SYNCERE RICHARDSON VS. NEW JERSEY MOTOR VEHICLE COMMISSION (NEW JERSEY MOTOR VEHICLE COMMISSION) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0276-20
SYNCERE RICHARDSON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY MOTOR
VEHICLE COMMISSION,
Respondent-Respondent.
__________________________
Submitted October 25, 2021 – Decided November 9, 2021
Before Judges Fasciale and Vernoia.
On appeal from the New Jersey Motor Vehicle
Commission.
Syncere Richardson, appellant pro se.
Andrew J. Bruck, Acting Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Jennifer R. Jaremback, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Syncere Richardson appeals from an August 31, 2020 New Jersey Motor
Vehicle Commission (MVC) final agency determination suspending his driver's
license for his seventh motor vehicle violation in two years, and for his violation
of the conditions of a one-year driving probation period. The MVC initially
imposed a ninety-day suspension, but then reduced it to thirty days. We lift a
temporary stay that we imposed pending appeal and affirm, concluding the
MVC's decision was not arbitrary.
Richardson received his permit in 2017, and his probationary driver's
license in 2018. Since Richardson received his probationary license, he has
committed seven motor vehicle violations. 1 After his first three violations,
Richardson was required to complete a probationary driver program (PDP).
While enrolled in the program, Richardson committed another three motor
vehicle violations. The MVC advised Richardson, in person and via written
notice, that if he committed another offense within a year of the program's
1
This includes: (1) an accident and careless driving charge, which added two
motor vehicle points to his driving record; (2) another careless driving charge,
which added another two motor vehicle points to his driving record; (3) an
unsafe operation of a motor vehicle charge arising out of the same incident as
the second careless driving charge; (4) a violation for failure to move over for
an emergency vehicle; (5) a violation for failure to give a proper signal, which
added another two points to his license; (6) another unsafe operation of a motor
vehicle charge; and (7) a speeding charge.
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completion, his driver's license would be subject to suspension. Richardson
committed a violation three months after the course concluded—for speeding.
On appeal, Richardson's primary argument is that the MVC failed to
consider that his license suspension creates a hardship, which he argues
constitutes good cause warranting a deviation from N.J.S.A. 39:5-30.10—a
mandate that a person convicted of a violation within one year of completion of
a PDP have his or her license suspended.
Judicial review of an agency determination is limited. Allstars Auto
Group, Inc. v. New Jersey Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 234 N.J. 150, 157 (2018)
(citing Russo v. Bd. of Trs., PFRS, 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011)). A reviewing court
"must be mindful of, and deferential to, the agency's 'expertise and superi or
knowledge of a particular field.'" Id. at 158 (quoting Circus Liquors, Inc. v.
Middletown Twp., 199 N.J. 1, 10 (2009)). Moreover, "[a] reviewing court 'may
not substitute its own judgment for the agency's, even though the court might
have reached a different result.'" Ibid. (quoting In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182,
194 (2011)). "An administrative agency's final quasi-judicial decision will be
sustained unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record." Id. at 157 (quoting
Russo, 206 N.J. at 27). We defer to the MVC's "expertise and superior
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knowledge" of this field and do not substitute our own judgment for the agency's
even if we might have reached a different result. Id. at 158 (quoting Circus
Liquors, 199 N.J. at 10).
The MVC is empowered to suspend or revoke a driver's license for any
motor vehicle statute violation. N.J.S.A. 39:5-30(a); Cresse v. Parsekian, 81
N.J. Super. 536, 548-49 (App. Div. 1963). The MVC director "shall suspend"
the driver's license of any person who "is convicted of a violation committed
within [one] year of [his or her] . . . completion of the approved driver
improvement course." N.J.S.A. 39:5-30.10. A person who completes the PDP
may retain their license upon the express condition and understanding that any
subsequent violation within six months of the completion will result in a ninety-
day license suspension. N.J.A.C. 13:19-10.6(a).
Richardson maintains that he needs his license for work and for school,
and that he lives in an area without access to public transportation. The MVC
asserts that Richardson's conduct has shown "little regard for the motor vehicle
laws or the public with whom he shares the road." And that the suspension was
authorized by statute and the MVC acted reasonably in reducing the suspension
to thirty days to accommodate Richardson's hardship request. The MVC
properly weighed and balanced Richardson's circumstances with the mandated
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suspension period, and its decision is not arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable,
nor does it lack fair support in the record.
Richardson's hardship from a license suspension was appropriately
considered, as evidenced by the MVC's reduction of the mandated ninety-day
suspension to a thirty-day suspension. The MVC measured Richardson's
extensive motor vehicle violation history against his need for a license. The
MVC properly exercised its authority and discretion to suspend Richardson's
license under N.J.S.A. 39:5-30.10, given that he committed a motor vehicle
violation within six months of completion of his PDP, after committing six prior
motor vehicle violations, and the statute otherwise requires a ninety -day
suspension
Affirmed; stay vacated.
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