L.C. VS. J.C. (FM-16-0955-12, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2285-17T3
L.C.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
J.C.,
Defendant-Respondent.
_____________________________
Submitted January 23, 2019 – Decided February 8, 2019
Before Judges Fisher and Firko.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Passaic County,
Docket No. FM-16-0955-12.
Michael E. Damico, attorney for appellant.
Damiano Law Offices, attorneys for respondent (Toni
Belford Damiano, of counsel and on the brief; Ruchika
S. Hira, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
In this post-judgment dissolution matter, the motion judge entered an
order on October 17, 2017, providing numerous items of relief. Plaintiff, the
ex-husband1, who was then self-represented, retained counsel, who represented
him in the divorce proceedings, and filed a motion for reconsideration on
November 6, 2017. The judge denied the reconsideration motion as
procedurally deficient for not being filed within twenty days after service of the
order, and found that plaintiff failed to specify the basis for his motion. We
have considered plaintiff's contentions in light of the record and applicable law
and we reverse.
The parties were divorced after seventeen years of marriage and have three
unemancipated children. There is a litigious, post-judgment motion history
between the parties including Division of Child Protection and Permanency
involvement, college expenses for the oldest child, re-calculation of child
support, and counsel fees. The October 17 order was entered following oral
argument that day and given to the parties. The judge denied plaintiff's motion
and granted defendant's cross-motion finding plaintiff to be in violation of
litigant's rights, among other relief.
1
We use initials in the caption to protect the privacy of the parties.
A-2285-17T3
2
We first address plaintiff's argument that his reconsideration motion was
filed within twenty days, Rule 4:49-2, utilizing the computational principles set
forth in Rule 1:3-1:
In computing any period of time fixed by rule or court
order, the day of the act or event from which the
designated period begins to run is not to be included.
The last day of the period so computed is to be included,
unless it is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, in
which event the period runs until the end of the next
day which is neither a Saturday, Sunday nor legal
holiday . . . .
The reconsideration motion was filed on day twenty. Therefore, the judge
erred in concluding that the reconsideration motion was procedurally deficient
pursuant to Rule 4:49-2. We are not persuaded by defendant's argument that she
was not served with the motion until November 14 because the motion was
timely filed, and no prejudice has been shown.
We next address the second paragraph of the November 27 order that
provides: "Further, [p]laintiff has failed to state with specificity the ba sis on
which he is filing his motion for reconsideration, as required by R. 4:49-2." As
is evident from the order, the judge provided no reasoning to support his
conclusion contrary to Rule 1:7-4, which requires judges to include findings of
facts and conclusions of law for each determination they make. Compliance
with Rule 1:7-4 is crucial because "[m]eaningful appellate review is inhibited
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unless the judge sets forth the reasons for his or her opinion"; appellate courts
should not be "left to conjecture as to what the judge may have had in mind."
Salch v. Salch, 240 N.J. Super. 441, 443 (App. Div. 1990).
This court has firmly established that "[n]aked conclusions are
insufficient" and judges "must fully and specifically articulate findings of fact
and conclusions of law." Heinl v. Heinl, 287 N.J. Super. 337, 347 (App. Div.
1996) (citing R. 1:7-4). In short, a failure to comply with Rule 1:7-4 ordinarily
results in remand. See Strahan v. Strahan, 402 N.J. Super. 298, 310 (App. Div.
2008) (reversing and remanding a trial judge's child support award because it
"failed to make the specific findings of fact necessary to sustain its decision
regarding the amount" contained in the award). Here, we deem a remand
necessary because no factual or legal findings were set forth in the November
27 order. In light of our remand, we do not need to address plaintiff's other
arguments.
In summary, the November 27 order is reversed and the judge shall modify
the order to provide that plaintiff timely filed his motion for reconsideration.
We remand and direct the judge to comply with Rule 1:7-4 and provide a
determination as to why he concluded that plaintiff failed to specify the basis
for his reconsideration motion.
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4
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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