple weeks "to settle things up."
The police interviewed Daniel's friend, Valiante. Shortly
after Daniel's disappearance, defendant called Valiante and told
him Daniel moved to Florida with another woman. At defendant's
request, Valiante went to the home. Defendant offered to sell
Valiante Daniel's tools. Valiante expressed reluctance and was
struck when defendant told him not to worry because "he's not
coming back." Valiante was skeptical of defendant's story as he
did not believe Daniel would leave without telling him or before
he sold his home.
Valiante also noticed a very strong odor in the backyard and
saw mothballs strewn on the ground. Defendant told him the smell
was a dead woodchuck. He testified he rejected this explanation
because the odor did not resemble the smell of a dead animal.
Valiante also observed defendant was not moving well. She stated
she hurt her back moving the trellis, which he did not think
appeared to have fallen over.
Valiante's suspicions motivated him to tape a phone
conversation with defendant. At trial, the State played the
recording for the jury, and provided a written transcription of
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the conversation. During the call, defendant claimed Daniel left
her for another woman, and took their savings.
New Jersey State Police Lieutenant Wanda Stojanov was
assigned to the missing persons investigation. Lieutenant
Stojanov interviewed defendant twice, and her trial testimony
noted inconsistencies in defendant's statements.
Lieutenant Stojanov first spoke with defendant on November
7, 2007. Defendant described her trip to Sesame Place with her
daughter's family, and stated Daniel was gone when she returned
on August 5. Defendant reiterated her belief Daniel left with
another woman, and stated she saw a yellow Hummer with Florida
registration parked at her home. Defendant also told Lieutenant
Stojanov Daniel called to insist he receive one-half of the
proceeds from the sale of their home. Defendant admitted Daniel
left his watch, cell phone, and wallet. Lieutenant Stojanov
inspected the backyard, with defendant's consent. She recorded
"nothing evidentiary" and did not detect any unusual odor.
Almost a year later, on September 10, 2008, Lieutenant
Stojanov spoke to defendant a second time. In this interview,
defendant's account of events changed. Defendant told Lieutenant
Stojanov Daniel was home when she returned from the trip with her
daughter's family, but she learned he left the next day, while she
was working. She also claimed she saw a yellow truck leave her
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residence and insisted Daniel took his watch, wallet, birth
certificate, and personal items.
Defendant sold the former marital home, and placed the
proceeds in an escrow account. She relocated to Corbin City,
retained counsel, and filed for divorce, citing no-fault grounds
of eighteen months separation. Claiming she was unaware of
Daniel's address, an order permitted service through publication.
The final judgment of divorce awarded defendant half the escrowed
sale proceeds as equitable distribution. A post-judgment
application resulted in an order releasing the remaining monies
to defendant as alimony.
Defendant moved to Ventnor. On May 15, 2013, police executed
a warrant to search this residence to look for documents relating
to the sale of the marital home. Earlier, a warrant allowed police
to search the grounds of the Mays Landing property accompanied by
a cadaver dog, which proved fruitless. When Atlantic County
Prosecutor's Office Detective Lynne Dougherty informed defendant
police were about to search her Ventnor home, she witnessed
defendant's reaction as: her "whole body sunk," "[s]he lost color
in her face[,]" began wringing her hands, and seemed nervous.
Atlantic County Prosecutor's Office Detective Caroline
MacDonald, of the Forensic Crime Scene Unit, participated in the
search of the Ventnor residence. In an upstairs closet, detectives
11 A-4590-14T2
found human remains inside two large Tupperware containers. Each
container was wrapped in nine layers of plastic trash bags, with
scented beads and dryer sheets between each layer. Detectives
noticed a strong odor of decomposition and notified the medical
examiner, who transported the containers to the morgue.
The first container held the "entire right upper extremity"
of a human body, a human skull and a purse lying in decomposition
fluid, which contained the separated jaw bone. The remainder of
the body was in the second container and included the left upper
arm, pelvis, lower vertebrae, and both legs, along with a knife
sharpener. The medical examiner determined the cause of death was
homicide, and the "circumstances surrounding the death . . . was
assault[] by another person." The extent of decomposition
prohibited the State's expert forensic scientists from
conclusively identifying the cause of death, but the experts
detailed various knife cuts, saw marks, and trauma inflicted upon
the body.
The State presented two forensic odonatologists, who examined
the remains against Daniel's dental records. Although there were
some dissimilarities, they both concluded the remains were Daniel
Burroughs.
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II.
Defendant seeks reversal of her conviction and a new trial
claiming the prosecutor's opening statement and summation were
inappropriate and rose to misconduct. Defendant contends the
prosecutor's remarks portraying her as a master manipulator of
friends and family, improperly swayed the jury's emotions, and
deprived her of a fair trial. We pause to recite the challenged
comments.
During opening, the State referenced the fable of "Little Red
Riding Hood," remarking "like all these old folk tales, there's a
lesson to be learned, there's a moral to the story." The theme
then presented was "not everyone or everything is as it seems."
The prosecutor disavowed any analogy and stated he was not "trying
to call defendant a wolf," saying:
This defendant tried to convince everyone she
was a nice lady, a loving mother, a caring
grandmother. And in fact, a victim, a victim
of her husband having left her for another
woman. During the course of trial, I want you
to look more closely. I want you to look
behind the disguise.
The State's opening repeated the suggestion to look behind the
disguise and examine what defendant was actually doing, and
specifically suggested the jury must do what Little Red Riding
Hood did: "the more she interacted with the wolf, the more she
realized something was wrong."
13 A-4590-14T2
Defendant objected and the trial judge addressed the jury,
explaining: "[W]hat the lawyers say to you in their opening
statements is not evidence. They're giving you a summary of what
they expect to prove. . . ."
In summation, the prosecutor refrained from further
references to "Little Red Riding Hood." Instead, comments centered
on defendant's façade as fragile and helpless, a victim of her
husband's infidelity, who was left financially destitute, then
accused her of acting under the façade of a "helpless grandmother,"
because defendant was manipulative and asking for "one last favor,"
an acquittal. The prosecutor stated:
[D]efendant needs you. She needs just one
more favor. Can you please help her just this
one last time because she's almost there,
right? She's almost there. After eight
years, you are the last thing to stand in her
way between justice and getting away with
murder, so she needs you.
Hasn't she told you the stories of the yellow
Hummer and the woman down in Florida? Hasn't
she cried here for court [sic]? Hasn't she
said she's a grandmother of four and she needs
you, she needs this favor? Can you help her
out this one last time?
Because without this favor, she has to face
justice, and that's what she's spent these
last eight years avoiding. She's lied. She's
manipulated. She's asked for favors for eight
years to get to this point, to be one step
away from getting away with it.
. . . .
14 A-4590-14T2
She's asked a lot of people for a lot of
favors. And you've heard it from witness
after witness. She tells a sad story. She
says I just need a favor. Can't you help me
out. And she's done this from witness to
witness to witness. . . . Don't be the last
person she talks into helping her.
. . . .
And I don't want a favor from you. What I
want you to do is consider every piece of
evidence you get back there. I want you to
use your logic. I want you to trust your
guts. I want you to think about this trial
and I want you to say no to the defendant for
the first time. Be the first people to tell
this defendant no. And you can do that because
you know that this story ends with the
defendant being $100,000 richer and Danny
Burroughs in her closet in Tupperware. I
don’t want a favor. I want justice for Danny
Burroughs.
Defendant objected and the trial judge issued a curative
instruction. The judge reminded the jurors closing arguments were
not evidence and, in reaching a verdict, they should rely only on
the evidence presented at trial. Not satisfied, defendant
requested the judge issue a more comprehensive instruction,
specifically addressing the possibility the comments misinformed
the jury on the burden of proof. The judge complied, stating:
One thing that the prosecutor alluded to was
about whether or not the defendant is here
seeking a favor. I don’t know that that is
an actual proper comment. Nobody's here
seeking any favors from anybody, okay? We're
here in a search for the truth. We're here
15 A-4590-14T2
to put the [S]tate to their burden of proof,
to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt
and then we're here to tie in the facts as you
find them to be, to the law as I instruct you
to arrive at a fair and just verdict. Okay?
We're not here to give anybody any favors or
any passes and remember because of that there
might be insinuation that the defense has to
come forward and say something about a favor.
That's not what this is about. All right, so
that comment you should disregard from the
prosecutor. Nobody's seeking any favors, all
right? As the prosecutor alluded to at the
end of his summation we're here seeking
justice, okay? So keep that in mind.
A.
The guarantee of a fair trial before an impartial jury, see
U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; N.J. Const. art. 1, ¶ 10, "includes
the right to have the jury decide the case based solely on the
evidence presented at trial, free from the taint of outside
influences and extraneous matters." State v. R.D., 169 N.J. 551,
557 (2001) (citing State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 45, 75 (1998)). Indeed,
"securing and preservation of an impartial jury goes to the very
essence of a fair trial." Bey, supra, 112 N.J. at 75 (quoting
State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39, 60 (1983)).
A prosecutor has great leeway in his or her opening comments,
and he or she is allowed to be forceful. See State v. Wakefield,
190 N.J. 397, 443 (2007) (quoting State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434,
474 (1994)), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1146, 128 S. Ct. 1074, 169 L.
Ed. 2d 817 (2008). During an opening statement, a prosecutor may
16 A-4590-14T2
reference facts she or "he intends in good faith to prove by
competent evidence." Id. at 442 (quoting State v. Hipplewith, 33
N.J. 300, 309 (1960)).
Name calling, such as labeling defendant a "coward," "liar,"
or "jackal" has been found untoward or derogatory. State v.
Pennington, 119 N.J. 547, 577-78 (1990). Moreover, "to employ
degrading epithets such as '[a] cancer,' and 'parasite upon
society,' 'animal,' 'butcher boy,' 'young punk,' 'hood,' 'punk,'
and 'bum'" required a new trial because the names squarely placed
defendant's character at issue. Ibid. (citations omitted).
In presenting a case to a jury, the State is "not to obtain
convictions but to see that justice is done." State v. Ramseur,
106 N.J. 123, 320 (1987); see also Berger v. United States, 295
U.S. 78, 88, 55 S. Ct. 629, 633, 79 L. Ed. 1314, 1321 (1935) ("[A
prosecutor] may prosecute with earnestness and vigor -- indeed,
he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not
at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain
from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction
as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just
one."). The prosecutor may not impassion a jury or incite a
verdict based on emotions, but may comment on the evidence to be
presented. State v. Black, 380 N.J. Super. 581, 594-95 (App. Div.
2005), certif. denied, 186 N.J. 244 (2006).
17 A-4590-14T2
A similar standard guides the State's presentation in
summation.
Prosecutors are expected to make a
vigorous and forceful closing argument to the
jury, and are afforded considerable leeway in
that endeavor. Nevertheless, there is a fine
line that separates forceful from
impermissible closing argument. Thus, a
prosecutor must refrain from improper methods
that result in wrongful conviction, and is
obligated to use legitimate means to bring
about a just conviction.
[State v. Ingram, 196 N.J. 23, 43 (2006)
(quoting State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440, 471
(2008)).]
In our review of a prosecutor's statements, we evaluate the
alleged improper comments to determine "the severity of [any]
misconduct and its prejudicial effect on the defendant's right to
a fair trial . . . ." Wakefield, supra, 190 N.J. at 437.
"[P]rosecutorial misconduct is not grounds for reversal of a
criminal conviction unless the conduct was so egregious as to
deprive defendant of a fair trial." Ibid. Claimed errors are not
considered in isolation, but viewed in the context of the entire
trial. State v. Negron, 355 N.J. Super. 556, 576 (App. Div. 2002).
Thus, to warrant reversal, the remarks must be "clearly and
unmistakably improper" and "substantially prejudice [a]
defendant's fundamental right to have a jury fairly evaluate the
18 A-4590-14T2
merits of his [or her] defense." State v. Papasavvas, 163 N.J.
565, 625 (2000); see also Ingram, supra, 196 N.J. at 43.
B.
Defendant argues the prosecutor's oblique reference to her
as the wolf in "Little Red Riding Hood," rises to the use of
"degrading and dehumanizing epithets." She further urges the
curative instruction insufficiently diminished the prejudice
caused by opening comments equating defendant to "the wolf."
We recognize the prosecutor explained in the referenced
opening remarks the fable metaphor was illustrative and designed
to focus the jurors' attention on examining the facts in evidence.
Notwithstanding the unnecessary comment, we reject defendant's
insistence the prosecutor's inappropriate references amount to a
prejudicial personal insult or degrading epithet designed to
attack defendant's character mandating reversal.
In Wakefield, the prosecutor compared the defendant to a
"wolf taking the lives of . . . two helpless sheep." Wakefield,
supra, 190 N.J. at 466. The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's
claim of prosecutorial misconduct, noting the use of a "single
metaphor . . . simply does not rise to the level where defendant's
right to a fair trial is implicated." Id. at 467.
Here, multiple mentions of the wolf were made. The State's
main point — that things may not be as they first appear — was
19 A-4590-14T2
appropriate and easily communicated by referring to the story,
without specific mention of the fairytale's characters. Frankly,
if there is a need to explain comments, as occurred here when the
prosecutor said, "I am not trying to say defendant is a wolf,"
such statements are best left unsaid. See State v. Williams, 113
N.J. 393, 456 (1988) (cautioning prosecuting attorneys against
derogatory name-calling).
Nevertheless, we cannot agree the prosecutor's misstep was
so "egregious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial" or led the
jury to an unjust verdict. Wakefield, supra, 190 N.J. at 437.
Not only did the prosecutor not state defendant was the wolf, he
openly disavowed any negative reference intended by these remarks
and clearly explained the point of the reference was the moral of
the tale. Further, the judge's curative instruction was
satisfactory and blunted the jury's possible reliance upon these
comments. See State v. Vallejo, 198 N.J. 122, 134 (2009)
(requiring curative instructions to be "firm, clear, and
accomplished without delay").
After considering the whole of the record, we conclude the
State's opening comments did not "substantially prejudice
defendant's fundamental right to have a jury fairly evaluate the
merits of h[er] defense." Papasavvas, supra, 163 N.J. at 625.
20 A-4590-14T2
Turning to the State's summation, defendant argues, "[I]n
imploring the jury not to do defendant a 'favor' by issuing an
acquittal, the prosecutor violated the fundamental rule governing
jury deliberations," implying the jury would fail in fulfilling
its duty were a guilty verdict not returned. She also suggests
the comments confused the jury as to the burden of proof. See
State v. Buscham, 360 N.J. Super. 346, 365 (App. Div. 2003)
(stating a jury must "determine whether the State ha[s] proven its
case against defendant beyond a reasonable doubt."). Defendant
also claims the judge's curative instructions were flawed and only
reinforced the prosecutor's impropriety. We remain unpersuaded
by these arguments.
"Warnings to a jury about not doing its job is considered to
be among the most egregious forms of prosecutorial misconduct."
State v. Acker, 265 N.J. Super. 351, 357 (App. Div. 1993) (quoting
State v. Knight, 63 N.J. 187, 193 (1973)). In Acker, the Appellate
Division reversed a conviction following the prosecutor's
assertion the jury must give the child victims justice, noting:
"The clear import was that unless the jury convicted defendant,
the jurors would violate their oaths." Id. at 356-57. We cannot
agree the State's comments suffer from the same defect.
More important, at defendant's request, the trial judge
issued detailed instruction to set the jury on course, allaying
21 A-4590-14T2
any possible prejudice caused by the remarks. The judge
specifically addressed the State's burden of proof, told the jury
the statements were not evidence, and reinforced the jury's role
as an impartial arbiter of the facts, as found from evidence. "One
of the foundations of our jury system is that the jury is presumed
to follow the trial court's instructions." State v. Burns, 192
N.J. 312, 335 (2007) (citing State v. Nelson, 155 N.J. 487, 526
(1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1114, 119 S. Ct. 890, 142 L. Ed.
2d 788 (1999)).
Finally, when considering "the claimed error . . . in the
context of the entire trial," Negron, supra, 355 N.J. Super. at
576, we reject any suggestion the jury was misled and reached an
improper verdict. In short, we cannot conclude the remarks had
"a palpable impact." State v. Roach, 146 N.J. 208, 219, cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 1021, 117 S. Ct. 540, 136 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1996).
These challenges do not require defendant's conviction be set
aside.
III.
During pre-trial motions, the trial judge reviewed
defendant's two 1996 convictions, one fourth-degree conviction for
theft by illegal retention, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-9, and the second, a
federal conviction for bank fraud. Following argument, the trial
judge concluded these convictions, in a sanitized form, were proper
22 A-4590-14T2
for impeachment purposes if defendant testified in her own defense.
In his findings, he noted Daniel was killed in 2007 and found "the
totality of the circumstances" resulting from defendant's conduct
delayed prosecution and trial.
Defendant argues the judge erred by finding the relevant date
for determining remoteness of a conviction was the date of the
alleged offense, not when trial commenced. Also, defendant
challenges the determination of admissibility, arguing the judge
failed to balance the probative value of the evidence against the
prejudicial effect required by N.J.R.E. 609.
The State contends there is no prejudice because defendant
never took the stand, likely because her custodial statement
detailing her conduct in killing Daniel would be admissible. We
dispel this suggestion as irrelevant to whether the prior
convictions were properly evaluated and found admissible. Our
Supreme Court has held "a defendant need not testify at trial to
obtain appellate review of a trial court's ruling that the
defendant's convictions may be used for impeachment purposes."
State v. Whitehead, 104 N.J. 353, 361-62 (1986). We turn to
consideration of defendant's argument.
The decision as to whether a prior conviction may be admitted
"rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge." State v.
Sands, 76 N.J. 127, 144 (1978). "[A] trial court's evidentiary
23 A-4590-14T2
rulings are 'entitled to deference absent a showing of an abuse
of discretion, i.e., there has been a clear error of judgment.'"
State v. Brown, 170 N.J. 138, 147 (2000) (quoting State v. Marrero,
148 N.J. 469, 484 (1997)); see also State v. Buda, 195 N.J. 278,
294 (2008) ("Trial court evidentiary determinations are subject
to limited appellate scrutiny, as they are reviewed under the
abuse of discretion standard.").
Directly related to remoteness, N.J.R.E. 609(b)(1) states:
"[i]f, on the date the trial begins, more than ten years have
passed since the witness's conviction for a crime . . . evidence
of the conviction is admissible only if the court determines that
its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect . . . ."
Therefore, a judge must consider the date of the prior conviction
and the date of the current trial.
The State concedes the trial judge erred by considering the
date of Daniel's death, rather than the date of defendant's trial.
However, even using the date of the murder, 2007, the prior
convictions were entered more than ten years earlier.
A conviction falling outside the defined ten-year period may,
nevertheless, be admitted to attack a defendant's credibility, if
the probative value outweighs any prejudicial effect. N.J.R.E.
609(b)(1). A judge is guided by several considerations, not simply
24 A-4590-14T2
the remoteness of the offense. Sands, supra, 76 N.J. at 144-45.
These consideration were discussed by the Court in Sands:
The key to exclusion is remoteness.
Remoteness cannot ordinarily be determined by
the passage of time alone. The nature of the
convictions will probably be a significant
factor. Serious crimes, including those
involving lack of veracity, dishonesty or
fraud, should be considered as having a
weightier effect than, for example, a
conviction of death by reckless driving. In
other words, a lapse of the same time period
might justify exclusion of evidence of one
conviction, and not another. The trial court
must balance the lapse of time and the nature
of the crime to determine whether the
relevance with respect to credibility
outweighs the prejudicial effect to the
defendant. Moreover, it is appropriate for
the trial court in exercising its discretion
to consider intervening convictions between
the past conviction and the crime for which
the defendant is being tried. When a
defendant has an extensive prior criminal
record, indicating that he has contempt for
the bounds of behavior placed on all citizens,
his burden should be a heavy one in attempting
to exclude all such evidence. A jury has the
right to weigh whether one who repeatedly
refuses to comply with society's rules is more
likely to ignore the oath requiring veracity
on the witness stand than a law abiding
citizen. If a person has been convicted of a
series of crimes through the years, then
conviction of the earliest crime, although
committed many years before, as well as
intervening convictions, should be
admissible.
[Sands, supra, 76 N.J. at 144-45.]
25 A-4590-14T2
The Court later adopted these factors in the 1993 revision
of our evidence rules. State v. Harris, 209 N.J. 431, 442 (2012).
In evaluating the admissibility of prior convictions that are more
than ten years old, the court must apply N.J.R.E. 609(b)(1), which
provides:
In determining whether the evidence of a
conviction is admissible under Section (b)(1)
of this rule, the court may consider:
(i) whether there are intervening convictions
for crimes or offenses, and if so, the number,
nature, and seriousness of those crimes or
offenses,
(ii) whether the conviction involved a crime
of dishonestly, lack of veracity, or fraud,
(iii) how remote the conviction is in time,
(iv) the seriousness of the crime.
Here, although elaboration of the specific findings made
under N.J.R.E. 609(b)(1) would have aided our review, we are able
to affirm the determination as the record contains sufficient
reasons to support the use of defendant's 1996 convictions.
The past criminal convictions both involved conduct evincing
dishonesty, lack of veracity, or fraud. Such prior crimes may be
given greater weight when assessing probative value. Sands, supra,
76 N.J. at 144. Moreover, this factor of dishonesty strongly
outweighs remoteness. Ibid. Second, in weighing the totality of
all circumstances, the trial judge considered defendant's efforts,
26 A-4590-14T2
which increased the length of time it took police to discover
Daniel's remains. The judge's statements, although inartful,
conveyed his evaluation of the nature of dishonesty attached to
defendant's prior convictions and the State's evidence of
defendant's efforts to conceal Daniel's death. Those
considerations, coupled with the totality of the circumstances,
warranted introduction of the past convictions, as sanitized to
challenge the credibility of defendant's offered testimony.
IV.
Finally, defendant challenges her sentence. Here, imposing
a fifty-five year term of imprisonment, the judge found five
applicable aggravating factors: (1) the nature and circumstances
of the offense, defendant's role in the crime, and that it was
committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner,
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1); (2) the gravity and seriousness of harm
inflicted upon the victim, including whether or not the defendant
knew or reasonably should have known that the victim of the offense
was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance due to
advanced age, ill-health, or extreme youth, or was for any other
reason substantially incapable of exercising normal physical or
mental power of resistance, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(2); (3) the risk
of re-offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3); (4) the nature and extent
of the defendant’s prior criminal record, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6);
27 A-4590-14T2
and (5) the need for deterrence, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9). The
judge rejected mitigation factors proposed by defendant, finding
none were warranted. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b).
Defendant urges the judge erred in giving aggravating factor
six strong weight and by rejecting application of mitigating factor
seven, which she states applied because she led a law-abiding life
for a substantial period of time before the commission of the
present offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7). We reject defendant's
arguments as lacking merit. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We add these brief
comments.
Our review is limited to whether the sentence imposed is
supported by substantial credible evidence in the record. State
v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 363-65 (1984). In order to warrant reversal,
a sentencing judge's decision must be so wide of the mark as to
"shock the judicial conscience." Ibid.We do not agree defendant's prior convictions should be
accorded little weight. The judge, in the context of applying
aggravating factor six, provided these remarks when he applied
aggravating factor three:
[D]efendant has a prior criminal record, being
convicted twice in the mid-1990's for theft
by deception and bank fraud. One must
remember that a part and parcel of this murder
is in the planning and aftermath was obtaining
this bogus divorce and obtaining all the
property of the victim for monetary purposes.
28 A-4590-14T2
See State v. T.C., 347 N.J. Super. 219, 244 (App. Div. 2002),
certif. denied, 177 N.J. 222 (2003) (holding support exists for
applying aggravating factor six even when a defendant's prior
record involved less serious criminal offenses).
Regarding application of mitigating factor seven, it must be
shown "the defendant has no history of prior delinquency or
criminal activity or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial
period of time . . . ." N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7). Defendant
suggests her last conviction occurred in 1996, nineteen years
prior to the murder conviction. While technically true, this
ignores the facts previously discussed, including the date of the
murder and defendant's conduct to hide the body, which
significantly delayed bringing her to trial. If one considered
the date defendant was released from prison for her last crime and
the date she killed her husband, only eight years elapsed. That
time period does not support the position defendant led a law
abiding life for a significant period of time.
Affirmed.
29 A-4590-14T2