STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. HANIF K. GWALTNEY (18-04-0323, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4520-19
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
HANIF K. GWALTNEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Submitted October 20, 2021 – Decided November 5, 2021
Before Judges Fuentes and Gummer.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Morris County, Accusation No. 18-04-0323.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Abby P. Schwartz, Designated Counsel, on
the brief).
Robert J. Carroll, Morris County Prosecutor, attorney
for respondent (Tiffany M. Russo, Assistant
Prosecutor, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Hanif Gwaltney appeals from an order denying his post-
conviction relief (PCR) petition and his request to withdraw his guilty plea. We
affirm.
On January 30, 2018, a police officer stopped and searched defendant's
car. The officer found in the car's interior an orange pill container with no
prescription label. The pill container held sixty-nine pills believed to be
oxycodone but were later determined to be caffeine pills. With defendant's
consent, the officer searched the trunk of the car and found a loaded .40 caliber
handgun.
Pursuant to a negotiated agreement with the State, defendant pleaded
guilty to third-degree distribution, possession, or manufacture of an imitation
controlled dangerous substance (CDS) in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-11(a)(3)
and second-degree being a certain person not permitted to possess weapons in
violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1). The court sentenced defendant to a five-
year imprisonment term on the imitation CDS charge and a concurrent five-year
imprisonment term with a five-year period of parole ineligibility for the certain
persons offense.
Defendant filed pro se a PCR petition, which his counsel later
supplemented. Defendant argued he should be allowed to withdraw his plea and
2 A-4520-19
that his trial counsel was ineffective in: not challenging the five-year parole
ineligibility on the certain-persons offense; misadvising him regarding the
Graves Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c); not challenging the sentence imposed; not
arguing for a dismissal of the distribution charge; pressuring him to plead guilty
without having meaningful conversations with him or providing him with
discovery; failing to argue vigorously mitigating factors; and failing to explore
drug-court participation.
In a written decision and corresponding order, the PCR judge denied
defendant's PCR petition and request for permission to withdraw his plea. The
judge found defendant had not established a prima facie case of ineffective
assistance of counsel under the two-prong test established by Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and adopted by our Supreme Court in
State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (1987). The PCR judge also concluded defendant had
made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary decision to plead guilty, amply
supported by the record of the plea hearing.
Defendant raises the following arguments on appeal:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO
EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS ON BOTH HIS
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA AND
3 A-4520-19
HIS PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
BASED ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL. DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TO
COUNSEL, A FAIR TRIAL, AND DUE PROCESS
WERE VIOLATED.
A. The Court Erred In Failing To Grant An
Evidentiary Hearing For The Motion To
Withdraw Defendant's Guilty Plea.
B. Defendant Was Denied His Right To
Effective Assistance Of Counsel In These
Plea And Sentencing Proceedings.
We find no legal or factual basis to conclude the PCR judge erred in
denying defendant's PCR petition and request for permission to withdraw his
plea. Defendant's arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant further discussion
in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
4 A-4520-19