JUSTINE BRANHAM VS. BOARD OF TRUSTEES (POLICE AND FIREMEN'S RETIREMENT SYSTEM) ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2345-17T4
JUSTINE BRANHAM,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
POLICE AND FIREMEN'S
RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
Respondent-Respondent.
Argued February 13, 2019 - Decided March 21, 2019
Before Judges Accurso and Vernoia.
On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the Police and
Firemen's Retirement System, Department of Treasury,
PFRS No. 3-10-051654.
Michael P. DeRose argued the cause for appellant
(Crivelli & Barbati, LLC, attorneys; Michael P.
DeRose, on the briefs).
Stephanie Kozic, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney
General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant
Attorney General, of counsel; Stephanie Kozic, on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Justine Branham appeals from a final decision of the Board of Trustees of
the Police and Firemen's Retirement System, denying her application for
accidental disability retirement benefits. The Board determined Branham was
not injured during and as a result of her regular or assigned duties. See N.J.S.A.
43:16A-7(1). Because we find this case indistinguishable from Mattia v. Board
of Trustees, Police & Firemen's Retirement System, 455 N.J. Super. 217 (App.
Div. 2018), we affirm.
The essential facts are undisputed. As the Administrative Law Judge
explained in his statement of the case, Branham, an eighteen-year veteran of the
Newark Police Department, "became disabled when she slipped and fell on the
stairs to work, just before her shift began." The Board determined Branham was
totally and permanently disabled as a direct result of the fall and physically or
mentally incapacitated from the performance of her usual duties. The Board
also determined the incident was identifiable as to time and place, was
undesigned and unexpected, caused by an external circumstance, not the result
of a pre-existing disease and not the result of willful negligence.
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Notwithstanding those findings, the Board denied Branham's application
for accidental disability retirement benefits because "the event did not occur
during and as a result of [her] regular or assigned duties" and instead awarded
her ordinary disability retirement benefits. Branham appealed, and the matter
was transferred to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) for a hea ring as a
contested case.
In the OAL, Branham testified that although her shift was from 8:00 a.m.
to 4:00 p.m., she was required to report for work in full uniform by 7:45 a.m.
and could be assigned to respond to a service call while en route from her home
to the precinct. She did not receive such a call on her way to work on the
morning of the accident, and although she left home early, snow slowed her
commute. Branham testified she drove her car through the gate, parked in the
lot reserved for employees and was walking up the stairs to the precinct when
she slipped and fell on ice a minute or so after 8:00 a.m. Because she was in
uniform and prepared to respond to a service call as required, Branham asserted
she was already on duty when she fell on the stairs "but had simply not been
assigned anything yet."
Based on that testimony, the ALJ found "when Branham left her home
between 7:20 a.m. and 7:30 a.m." on the day of the accident, "she was already
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on duty, awaiting assignment." He concluded Branham "became disabled doing
what she was expected to do." Finding Branham was "engaged in an activity
preparatory but essential to [her regular or assigned] duty," the ALJ concluded
"Branham was injured 'during and as a result of the performance of her regula r
or assigned duties' and is entitled to accidental disability benefits."
The Board disagreed. It rejected the ALJ's factual finding that Branham
was "already on duty, awaiting assignment" when she left her home on the day
of the accident. The Board noted Branham was not required to report for work
before 7:45 a.m. in advance of her 8:00 a.m. shift. It found that "Branham might
be available for assignment as needed on her drive to work . . . does not alter
her normal shift start time nor . . . place her on duty during her commute every
day." Although adopting the remainder of the ALJ's factual findings, the Board
rejected the ALJ's legal conclusion that Branham was engaged in her regular or
assigned duties when she was injured, concluding it was without support in the
record.
Specifically, the Board found Branham "was still commuting when she
slipped and fell in the parking lot because she had not yet begun her formal
workday." It concluded that simply because Branham "was in her uniform and
could be given an assignment does not mean that she was performing a function
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connected to her work at the time of her injury. . . . Branham was simply walking
up the stairs to enter the . . . precinct."
Branham appeals, arguing the Board's rejection of the ALJ's factual
findings and legal conclusions was "arbitrary, capricious and inconsistent with
the governing law," and specifically Kasper v. Board of Trustees of the
Teachers' Pension and Annuity Fund, 164 N.J. 564 (2000). We disagree.
Our role in reviewing the decision of an administrative agency is limited.
In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482 (2007). We accord a strong presumption of
reasonableness to an agency's exercise of its statutorily delegated responsibility,
City of Newark v. Nat. Res. Council, 82 N.J. 530, 539 (1980), and defer to its
fact finding, Utley v. Bd. of Review, 194 N.J. 534, 551 (2008). We will not
upset the determination of an administrative agency absent a showing that it was
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; that it lacked fair support in the evidence;
or that it violated legislative policies. In re Musick, 143 N.J. 206, 216 (1996)
(citing Campbell v. Dep't of Civil Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963)).
Our public pension systems are "bound up in the public interest and
provide public employees significant rights which are deserving of
conscientious protection." Zigmont v. Bd. of Trs., Teachers' Pension & Annuity
Fund, 91 N.J. 580, 583 (1983). Because pension statutes are remedial in
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character, they are liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons
intended to be benefited thereby. Klumb v. Bd. of Educ. of Manalapan-
Englishtown Reg'l High Sch. Dist., 199 N.J. 14, 34 (2009).
In order to qualify for ordinary disability retirement benefits, a member
must satisfy the requirements of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-6(1), which provide that the
member must be mentally or physically incapacitated for the performance of
usual duty and of any other duty the member's department would assign and that
such incapacity is likely to be permanent. To be eligible for the enhanced benefit
of an accidental disability pension, the member must further show that the
member is "permanently and totally disabled as a direct result of a traumatic
event occurring during and as a result of the performance of his regular or
assigned duties and that such disability was not the result of the member's willful
negligence." N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1).
As we recently explained in Mattia,
to qualify for accidental disability retirement benefits,
an employee cannot merely be coming to, or going from
work. Rather, the employee "must be engaged in his or
her employment duties on property owned or controlled
by the employer." In sum, in order to qualify for
accidental disability benefits, employees must satisfy
the statutory criteria that they were on the work
premises and performing a function causally connected
to their work.
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[455 N.J. Super. at 223 (quoting Kasper, 164 N.J. at
581) (citations omitted).]
Like the corrections officer in Mattia who fell in the parking lot on his
way into work, Branham does not qualify for accidental disability retirement
benefits because she was still on her commute and had yet to report to her desk
sergeant to receive the day's assignments. See id. at 219. She was thus not
performing any function connected to her work assignment when she was
injured ascending the steps to the precinct on her way into work. Kasper is
distinguishable because the petitioner in that case was on the school grounds to
carry out an assignment from her principal requiring her presence before the
start of the workday. See Kasper, 164 N.J. at 570-71.
As the Board's decision is supported by the evidence in the record and in
accordance with controlling law, there is no basis for us to alter the Board's
conclusion denying Branham's application for accidental disability retirement
benefits. See In re Young, 202 N.J. 50, 70-71 (2010).
Affirmed.
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