STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. WALTER R. DAYS-JACKSON (18-07-0438 AND 18-07-0439, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2002-19
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
WALTER R. DAYS-JACKSON,
a/k/a RAHEEM DAYS, WALTER
DAYS, WALTER R. DAYS,
RAHEEM DAYSJACKSON,
WALTER DAYSJACKSON,
WALTER R. DAYSJACKSON,
RAHEEM JACKSON,
WALTER JACKSON, and
WALTER R. JACKSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________
Argued September 21, 2021 – Decided October 18, 2021
Before Judges Fisher and Currier.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Union County, Docket Nos. 18-07-0438 and
18-07-0439.
Adam W. Toraya argued the cause for appellant.
Frank Muroski, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
cause for respondent (Andrew J. Bruck, Acting
Attorney General, attorney; Frank Muroski, of counsel
and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Walter R. Days-Jackson appeals from the trial court's July 11,
2019 order denying his motion to suppress. The trial judge found police officers
had probable cause to search the trunk of defendant's vehicle after smelling raw
marijuana and finding a scale while searching the interior of the car. We affirm.
While on duty one night, Rahway police detectives Michael Mezey and
Scott Maloney observed a car parked on the side of the road. The detectives had
the windows open in their car. While driving by the parked car, the detectives
observed a cloud of white smoke coming from its open windows. The officers
also smelled an odor of burnt marijuana. The detectives parked and approached
the car on foot.
Defendant was the driver of the car; there was a female passenger. Mezey
approached the car on the passenger side and Maloney went to the driver's side.
When asked about the cloud of smoke, defendant and his passenger admitted to
smoking marijuana earlier, but stated "it was all gone." Maloney observed the
passenger attempting to conceal a hand-rolled cigar, later determined to be
marijuana, and observed two open containers of alcohol on the center console.
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The detectives then asked both individuals to get out of the car. During their
search, the detectives found a second hand-rolled cigar containing marijuana in
the passenger's possession.
The detectives also searched the vehicle's passenger compartment, finding
(1) a digital scale, with marijuana residue, inside the center console; (2) a clear,
empty, plastic bag containing marijuana residue; (3) a container bearing
marijuana residue; and (4) a bag of suspected marijuana in a purse found on the
floor where the passenger was sitting. During the search, the detectives smelled
an odor of raw marijuana they believed emanated from the trunk area, since they
had removed all of the marijuana found in the passenger compartment.
Because of the discovery of the scale and the smell of raw marijuana that
could not be explained from the small amount of marijuana found in the
passenger compartment, the detectives concluded they had probable cause to
open and search the trunk. In the trunk, detectives found thirteen grams of
marijuana in a clear, plastic bag; a .32 caliber revolver, loaded with five .32
caliber cartridges; and ten .40 caliber cartridges, three of which were hollow
point. Defendant was subsequently charged in an indictment with first-degree
unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(j); fourth-degree
possession of a prohibited device, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(f); and in a second
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indictment with second-degree certain persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A.
2C:39-7b(1).
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the vehicle's
trunk. After a hearing in which the court heard testimony from Detective Mezey,
the court denied the motion in a July 11, 2019 order and written opinion. In
finding the detectives had probable cause to search the trunk, the judge stated
that, "taken all together, the scale and the scent of marijuana that could not be
explained by the amount of marijuana and residue found inside the passenger
compartment of the car established that the detectives had probable cause to
conduct a search of the trunk."
Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to first-degree unlawful
possession of a firearm. He was sentenced to five years in prison, subject to
forty-two months of parole ineligibility.
In our review of a determination on a motion to suppress, we must uphold
the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision so long as those findings
are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. State v. Elders, 192
N.J. 224, 243 (2007). We defer to these factual findings because they "are
substantially influenced by [an] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to
have the 'feel' of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy." State v.
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Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 424-25 (2014) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146,
161 (1964)). We will "not disturb the trial court's findings merely because 'it
might have reached a different conclusion were it the trial tribunal' or because
'the trial court decided all evidence or inference conflicts in favor of one side' in
a close case." Elders, 192 N.J. at 244 (quoting Johnson, 42 N.J. at 162).
Therefore, we only reverse a decision when the trial court's determination is "so
clearly mistaken 'that the interests of justice demand intervention and
correction.'" Id. at 244.
A trial court's interpretation of the law and the consequences that flow
from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. State v. Gandhi,
201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010); Manalapan Realty L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of the Twp.
of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995). Thus, a trial court's legal conclusions
are reviewed de novo. Gandhi, 201 N.J. at 176.
On appeal, defendant reiterates his assertion that the warrantless search of
the trunk of his car violated both the United States and New Jersey Constitutions.
We disagree.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I,
paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution protect citizens against unreasonable
searches and seizures and require a showing of probable cause prior to an arrest
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or the issuance of a warrant. U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7. "The
probable-cause requirement is the constitutionally-prescribed standard for
distinguishing unreasonable searches from those that can be tolerated in a free
society . . . ." State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 106 (1987). Warrantless
searches or seizures are only permissible in situations where they fall into the
"'few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions' to the warrant
requirement." State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 422 (2015) (quoting State v. Frankel,
179 N.J. 586, 598 (2004)). The State, as the party seeking to validate the
warrantless search, "has the burden of proving the validity of the search [or
seizure]." State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. 471, 489 (2001).
Our Court has consistently held that "a principal component of the
probable cause standard 'is a well-grounded suspicion that a crime has been or
is being committed.'" State v. Moore, 181 N.J. 40, 45 (2004) (quoting State v.
Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 515 (2003)). The Court has adopted the "totality of the
circumstances" test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); Moore, 181 N.J. at 46. "[The] test requires the
court to make a practical, common-sense determination whether, given all of the
circumstances, 'there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place.'" Ibid. (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 235).
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Defendant asserts that Detective Mezey's testimony was "contradictory"
and, therefore, not credible. Defendant refers to inconsistent statements made
regarding the area in which the officers located the bullets. He also challenges
the credibility of Mezey's testimony that a "strong odor" of raw marijuana was
coming from the trunk.
The State initially asserted the odor of raw marijuana, the discovery of the
scale and bullets in the passenger compartment of the car led the detectives to
believe they had probable cause to search the trunk. However, after Mezey was
confronted with conflicting testimony regarding whether the bullets were found
inside the car or in its trunk, the State only relied on the discovery of the scale
and the raw marijuana odor to support its assertion of probable cause.
Although the trial judge did not make specific credibility findings
regarding Mezey, his factual findings were consistent with Mezey's testimony.
That the court found Mezey credible can be inferred from its ultimate ruling.
During the suppression hearing, the judge heard Mezey describe his
experience as a law enforcement officer, detail the circumstances surrounding
the stop and search and explain any inconsistent statements. After considering
the testimony, the trial court found the circumstances leading to the search o f
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the trunk gave the detectives enough information to believe there was probable
cause to search the trunk. The judge stated:
[T]he detectives observed a cloud of white smoke that
smelled like burnt marijuana emanating from
[d]efendant's vehicle. . . . The smell of marijuana
suggested that marijuana was present within the vehicle
. . . . For this reason, [the detectives'] actions were
reasonable; thus the motor vehicle stop was lawful.
....
The initial search of [d]efendant's car was lawful
because in addition to the cloud of smoke and smell of
burnt marijuana emanating from [d]efendant's vehicle,
the detectives observed a partially smoked cigar that
. . . [the passenger] was attempting to conceal. Once
[d]efendant and [the passenger] were ordered out of the
vehicle, it was confirmed that the cigar contained
marijuana . . . . [T]he smell of burnt marijuana and the
presence of the cigar containing marijuana provided
and justified a search of the vehicle's interior.
....
The detectives also had probable cause to search the
vehicle's trunk . . . . [H]ere, detectives discovered more
than simply marijuana consistent with personal use.
While searching [the] vehicle's . . . interior the
detectives found a scale, which is indicative of more
than personal use.
....
Further, detectives detected a strong odor of raw
marijuana emanating from the trunk area . . . . [T]he
detectives determined that the smell had to be coming
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from the trunk because the smell could not be explained
by the small amount of marijuana and marijuana
residue found inside the passenger compartment of the
car. While the presence of marijuana alone does not
automatically give rise to an inference that contraband
is present in the trunk of the vehicle, taken all together,
the scale and the scent of marijuana that could not be
explained by the amount of marijuana and residue
found inside the passenger compartment of the car
established that the detectives had probable cause to
conduct a search of the trunk.
All that is required for probable cause is that there is a fair probability,
given the totality of the circumstances and common sense, that contraband may
be found. Here, the detectives found a scale with marijuana residue and smelled
raw marijuana after removing all marijuana from the passenger compartment.
Those circumstances, coupled together, were sufficient to support the trial
court's finding of probable cause necessary to search the trunk. Defendant has
not demonstrated the trial court was "so clearly mistaken 'that the interests of
justice demand intervention and correction.'" Elders, 192 N.J. at 244 (quoting
Johnson, 42 N.J. at 162).
Affirmed.
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