JEREMY D. PETERS VS. BONNIE A. MCCARTHY (L-2626-16, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5686-18
JEREMY D. PETERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BONNIE A. MCCARTHY,
Defendant-Respondent.
__________________________
Submitted April 19, 2021 – Decided October 22, 2021
Before Judges Hoffman, Suter, and Smith.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Ocean County, Docket No. L-2626-16.
Mallon & Tranger, attorneys for appellant (Randall L.
Tranger, of counsel; Daniel B. Glatz, on the brief).
Law Offices of Styliades and Jackson, attorneys for
respondent (Catherine A. Schmutz, of counsel and on
the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SMITH, J.A.D.
After a verdict for defendant in a personal injury negligence trial, plaintiff
appealed, arguing the judge erred in a series of evidential rulings both before
and during trial. We reverse and remand for a new trial because defendant's
expert testimony on biomechanics should have been barred consistent with the
principles set forth in Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 194 N.J. 6 (2008).
I.
On the afternoon of April 18, 2016, defendant rear-ended plaintiff's
vehicle while it was stopped at a controlled intersection. No police were called
to the scene and no traffic citations were issued; however, later that day plaintiff
filed a report at a police station and went to the emergency room. The record
shows plaintiff sustained several injuries including: cervical disc herniation at
C4-5, C5-6, and C6-7; cervical radiculopathy; lumbar sprain and strain with
severe spasm; L5-S1 disc herniation; and lumbar radiculopathy.
Plaintiff sued defendant. After discovery ended, plaintiff filed several
pre-trial motions in limine, including a motion to bar all testimony from
defendant's expert, Dr. Samuel Wordeman, and to bar any reference to the fact
that the police were not called to the accident scene. The trial court denied both
motions after hearing argument from counsel. The court found the fact that
police were not called to the scene was relevant to the "disputed matter as to the
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degree of the impact . . . [and] the extent of the injuries suffered . . . ." As to the
expert testimony, the court barred Dr. Wordeman from testifying about airbag
deployment at the crash scene because his report contained no foundation for
such testimony. The court deferred its decision on the motion to bar all of Dr.
Wordeman's testimony, stating that it expected defendant to lay a foundation at
trial for the doctor's opinion consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in
Hisenaj. Id. at 25.
At trial, Dr. Wordeman testified that the subject accident was not severe
enough to cause plaintiff's injuries. The documents that he relied on included:
(1) the police report (filed by plaintiff during a trip to the police station after the
collision); (2) photographs and repair estimates for both vehicles; (3) plaintiff's
medical records; (4) the pleadings; and (5) answers to interrogatories and the
parties' depositions. Dr. Wordeman also reviewed various scientific studies and
cited calculations that he performed in arriving at his opinion on causation.
On July 16, 2019, the jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant. On
appeal, plaintiff argues three points: Dr. Wordeman's expert opinion testimony
should have been barred in its entirety; testimony that the police were not called
should have been excluded on relevancy grounds; and plaintiff should have been
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permitted to testify about why he discontinued treatment in February 2017, after
defendant raised the issue in opening arguments.
II.
When considering a trial court's evidentiary rulings, our standard of
review is well settled. "When a trial court admits or excludes evidence, its
determination is 'entitled to deference absent a showing of an abuse of
discretion, i.e., [that] there has been a clear error of judgment.'" Griffin v. City
of E. Orange, 225 N.J. 400, 413 (2016) (quoting State v. Brown, 170 N.J. 138,
147 (2001)) (alteration in original). "Thus, we will reverse an evidentiary ruling
only if it 'was so wide [of] the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted.'"
Ibid. (quoting Green v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 160 N.J. 480, 492 (1999)).
N.J.R.E. 702 provides: "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
N.J.R.E. 703 provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an
expert bases an opinion or inference may be those
perceived by or made known to the expert at or before
the proceeding. If of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
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inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not
be admissible in evidence.
A determination on the admissibility of expert evidence is committed to
the sound discretion of the trial court. Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 52
(2015) (citing State v. Berry, 140 N.J. 280, 293 (1995)). A trial court's grant or
denial of a motion to preclude expert testimony is entitled to deference on
appellate review. Ibid. As instructed by the Supreme Court, "we apply [a]
deferential approach to a trial court's decision to admit expert testimony,
reviewing it against an abuse of discretion standard." Id. at 53 (quoting
Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 371-72 (2011))
(alteration in original).
In New Jersey, scientific evidence is admissible in a civil case if
"it derives from a reliable methodology supported by some expert
consensus." Suanez v. Egeland, 353 N.J. Super. 191, 195 (App. Div. 2002)
(citations omitted). There are three ways a party offering the results of scientific
evidence can demonstrate its reliability: "(1) the testimony of knowledgeable
experts; (2) authoritative scientific literature; and (3) persuasive judicial
decisions." Id. at 195-96 (citations omitted). A party offering novel scientific
evidence bears the burden of demonstrating its reliability. Id. at 196 (citation
omitted).
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In re Accutane Litigation, 234 N.J. 340 (2018), represents the Court's
adoption of certain factors that trial courts must utilize when assessing the
admissibility of expert testimony in civil cases.1 Id. at 347-48. The non-
exhaustive list of factors identified in Accutane to be used in conjunction with
N.J.R.E. 702 and 703 are as follows:
1) Whether the scientific theory can be, or at any time
has been, tested;
2) Whether the scientific theory has been subjected to
peer review and publication, noting that publication is
one form of peer review but is not a "sine qua non";
3) Whether there is any known or potential rate of error
and whether there exist any standards for maintaining
or controlling the technique's operation; and
4) Whether there does exist a general acceptance in the
scientific community about the scientific theory.
[Id. at 398.]
When determining whether to admit complex expert opinion testimony in a civil
case, trial courts serve a gatekeeper function, expected to "assess both the
methodology used . . . to arrive at an opinion and the underlying data used in the
formation of the opinion." Id. at 396-97.
1
These factors are referred to throughout Accutane as "Daubert factors," or the
"Daubert standard." See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579(1993).
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III.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that Dr. Wordeman's expert opinion testimony
should have been barred from trial. We agree.
At the motion in limine hearing before trial, plaintiff moved to bar Dr.
Wordeman's opinion that the rear-end vehicle collision did not cause plaintiff's
spinal injuries. Plaintiff argued that the data and studies Dr. Wordeman relied
upon and referenced in his written expert report were insufficient to support his
conclusion. However, the trial court conditionally denied the motion in limine,
citing Hisenaj. The court stated that it "expect[ed] to hear . . . that the defense
expert relied upon studies involving specific crash-like conditions over a period
of time which [the expert] believes are analogous . . . not the same vehicles, not
the exact same accident, but low-velocity impact."
Hisenaj involved a low-impact, vehicle-on-vehicle rear-end collision in
which the plaintiff alleged cervical and lumbar injuries as a result of the
collision. Hisenaj, 194 N.J. at 10-11. The plaintiff moved to bar the defense
biomechanical expert opinion under N.J.R.E. 702. The trial court denied the
motion and admitted the opinion. After a trial, the jury found no permanent
injury and rendered a partial verdict for the defendant. We reversed, finding the
trial court erred in admitting the defense expert opinion. The Supreme Court
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found the trial court committed no error in admitting the expert opinion, noting
that the expert relied on seventeen studies which "examined the outcomes of
low-impact accidents on individuals of both genders and of various ages and
body types." Id. at 20. The studies were "performed over a period of thirty-four
years on more than two-hundred test subjects." Ibid. Further testimony revealed
similarities between the test subjects and the plaintiff. For example, at least
fifty-two of the two-hundred test subjects were the same gender as the plaintiff.
The Court found that the defense expert relied on these detailed studies, which
he testified were authoritative and generally accepted in the scientific
community. Id. at 22. The Court concluded the testimony was admissible,
finding that the record showed defense presented an "adequately reliable
scientific foundation" at trial. Id. at 25.
The Court contrasted the Hisenaj record to the defense biomechanical
expert record in Suanez, another low speed rear-end collision case where we
held the defense biomechanical expert opinion was not admissible. Suanez, 353
N.J. at 203. We found that the scientific literature cited by the expert in Suanez
simply did not provide a reliable basis for his opinion, as it involved tests
"performed . . . upon cadavers or upon military personnel . . . ." Id. at 200.
During testimony, the expert in Suanez struggled to indicate with particularity
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the studies that supported his conclusion. Id. at 199-200. Instead, he relied
mostly upon "unidentified articles" written by "unidentified authors" to support
his theories. Id. at 201.
Keeping in mind the trial court's statement that it expected defense to meet
the Hisenaj expert standard, we turn to the record to determine whether the trial
court "assess[ed] both the methodology used . . . to arrive at an opinion and the
underlying data used in the formation of the opinion." Accutane, 234 N.J. at
396-97.
After Dr. Wordeman was qualified as an expert without objection, the trial
court conducted a brief Rule 104 hearing to hear his proffered testimony.
Plaintiff objected to Dr. Wordeman's pending testimony, which the plaintiff
characterized as more medical than biomechanical in nature, and therefore more
properly the province of a medical witness rather than an engineering witness.
The trial court overruled the objection, admitting Dr. Wordeman's entire expert
testimony without hearing any additional proffer by the plaintiff. The court
found that Dr. Wordeman's testimony would come in under N.J.R.E. 703 without
undertaking further analysis.
Dr. Wordeman proceeded to testify at length concerning a wide range of
topics beyond the ken of the average juror, including but not limited to: the
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effect of forces on the cervical and lumbar spine; unspecified studies and
technical literature he used in forming his opinions; and his ultimate opinion
that the forces resulting from the collision did not cause plaintiff's cervical or
lumbar back injuries.
The trial court mistakenly exercised its discretion when it declined to
assess the methodology and underlying data Dr. Wordeman used in forming his
opinion during the Rule 104 hearing. Id. at 397-98. During the motion in limine
hearing, the trial court correctly anticipated the need to perform its gatekeeping
function in this highly complex and hotly contested expert field of
biomechanical engineering. Then, during trial, it failed to take the next step
under N.J.R.E. 703 and use the Daubert factors to assess the reliability of Dr.
Wordeman's testimony. Its failure to "determine whether the scientific
community would accept the methodology employed" by Dr. Wordeman before
admitting his testimony was an error "so wide [of] the mark that a manifest
denial of justice resulted." Griffin, 225 N.J. at 413.
Mindful of the clear boundaries set by the Court in Hisenaj, we are
committed to the deferential standard of review applicable when trial courts
decide the admissibility of expert opinion testimony. See Hisenaj, 194 N.J. at
25. We restrict the scope of our review to the record before the trial court, and
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do not engage in an "unconstrained review [of] . . . material not part of the
evidentiary record and argument . . . beyond that which was advanced before the
trial court." Ibid.We simply note that the trial court's proper recognition of complex
scientific testimony during the motion in limine required assessment of the
reliability of that testimony pursuant to Rule 703 prior to its admission into
evidence. This was clear from the trial court's comments during the Rule 104
hearing: citing to Hisenaj and directly informing counsel that it expected to hear
testimony analogous to Hisenaj's expert testimony at trial. The trial court
recognized it had an obligation to use the Daubert/Accutane gatekeeper factors
to scrutinize Dr. Wordeman's opinion testimony before exposing the jury to it.
Unfortunately, the testimony analogous to Hisenaj's expert testimony was never
presented.
As a result, the trial court never performed the critical assessment required
by Hisenaj, thereby abdicating its gatekeeper role. Because we find this lapse
dispositive, we need not make findings on the sufficiency or reliability of Dr.
Wordeman's referenced studies, as that would require us to reach beyond the
trial record.
Difficult as it may be, the gatekeeping role must be
rigorous. In resolving issues of reliability of an expert's
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methodology in a new and evolving area of medical
causation . . . [t]he court's function is to distinguish
scientifically sound reasoning from that of the self-
validating expert, who uses scientific terminology to
present unsubstantiated personal beliefs.
[Accutane, 234 N.J. at 390.]
Our view of proper gatekeeping in a methodology-
based approach to reliability for expert scientific
testimony requires the proponent to demonstrate that
the expert applies his or her scientifically recognized
methodology in the way that others in the field practice
the methodology. When a proponent does not
demonstrate the soundness of a methodology, both in
terms of its approach to reasoning and to its use of data,
from the perspective of others within the relevant
scientific community, the gatekeeper should exclude
the proposed expert testimony on the basis that it is
unreliable.
[Id. at 399-400.]
Defendant, the proponent of the Dr. Wordeman's testimony, made no such
demonstration, nor did the trial court require it. On this record we discern no
recourse but to reverse and remand this matter for a new trial.
For completeness, we comment upon plaintiff's remaining two appeal
issues: the trial court's admission of testimony that the police were not called to
the collision scene; and the trial court's exclusion of plaintiff's testimony about
why he discontinued medical treatment. The trial court placed its reasons on the
record in each matter, and our review reveals no abuse of discretion. We
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conclude that the trial judge is entitled to deference on these two aspects of
plaintiff's appeal. Griffin, 225 N.J. at 413.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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