S.M.B. VS. M.F.B. (FV-03-0217-20, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2021 )


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  •                                      RECORD IMPOUNDED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-0731-19
    S.M.B.,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    M.F.B.,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    _______________________
    Submitted October 25, 2021 – Decided November 17, 2021
    Before Judges Messano and Accurso.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Chancery Division, Family Part, Burlington County,
    Docket No. FV-03-0217-20.
    Charny Karpousis Altieri & Donoian, PA, attorneys
    for appellant (Melissa Y. Hoffman Spears, on the
    briefs).
    Rutgers Domestic Violence Clinic, Rutgers Law,
    attorneys for respondent (Denise Higgins, Staff
    Attorney, of counsel; Hannah Lee, admitted pursuant
    to Rule 1:21-3(b), on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant M.F.B. appeals from a final restraining order entered against
    him pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17
    to -35, based on the predicate act of harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4. See
    N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)(13). He contends the evidence failed to establish
    harassment or that plaintiff, his ex-wife S.M.B., needs the protection the order
    provides. Having reviewed the record, we cannot agree on either point and
    thus affirm entry of the restraining order.
    The parties had been married for fourteen years when their relationship
    foundered, largely over finances and differences in parenting their three
    children, all young adolescents. Plaintiff testified defendant had trouble
    controlling his anger toward her and their children, resulting in his often
    yelling at them and occasionally throwing things, such as homework or a
    schoolbook.
    According to plaintiff, defendant could, on occasion, get so worked up
    he would shove, slap or choke her. She testified she turned to defendant's
    parents for help, hoping they could "[s]it down and talk with him and us all
    work out how he can get himself some help." She claimed the intervention
    went badly after defendant "blew up, and he lost his mind by yelling and
    screaming," saying it was all her fault and "how dare [she] involve his
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    2
    parents." When plaintiff told him she wanted a divorce, defendant threatened
    to kill her, telling her he wanted to rip out her eyes and rip off her ears, and
    that he would dig a hole and bury her in it and no one would find her.
    Although she had called the police on one occasion a few years earlier,
    plaintiff sought a restraining order only after the parties had been separated for
    almost a year. She testified defendant called her at work over money he
    believed was missing from their joint checking account. He said he was
    coming over and demanded she give him cash. Plaintiff testified she told him
    she didn't have the money and pleaded with him not to come to the dentist's
    office where she worked as a receptionist, as she did not want to lose her job.
    Defendant came anyway, yelling and throwing bank statements at her, as well
    as pens and items he found on her desk. After asking him to please be quiet,
    she walked into the parking lot so they could talk privately.
    Although plaintiff testified she repeatedly asked defendant "please don't
    do this," as she was "going to lose [her] job," she claimed he was "in [her]
    face," following her as she continued to back away from him. As they went
    around the back of the building, defendant kicked her car and punched her car
    window while continuing to scream at her. When the dentist came to her aid at
    the back door, defendant told him to shut the door, that this was "none of [his]
    A-0731-19
    3
    business," and had "nothing to do with him." When defendant was distracted
    by a passing truck, plaintiff broke away from him and ran inside, locking the
    door. She managed to get the front door locked before defendant came around
    the building, but that did not stop him from kicking the door and banging on it
    to get in.
    Plaintiff did not pursue a final restraining order after that incident.
    Instead, the parties, with assistance from their divorce lawyers, agreed to the
    entry of civil restraints. The order barred defendant from plaintiff's office, and
    the parties agreed they would only contact one another through My Family
    Wizard, and only about the children and "marital bills." Plaintiff testified that
    within weeks, however, defendant had violated its terms, screaming at her
    when she dropped off their son for parenting time that she had "ruined [their]
    family," was "separating everyone," and that he wanted them to "stay together
    and work things out."
    Plaintiff filed a police report but did not immediately seek a new
    temporary restraining order, notwithstanding that defendant had repeatedly
    texted and called her about their relationship and not wanting the divorce.1
    1
    The parties were communicating about the children through texts as they had
    not established a My Family Wizard account because plaintiff claimed she
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    4
    Plaintiff only sought a new restraining order after she listened to a voice mail
    message from defendant on their ten-year-old's phone, three-weeks after she
    had dismissed her temporary restraining order in favor of civil restraints. The
    "message" was not actually a message at all, but a recording of an angry
    argument between defendant and his parents, in which defendant could be
    heard shouting that he would kill plaintiff, cut off her legs and leave the
    country with the children. Plaintiff testified she feared defendant and believed
    his harassment of her would not stop without entry of a final restraining order.
    Defendant and his mother also testified at the hearing. Defendant
    testified he had never shoved, slapped or choked plaintiff, and that none of the
    incidents she testified to had ever happened. He did admit going to her office
    because he "wanted to show her the bank statements," but claimed he was
    "completely calm," when he "took the paperwork [and] threw it on the floor."
    Defendant also admitted telling plaintiff's boss "to mind his business and go
    in," when the dentist went to the back door after "he probably heard [their]
    conversation inside," although defendant denied ever yelling at plaintiff.
    Defendant further admitted going around to the front door after plaintiff ran
    could not afford the cost. Plaintiff testified that in addition to texting about the
    children, however, defendant also contacted her about wanting to get back
    together.
    A-0731-19
    5
    inside, but claimed that after turning the doorknob and finding it locked, he
    knocked only one time before retreating to his truck.
    As for the voice mail message left on their son's cell phone, defendant
    testified he'd come back from taking his son home early during his parenting
    time and was "aggravated, frustrated, [and] upset." After leaving his phone on
    the kitchen counter of his parents' home where he was staying, he walked into
    the living room where his mother told him that plaintiff "really knows how to
    push your buttons." He testified he responded by asking "is that something to
    be proud of?" He testified he told his mother, he "could do this too" and then
    foolishly "said all these things that were heard" in the recording "that [he]
    would never do and — and that was the conversation."
    Defendant testified he didn't deliberately dial his son and leave that
    message when plaintiff was "already destroying our relationship, you know,
    and destroying them at this point." He claimed he must have inadvertently
    pressed his son's contact entry when he put the phone down on the counter.
    Asked by his counsel what was his intention in arguing with his parents,
    defendant responded "[t]o prove to my mom that just because [plaintiff's] able
    to push my buttons, doesn't make it right." Asked what he intended by saying
    he would kidnap his children, defendant explained he was trying to "prove to
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    [plaintiff] that — metaphorically, it's compared to what she's doing to me, and
    what she's been doing and why we got divorced and why I filed for divorce."
    Asked how the conversation with his parents ended, defendant said it ended
    with him "saying well, guess what, that whole conversation got recorded."
    Defendant testified he walked into the kitchen, saw his son's name on the
    phone and his "heart sunk." He said he "hit the end button and . . . waited for
    the consequences."
    Defendant's mother testified the recorded argument started after
    defendant saw how upset and frustrated they were over not seeing the children.
    According to her, defendant "was beside himself because he didn't get the time
    to spend with his son" and "said something inappropriately," which "he didn't
    mean . . . literally." She explained that when she told him he "can't let
    [plaintiff] press your buttons. . . . [H]e said, 'pressing my buttons? I'd like to
    cut her legs [off].'" Defendant's mother testified she knew her son "would
    never do that. He was just extremely, extremely frustrated."
    Defendant's mother explained that defendant sounded loud on the
    message because "first of all, the television was full blast because [her]
    husband has a hearing problem, and we were — [defendant] was standing right
    by the TV, and we were in the living room." Asked on cross-examination
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    7
    whether her son had "an anger management issue," she testified "he yells too
    much at times. Yeah." Asked whether she had "ever seen him angry and hit
    anything," defendant's mother responded, "No. Yeah, no. Not — no." Asked
    whether he'd ever hit a wall, she admitted "yeah, there was a time" at his
    house, and she "yelled at him for that."
    After hearing the testimony, the judge found defendant had harassed
    plaintiff, and that she needed the protection of a final restraining order. The
    judge found plaintiff a credible witness, explaining her testimony was
    reasonable, simply relating events and not searching for answers. He found
    defendant, however, not believable, finding it impossible to square defendant's
    account of himself, particularly as to his calmly going to plaintiff's office to
    discuss their joint bank account balance, with the rage in his voice in the
    recording left on his son's phone. 2 Comparing what defendant said in that
    message, and the manner in which he said it, with his testimony at trial, the
    judge was convinced plaintiff had testified truthfully about defendant's prior
    acts of domestic violence.
    2
    Although acknowledging he found defendant's mother "for the most part
    credible," albeit biased in favor of her son, the judge noted he didn't hear a TV
    in the background of the recording, which was the witness's explanation for
    why defendant sounded so loud even though the phone was in the kitchen and
    they were in the living room, two rooms away.
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    The judge found defendant's angry communications with plaintiff when
    she dropped off their son and the text messages he sent her about not wanting
    the divorce and "winning her back," which texts were admitted into evidence,
    constituted harassment. Relying on the order for civil restraints, which limited
    the parties' communication to their children and bills, the judge found
    defendant knew he should not be communicating with plaintiff about their
    relationship, was aware his communications were unwanted and annoying to
    plaintiff, and yet he persisted in his efforts to contact her. The judge found
    those acts were not only a violation of the order but manifested a purpose on
    defendant's part to harass plaintiff.
    The judge had no hesitation in finding plaintiff needed the protection of
    a final order. Besides noting defendant's "very disturbing" threats to plaintiff,
    the judge found the couple's prior history and defendant's willingness to
    violate a consensual order for civil restraints, made clear "these actions would
    continue" if a final restraining order were not in place.
    Defendant appeals, arguing the court erred in entering a final restraining
    order based on the violation of a consent order for civil restraints "[w]ithout
    any credible evidence of a prior history of domestic violence," ruling "the
    demeanor of a 45 second voice mail message that was not intended for anyone
    A-0731-19
    9
    to hear, was more credible than the man that sat before him for hours during
    trial and thereby justified protecting the plaintiff from further such 'abuse.'"
    Our review of a trial court's factual findings is limited. Cesare v.
    Cesare, 
    154 N.J. 394
    , 411 (1998). Findings by the trial court "are binding on
    appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." 
    Id.
     at 412
    (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co., 
    65 N.J. 474
    , 484 (1974)).
    Deference is especially appropriate in a case, such as this one, in which the
    evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility because
    the trial court's ability to see and hear the witnesses provides it a better
    perspective than a reviewing court to judge their veracity. 
    Ibid.
    A final restraining order may issue only if the judge finds the parties
    have a relationship bringing the complained of conduct within the Act,
    N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d); the defendant committed an act designated as domestic
    violence, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a); and the "restraining order is necessary, upon
    an evaluation of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1) to -29(a)(6), to
    protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse."
    Silver v. Silver, 
    387 N.J. Super. 112
    , 125-27 (App. Div. 2006) (noting once the
    jurisdictional prerequisites have been met, the judge's task is two-fold; first to
    determine whether plaintiff proved a predicate act, and, if so, whether a final
    A-0731-19
    10
    restraining order is necessary to protect the victim from immediate danger or
    to prevent further abuse).
    Applying those standards here, we find defendant has provided us no
    basis on which we could upset the factual findings or legal conclusions of the
    trial court. Both parties testified at some length. The judge had ample
    opportunity to judge their credibility and obviously found defendant's wanting
    for reasons the judge explained. The rage with which defendant, in an
    unguarded moment, expressed his desire to maim and kill plaintiff and kidnap
    their children corroborated plaintiff's account of how defendant had raged at
    her over several years, including her description of a prior threat defendant
    made to kill her in similarly graphic terms. The judge was free to find those
    "45 seconds" more telling of defendant's character and his behavior toward
    plaintiff than the picture he attempted to present to the court in his testimony
    at the domestic violence trial.
    Although defendant contends the court's finding that he harassed
    plaintiff was improperly based only on a violation of a consent order for civil
    restraints, see N.B. v. S.K., 
    435 N.J. Super. 298
    , 305 (App. Div. 2014), that is
    obviously not so. The judge simply inferred defendant acted with a purpose to
    harass plaintiff by his yelling at her during parenting exchanges and sending
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    11
    her multiple texts unrelated to the children, because he was on notice by virtue
    of the dismissal of the temporary restraining order in favor of the order for
    civil restraints that his conduct was unwelcome and both alarming and
    annoying to plaintiff, making clear his conscious object was to do just that.
    See State v. Hoffman, 
    149 N.J. 564
    , 577 (1997) (noting a finding of a purpose
    to harass may be inferred from the evidence, informed by common sense and
    experience).
    Although the trial court should have specified the section of the
    harassment statute on which he relied, we are satisfied the evidence the judge
    found credible would support a finding of harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33 -
    4(a), "makes . . . communications in . . . any other manner likely to cause
    annoyance or alarm;" or 2C:33-4(c), "engages in any other course . . . of
    repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other
    person" in light of the parties' prior history and the totality of the surrounding
    circumstances. See N.B., 435 N.J. Super. at 304-07 (App. Div. 2014)
    (discussing "the importance of the context or setting in which the act or acts of
    harassment occurred" in determining whether conduct constituted harassment).
    We are convinced by plaintiff's long delay in seeking a restraining order
    that there is no basis for defendant's claim that she was attempting to use the
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    order as a sword against defendant in the divorce instead of a shield against his
    continued harassment. See J.D. v. M.D.F., 
    207 N.J. 458
    , 487 (2011)
    (cautioning courts to be "especially vigilant" in evaluating claims of
    harassment in cases involving the interactions of a couple "in the midst of a
    breakup"). The trial court was correct to reject defendant's claim that his
    repeatedly alarming conduct was no more than "ordinary domestic
    contretemps." Peranio v. Peranio, 
    280 N.J. Super. 47
    , 57 (App. Div. 1995).
    Affirmed.
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