STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. NAHSHAUN K. WHITE (17-02-0393, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2492-18
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
NAHSHAUN K. WHITE,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Submitted September 20, 2021 – Decided November 10, 2021
Before Judges Messano and Rose.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 17-02-0393.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Kayla Rowe, Designated Counsel, of counsel
and on the briefs).
Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting Essex County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Lucille M.
Rosano, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Tried to a jury, defendant Nahshaun K. White was convicted of robbing a
stranger at gunpoint around 8:00 p.m. on November 5, 2016, outside the victim's
apartment building in Newark. Following the jury's guilty verdict on all five
counts charged in an Essex County indictment,1 defendant was sentenced to an
aggregate prison sentence of ten years, subject to the No Early Release Act
(NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.
On appeal, defendant challenges the admission of the victim's out-of-court
"showup" identification, which was made about thirty-five minutes after the
incident and a block away from the crime scene. Defendant also belatedly
challenges the jury instructions on identification. In the alternative, defendant
claims his sentence is excessive, contending for the first time on appeal that the
judge should have sentenced him as a second-degree offender pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2). More particularly, defendant raises the following points
for our consideration:
1
Defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; second-
degree possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); second-degree possession
of a handgun for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); fourth-degree
unlawful possession of a defaced firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(d); and fourth-
degree resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(2).
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POINT I
THE ADMISSION OF THE MISIDENTIFICATION
RESULTED IN [DEFENDANT]'S WRONGFUL
CONVICTION AND DEMANDS REVERSAL.
A. The Wade2 motion judge incorrectly applied
the Henderson3 analytical framework and
improperly admitted the unreliable identification.
B. The trial judge's refusal to consider
[defendant]'s request to revisit the identification
issue was improper.
POINT II
THE IDENTIFICATION INSTRUCTION WAS
INCOMPLETE, RESULTING IN PLAIN ERROR
THAT DEMANDS REVERSAL.
(Not raised below)
POINT III
THE CUMULATIVE ERROR OF THE ADMISSION
OF THE MISIDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE AND
THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS REQUIRE REVERSAL
OF [DEFENDANT]'S CONVICTION.
(Not raised below)
POINT IV
THE SENTENCE IMPOSED ON [DEFENDANT]
SHOULD HAVE BEEN TO A TERM APPROPRIATE
2
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
3
State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208 (2011).
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3
TO A CRIME OF ONE DEGREE LOWER THAN THE
CRIMES HE WAS CONVICTED OF, GIVEN THE
CONSIDERABLE MITIGATING FACTORS.
(Not raised below)
We reject these contentions and affirm defendant's convictions and
sentence. But we remand for the limited purpose of correcting the judgment of
conviction (JOC) to reflect mitigating factor nine, consistent with the judge's
"oral pronouncement of sentence." State v. Rivers, 252 N.J. Super. 142, 147 n.1
(App. Div. 1991); see also State v. Pohlabel, 40 N.J. Super. 416, 423 (App. Div.
1956) (recognizing the oral pronouncement is "the true source of the sentence"
whereas the creation of the JOC is "merely the work of a clerk").
I.
A. Defendant's Motion to Suppress the Showup Identification
Because defendant's merits brief primarily focuses on the motion judge's
decision to admit the showup identification in evidence, we begin by stating the
applicable legal principles before discussing the testimony adduced at the
pretrial hearing on defendant's suppression motion.
A showup identification "essentially [is a] single-person lineup," during
which "a single suspect is presented to a witness to make an identification ."
Henderson, 208 N.J. at 259. As the language suggests, showups traditionally
involve the witness's observation of a suspect live and in person. Id. at 261.
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Generally, a showup identification occurs at the crime scene or shortly
afterward. Id. at 259. By definition, a showup is "inherently suggestive"
because the victim can only choose from one person, who ordinarily is in police
custody. State v. Herrera, 187 N.J. 493, 504 (2006); see also Henderson, 208
N.J. at 259. Nonetheless, a showup identification may be admitted at trial if it
is otherwise reliable. See Henderson, 208 N.J. at 303; Herrera, 187 N.J. at 503-
04.
As our Supreme Court recognized in Henderson, "the risk of
misidentification is not heightened if a showup is conducted immediately after
the witnessed event, ideally within two hours." Id. at 259. However, officers
"should instruct witnesses that the person they are about to view may or may not
be the culprit." Id. at 261.
In Henderson, the Court adopted a framework to determine whether the
process utilized by police to obtain eyewitness identification of a perpetrator
was reliable or improperly suggestive, thereby requiring a hearing to determine
the identification's admissibility. Id. at 288-96. Thereafter, that framework was
incorporated in the revised model jury charges on identification. See Model
Jury Charges (Criminal), "Identification: In-Court and Out-of-Court
Identifications" (rev. May 18, 2020); "Identification: Out-of-Court
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Identification Only" (rev. July 19, 2012); "Identification: In-Court
Identification Only" (rev. July 19, 2012); see also Henderson, 208 N.J. at 298-
99.
The Court held that in assessing the identification procedure, trial courts
should consider "system variables," which are factors relating to the
identification within the State's control. Henderson, 208 N.J. at. 248, 289.
System variables include: lineup or showup construction; blind administration;
pre-identification instructions; avoiding feedback; and recording confidence.
Id. at 289-90.
The Court also held trial courts should consider "estimator variables,"
which are factors over which the State has no control. Id. at 291, 294. Estimator
variables relate to the witness, the perpetrator, or the event itself. Id. at 261.
They include: stress; weapon focus; duration of the witness's observation of the
perpetrator; distance and lighting; the perpetrator's appearance, including
whether a mask or disguise was employed; racial bias; memory decay; and the
speed of an identification. Id. at 261-72.
In the present matter, the Wade/Henderson hearing was held over two non-
consecutive days, before two motion judges. On the first day of the hearing in
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June 2017, the State presented the testimony of Frank Richiez, a detective
assigned to the Newark Police Department's Special Enforcement Division.
At approximately 8:30 p.m. on November 5, 2016, Richiez, his partner,
and other officers were dispatched to a robbery in progress on Martin Luther
King (MLK) Boulevard. Within ten minutes, Richiez saw a man, who matched
the dispatcher's description of the suspect. Richiez and his partner pursued
defendant on foot and arrested him within "a block" of the crime scene.
While Richiez was placing defendant into the patrol car, he heard the
victim, Aaron Harris, state: "That's him, that's him." Richiez then turned and
saw Harris point at defendant. Richiez did not recall how much time had passed
before Harris arrived at the arrest location. Neither Richiez nor any other officer
said anything to Harris before the identification was made. Richiez did not
"advise the victim that somebody was in custody that he was going to be
observing."
At the conclusion of the detective's testimony, the State argued police did
not conduct a showup procedure here, where the victim's identification was
"spontaneous." Referencing the victim's prior statement to police, defendant
countered that "the detective ask[ed] [Harris] about . . . the identification
process." Because the victim was not available to testify that day, the judge
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adjourned the hearing, finding "apparently there's a factual dispute as to what
transpired."
The hearing continued in April 2018, with the victim's testimony before a
different judge, defendant's now-retained counsel, and a different assistant
prosecutor. Harris said he called the police about five or ten minutes after the
robbery and thereafter saw police cars, with lights and sirens activated, driving
down Seventh Avenue toward MLK Boulevard. About twenty or twenty-five
minutes after the robbery, the police contacted Harris, requesting his presence
at Seventh Avenue and MLK Boulevard. On cross-examination, Harris denied
he was told to respond to that location "to make an identification."
Instead, when Harris arrived, an officer asked whether he could "make an
identification." Confirming he could do so, Harris identified defendant after the
officer "pulled the suspect out of the other car." No one was "talking or coaching
[Harris] through" the identification process. On cross-examination, Harris
initially stated he did not recall whether police said the person they were pulling
out of the police car "could be the suspect or could not be." However, when the
judge repeated the question, Harris said the officer did so instruct him.
Following cross-examination, the motion judge determined Harris's
testimony that police asked him whether he could "make an I.D.," and removed
A-2492-18
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defendant from the police car, "sound[ed] like a showup." Accordingly, the
judge permitted the State to reopen the hearing, and elicit testimony concerning
the estimator variables under Henderson.
Harris testified that at the time of the robbery, he was waiting outside his
building for a taxicab. He was listening to music on his Beats headphones when
he saw defendant walking toward him with another man. No one else was in the
area. The area was lit, but "not well lit."
When defendant first approached Harris, the two men were "practically
facing each other" about one foot apart; defendant was so close that Harris
"could smell him." Defendant had his hands in his pockets when he approached
Harris, demanding: "Give me everything." But Harris responded: "Oh, you're
gonna have to show it to me." Acknowledging it was "stupid" to react that way,
Harris claimed he had witnessed robberies and knew perpetrators "get away
with" the crime by placing their hands in their sleeves. Until defendant pulled
the gun out and pointed it toward Harris's head, he was not 100 percent certain
defendant had a gun. Defendant took Harris's headphones, cellphone, Apple
watch, and wallet containing three dollars, including his "lucky two-dollar bill."
The incident lasted about thirty seconds.
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According to Harris, the gun was black, "like a .380." He described
defendant as a black male, with a "little mustache," wearing a gray hoodie, with
dreadlocks "hanging out his hood." Harris estimated defendant's height was
between six feet, three inches and six feet, five inches. Defendant appeared
slightly older than Harris, who was around twenty or twenty-one years old at the
time.
On cross-examination, Harris acknowledged he was "under stress" during
the robbery. However, Harris was "a hundred percent" positive defendant was
the man who robbed him.
At the conclusion of Harris's testimony, defense counsel argued the victim
was not credible because his testimony was inconsistent with his prior statement
to law enforcement. Defendant further argued the police failed to issue proper
instructions prior to the showup procedure. Referencing Harris's testimony, his
prior statement, and police reports, the prosecutor countered that the victim's
identification was sufficiently reliable: "It wasn't cross-racial. They were face-
to face. The identification happened very quickly afterwards."
Following arguments, the judge issued a cogent oral decision, denying
defendant's motion. Pertinent to this appeal, the judge acknowledged the
testimony of Harris and Richiez differed as to whether, prior to viewing
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defendant, Harris was instructed "that the perpetrator may or may not be
present." The judge also found defense counsel demonstrated Harris's testimony
was inconsistent with his prior statement as to whether Harris "was approached
from behind by the robber," or whether Harris observed the robber approach
him.
Although the judge found those inconsistencies demonstrated "possible
bias towards . . . wanting to get the I.D. in," the judge was not persuaded that
"those inconsistencies [we]re sufficiently . . . egregious to warrant a finding that
[Harris] was not credible" regarding his initial observations during the robbery.
Those observations were made when the men were "face-to-face," and defendant
was "so close" that Harris "could smell him."
Noting the robbery "was stressful," the judge nonetheless found the event
"was not so stressful to preclude rational thought, rational perception." Whether
or not Harris observed defendant "all the way from the corner as [he]
approached," the thirty-second duration of the robbery, during which the gun
was not drawn until the last moments, was "a substantial period of time." The
judge therefore credited Harris's testimony, noting the victim observed
defendant for thirty seconds, including the time during which Harris assumed
defendant was unarmed.
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Turning to the system variables, the motion judge found "no evidence of
impermissible feedback"; the witness was "100 percent" confident in his
identification of defendant; and only one viewing took place. However, the
judge found "insufficient evidence" that police issued pre-identification
instructions, which "militate[d] toward a suggestive procedure." The judge
further recognized, that after Harris "arrived at the scene" and "was asked if he
could make an identification[, a] rational person . . . would presume that the next
person he was . . . shown would be the person, who . . . the officers believed was
. . . the perpetrator."
Finding the showup procedure was suggestive, the judge then assessed the
applicable estimator variables and noted several factors weighed in favor of the
identification's reliability. Among those factors, the judge found: the weapon
was not displayed until the end of the event, thereby affording Harris "sufficient
opportunity to make a rational – although stupid – decision to call for the gun";
the amount of time Harris was face-to-face with his assailant; Harris's initial
description of a "tall, black male" with "dreads" was consistent with his
subsequent identification of defendant; there was no time for memory delay; no
race bias; and Harris was "100 percent" certain of his identification.
A-2492-18
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After considering the estimator variables, the motion judge concluded the
showup identification was not impermissibly suggestive and was "reliable
within the meaning of Henderson." Accordingly, the judge denied defendant's
motion and issued an accompanying order on April 4, 2018.
On appeal, defendant maintains the showup identification should have
been suppressed. Defendant contends the motion judge "ignored key systemic
and estimator factors and assigned too much weight to marginally supported
estimator factors." In essence, defendant argues the motion judge failed to
articulate the weight he assigned to the systemic factors, which underpinned his
decision that the showup was suggestive. Defendant further asserts that the
judge's assessment of estimator variables was not supported by the record. We
are unpersuaded.
When reviewing an order denying a motion to bar an out-of-court
identification, our standard of review "is no different from our review of a trial
court's findings in any non-jury case." State v. Wright, 444 N.J. Super. 347, 356
(App. Div. 2016). We accept the trial court's findings provided they are
"supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Watts, 223
N.J. 503, 516 (2015). However, we do not defer to a trial court's interpretation
of the law, which we review de novo. Ibid.A-2492-18
13
Having considered defendant's contentions in view of the applicable law
and the motion record, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We affirm substantially for the
reasons set forth by the motion judge in his well-reasoned decision. We
therefore discern no basis to disturb his decision. Watts, 223 N.J. at 516.
B. Defendant's Motion For Reconsideration
The matter was tried before another judge over five days in late August
and early September 2018. In addition to Harris, the State presented the
testimony of six law enforcement witnesses, and a rebuttal witness. Defendant
testified on his own behalf. Several items were admitted in evidence, including
the dispatch recording, which was played for the jury during the testimony of
Richiez's partner, Detective Christopher Moss.
According to Moss, he and Richiez were a few blocks away from MLK
Boulevard and Seventh Avenue, when they heard dispatch advise that the
robbery suspects4 were seen walking in that direction and that one of them was
armed. When the officers pulled up to that location, defendant ran and discarded
a loaded .380-caliber, semi-automatic handgun.
4
We glean from the record that the second suspect was not arrested.
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Pertinent to this appeal, and similar to Richiez's testimony at the
suppression hearing, none of the law enforcement witnesses testified that
instructions were given to Harris prior to his identification of defendant.
Further, the trial testimony revealed that when Harris first arrived at the arrest
location: he identified himself; listed his stolen items; and identified defendant
– before he was asked to identify the items seized during a search incident to
defendant's arrest. Those items included an iPhone, Beats headphones, Apple
watch, two-dollar bill, and one-dollar bill. Harris positively identified all items,
except the iPhone.
During the charge conference, defense counsel orally moved for
reconsideration of the motion judge's ruling on his suppression motion. Noting
the trial judge had heard "a lot more testimony" than the motion judge, defense
counsel argued the identification should be suppressed because the showup "was
overly suggestive and the warning required by the instruction . . . was not given."
In sum, counsel argued Harris "was directed by the dispatcher . . . to the location
where . . . he was led to understand that there would be the person who
committed the offense, [and] no instructions were given." Further, when Harris
made the identification, defendant was handcuffed and standing "in close
proximity to the rear of a patrol car."
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After reviewing the transcript of the motion judge's decision, the trial
judge preliminarily found she was bound by law of the case, unless defense
counsel could demonstrate that the motion judge failed to consider evidence.
The trial judge afforded counsel overnight the opportunity to file a written
submission delineating his supplemental argument.
The following day, the trial judge denied defendant's reconsideration
motion, initially finding the motion was time-barred. Nonetheless, the trial
judge denied the motion on the record, concluding her review of the motion
transcript revealed: "The issue of what the complaining witness was or was not
told . . . before he saw . . . defendant, was addressed and included in [the motion
judge's] opinion."
For the first time on appeal, defendant asserts there existed "confusion"
as to whether police asked Harris to identify his stolen property before or after
he identified defendant. During his prior statement to police, Harris said the
police asked him to identify his property after he identified himself as the victim.
At trial, Harris testified that the police showed him his property after he
identified defendant. Defendant now claims "either sequence of events bring
the feedback variable into play," which the motion judge found inapplicable in
his assessment of the estimator variables. We generally refuse to consider issues
A-2492-18
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not presented to the trial court, State v. Alexander, 233 N.J. 132, 148 (2018),
but we address defendant's claim here for purposes of complete review.
As a preliminary matter, we disagree with the trial judge's conclusion that
defendant's reconsideration motion was time-barred, or that she was bound by
the motion judge's decision. Because the order was interlocutory, the trial court
may, in its discretion, review the ruling "at any time before the entry of final
judgment," see State v. Puryear, 441 N.J. Super. 280, 293 (App. Div. 2015), "in
the interests of justice," State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 554 (1999)
(noting the absence of an explicit rule for reconsideration motions in criminal
matters, but holding that such motions are permitted in criminal matters) .
However, a reconsideration motion "is not to be granted lightly and the
grounds for reconsideration are generally limited." Puryear, 441 N.J. Super. at
294. "The proper object of reconsideration is to correct a court's error or
oversight." Ibid. It "cannot be used to expand the record and reargue a motion."
Capital Fin. Co. of Del. Valley, Inc. v. Asterbadi, 398 N.J. Super. 299, 310 (App.
Div. 2008). Guided by these criteria, defendant failed to demonstrate that
reconsideration was warranted here.
The events at the scene transpired quickly. According to Moss:
I asked [Harris] to identify himself. You know,
he told me his name. He described . . . the stuff that
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had been taken. And he said that's the guy right there;
that's the guy. So, I said, okay, and I walked back over
towards my partner, [Richiez, who] had the suspect.
We searched him. [Defendant] had some stuff on him.
And it happened to match the proceeds that the victim
was telling me was taken which was [sic]. . . some Dr.
Dre headphones, a two-dollar bill, a one-dollar bill, and
an iWatch and an iPhone as well.
....
After getting the items off of the suspect, I
walked back over to the victim and I showed him the
objects. He positively [identified] everything except
for the iPhone . . . as being his [property].
We discern no confusion regarding the sequence of events. The trial
testimony of Moss, as corroborated by Harris and Richiez, demonstrates that
Harris made his identification first and then was shown the items police
recovered from defendant. Nor is there any evidence in the trial record that the
officers provided Harris "any information or feedback about the suspect or the
crime, before, during, or after the identification procedure," Henderson, 208 N.J.
at 290, during that short time span. Indeed, there simply is no indication in the
trial record that Harris's identification of defendant was ever confirmed by
police. We therefore discern no basis to disturb the motion judge's decision.
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II.
For the first time on appeal, defendant argues the trial judge's instructions
regarding identification were flawed. Defendant contends the judge failed to
include "three important factors" in her identification charge: "prior description
of the perpetrator; confidence and accuracy; and feedback." See Model Jury
Charges (Criminal), "Identification: In-Court and Out-of-Court Identifications"
(eff. Sept. 4, 2012).5 The State counters that any error in the charge was invited
by defendant, who agreed with the judge's decision to include only "stress,
duration, weapon focus, and lighting" as the applicable estimator factors, and
did not object after the charge was issued.
When a defendant fails to object to an error regarding jury charges, we
review for plain error. State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 473 (2007) (holding
that under Rules 1:7-2 and 2:10-2, "the failure to object to a jury instruction
requires review under the plain error standard"). "Under that standard, we
disregard any alleged error 'unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly
5
Following the Court's decision in State v. Anthony, 237 N.J. 213, 234-35
(2019), the model jury charge was revised. See Model Jury Charges (Criminal),
"Identification: In-Court and Out-of-Court Identification" (rev. May 18, 2020).
Those revisions do not pertain to the issues on appeal in this case, which was
tried before Anthony was decided.
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capable of producing an unjust result.'" State v. Funderburg, 225 N.J. 66, 79
(2016) (quoting R. 2:10-2).
Plain error, in the context of jury instructions, is: "'Legal impropriety in
the charge prejudicially affecting the substantial rights of the defendant and
sufficiently grievous to justify notice by the reviewing court and to convince the
court that of itself the error possessed a clear capacity to bring about an unjust
result.'" State v. Camacho, 218 N.J. 533, 554 (2014) (quoting State v. Adams,
194 N.J. 186, 207 (2008)). Further, the error must be viewed in totality of the
entire charge, not in isolation. State v. Chapland, 187 N.J. 275, 289 (2006).
"[A]ny finding of plain error depends on an evaluation of the overall
strength of the State's case." State v. Nero, 195 N.J. 397, 407 (2008) (quoting
Chapland, 187 N.J. at 289). When the trial court fails to issue an identification
instruction, "[t]he determination of plain error depends on the strength and
quality of the State's corroborative evidence rather than on whether defendant's
misidentification argument is convincing." State v. Cotto, 182 N.J. 316, 326
(2005).
At the outset, we are not convinced that defendant's failure to object to the
instruction charge issued by the judge constituted invited error. See State v.
Bailey, 231 N.J. 474, 490 (2018) (declining to apply the doctrine of invited error
A-2492-18
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where defense counsel asked the court to comply with the model jury charge and
failed to object to the jury charge that was given).
During the charge conference, the trial judge informed counsel she would
charge "the standard language" set forth in the model jury charge on in-court
and out-of-court identifications and the showup procedure portion of the charge.
The judge then asked defense counsel, whether "the factors that will be . . . read
to the jury include stress, duration, weapon focus, and lighting?" Defense
counsel responded: "Yes." Having considered the charge as a whole, State v.
Torres, 183 N.J. 554, 564 (2005), we are not persuaded that the omission of the
factors defendant now deems relevant did not have the capacity to bring about
an unjust result. R. 2:10-2.
For example, the trial judge instructed the jury it was "free to consider any
other factor based on the evidence or lack of evidence in the case that you
consider relevant to your determination"; that it may consider "all of the
circumstances in this case including all of the testimony and documentary
evidence, in determining whether a particular identification made by a witness
is accurate"; and, when assessing credibility of a witness, the jury may consider
"whether the witness made any inconsistent or contradictory statements." Taken
as a whole, those instructions were similar to the relevant portion of the prior
A-2492-18
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description of a perpetrator factor, which states the jury may find relevant:
"whether the witness's testimony at trial was consistent with, or different from,
his/her prior description of the perpetrator."
Defendant contends the judge also failed to charge the confidence and
accuracy factor, which provides, in pertinent part: "As I explained earlier, a
witness's level of confidence, standing alone, may not be an indication of the
reliability of the identification. Although some research has found that highly
confident witnesses are more likely to make accurate identifications, eyewitness
confidence is generally an unreliable indicator of accuracy."
But the charge as given closely followed the general portions of the
identification charge:
Eyewitness identification evidence must be
scrutinized carefully.
....
Although nothing may appear more convincing
than a witness's categorical identification of a
perpetrator, you must critically analyze the testimony.
Such identifications, even if made in good faith, may
be mistaken. Therefore, when analyzing such
testimony be advised that a witness's level of
confidence standing alone may not be an indication of
the reliability of the identification.
A-2492-18
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Given the similarity between these instructions, defendant was not prejudiced
by the omitted language.
As stated, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that Harris received
feedback from the officers. In any event, the trial judge instructed the jury to
"consider everything that was done or said by law enforcement to the witness
during the identification process." Arguably, the jury was implicitly instructed
to consider suggestive comments or actions by the police. We presume the jury
followed the trial judge's instructions. See State v. Vega-Larregui, 246 N.J. 94,
126 (2021).
Ultimately, the trial evidence substantially corroborated Harris's
identification. See Cotto, 182 N.J. at 326-27. Defendant matched Harris's
description to police and was arrested just blocks away from the crime scene,
shortly after commission of the crime, with Harris's stolen items in his
possession. We therefore discern no error, let alone plain error, in the omission
of the factors now raised.
Accordingly, we reject defendant's contention, raised in point III, that the
cumulative effect of the errors committed during his trial warrants reversal.
Defendant has failed to demonstrate any error or pattern of errors, rising to the
level, either singly or cumulatively, that denied him a fair trial. "A defendant is
A-2492-18
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entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one." State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 334
(2005).
III.
Finally, defendant argues the mitigating factors warranted a sentencing
term appropriate to a crime one degree lower than "the most serious crimes of
which he was convicted." We disagree.
In reviewing a trial judge's sentencing determinations, we employ a
deferential standard. State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014). We must affirm
the sentence unless:
(1) the sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the
aggravating and mitigating factors found by the
sentencing court were not based upon competent and
credible evidence in the record; or (3) "the application
of the guidelines to the facts of [the] case makes the
sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the
judicial conscience."
[Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Roth, 95
N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)).]
The trial court may not ignore "mitigating factors that are called to the court's
attention . . . , and when amply based in the record, . . . they must be found."
State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 64 (2014) (citation omitted).
When a sentencing judge "is clearly convinced that the mitigating factors
substantially outweigh the aggravating factors and where the interest of justice
A-2492-18
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demands," the judge may sentence a defendant who has been convicted of a first -
or second-degree crime "to a term appropriate to a crime of one degree lower
than that of the crime for which he was convicted." N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2). In
evaluating whether to impose a downgraded sentence under the statute, a
sentencing court "must apply a two-step process[:] The judge must be clearly
convinced that the mitigating factors substantially outweigh the aggravating
ones and that the interest of justice demands a downgraded sentence." State v.
Rice, 425 N.J. Super. 375, 384 (App. Div. 2012) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
"The decision to downgrade a defendant's sentence in the interest of
justice should be limited to those circumstances in which defendant can provide
'compelling' reasons for the downgrade." State v. Briggs, 349 N.J. Super. 496,
502 (App. Div. 2002) (quoting State v. Megargel, 143 N.J. 484, 501-02 (1996)).
The "compelling . . . reasons must be in addition to, and separate from, the
'mitigating factors which substantially outweigh the aggravating factors,' that
the trial court finds applicable to a defendant under the first prong of [N.J.S.A.
2C:]44-1(f)(2)." Id. at 502.
To place defendant's newly-minted arguments in context, we reiterate that
he was convicted of first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (count one); second-
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degree possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (count two); second-
degree possession of a handgun for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)
(count three); fourth-degree unlawful possession of a defaced firearm, N.J.S.A.
2C:39-3(d) (count four); and fourth-degree resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-
2(a)(2) (count five), for the armed robbery of a stranger.
Prior to imposing sentence, the judge ordered the appropriate merger of
defendant's conviction on count two with count three. The judge then imposed
the minimum sentence on defendant's first- and second-degree convictions: ten
years' imprisonment, subject to NERA on count one; and ten years'
imprisonment, with a five-year mandatory prison term under the Graves Act,
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c), on count three. The judge imposed concurrent sentences
on all counts. Accordingly, defendant was sentenced to the lowest possible
aggregate prison sentence of ten years, subject to NERA.
In imposing sentence, the judge considered defendant's employment
history and letters submitted to the court that attested to defendant's character.
The judge found aggravating factor nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9) (general and
specific deterrence); and mitigating factors seven, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7)
(defendant's lack of prior criminal history), and nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(9)
(defendant is unlikely to reoffend). The judge declined to find mitigating factor
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eight, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(8) (defendant's conduct was the result of
circumstances unlikely to recur). Although the judge recognized defendant had
no prior criminal history and was employed at the time of the offense, she
reasoned the robbery "was a crime of opportunity" and the commission of the
offense with a weapon underscored defendant's "intent to either commit a crime
or be armed against someone else who was committing a crime."
Based on our review of the record, we are satisfied the trial judge's refusal
to find mitigating factor eight was not an abuse of discretion. See Rice, 425 N.J.
Super. at 382-83 (recognizing mitigating factor eight applies when a defendant
accepts responsibility and shows a willingness to remove himself from
circumstances that may lead to similar unlawful conduct). Nor does anything in
this record convince us that the judge erred in sua sponte failing to sentence
defendant one-degree lower on the robbery conviction.
Affirmed, but remanded solely to correct the JOC to reflect the judge's
finding of mitigating factor nine.
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