DONNA M. DELVALLE VS. DANIEL J. QUINN (L-2150-17, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0332-20
DONNA M. DELVALLE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DANIEL J. QUINN, and
DONNAJEAN E. KAFADER,
Defendants-Respondents.
__________________________
Submitted October 26, 2021 – Decided November 9, 2021
Before Judges Fisher and Currier.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. L-2150-17.
Lueddeke Law Firm, attorneys for appellant (Karri
Lueddeke, on the briefs).
Maggs McDermott & DiCicco, LLC, attorneys for
respondent (James A. Maggs, of counsel; Victoria J.
Adornetto, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Donna DelValle was employed as a medical staff manager by
Atlantic Medicine & Wellness, LLC, from 2012 to 2016. Defendant Daniel
Quinn was a patient of Dr. Vladimir Berkovich, one of Atlantic's physicians.
The other defendant, DonnaJean Kafader, is not an Atlantic patient but she has
had an intermittent dating relationship with Quinn over the course of many
years; in addition, her adult daughter, Michelle Navas, is a patient of Dr.
Berkovich. Quinn viewed himself as having a stepfather/stepdaughter
relationship with Navas.
This suit has its genesis in the undisputed fact that Kafader heard, and told
Quinn, that members of Atlantic's staff referred to Quinn as a "creepy perverted
stepdad" because he accompanied Navas to her appointments, often entering and
remaining in the consultation room with Navas when she met with Dr.
Berkovich. Kafader learned of this office gossip from Linda Husserl, who was
not employed by or a patient of Atlantic but is plaintiff's sister.
Upon hearing from Kafader what Husserl told Kafader, Quinn spoke to
Dr. Berkovich and, in response to the doctor's questions, advised that Husserl
was the source of his information. In depositions, both Quinn and Dr. Berkovich
acknowledged Quinn sought nothing but a halt to the gossip. Atlantic's partners
met and discussed the matter, believed a breach of office confidence had
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occurred, determined plaintiff was the cause of the breach, and terminated her
employment.
Plaintiff commenced this action against only Quinn and Kafader, alleging
defamation, tortious interference with an economic advantage, and the tort of
outrage. After discovery closed, defendants successfully moved for summary
judgment, and the complaint was dismissed.
Plaintiff appeals, arguing only that the judge erred in dismissing her claim
of defendants' tortious interference with her economic advantage. We find
insufficient merit in plaintiff's arguments to warrant further discussion in a
written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E), adding only the following few comments.
To maintain her tortious interference claim, plaintiff was required to
prove: (1) a reasonable expectation of economic advantage; (2) defendants acted
intentionally and with malice in interfering with plaintiff's reasonable
expectation; (3) defendants' interference caused the loss of the economic benefit;
(4) and if there was no interference it was reasonably probable plaintiff would
have received the anticipated economic benefit. See Printing Mart-Morristown
v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 750-52 (1989); Harris v. Perl, 41 N.J. 455,
462 (1964). The reference to the word "malice" in the second element does not
mean that the defendant acted with "ill will toward the plaintiff," only that the
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defendant inflicted the harm "intentionally and without justification or excuse."
Printing Mart, 116 N.J. at 751.
In adhering to the Brill1 standard, the trial judge assumed the truth of
plaintiff's factual assertions, provided her with the benefit of all reasonable
inferences, and therefore accepted plaintiff's allegations that: she was terminated
because of Quinn's conversation with Dr. Berkovich; her employment would
have continued but for that conversation and Atlantic's investigation that
followed without Quinn's further involvement, and all the other elements of the
cause of action were adequately supported – except one.
The judge found no admissible evidence and that it was not otherwise
reasonably inferable from the evidence that defendants Quinn and Kafader acted
intentionally or with ill will. Instead, the judge observed that Quinn had
expressed surprise when he learned of plaintiff's termination and that he had no
plan or intention of causing her termination. We agree the evidence on this
element was so one-sided as to warrant the entry of summary judgment in
defendants' favor.
For example, Quinn testified that he only wanted the staff to stop joking
about his relationship with Navas. Indeed, the one-sided evidence demonstrated
1
Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520 (1995).
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that Quinn never mentioned plaintiff's name in connection with his complaints
to Dr. Berkovich, that he did not seek a termination of plaintiff's employment,
and that he was surprised about her firing. Plaintiff acknowledged in her
discovery responses that her termination was based on a breach of confidence
and that she had no evidence to suggest Quinn made such an allegation when he
spoke with Dr. Berkovich. And Dr. Berkovich testified at his deposition that it
wasn't Quinn's complaint that prompted plaintiff's termination; that step was
taken only after Atlantic investigated and concluded there was a breach of
confidence. There is simply no direct evidence, or a reasonable inference to be
drawn, that Quinn intentionally or maliciously acted.
Kafader was also entitled to summary judgment. While it was her
conversation with Husserl that formed the basis for Quinn's complaint to Dr.
Berkovich, Kafader never spoke to Dr. Berkovich or anyone else at Atlantic
about the situation.
We affirm for these reasons and substantially for those reasons set forth
by Judge Linda Grasso Jones in her written opinion.
Affirmed.
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