STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JUAN A. REYES (18-06-0965, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-4096-19
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    JUAN A. REYES,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Submitted September 30, 2021 – Decided November 17, 2021
    Before Judges Alvarez and Mitterhoff.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Atlantic County, Indictment No. 18-06-0965.
    Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
    appellant (Stefan Van Jura, Assistant Deputy Public
    Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
    Cary Shill, Acting Atlantic County Prosecutor, attorney
    for respondent (Debra B. Albuquerque, Special Deputy
    Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of
    counsel and on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant Juan A. Reyes entered a guilty plea to second-degree unlawful
    possession of cocaine in a quantity of half an ounce or more with intent to
    distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(2); third-degree possession with intent to
    distribute methamphetamine, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and 2C:35-5(b)(9); and
    second-degree distribution of cocaine in a quantity of half an ounce or more,
    N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(2). The plea was entered after the Law Division judge
    denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized while executing a search
    warrant. On March 6, 2020, the judge sentenced defendant to the negotiated
    concurrent terms of imprisonment: 1 eight years subject to five years of parole
    ineligibility on the drug possession, eight years on the drug distribution, and five
    years on the third-degree crime. We affirm the judge's denial of the suppression
    motion, but vacate the sentence and remand for a new proceeding because parole
    ineligibility was an unauthorized disposition. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2.
    The affidavit supporting the search warrant application recited that the
    affiant, an Atlantic County Prosecutor's Office detective, arranged two separate
    controlled buys from defendant, on January 21, 2018, and "during the week of
    March 18, 2018." On both occasions, standard protocol was followed—the
    1
    Defendant was also sentenced to a concurrent term on a violation of probation
    sentence; that offense is not relevant as defendant has not appealed that aspect
    of the judgment.
    A-4096-19
    2
    confidential informant was searched beforehand to ensure he had no contraband
    or cash on his person, he was given cash for the purchase, and a meeting place
    was fixed for him to deliver the drugs to police after the sale.       The first
    transaction occurred at a predetermined location arranged by defendant; the
    second occurred at his home. The detective described the substances as looking
    like crack cocaine, and the packaging as that typically used for the drug, but he
    did not conduct any field testing.
    The affidavit recited defendant's extensive prior criminal history, as well
    as a detailed description of the detective's prior training and experience. The
    detective did not detail law enforcement's prior involvement with the
    confidential informant.
    The warrant was executed days later on March 27, 2020. Officers seized
    both cocaine and methamphetamines from defendant's home.
    At sentencing, the judge found aggravating factors three, six, and nine,
    and no mitigating factors. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), (6), (9); N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b).
    The judge failed to explain why defendant's parole ineligibility exceeded one-
    half of his base term at either the plea or sentencing hearings.
    Now on appeal, defendant raises the following issues for our
    consideration:
    A-4096-19
    3
    POINT I
    THE CONTRABAND FOUND IN THE HOUSE
    SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THE
    WARRANT DID NOT ESTABLISH PROBABLE
    CAUSE TO BELIEVE THE HOUSE WOULD
    CONTAIN DRUGS FOR TWO REASONS: 1) TOO
    MUCH TIME HAD PASSED BETWEEN THE
    CONTROLLED BUY AND THE EXECUTION OF
    THE WARRANT; AND 2) THE POLICE FAILED TO
    CONDUCT ANY TESTING OF THE ALLEGED
    DRUGS TO DETERMINE THAT THEY WERE, IN
    FACT, DRUGS.
    POINT II
    THE MATTER MUST BE REMANDED FOR
    RESENTENCING BECAUSE THERE WAS NO
    LAWFUL BASIS FOR THE IMPOSITION OF A
    FIVE-YEAR PERIOD OF PAROLE INELIGIBILITY.
    I.
    Defendant challenges the warrant on two grounds: first, the purported
    "untimeliness" of its execution; and second, the failure to test the substances
    purchased during the controlled buys. These arguments lack merit.
    When reviewing a motion to suppress evidence, we uphold the trial court's
    factual findings, provided they are "supported by sufficient credible evidence in
    the record." State v. Boone, 
    232 N.J. 417
    , 426 (2017) (citing State v. Scriven,
    
    226 N.J. 20
    , 40 (2016)). We overturn the decision only when the interests of
    A-4096-19
    4
    justice demand.     
    Ibid.
     (citing State v. Elders, 
    192 N.J. 224
    , 244 (2007)).
    Conclusions of law are always subject to de novo review. 
    Ibid.
    The lynchpin for a valid search warrant is a supporting affidavit reciting
    adequate probable cause to conclude a crime has been committed or is being
    committed at the place to be searched. 
    Ibid.
     Warrant-backed searches are
    presumptively valid. Id. at 427. The defendant bears the burden of establishing
    lack of probable cause or the unreasonableness of the search. Ibid.
    We "accord substantial deference to the discretionary determination
    resulting in the issuance of the [search] warrant." Ibid. (citing State v. Jones,
    
    179 N.J. 377
    , 388 (2004)). In this case, the totality of the circumstances clearly
    warranted the issuing judge's finding of probable cause. See 
    ibid.
    The brief delay between the second controlled buy and the issuance of the
    warrant is inconsequential because the two transactions were arranged. Given
    the officer's considerable experience, defendant's lengthy criminal history, and
    the arranged nature of the buys, probable cause did not evanesce after just a few
    days.
    The failure to chemically analyze the drugs was also of no moment
    because the highly experienced detective provided a detailed description of the
    substances.     Certainly, defendant may have sold imitation CDS—itself
    A-4096-19
    5
    contraband—but that is pure speculation.        The officer established ample
    probable cause.
    II.
    Defendant contends his sentence violates N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b) because
    parole ineligibility is lawful only when aggravating factors substantially
    outweigh mitigating factors, not when aggravating factors merely preponderate,
    as the sentencing judge found. Additionally, defendant contends that N.J.S.A.
    2C:43-6(b) prohibits imposing a parole ineligibility term exceeding one-half of
    the overall sentence.
    We agree with both points. Where aggravating factors only preponderate,
    and do not substantially outweigh mitigating factors, a longer term within the
    statutory range may be imposed, but not a period of parole ineligibility. See
    N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b); State v. Case, 
    220 N.J. 49
    , 65-66 (2014).
    An illegal sentence is one not authorized by our Code of Criminal Justice.2
    See State v. R.K., 
    463 N.J. Super. 386
    , 494 (App. Div. 2020). Such a sentence
    2
    The State's brief posits that defendant's prior history regarding weapons
    possession may have justified a Graves Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7(c), sentence
    requiring a five-year term of parole ineligibility. No mention is made anywhere
    in the record available to us, from the plea allocution, plea form itself, or the
    sentencing hearing, of anything related to Graves Act sentencing. Furthermore,
    none of the offenses to which defendant entered a guilty plea involved weapons
    possession.
    A-4096-19
    6
    may be corrected at any time. 
    Ibid.
     We are unaware of any statutory provision
    that would have allowed the term of parole ineligibility to exceed half of the
    base term; no such provision was discussed on the record. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-
    6(b). Certainly, a plea agreement between the State and defendant cannot render
    an illegal sentence legal. Thus, we vacate the sentence and remand for the judge
    to impose a lawful term of parole ineligibility.
    Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded.
    A-4096-19
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-4096-19

Filed Date: 11/17/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/17/2021