STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. BRANDON SANABRIA (15-06-0554, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3404-19
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
BRANDON SANABRIA,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Submitted October 4, 2021 – Decided October 14, 2021
Before Judges Rothstadt and Natali.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Passaic County, Indictment No. 15-06-0554.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Ruth A. Harrigan, Designated Counsel, on
the briefs).
Camelia M. Valdes, Passaic County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Marc A. Festa, Senior
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Brandon Sanabria appeals from a November 20, 2019 order
denying his petition for post-conviction relief ("PCR") without an evidentiary
hearing. We affirm.
I.
In January 2015 defendant stabbed Alejandro Leal multiple times in the
head and neck, causing his death. A grand jury subsequently returned an
indictment charging defendant with: 1) first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-
3(a)(1) or N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(2); 2) third-degree possession of a weapon for an
unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d); and 3) fourth-degree unlawful
possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d).
On November 15, 2016, defendant pled guilty to an amended charge of
aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1), as well as an unrelated third-
degree burglary charge from a separate indictment. The parties agreed that the
plea would dispose of an additional pending accusation for a fourth-degree
assault related to an incident while defendant was detained. The State also
agreed it would dismiss the weapons offenses.
During his plea colloquy before the Honorable Sohail Mohammed, J.S.C,
defendant testified that he was "pleading guilty freely, voluntarily, and because
[he was] in fact guilty." He also provided a detailed factual basis for the plea .
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With regard to the amended aggravated manslaughter charge, defendant
admitted that he "stab[bed the victim] in the head and neck area" "three or four
times" with a "pocketknife." Defendant added that he stabbed the victim
"purposefully" as he "knew what [he was] doing when [he] stabbed" him.
Furthermore, defendant testified that he did not act "in self-defense" and, while
"there had been an altercation," "nobody . . . attacked [him] such that [he] needed
to stab [the victim] with the knife." Defendant also admitted that he understood
his actions were "reckless" and "manifest[ed] extreme indifference to . . . human
life." Regarding the burglary charge, defendant stated that he "broke in the
door" of a house and entered with the purpose to "take anything of value that
[he] found," and that he "didn’t have permission to go in" or "to take items of
value from inside."
Defendant further testified that he understood that he was not obligated to
accept the plea and he could have proceeded to trial where "the State would have
had the obligation to prove [him] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt," his counsel
"would have cross-examined witnesses on [his] behalf" and filed "pre-trial
motions . . . that could have helped with [his] defense." Defendant
acknowledged that he was "giving up all those rights by pleading guilty," that
there was a "presumption of imprisonment," which the judge was likely to
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impose, and that the State "could have sought to have [the] charges run
consecutively, however, [they agreed] to concurrent charges."
Finally, defendant testified about his plea counsel's efforts. He agreed
that his attorney had visited him "between ten and fifteen times" while he was
detained, "went over the evidence that the State had and the evidence the State
was proffering they would present at trial," and discussed "the various defenses
that may be available" and "what [he] thought would happen at trial and what a
trial would look like."
Further, defendant stated that "he asked [his attorney] questions" and his
attorney "tried [his] best to answer them" and "at the conclusion of all these
conversations that included looking at the [S]tate's evidence, [he] determined
that [he] wished to plead guilty to these charges." Defendant also said that he
was not "threatened in any way to cause [him] to plead guilty."
The judge also inquired about a letter defendant wrote to the court in
which he stated he wanted to hire different counsel. 1 In response, defendant
explained that after he had "sufficient time to think," he was "satisfied with [his
counsel's] services." Defendant also signed plea forms that included the
1
The letter referenced at the plea hearing is absent from the record on appeal.
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question "Are you satisfied with the advice you have received from your
lawyer," to which he responded "yes."
The court sentenced defendant consistent with the plea agreement to
concurrent terms of sixteen years with an eighty-five percent parole disqualifier
for the aggravated manslaughter charge, five years for the burglary charge, and
eighteen months for the pending assault accusation. Defendant appealed only
his sentence and we affirmed, finding that it was not manifestly excessive,
unduly punitive, or the result of an abuse of discretion. State v. Sanabria, No.
A-2778-16 (App. Div. June 5, 2017).
On November 28, 2018, defendant filed a verified PCR petition in which
he requested an evidentiary hearing. Assigned counsel subsequently filed an
amended petition along with a supplemental certification. In sum, defendant
claimed that his plea counsel was constitutionally ineffective because he "never
provided [him] a copy of the discovery," "specifically . . . [twenty-one] DVD's
of [the] State's evidence," and "never went over it with [him]," "refused to
consider any . . . possibility" of going to trial because counsel "was about to get
married and . . . would not be able to conduct a trial," failed to "explain[] . . .
how self[-]defense would be presented at trial," and pressured him into pleading
guilty.
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Judge Mohammed heard oral arguments and on November 20, 2019 issued
an order and a comprehensive written opinion denying defendant's petitio n and
concluding an evidentiary hearing was not required to resolve defendant's
application. As a threshold matter, the judge determined that defendant's
petition was timely and was not otherwise procedurally barred.
On the merits, Judge Mohammed rejected defendant's argument that
counsel was ineffective for failing to review the discovery with him, concluding
that defendant's claim was expressly contradicted by his testimony during the
plea hearing. The judge, who, as noted, also presided over defendant's plea, also
pointed out that counsel had filed "an omnibus motion addressing the merits of
the case" and "motions to reduce bail."
Judge Mohammed also rejected defendant's argument that his counsel
improperly pressured him into accepting a plea, again relying on defendant's
plea hearing testimony, in which defendant clearly indicated his decision to
enter the plea was knowing and voluntary. Finally, the court determined that
defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because he failed to
establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance. The court based that
decision on its findings that the defendant's petition consisted of "bald
assertions" not sufficiently supported by the record.
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This appeal followed in which defendant argues:
I. THE POST CONVICTION RELIEF JUDGE
ERRED IN HIS DETERMINATION THAT TRIAL
COUNSEL PROVIDED EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE SINCE COUNSEL FAILED TO
REVIEW DISCOVERY WITH DEFENDANT,
PROPERLY PREPARE THE CASE AND
IMPROPERLY PRESSURED DEFENDANT INTO
PLEADING GUILTY.
A. Trial counsel failed to review discovery with
defendant and properly prepare the case.
B. Trial counsel improperly pressured defendant
into pleading guilty.
II. THE POST-CONVICTION RELIEF COURT
ERRED BY DENYING DEFENDANT'S
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
WITHOUT AFFORDING HIM AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO FULLY
ADDRESS HIS CONTENTION THAT HE
FAILED TO RECEIVE ADEQUATE LEGAL
REPRESENTATION FROM TRIAL COUNSEL.
We disagree with all these arguments and affirm substantially for the
reasons in Judge Mohammed's comprehensive and well-reasoned November 20,
2019 decision. We offer the following comments to amplify our opinion.
II.
"[W]here the [PCR] court does not hold an evidentiary hearing, we may
exercise de novo review over the factual inferences the trial court has drawn
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from the documentary record." State v. O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super. 351, 373
(App. Div. 2014) (citation omitted). We review a PCR court's legal conclusions
de novo. State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 415-16 (2004) (citing Toll Bros., Inc. v.
Twp. of W. Windsor, 173 N.J. 502, 549 (2002)).
A claim for ineffective assistance of counsel must satisfy the two-part test
pronounced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984), by demonstrating
that "counsel's performance was deficient," that is, "that counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see also State
v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987) (Strickland/Fritz). This test applies to plea
counsel as well. State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 350-51 (2012).
The first prong requires a showing that "counsel's representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. A
defendant, however, must overcome a strong presumption that counsel rendered
reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689. "The test is not whether defense
counsel could have done better, but whether he met the constitutional threshold
for effectiveness." State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 543 (2013). Further, the failure
to raise unsuccessful legal arguments does not constitute ineffective assistance
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of counsel. State v. Worlock, 117 N.J. 596, 625 (1990) (citing Strickland, 466
U.S. at 688).
Under the second prong, a defendant must demonstrate that his counsel's
errors prejudiced the defense such as to deprive defendant of a fair and reliable
outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To prove this element, a defendant must
demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694.
Moreover, "a [defendant] must convince the court that a decision to reject the
plea bargain" and "insist on going to trial" would have been "rational under the
circumstances." State v. Maldon, 422 N.J. Super. 475, 486 (App. Div. 2011)
(quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010)). That determination
should be "based on evidence, not speculation." Ibid.A defendant is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing by
simply raising a PCR claim. State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App.
Div. 1999) (citing State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462 (1992)). An evidentiary
hearing is required only when: 1) a defendant establishes a prima facie case in
support of PCR, 2) the court determines there are disputed issues of material
fact that cannot be resolved by review of the existing record, and 3) the court
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determines that an evidentiary hearing is required to resolve the claims asserted.
State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354 (2013) (citing R. 3:22-10).
Here, we agree with Judge Mohammed that defendant failed to satisfy
either the performance or prejudice prongs of the Strickland/Fritz test. As Judge
Mohammed explained, defendant's claims are completely contradicted by his
testimony at the plea colloquy, and his signed plea forms, and are otherwise
unsupported by the record. Indeed, contrary to his claims in point one, in which
he asserts that his trial counsel failed to review the entirety of the discov ery in
the case, during his plea colloquy, defendant admitted that his counsel visited
him in jail "between [ten] and [fifteen] times" and "went over the police records"
and "the evidence the [S]tate was proffering they would present at trial."
Defendant's claim that counsel improperly failed to investigate and
advocate that his conduct in stabbing the victim constituted self-defense is
similarly unavailing. It bears repeating that defendant explicitly disclaimed
during the plea hearing that he acted in self-defense admitting that he not only
stabbed the victim purposefully during an altercation, but that neither the victim
nor anyone else attacked him "such that [he] needed to stab [the victim] with [a]
knife." Defendant also acknowledged that his plea counsel discussed available
defenses with him and what would occur at trial.
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Finally, defendant's claim that his plea counsel was ineffective because he
pressured him to plead guilty based on his unavailability to try the case due to
his pending wedding plans is similarly contradicted by defendant's plea
testimony. Again, defendant testified at the plea hearing that he was satisfied
with his counsel's representation and that counsel had discussed what would
occur should they decide to go to trial. Defendant's claim is also contradicted
by his plea form where he stated that he was satisfied with his plea counsel's
representation.
III.
Even if trial counsel's performance was deficient, we agree with Judge
Mohammed that defendant's petition failed to establish that he was prejudiced
by trial counsel's alleged ineffectiveness. Defendant offers no support for the
proposition that it would have been reasonable, but for counsel's errors, to reject
the plea offer.
As noted, defendant was originally charged with first-degree murder,
which alone exposed defendant to a potential sentence of thirty years to life,
N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(1), and two weapons charges, yet ultimately pled guilty to
a single, lesser charge of aggravated manslaughter with a sentence of sixteen
years. In addition, the State's plea offer, which was ultimately accepted by Judge
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Mohammed, ran that sentence concurrent to defendant's convictions related to a
separate robbery charge and assault accusation. Given the State's offer to
significantly reduce defendant's substantial sentencing exposure and parole
ineligibility, defendant fails to establish that it would have been rational to reject
the plea offer and that he probably would have done so. Maldon, 422 N.J. Super.
at 486.
Defendant also offers no evidence to suggest the State might have
reasonably altered its plea offer based on any additional efforts of his trial
counsel nor can we reasonably conclude otherwise based on defendant's bald
assertions and unequivocal admission to stabbing and killing the victim without
justification. We also note that defendant's petition fails to identify what,
precisely, was contained in the "21 DVD's of State's evidence," or how it would
have affected his decision to plead guilty or the State's generous plea offer. In
sum, defendant's vague, conclusory, and unsupported statements in his
certification provide no refuge against his explicit statements during the plea
colloquy which included his testimony that his counsel met with him
extensively, reviewed discovery, and considered all potential defenses.
Finally, because we agree with Judge Mohammed that defendant did not
establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, we likewise
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conclude he did not abuse his discretion in denying defendant's request for an
evidentiary hearing. See Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462. To the extent we have not
addressed specifically any of defendant's remaining arguments it is because we
have concluded that they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a
written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
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