CHRISTOPHER RICCIARDI VS. ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO. (L-1779-18, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4045-19
CHRISTOPHER RICCIARDI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO.,
Defendant-Respondent.
__________________________
Argued September 15, 2021 – Decided October 27, 2021
Before Judges Messano, Accurso and Rose.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Union County, Docket No. L-1779-18.
Michael A. Rabasca argued the cause for appellant (The
Epstein Law Firm, PA, attorneys; Michael J. Epstein,
of counsel and on the briefs; Michael A. Rabasca, on
the briefs).
Joseph B. O'Toole, Jr. argued the cause for respondent
(O'Toole, Couch & Della Rovere, LLC, attorneys;
Joseph B. O'Toole, Jr., on the brief).
PER CURIAM
In this automobile insurance coverage dispute, plaintiff Christopher
Ricciardi appeals from June 30, 2020 Law Division orders, dismissing his
complaint against defendant Allstate Insurance Company on the parties' cross -
motions for summary judgment. On appeal, plaintiff reprises his argument that
he was a "resident relative" as defined in his brother's Allstate policy, entitli ng
plaintiff to underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage. He further maintains
Allstate should be precluded, under equitable principles, from belatedly denying
coverage on the ground that plaintiff's personal vehicle was insured under
another automobile policy. We reject these contentions and affirm.
We summarize the relevant facts from the record before the motion judge
in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Ben Elazar v. Macrietta
Cleaners, Inc., 230 N.J. 123, 135 (2017).
Plaintiff was injured in a January 15, 2017 collision with an underinsured
motorist while driving his brother's pickup truck during their move to Florida.
Allstate insured the pickup truck; the policy listed plaintiff's brother as the only
named insured. Claiming his injuries exceeded the $50,000 bodily injury policy
limit tendered by the tortfeasor's insurance carrier, plaintiff sought coverage as
a "resident relative" under his brother's Allstate policy, which provided up to
$250,000 UIM coverage. Plaintiff's personal vehicle was insured by
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Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO), which limited UIM
coverage for bodily injury claims to $25,000.
In response to plaintiff's claim for UIM coverage and Longworth1
approval to resolve his claims against the tortfeasor, Allstate denied coverage in
its May 26, 2017 correspondence to plaintiff's Florida attorney. Allstate asserted
plaintiff "was a non-resident operator of [its] insured's vehicle" and, as such, the
policy's "UIM limits would 'step down' to the mandatory minimum specified by
the laws of New Jersey." See N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1(a)(1) (setting the mandatory
minimum amount of bodily injury coverage at $15,000). Notably, three months
earlier on January 16, 2017, Allstate had denied plaintiff's claim for personal
injury protection (PIP) benefits, asserting plaintiff's GEICO policy was
"PRIMARY." See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.2 (authorizing PIP benefits "for the named
insured and any resident relative in the named insured's household who is not a
named insured under an automobile insurance policy of his own").
At the time of the accident, the brothers were en route to Delray Beach,
Florida, to move into a new apartment. Their lease term commenced that same
day. For three months prior to the move, the brothers had lived together in their
1
Longworth v. Van Houten, 223 N.J. Super. 174 (App. Div. 1988) (defining
the obligations of insureds and insurers in the UIM context).
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parents' Scotch Plains, New Jersey home. Before moving into his parents' home,
plaintiff had resided for several years in Brooklyn, New York, with his
girlfriend. Plaintiff's driver's license and GEICO policy were issued in New
York State.
Plaintiff filed his complaint against Allstate in May 2018, seeking a
declaration that he qualified as a "resident relative" of his brother's household
and was entitled to UIM benefits under the Allstate policy. Although Allstate's
ensuing answer did not expressly deny coverage on the ground that plaintiff was
the named insured on his GEICO policy, Allstate generally asserted separate
defenses under the "no-fault" statute, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1 to -35, and the UIM
statute, N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1 to -1.9.
The discovery period was protracted by motion practice, initially
stemming from Allstate's failure to answer plaintiff's interrogatories and request
for documents. Ultimately, the judge granted plaintiff's unopposed motion to
strike Allstate's answer and defenses based on the carrier's failure to respond to
plaintiff's request for a single admission. The August 5, 2019 memorializing
order provided that Allstate "conclusively . . . admitted . . . its sole stated reason
for denying UIM benefits to plaintiff is that plaintiff was not a resident relative
of [his brother] on the date and at the time of the subject accident."
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At the close of discovery, plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment
on the coverage issue. Allstate opposed plaintiff's motion and cross-moved to
vacate the August 5, 2019 order and reinstate its answer and defenses. Allstate
contended plaintiff lacked any intention to continue his residence at the Scotch
Plains home, which was the address associated with the policy, and there was
no evidence in the record demonstrating the policy was amended to include
plaintiff as a new driver in the household.
Following argument, the judge issued an oral decision, denying plaintiff's
motion without prejudice and extending the discovery end date. The judge
permitted additional discovery, which was limited to whether plaintiff qualified
as a member of his brother's household. Accordingly, the judge vacated the
August 5, 2019 order, and reinstated Allstate's answer and defenses.
Thereafter, plaintiff renewed his motion for partial summary judgment on
the same grounds. Allstate opposed plaintiff's motion and cross-moved for
summary judgment, arguing that even if plaintiff were deemed a resident relative
under Allstate's UIM provision, because plaintiff was the named insured on his
own automobile insurance policy, he was consequently not entitled to Allstate's
full UIM coverage.
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Allstate summarized its limits of liability provision of UIM coverage as
follows2:
(1) $250,000 is available to the named insured, resident
spouse or civil partner of named insured and resident
relatives[,] who [is] in an insured auto or non-owned
vehicle that [is] not the named insured, spouse, or civil
union partner of a named insured on another policy.
(2) $15,000 is available to named insured, civil union
partner or resident spouse of the named insured or
resident relative[,] who [is] in a motor vehicle owned
by that person or a resident relative or is available for
regular use by that person or resident relative which is
not an insured vehicle on the policy and is insured for
similar coverage under another policy.
(3) $15,000 for all other insured persons.
[(Emphasis added).]
Because plaintiff was the named insured on his own GEICO policy, Allstate
primarily contended his claim fell within category three.
Acknowledging it did not assert this coverage defense in its May 26, 2017
denial letter – and that its motion "could . . . have been filed sooner" – Allstate
nonetheless argued the issue was raised during litigation. As one notable
example, Allstate referenced its interrogatory answer to plaintiff's request for
facts supporting its affirmative defenses. That answer specifically cited the UIM
2
Plaintiff does not dispute Allstate's summary of the provision.
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statute and asserted plaintiff had his own automobile insurance policy issued by
GEICO. And when deposed, plaintiff acknowledged he was insured under the
GEICO policy. Because it was definitive in its denial of plaintiff's UIM claim
from "the very beginning," Allstate argued plaintiff did not establish detrimental
reliance that would otherwise entitle him to equitable relief from "a valid
limitation within the insurance contract."
Following oral argument, the motion judge reserved decision and
thereafter issued a cogent written statement of reasons that accompanied the
June 9, 2020 orders. The judge squarely addressed the issues raised in view of
the governing law.
Initially, the motion judge determined issues of fact precluded judgment
as a matter of law as to whether plaintiff intended to establish residency while
residing with his brother at the Scotch Plains home. The judge elaborated:
Plaintiff testified at his deposition that his residence in
New Jersey was temporary. Furthermore, he has a New
York license and uses a Staten Island address for vital
documents such as his insurance and driver's license
information even though he has been living in Florida
for more than three years. Also, [p]laintiff worked at
the Country Club Services in Millburn, New Jersey
part-time for six weeks. Working in New Jersey for
such a short time, along with having a New York
license, a New York address listed on his insurance
policy and testifying that living in New Jersey was
temporary could lead a reasonable juror to find that
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[plaintiff] did not intend to establish residency in New
Jersey at the time before the accident.
The motion judge also found "at issue . . . whether [plaintiff's] brother gave
proper notice to Allstate about the fact that [p]laintiff was now living with him
and was properly defined as a resident insured."
Turning to Allstate's motion, the judge focused on the "clear and
unambiguous" terms of the policy's UIM step-down provision, which resulted in
the mandatory minimum limit applying here. Because that limit did not exceed
the tortfeasor's $50,000 bodily injury policy limit, the judge concluded Allstate's
UIM provision was not triggered, thereby dismissing plaintiff's UIM claim.
In reaching his decision, the motion judge rejected plaintiff's argument
that the equitable remedies of laches, estoppel, or waiver applied here where
Allstate's delayed defense "ambush[ed]" plaintiff. Citing the record evidence to
the contrary, the judge found no "suggesti[on] that [p]laintiff changed his
position in any manner in reaction to Allstate's purported failure to properly rely
upon the step-down provision."
We review the trial court's decision on summary judgment de novo,
applying the same legal standard as the trial court. RSI Bank v. Providence Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 234 N.J. 459, 472 (2018). We must therefore determine "whether
the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury
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or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law."
Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 536 (1995) (citation
omitted).
Summary judgment must be granted "if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law."
Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224
N.J. 189, 199 (2016) (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)). If there is no genuine issue of
material fact, we must then "decide whether the trial court correctly interpreted
the law." DepoLink Ct. Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J.
Super. 325, 333 (App. Div. 2013) (citation omitted).
Because the interpretation of an insurance contract is a question of law,
our review is de novo. Polarome Int'l, Inc. v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 404 N.J.
Super. 241, 260 (App. Div. 2008); see also Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463,
478 (2013) (recognizing appellate courts review summary judgment motions de
novo and accord no deference to the judge's conclusions on issues of law).
"[F]or mixed questions of law and fact, [an appellate court] give[s] deference
. . . to the supported factual findings of the trial court, but review[s] de novo the
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lower court's application of any legal rules to such factual findings." State v.
Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 577 (2015) (citations omitted).
Courts "give special scrutiny to insurance contracts because of the stark
imbalance between insurance companies and insureds." Zacarias v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 168 N.J. 590, 594 (2001). Courts should interpret insurance policies
according to "their plain, ordinary meaning." Id. at 595. Insurance policies are
"contracts of adhesion" and should be interpreted as such. Ibid. Accordingly,
exclusionary provisions "must be construed narrowly; the burden is on the
insurer to bring the case within the exclusion." Homesite Ins. Co. v. Hindman,
413 N.J. Super. 41, 46 (App. Div. 2010). Exclusionary provisions are
nonetheless "presumptively valid and will be given effect if specific, plain,
clear, prominent, and not contrary to public policy." Ibid. Accordingly, if there
is no ambiguity in the language, courts should not write a better policy than the
one purchased. Ibid.On appeal, plaintiff argues the motion judge's decision granting Allstate's
motion "ignored" Allstate's admission under Rule 4:22-1; failed to apply the
equitable principles to Allstate's untimely defense; and based its decision on
"incorrect facts and assumptions." Plaintiff further asserts the judge erroneously
denied his motion by failing to apply basic contract principles, and too narrowly
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defining "household," "resident," and "residence," in a manner not supported by
the policy language. Plaintiff also argues there were no issues of material fact
that precluded judgment as a matter of law on the coverage issue.
We have considered de novo plaintiff's contentions in view of the
applicable law, and conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant extended
discussion in our written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We affirm substantially
for the reasons expressed by the motion judge in his well-reasoned decision,
adding the following remarks.
As a preliminary matter, even assuming plaintiff qualified as a resident
relative under the Allstate policy, he was not entitled to UIM coverage because
he was insured under his own automobile policy. Nor are we convinced Allstate
was foreclosed from raising in its cross-motion for summary judgment that the
policy's UIM step-down provision precluded coverage. Notably, plaintiff does
not challenge the judge's finding that the terms of the UIM step-down provision
were "clear and unambiguous." Nor does he assert his GEICO policy was not
in effect at the time of the accident.
Rather, plaintiff's contentions focus on the inequities of Allstate's trial
position, i.e., litigating the residency defense for two years, then raising – at the
close of discovery – the uncontroverted defense that plaintiff's GEICO coverage
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precluded full UIM recovery under the step-down provision of Allstate's policy.
While we agree with Allstate that its motion "could . . . have been filed sooner,"
we likewise concur with the motion judge's observation that the "G[EICO]
policy was always in the mix."
Indeed, as early as the day after the accident, Allstate notified plaintiff it
denied his PIP claim because plaintiff was covered by his GEICO policy. We
acknowledge plaintiff's argument that the judge erroneously found Allstate
disclaimed "UIM" coverage in its January 16, 2017 letter. But that error does
not affect the outcome here, where the judge correctly determined Allstate's May
26, 2017 correspondence "specifically disclaimed coverage [under] the step-
down provision[.]" Moreover, Allstate generally pled an affirmative defense
under the UIM statute and specifically asserted plaintiff was insured by GEICO
in its answer to plaintiff's interrogatory regarding the factual basis for its
affirmative defenses.
Little need be said regarding plaintiff's contention that Allstate's
"conclusive admission" precluded it from asserting plaintiff's UIM claims were
barred under the policy's step-down provision. Rule 4:22-1, governing requests
for admissions, allows a party to seek "the truth of any matters of fact within the
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scope of [the discovery rule]." Failure to answer the request within thirty days
of service, results in an admission of the matter. Ibid."The purpose of a request for admissions is to establish matters to be true
for purposes of trial when there is not a real controversy concerning them[,] yet
their proof may be difficult or expensive." Essex Bank v. Capital Res. Corp.,
179 N.J. Super. 523, 532 (App. Div. 1981). "A request for admissions . . . thus
serve[s] the relatively limited purpose of eliminating the necessity of proving
facts which are or should be uncontroverted." Ibid.; see also Torres v. Pabon,
225 N.J. 167, 185 (2016). "[A] request for admissions should not be used in an
attempt to establish the ultimate fact in issue." Essex Bank, 179 N.J. Super. at
533.
In the present matter, the August 5, 2019 order, which deemed the
plaintiff's request admitted, was later vacated in the same December 23, 2019
order that restored Allstate's answer and defenses. Moreover, the request for
admission did not seek to establish uncontroverted facts, but rather went to the
very core of Allstate's defense under the UIM provision of the policy.
Affirmed.
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