IN THE MATTER OF VICTOR VAZQUEZ (NEW JERSEY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION) (CONSOLIDATED) ( 2021 )


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  •                              NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-4034-18
    A-4035-18
    IN THE MATTER OF
    VICTOR VAZQUEZ,
    MARK GUTIERREZ,
    JOSEPH GONZALES,
    ROCCO DUARDO,
    JUSTIN DE LA BRUYERE,
    and CITY OF HACKENSACK
    POLICE DEPARTMENT.
    __________________________
    Argued September 21, 2021 – Decided October 21, 2021
    Before Judges Fisher, Currier and DeAlmeida.
    On appeal from the New Jersey Civil Service
    Commission, Docket Nos. 2018-2412, 2018-2471, and
    2018-2472.
    Raymond R. Wiss argued the cause for appellant/cross-
    respondent City of Hackensack Police Department in
    A-4034-18 and as respondent in A-4035-18 (Wiss &
    Bouregy, PC, attorneys; Raymond R. Wiss, of counsel;
    Timothy J. Wiss and Thomas K. Bouregy, Jr., on the
    briefs).
    Charles J. Sciarra argued the cause for appellant Mark
    Gutierrez in A-4035-18 (Sciarra & Catrambone, LLC,
    attorneys; Charles J. Sciarra, of counsel; Frank C.
    Cioffi, on the briefs).
    Catherine M. Elston argued the cause for cross-
    appellants/respondents Victor Vazquez and Rocco
    Duardo in A-4034-18 (C. Elston & Associates, LLC,
    attorneys; Catherine M. Elston, of counsel and on the
    briefs).
    Dominic L. Giova, Deputy Attorney General, argued
    the cause for respondent New Jersey Civil Service
    Commission in A-4034-18 and A-4035-18 (Andrew J.
    Bruck, Acting Attorney General, attorney; Jane C.
    Schuster, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel in A-
    4034-18; Sookie Bae-Park, Assistant Attorney General,
    of counsel in A-4035-18; Dominic L. Giova, on the
    briefs).
    PER CURIAM
    In these back-to-back appeals, we consider the Civil Service
    Commission's decision imposing a six-month suspension on Hackensack Police
    Officers Rocco Duardo and Victor Vasquez, and its decision to remove Officer
    Mark Gutierrez from employment. The City of Hackensack Police Department
    (City) sought removal for all three officers. The officers argued for lesser
    penalties.
    The sanctions were imposed after a determination by the Administrative
    Law Judge and the Commission that the officers conducted an unlawful,
    warrantless search of a private citizen's home and later fabricated the reasons
    for their actions. Gutierrez was additionally charged with and found to have
    prepared a false and misleading report concerning the events.
    A-4034-18
    2
    In the Duardo and Vazquez matters, the City appeals from the
    Commission's decision not to remove the officers as well as other aspects of its
    ruling. Vazquez and Duardo cross-appeal, contending the Commission erred in
    not accepting the ALJ's recommended suspension of ninety days.
    Gutierrez appeals from the substantiation of charges against him and
    asserts the penalty of removal is excessive.      In light of the "substantial
    deference" we give an agency's imposition of a disciplinary sanction, we affirm
    the Commission's decisions and penalties issued in both matters. Matter of
    Hendrickson, 
    235 N.J. 145
    , 159 (2018).
    I.
    A.
    These disciplinary matters arose from the investigation undertaken by the
    Internal Affairs Department (IA) of the Hackensack Police Department (HPD)
    after it received an anonymous letter describing a cover-up of events that
    occurred at a specified address in December 2016. Following the investigation,
    notices of disciplinary action were served on Officers Duardo, Vazquez, and
    Gutierrez (the officers). Following a disciplinary hearing, the charges were
    sustained, and the IA issued the officers Final Notices of Disciplinary Action
    (FNDA), removing them from employment.
    A-4034-18
    3
    The FNDA stated:
    On or about December 28, 2016, together with other
    members of the [HPD], you conducted, and conspired
    to conduct, an illegal warrantless search of a residence
    located at [a specific address], Apt. [A]. In connection
    with such search, entry to the referenced apartment was
    achieved by tampering with the entrance lock/door.
    While conducting the foregoing warrantless search, you
    illegally seized, and conspired to seize, without a
    warrant, personal property of . . . the resident [of the
    apartment].
    The FNDA issued to Gutierrez included this additional language:
    In addition to the foregoing, you knowingly filed false,
    misleading and inaccurate police reports with respect to
    the events relating to the above referenced warrantless
    search of Apartment [A].
    B.
    The officers appealed the decision to the Office of Administrative Law.
    The ALJ presided over eight days of hearings—with testimony from the
    investigating officer, the officers involved in the incident,1 and other
    representatives of the City and HPD.       The ALJ also reviewed documents
    1
    Two other officers, in addition to Duardo, Vazquez, and Gutierrez, were also
    involved in this incident.
    A-4034-18
    4
    including investigation reports, IA investigation notes, emails, surveillance
    videos,2 and audio recordings.
    The officers contended they were instructed by a HPD Captain to go to
    Apt. A to conduct a weapons investigation. They testified that upon entering
    the building, they were advised by an anonymous resident that he heard
    screaming from Apt. A and there might be an unattended child in the apartment.
    Gutierrez documented the events in an investigation report, describing the
    incident as a "Narcotics Investigation" and "Welfare Check." The report stated:
    On this day myself, Detective Lt. Sybell, Detective
    Duardo, Detective Gonzalez and P.O. Vazquez
    responded to . . . Avenue to check for narcotic activity.
    Upon our arrival we began walking through the
    building at which time we were met by a resident who
    requested to remain anonymous. This individual
    informed us that he believed there was an unattended
    child left in apartment [A].
    Upon receiving this information we responded to this
    apartment and began knocking on the apartment door.
    After a short time no one answered the door. While
    standing outside we discovered this door was left
    insecure [sic]. At this time a check of this residence
    was conducted at which time we discovered there was
    no one home. Upon completion of this check the
    apartment was secured when we left.
    2
    There was surveillance video from cameras located inside the apartment
    building showing the officers' entry into the building and their actions once
    inside.
    A-4034-18
    5
    The IA investigating officer testified regarding his interviews with two
    tenants who lived on the same floor as the occupants of Apt. A. Neither heard
    screaming or a baby or child crying. The occupants of Apt. A were not home at
    the time of the December 2016 incident and were not aware police had been in
    their residence until the IA officer informed them later.
    In her findings, the ALJ noted the testimony of the officers and the
    surveillance footage. She found the owners of the building provided a key to
    the HPD and therefore they were "authorized by the building's owner to enter
    the   building    for   law-enforcement      purposes,      including   suspected
    narcotics/weapons activity." However, the ALJ found the surveillance footage
    showed the officers walking "directly to the third floor (arriving at 12:41) and
    to Apt. A without encountering or speaking with anybody." According to the
    ALJ, the officers stood at the door for several minutes while one of them placed
    "his ear to the door" and "attempted to look under the apartment door but was
    unable to see anything or anyone."
    The ALJ found that "[t]he lock to Apt. A cannot be seen on the video and
    no officer is actually seen tampering with the lock or door." Therefore, the ALJ
    found the evidence "inconclusive as to whether any officer . . . tampered with
    the lock to Apt. A or whether the door was unlocked upon the officers' arrival."
    A-4034-18
    6
    The ALJ noted the surveillance showed that about six minutes "after
    arriving at Apt. A, [officers] Vazquez, Duardo and de la Bruyere spoke with [a
    resident] at his apartment door across the hall from Apt. A, and then [spoke with
    a second resident of the same apartment] . . . ." According to the ALJ, following
    these conversations, the officers "continue to stand at or around Apt . A, with no
    visible change in their conduct or demeanor." She found that approximately two
    and a half minutes after speaking with the residents, "Vazquez walks directly to
    Apt. A and is the first to enter the apartment." Officers de la Bruyere, Gutierrez,
    and Duardo followed.       The officers spent "about six minutes inside" the
    apartment and then left the building.
    The ALJ made the following findings:
    The officers did not have a warrant when they entered
    Apt. A, but claim that they entered the unlocked
    apartment to check for an unattended child based on a
    statement made by [a resident of an apartment on the
    same floor].       Their testimony concerning [that
    resident's] report of an unattended child and his request
    to remain anonymous, however, was not credible.
    Apart from the officers' own testimony, they offered no
    evidence to support their assertion that [the resident]
    indicated that there was an unattended child in Apt. A.
    [The resident] did not testify to corroborate the officers'
    testimony, and nobody testified, or even indicated in a
    recorded statement that they heard a child in or around
    Apt A on the morning of December 28, 2016. The
    officers stood outside Apt. A for about six and a half
    minutes before speaking with [the resident], and
    A-4034-18
    7
    remained at or around Apt. A for an additional eight
    minutes before entering the apartment, and not one
    officer heard a child inside that apartment.
    After speaking with [the resident], the officers'
    behavior on the video did not appear to change in any
    way—they continued to mill around the third floor as
    they did earlier and their behavior did not reflect any
    sense of urgency or concern that someone could
    potentially be in danger in Apt. A. There is also no
    evidence of any type of follow-up by the officers or
    HPD to ascertain further information about a reported
    child.
    The ALJ found the "officers were not informed that there was an
    unattended child in Apt. A at that time, and that the officers' conversation with
    [the resident] did not trigger or create an exigent circumstance or emergency
    situation." The ALJ made these findings based on her "review of the video,
    [her] assessment of the officers' testimony, and the absence of any testimony
    from an impartial witness corroborating the report of an unattended child or that
    a child was heard in the apartment that morning."
    The ALJ found the "credible evidence" supported the finding that "no
    exception to the warrant requirement applies here and that, therefore, the
    warrantless search of the apartment was unjustified and improper." However,
    the ALJ found "the evidence is inconclusive as to whether the officers planned
    A-4034-18
    8
    or conspired to conduct an unauthorized or improper warrantless search of Apt
    A, or to seize personal property of [the residents of Apt. A]."
    The ALJ then addressed Gutierrez's investigation report for the December
    28, 2016 incident. She found:
    The Investigation Report . . . documenting the events of
    December 28, 2016 . . ., which was prepared by
    Gutierrez and reviewed by de la Bruyere, does not
    mention that Riotto and de la Bruyere also responded to
    [the building]. More importantly, while Gutierrez was
    not on the third floor the entire time and may not have
    had firsthand knowledge of some of the events that
    occurred, I FIND that the report falsely indicates that
    while walking through the building Gutierrez and the
    other officers . . . were met by a resident who informed
    them that he believed there was an unattended child left
    in Apt. A. Even if Gutierrez did not speak directly with
    [the resident on the same floor], and only heard of a
    possible unattended child from Sybel, as he testified,
    the report does not reflect this. The report also states
    that "upon receiving" this information concerning the
    unattended child, they responded to the apartment "and
    began knocking on the apartment door." The report
    continues: "After a short time no one answered the
    door. While standing outside we discovered this door
    was left insecure [sic]." Contrary to this written report,
    the officers not only testified that it was [the resident
    on the same floor] who reported the unattended child,
    but that the unlocked door was discovered before even
    speaking with [that resident]. I FIND that the report is
    not simply vague, it contains misleading and inaccurate
    information.
    ....
    A-4034-18
    9
    I FIND, therefore, that Gutierrez wrote . . . the filed
    Investigation Report of December 28, 2016, which
    contained knowingly false, misleading, and inaccurate
    information with respect to events relating to the search
    of Apt. A.
    The ALJ concluded the officers had not demonstrated an exception to the
    warrant requirement to permit their entry into Apt. A. She rejected the officers'
    assertion of the community-caretaking doctrine, stating:
    The [officers] all concede that they had no warrant to
    enter Apt. A. They left headquarters intending to make
    contact with [the occupant of Apt. A] and further the
    weapons investigation. After waiting outside the
    apartment for about fourteen minutes, the four officers
    entered the apartment. I was not convinced by the
    officers' testimony that they were informed that there
    was an unattended child in Apt. A that morning, or that
    they entered the apartment in response to a report of an
    unattended child.
    The ALJ concluded there was "no evidence of any immediate danger or
    urgent need for police action. Consequently, there did not exist any objectively
    reasonable emergency or species of exigent circumstances to justify their entry
    into Apt. A, and the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement
    cannot apply."
    The ALJ considered each charge and found that the following charges
    were sustained as to all three officers: N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(1), incompetency,
    inefficiency or failure to perform duties; N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(6), conduct
    A-4034-18
    10
    unbecoming; N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(7), neglect of duty; and N.J.A.C. 4A:2-
    2.3(a)(12), other sufficient cause. The ALJ also sustained violations of several
    HPD Rules and Regulations.
    1.
    The City sought removal of all of the officers. In considering the penalty
    to be imposed against Duardo and Vazquez for their improper actions, the ALJ
    stated that "conduct[ing] an improper warrantless search" of a private citizen's
    residence was "a serious charge, particularly considering that a police officer's
    primary duty is to enforce and uphold the law." However, she noted that Duardo
    and Vazquez went to Apt. A to conduct a legitimate law enforcement
    investigation and only entered the apartment after a commanding officer
    directed them to do so. In addition, neither officer went into the residence to
    further a personal interest. Nonetheless, the ALJ concluded that the officers
    "knew, or should have known, that the search of Apt. A without a warrant was
    not a legitimate one because no exigent circumstance or emergency existed."
    Because of the expressed mitigating factors, the ALJ found Duardo's and
    Vazquez's actions were "insufficiently severe to render" them unsuitable to
    continue in their respective positions with the HPD. She concluded that "the
    penalty of removal is excessive, and that progressive discipline should apply."
    A-4034-18
    11
    Therefore, she found "a ninety-day suspension is more appropriate and
    proportionate to the offense." The ALJ ordered the reinstatement of Vazquez
    and Duardo to their position as patrolmen and they were entitled to any
    applicable back pay and benefits.
    2.
    In assessing the appropriate penalty against Gutierrez, the ALJ
    acknowledged the seriousness of the offenses but found his "actions were
    insufficiently severe to render him unsuitable to continue in his position as
    detective, . . . the penalty of removal is excessive, and that progressive discipline
    should apply." Therefore, the ALJ concluded "a 150-day suspension is the more
    appropriate and proportionate discipline." She ordered his reinstatement as a
    detective and the issuance of any back pay and benefits.
    C.
    In its April 8, 2019 decision, the Commission agreed with the ALJ's
    credibility assessments and determinations regarding the charges.                The
    Commission found that the officers improperly entered the apartment without a
    warrant, and that the officers' testimony that they entered the apartment
    following the report of an unattended child was not credible. Consistent with
    the ALJ's fact findings, the Commission determined it was inconclusive whether
    A-4034-18
    12
    the officers had removed any property from the apartment and there was no
    conclusive evidence indicating the officers conspired to conduct a warrantless
    search.
    However, the Commission did not adopt the ALJ's recommended
    penalties. In addressing Duardo and Vazquez, the Commission described their
    actions of entering an apartment without a warrant in the absence of any
    emergent circumstances as "not acceptable and . . . deserving of a severe
    punishment" and "of more than a 90-day suspension given the seriousness of
    their actions." The Commission found that "the appropriate penalty is a six-
    month suspension . . . which will serve as an indication that any further
    infractions committed by them will potentially subject them to removal from
    employment." The Commission found the officers were entitled to back pay,
    benefits, and seniority for the period after the imposition of the six -month
    suspension up to their dates of reinstatement.
    In its review of Gutierrez's matter, the Commission also adopted the ALJ's
    conclusions that Gutierrez improperly entered the apartment without a warrant
    and was responsible for a false and misleading report regarding the incident. It
    characterized these actions as "extremely serious offenses" and "sufficiently
    A-4034-18
    13
    egregious to warrant the penalty of removal." The Commission found "the
    action of the appointing authority in removing . . . Gutierrez was appropriate."
    II.
    Our review of the Commission's decisions is limited, In re Stallworth, 
    208 N.J. 182
    , 194 (2011), as its determinations are entitled to "a strong presumption
    of reasonableness." In re Carroll, 
    339 N.J. Super. 429
    , 437 (App. Div. 2001)
    (quoting In re Vey, 
    272 N.J. Super. 199
    , 205 (App. Div. 1993)). To reverse an
    agency's judgment, we "must find the agency's decision to be 'arbitrary,
    capricious, or unreasonable, or [] not supported by substantial credible evidence
    in the record as a whole.'" Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 194 (quoting Henry v. Rahway
    State Prison, 
    81 N.J. 571
    , 579-80 (1980)).
    We may not "substitute [our] own judgment for the agency's, even though
    [we] might have reached a different result." 
    Ibid.
     In addition, the ALJ's factual
    findings and credibility determinations must be given "due regard." Clowes v.
    Terminix Int'l, Inc., 
    109 N.J. 575
    , 587 (1988) (quoting Close v. Kordulak Bros.,
    
    44 N.J. 589
    , 599 (1965)).
    The deferential nature of our review also applies to disciplinary sanctions.
    In re Herrmann, 
    192 N.J. 19
    , 28 (2007). "Traditionally, we give substantial
    deference to an agency's imposition of a disciplinary sanction, based on its
    A-4034-18
    14
    'expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field.'" In re Hendrickson, 235
    at 158-59 (quoting Herrmann, 
    192 N.J. at 28
    ).
    "In light of the deference owed to such determinations, when reviewing
    administrative sanctions, the test . . . is whether such punishment is so
    disproportionate to the offense, in light of all the circumstances, as to be
    shocking to one's sense of fairness." 
    Id. at 159
     (quoting Herrmann, 
    192 N.J. at 28-29
    ) (internal quotation omitted).     "That standard gives a wide berth of
    discretion." 
    Ibid.
     "Only a patently unreasonable sanction would call for this
    [c]ourt's intervention." 
    Ibid.
     "[C]ourts should take care not to substitute their
    own views of whether a particular penalty is correct for those of the body
    charged with making that decision." In re Carter, 
    191 N.J. 474
    , 486 (2007).
    A.
    On appeal, the City asserts that police officers are held to a higher standard
    of conduct than a typical public employee and that this factor outweighs the
    doctrine of progressive discipline. The City contends that the Commission's
    imposition of a six-month suspension for Duardo and Vazquez is so patently
    unreasonable that it requires this court's intervention. The City seeks the penalty
    of removal for these officers.
    A-4034-18
    15
    In its review of the ALJ's recommendations regarding Duardo and
    Vazquez, the Commission found that a more severe penalty was warranted than
    a ninety-day suspension. The Commission agreed that "a law enforcement
    officer is held to a higher standard than a civilian public employee."         The
    Commission stated: "The illegal entry of a law enforcement officer into a
    member of the public's home is not acceptable and is deserving of a severe
    punishment.    Such actions erode the public trust in the law enforcement
    community."
    However, as stated, the Commission found there were "mitigating factors
    [that justified] a penalty less severe than removal." It determined the appropriate
    penalty was a six-month suspension. Although we might differ regarding the
    right sanction, it is not our role to substitute our own views. We are satisfied
    the Commission's decision was not arbitrary or capricious as it was supported
    by the substantial credible evidence in the record. Therefore, we affirm the
    penalty imposed by the Commission on Duardo and Vazquez.
    The City raises several other arguments in its appeal regarding Duardo
    and Vazquez. Specifically, the City asserts the Commission erred in finding the
    City did not prove the charge of misconduct under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147 and did
    A-4034-18
    16
    not establish the elements of a civil conspiracy. We find no merit to these
    contentions.
    N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147 does not apply to a civil service jurisdiction such as
    the City. See Borough of Franklin v. Smith, 
    466 N.J. Super. 487
    , 496 (App.
    Div. 2021) (citing Ruroede v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, 
    214 N.J. 338
    , 343
    (2013)) (stating that "[p]roceedings governing the termination of a police officer
    in a non-civil service jurisdiction are set forth in N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147 to -151.").
    In considering the allegations of a civil conspiracy, both the ALJ and the
    Commission found the evidence was inconclusive whether a conspiracy existed
    at the time of the officers' entry into the apartment. We see no reason to disturb
    the Commission's finding that the City did not establish the charge by a
    preponderance of the evidence.
    Finally, the City requests we reverse the Commission's decision to award
    Vazquez and Duardo back pay and benefits.           We decline to do so as the
    Commission acted within its discretion in awarding back pay and benefits. See
    N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10(a) ("Where a disciplinary penalty has been reversed, the
    Commission shall award back pay, benefits, seniority or restitution of a fine.
    Such items may be awarded when a disciplinary penalty is modified.").
    A-4034-18
    17
    B.
    In their cross-appeal, Duardo and Vazquez assert their testimony
    regarding an unattended child in Apt. A was credible and justified the
    warrantless search. They further contend the Commission and ALJ failed to
    address their motion for summary decision regarding conflicts of interest they
    allege tainted the disciplinary process.     We are unconvinced by either
    contention.
    The Commission concluded the City presented sufficient proofs to show
    by a preponderance of the evidence that the officers' entry into the apartment
    was unlawful. There is sufficient credible evidence to support the agency's
    conclusion. The IA investigating officer testified regarding the details of his
    investigation and produced documents relating to the investigation. Included in
    the documents were witness statements from multiple residents in the apartment
    building; none of the witnesses reported hearing a child in distress on December
    28, 2016.
    In addition, the City submitted video from the apartment building's
    security cameras. In reviewing the video, the ALJ made fact findings regarding
    the officers' behavior. Although the officers testified that a neighbor informed
    them of the unattended child, the ALJ did not find this testimony credible.
    A-4034-18
    18
    Instead, the ALJ found the "credible evidence" supported a finding that "no
    exception to the warrant requirement applies here and that, therefore, the
    warrantless search of the apartment was unjustified and improper." The findings
    and conclusions of the ALJ and the Commission are supported by the credible
    evidence in the record and are not arbitrary and capricious.
    Finally, we reject Duardo's and Vazquez's argument that the ALJ did not
    consider their motion to dismiss. To the contrary, the ALJ addressed the motion
    and denied it in her initial decision.
    III.
    We turn next to the issues raised by Gutierrez in his appeal from the
    Commission's decision to remove him from employment. First, he asserts the
    ALJ and Commission erred in substantiating the charges against him. Because
    we have addressed this issue at length above, we need not repeat ourselves here.
    For the reasons we have already stated, the ALJ's and Commission's factual
    findings were supported by the credible evidence in the record.       Gutierrez
    unlawfully entered and searched Apt. A without a warrant and prepared and filed
    a false and misleading police report.
    Gutierrez also challenges the imposed penalty of removal, asserting the
    Commission should have applied progressive discipline. We are not persuaded.
    A-4034-18
    19
    As our Supreme Court has stated, "[p]rogressive discipline [can be] bypassed
    when an employee engages in severe misconduct, especially when the
    employee's position involves public safety and the misconduct causes risk of
    harm to persons or property." Herrmann, 
    192 N.J. at 33
    .
    In considering the appropriate penalty for Gutierrez, the Commission
    noted the "extremely serious offenses" sustained against the officer and that his
    actions eroded the public trust in the law enforcement community. Therefore,
    the Commission determined not to apply progressive discipline, instead finding
    Gutierrez's actions were severe enough to warrant his removal from the police
    department.
    Again, in deference to the Commission's expertise and knowledge
    regarding the imposition of a disciplinary sanction, we see no reason to disturb
    its decision.
    Affirmed.
    A-4034-18
    20