CAROLINE MYLETT VS. BOARD OF REVIEW (BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR) ( 2019 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-0324-17T4
    CAROLINE MYLETT,
    Appellant,
    v.
    BOARD OF REVIEW,
    DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
    and CARYN MAX
    SALON WEST, LLC,
    Respondents.
    _____________________________
    Submitted January 29, 2019 – Decided February 8, 2019
    Before Judges Hoffman and Firko.
    On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of
    Labor and Workforce Development, Docket No.
    119,229.
    Caroline Mylett, appellant pro se.
    Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
    respondent Board of Review (Melissa Dutton Schaffer,
    Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Shareef M.
    Omar, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
    Respondent Caryn Max Salon, LLC, has not filed a
    brief.
    PER CURIAM
    Claimant appeals from the August 4, 2017 final decision of the Board of
    Review (Board) disqualifying her from receiving unemployment benefits after
    finding she left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to her work.
    Because the Board's factual findings were not supported by substantial credible
    evidence, and the Board overlooked contrary evidence, we reverse.
    Our review of administrative agency decisions is limited. In re Stallworth,
    
    208 N.J. 182
    , 194 (2011). We will not reverse an agency's decision unless it is
    arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.    
    Ibid. Agency action is
    arbitrary,
    capricious, and unreasonable if the record does not contain substantial credible
    evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its decision. 
    Ibid. Additionally, when "an
    agency 'overlook[s] or undervaluat[es] . . . crucial
    evidence,' a reviewing court may set aside the agency's decision." Cottman v.
    Bd. of Review, 
    454 N.J. Super. 166
    , 171 (App. Div. 2018) (alterations in
    original) (quoting Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 
    166 N.J. 113
    , 192 (2001)).
    We "must also give due regard to the opportunity of the one who heard
    the witnesses to judge their credibility." Logan v. Bd. of Review, 299 N.J.
    Super. 346, 348 (App. Div. 1997).      The Board has "the authority to make
    A-0324-17T4
    2
    different credibility assessments" than the Tribunal "where the record is open to
    competing interpretations." Messick v. Bd. of Review, 
    420 N.J. Super. 321
    , 330
    (App. Div. 2011). We recognize, however, that if the Board did not hear the
    evidence directly, it is "in a poor position to determine the credibility of the
    claimant." 
    Logan, 299 N.J. Super. at 348
    .
    New Jersey's Unemployment Compensation Law disqualifies a person
    from receiving unemployment benefits if he or she "left work voluntarily
    without good cause attributable to such work." N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). The phrase
    "good cause attributable to such work" is defined as "a reason related directly to
    the individual's employment, which was so compelling as to give the individual
    no choice but to leave the employment." N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(b). "The test of
    'ordinary common sense and prudence' must be utilized to determine whether an
    employee's decision to leave work constitutes good cause." Brady v. Bd. of
    Review, 
    152 N.J. 197
    , 214 (1997) (quoting Zielenski v. Bd. of Review, 85 N.J.
    Super. 46, 52 (App. Div. 1964)). The employee bears the burden of proof to
    establish good cause. 
    Id. at 218;
    N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(c).
    N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) "protects not only workers who are involuntarily
    unemployed—those who are laid-off or terminated from their jobs by their
    employers—but also those who voluntarily quit their jobs for good cause
    A-0324-17T4
    3
    attributable to their work." Utley v. Bd. of Review, Dep't of Labor, 
    194 N.J. 534
    , 543-44 (2008).      Because an employee "has the 'responsibility to do
    whatever is necessary and reasonable in order to remain employed.[,]'" 
    ibid. (quoting Heulitt v.
    Bd. of Review, 
    300 N.J. Super. 407
    , 414 (App. Div. 1997)),
    however, the employee's decision to quit "'must be compelled by real,
    substantial and reasonable circumstances not imaginary, trifling, and whimsical
    ones.'" 
    Ibid. (quoting Domenico v.
    Bd. of Review, 
    192 N.J. Super. 284
    , 288
    (App. Div. 1983)).
    If "an employee knows that he or she is about to be fired, the employee
    may quit without becoming ineligible." 
    Cottman, 454 N.J. Super. at 170
    . Thus,
    "an employee need not wait to be fired when discharge is imminent[,]" but
    instead "may resign and still be eligible for benefits." 
    Id. at 172-73.
    The
    determination of whether a worker quit in the face of being fired calls for a fact-
    sensitive analysis "of all relevant factors . . . ." 
    Utley, 194 N.J. at 548
    . The facts
    must "'indicate a strong probability that fears about the employee's job security
    will in fact materialize, that serious impending threats to [the employee 's] job
    will be realized, and that the employee's belief that his [or her] job is imminently
    threatened is well founded.'" Shuster v. Bd. of Review, 
    396 N.J. Super. 240
    ,
    A-0324-17T4
    4
    245 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Fernandez v. Bd. of Review, 
    304 N.J. Super. 603
    ,
    606 (App. Div. 1997)).
    Appellant worked as a bookkeeper for Caryn Max Salon West, LLC, from
    April 20, 2011, through April 5, 2017. 1 On Tuesday March 28, 2017, Caryn
    Procaccini, the owner of the salon, held a staff meeting to institute a new "gossip
    policy" because she perceived "negativity in the salon." The following day,
    another employee gave claimant an eyebrow service, during which they
    discussed the new gossip policy and also discussed a client who was not happy
    with the services she received. Unbeknownst to them, Procaccini listened to
    their conversation from the other side of a closed door, and believed that they
    violated the new gossip policy.
    When the eyebrow service concluded, Procaccini approached claimant
    and told her that she wanted to meet with her, but the two were unable to meet
    that day.   Claimant testified that when she arrived at work the following
    Monday, "everything," including her desk and other "stuff," was cleared out,
    and her file cabinets were locked. Claimant did her usual payroll work that day.
    1
    The number of "inaudible" notations in the transcript makes it hard to discern
    the testimony and hinders our review.
    A-0324-17T4
    5
    Claimant and Procaccini finally met on the morning of Wednesday April
    5, 2017. Procaccini began by asking claimant numerous questions, including
    what work she still needed to finish that week, how much the salon paid for its
    cleaning service, and how to access files on the computer. Fearing that she was
    going to be fired "any minute," claimant quit. Procaccini then produced a letter
    of resignation and asked appellant to sign it, but claimant refused. Claimant
    testified that she later learned that Procaccini had already hired a new
    bookkeeper who started the same day that claimant separated from her
    employment.
    Procaccini testified that claimant was required to clock out and get a
    manager's approval before getting any "personal service", which she did not do.
    Procaccini also said that she overheard claimant discussing the staff meeting and
    new gossip policy while getting her eyebrows treatment, which Procaccini
    believed violated the new gossip policy.
    Procaccini admitted that she cleared out the office that she shared with
    claimant. She said that she had cleaned out the office previously, but later
    clarified that although she swept it out "occasionally," she never before "did a
    detail of it" like she did on this occasion. She denied purposely removing the
    desktop icons on claimant's computer, claiming that she "backed up" claimant's
    A-0324-17T4
    6
    computer and the files were inadvertently minimized. She also explained that
    she locked the file cabinets containing employee personnel files because sh e did
    not want anyone else to have access to her employees' personal information, and
    that she had requested that claimant do so in the past.
    Procaccini said she asked claimant questions about bookkeeping,
    computer passwords, and company procedures when they met because she had
    to "protect [her]self" in case claimant quit. Procaccini insisted that she hired the
    new employee as a receptionist before claimant separated from employment, and
    "low and behold" the new employee had some background in bookkeepin g and
    "took over right away." Procaccini maintained that she did not fire claimant and
    that claimant quit voluntarily.
    On June 13, 2017, the Appeal Tribunal (Tribunal) concluded that claimant
    was entitled to unemployment benefits because she did not leave her job
    voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work under N.J.S.A. 43:21 -
    5(a). Instead, it found that Procaccini's actions supported claimant's belief that
    "her discharge was imminent" and claimant "resigned in lieu of imminent
    discharge."    The Tribunal relied on Procaccini "requesting operational
    information" from claimant, as well as Procaccini's actions removing claimant's
    desktop from her computer, locking the file cabinets, and "box[ing] other
    A-0324-17T4
    7
    documents used by [claimant] to perform her duties." The Tribunal also found
    that claimant did not intend to violate the no gossip policy, that any violation
    was not deliberate, wanton, or willful, and that claimant therefore was not
    disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(b)
    due to employee misconduct. Because no disqualifications applied, the Tribunal
    determined that claimant was entitled to receive unemployment benefits.
    On August 4, 2017, the Board reversed the Tribunal's decision. The Board
    did not make any credibility determinations.        The Board, however, felt
    "compelled to rewrite the Findings of Fact as those of the Appeal Tribunal do
    not reflect the record." Specifically, the Board made the following factual
    findings:
    [Claimant] was upset with the owner, who had asked
    her some questions about the files and payroll. The
    owner was not disrespectful toward [claimant]. The
    owner had cleaned the office, including [claimant]'s
    desk, prior to April 3, 2017. She did not remove the
    desktop that [appellant] was using or [claimant]'s
    belongings. The owner locked the personnel files,
    because they had confidential information. The owner
    intended to meet with [claimant] on April 5, 2017 to
    discuss with her the gossip policy.          However,
    [appellant] resigned before she had the opportunity to
    do so. [Claimant]'s job was not in jeopardy at the time
    of her separation.
    A-0324-17T4
    8
    Based on those findings, the Board concluded that claimant left work voluntarily
    without good cause attributable to the work and was therefore disqualified from
    receiving unemployment benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a).2
    On appeal, claimant argues that the Board did not base its findings on
    substantial credible evidence in the record and ignored contrary evidence. We
    agree.
    The Board's conclusion that claimant's job was not in jeopardy at the time
    she quit was based on factual findings that were not supported by the record.
    For instance, the Board found that Procaccini cleaned the office, including
    claimant's desk, prior to April 3, 2017. Although Procaccini said that she had
    cleaned the office in the past, she later clarified that she would "sweep it out
    occasionally," but admitted that she never, as she put it, "did a detail" like she
    did in this instance. There was no testimony that Procaccini had ever cleaned
    claimant's desk or locked the filing cabinets previously. The Board also found
    that Procaccini did not remove the "desktop" from claimant's computer, but
    Procaccini acknowledged that she inadvertently "minimized" the icons on
    claimant's desktop when she "backed up" claimant's computer.
    2
    The Board agreed with the Tribunal that claimant was not disqualified from
    receiving unemployment benefits for employee misconduct related to violating
    company policy under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(b).
    A-0324-17T4
    9
    More significantly, the Board found that Procaccini intended to meet with
    claimant on April 5, 2017, but that claimant "resigned before she had the
    opportunity to do so." Both parties testified, however, that they met on April 5,
    and that Procaccini asked claimant a series of questions about claimant 's
    remaining work, bookkeeping, computer passwords, and company procedures.
    It was at that point that claimant, fearing she was going to be fired "any minute"
    based on Procaccini's questioning, quit her position. The Board's finding that
    claimant resigned before the meeting was not supported by the evidence in the
    record.
    The Board also either overlooked or underappreciated evidence in the
    record supporting claimant's claim.      The Board did not consider that once
    claimant announced that she was quitting, Procaccini produced a pre-written
    letter of resignation and asked her to sign it. It also did not consider that a new
    receptionist/bookkeeper started work the same day claimant quit, which we have
    recognized is evidence indicating "imminent layoff or discharge[.]" 
    Shuster, 396 N.J. Super. at 247
    .
    Because the Board did not base its findings on substantial credible
    evidence in the record and overlooked contrary evidence in reaching its
    conclusions, its decision was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.
    A-0324-17T4
    10
    Accordingly, we reverse the final decision of the Board, and remand the case to
    the Division of Unemployment and Disability Insurance to determine the
    amount of unemployment compensation benefits owed to claimant.
    Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
    A-0324-17T4
    11