STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JOSE CARRANZA (08-09-2688, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2021 )


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  •                                       RECORD IMPOUNDED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    Internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-1531-19
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    JOSE CARRANZA, a/k/a
    JOSE LACHIRA,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    _______________________
    Argued October 14, 2021 – Decided November 1, 2021
    Before Judges Whipple and Geiger.
    On appeal from the State of New Jersey, Law Division,
    Essex County, Indictment No. 08-09-2688.
    Jose Carranza, appellant, argued the cause pro se.
    Frank J. Ducoat, Special Deputy Attorney
    General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause
    for respondent (Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting Essex
    County Prosecutor, attorney; Frank J. Ducoat, of
    counsel and on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant Jose Carranza appeals from the June 5, 2019, denial of his
    second petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). Defendant filed his second
    PCR petition in May 2019, more than four years since the court denied his first
    PCR petition in October 2014. Because Rule 3:22-12(a)(2) imposes a one-year
    limitation on second and subsequent PCR petitions, we affirm.
    Defendant raised the following points in this appeal.
    POINT I:
    PCR COUNSEL DID NOT ADVANCE THE
    GROUNDS NOR SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS
    GERMANE TO THE SECOND PRO SE PETITION
    INSISTED BY MR. JOSE [CARRANZA] . . . WITH
    SEPARATE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
    COUNSEL CLAIMS. THUS, THE EVIDENTIARY
    HEARING HELD ON AUGUST 20, 2014 DID NOT
    RESULT IN A COMPLETE ADJUDICATION.
    BECAUSE PCR COUNSEL "INADVERTENTLY
    DID NOT ATTACH[]" . . . THEM TO HIS PCR
    BRIEF. AS A RESULT NEITHER THE PCR COURT,
    TRIAL COUNSEL, NOR RESPONDENT [WERE]
    ABLE TO REVIEW THE GROUNDS FOR RELIEF
    NOR SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS, SINCE PCR
    COUNSEL [VIOLATED] RULE 3:22-6(d) AND THE
    HOLDING IN RUE AND WEBSTER . . . CAUSING
    NO FINALITY TO THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING
    HELD ON AUGUST 20, 2014. THUS, "GOOD
    CAUSE," RULE 3:22-6(b) EXIST[S] TO RE-ASSIGN
    AN    ATTORNEY       FROM     THE     PUBLIC
    DEFENDER[']S OFFICE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH
    THE SMITH AND WEBSTER HOLDINGS TO
    GRANT REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT'S PCR
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    2
    ORDER   AND   REMAND    FOR  FURTHER
    COLLATERAL EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS.1
    POINT II:
    THE SECOND PETITION WAS SECURED FOR THE
    RECORD SINCE AUGUST 20, 2014, THEREFORE
    IT WAS NOT [UNTIMELY] NOR ARE THERE ANY
    PROCEDURAL BANS THAT APPLY.
    POINT III:
    APPELLANT ADOPTS AND INCORPORATES BY
    REFERENCE ALL FACTS, LAW, AND EVIDENCE
    FROM THE ISSUES RAISED BY APPELLANT IN
    HIS SUPPLEMENTAL [LETTER] BRIEF AND
    APPENDI[C]ES FILED IN THIS APPEAL.
    On September 12, 2008, defendant was indicted for nineteen counts of
    numerous offenses. On February 14, 2012, a jury found defendant guilty of four
    counts of first-degree armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1, and three counts of
    felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3).    Following mergers, the trial court
    sentenced defendant to an aggregate sentence of 155 years subject to the No
    Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. On November 16, 2013, we affirmed
    his convictions and sentence. State v. Carranza, No. A-4139-11T1 (App. Div.
    Nov. 6, 2013) (slip op. at 1-2).
    1
    Defendant omitted citations to State v. Rue, 
    175 N.J. 1
     (2002); State v.
    Webster, 
    187 N.J. 254
     (2006); State v. Smith, No. A-4371-11 (App. Div. June
    19, 2014).
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    3
    On February 6, 2014, defendant filed his first PCR petition, which the
    court denied on October 22, 2014. We affirmed, State v. Carranza, No. A-2777-
    14T2 (App. Div. Apr. 17, 2017) (slip op. at 2), and the Supreme Court denied
    certification, State v. Carranza, 
    231 N.J. 208
     (2017). Defendant filed his second
    PCR petition on May 29, 2019, which the court denied with its order dated June
    5, 2019. This appeal followed.
    "Post-conviction relief is New Jersey's analogue to the federal writ of
    habeas corpus." State v. Pierre, 
    223 N.J. 560
    , 576 (2015) (quoting State v.
    Preciose, 
    129 N.J. 451
    , 459 (1992)). Post-conviction relief provides "a built-in
    'safeguard that ensures that a defendant was not unjustly convicted.'" State v.
    Nash, 
    212 N.J. 518
    , 540 (2013) (quoting State v. McQuaid, 
    147 N.J. 464
    , 482
    (1997)). Appellate court "review is necessarily deferential to a PCR cou rt's
    factual findings based on its review of live witness testimony." Nash, 212 N.J.
    at 540. We review the PCR court's interpretation of the law de novo. Id. at 540-
    41.
    Rule 3:22-2(e) provides that "[a] petition for post-conviction relief is
    cognizable if based upon . . . [a] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based
    on trial counsel's failure to file a direct appeal of the judgment of conviction and
    sentence upon defendant's timely request." "A petitioner is generally barred
    A-1531-19
    4
    from presenting a claim on PCR that could have been raised at trial or on direct
    appeal, R. 3:22-4(a), or that has been previously litigated, R. 3:22-5." Nash, 212
    N.J. at 546. A petition for PCR is not a substitute for a direct appeal. State v.
    Mitchell, 
    126 N.J. 565
    , 583-84 (1992).
    But "petitioners are rarely barred from raising ineffective-assistance-of-
    counsel claims on post-conviction review. Such claims may fall within Rule
    [3:22-4(a)(3)], which affords post-conviction review for constitutional claims
    that could have been raised earlier, because those claims are grounded in the
    Sixth Amendment and the New Jersey Constitution." Preciose, 
    129 N.J. at
    459-
    60. Falling within Rule 3:22-4(a)(3) for claims not raised during the conviction
    proceeding or appeal proceeding will not, however, mean that a petitioner has
    timely filed pursuant to Rule 3:22-12(a)'s enumerated exceptions to time
    limitations.
    A first petition for PCR must be filed within five years of the date of entry
    of the judgment of conviction, unless, among other things, the petitioner "alleges
    facts showing that the delay beyond said time was due to defendant's excusable
    neglect and that there is a reasonable probability that if the defendant's factual
    assertions were found to be true enforcement of the time bar would result in a
    fundamental injustice . . . ." R. 3:22-12(a)(1)(A).
    A-1531-19
    5
    A second or subsequent petition must be filed within one year after the
    latest of:
    (A) the date on which the constitutional right asserted
    was initially recognized by the United States Supreme
    Court or the Supreme Court of New Jersey, if that right
    has been newly recognized by either of those Courts
    and made retroactive by either of those Courts to cases
    on collateral review; or
    (B) the date on which the factual predicate for the relief
    sought was discovered, if that factual predicate could
    not have been discovered earlier through the exercise
    of reasonable diligence; or
    (C) the date of the denial of the first or subsequent
    application for post-conviction relief where ineffective
    assistance of counsel that represented the defendant on
    the first or subsequent application for post-conviction
    relief is being alleged.
    [R. 3:22-12(a)(2).]
    The time limitations shall not be relaxed, except as provided in Rule 3-22:12(a).
    In this case, defendant fails to satisfy any condition under Rule 3:22-
    12(a)(2) that might permit his second PCR petition. First, defendant fails to
    allege new constitutional rights or factual predicates. Defendant exclusively
    relies on case law and facts that were known at the time of trial in 2012 and at
    the time he filed his first PCR petition in February 2014. Second, defendant
    filed his second PCR petition in May 2019—more than four years after the court
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    6
    denied his first PCR petition in October 2014. This far exceeds the one-year
    limitation set forth in Rule 3:22-12(a)(2).
    Because defendant fails to demonstrate any condition under Rule 3:22-
    12(a)(2), we affirm the trial court's denial of his second PCR petition. Further,
    because Rule 3:22-12(a)(2) bars defendant's second PCR petition for
    untimeliness, we decline to address any of defendant's additional arguments.
    Affirmed.
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