JOSEPH BAHGAT VS. NATALE CHILDREN, LLC (C-000066-18, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-0114-19
    JOSEPH BAHGAT,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    NATALE CHILDREN, LLC,
    JDN PROPERTIES, LLC,
    a/k/a LAND MANAGEMENT
    ASSOCIATES, MICHAEL
    JACONELLI, MICHELE
    JACONELLI, and TAM
    LENDING CENTER, INC.,
    Defendants-Respondents.
    ___________________________
    Argued September 30, 2021 – Decided November 18, 2021
    Before Judges Alvarez and Mitterhoff.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Chancery Division, Middlesex County, Docket No.
    C-000066-18.
    Joseph A. Bahgat, appellant, argued the cause pro se.
    Frederick B. Zelley argued the cause for respondents
    Natale Children, LLC, and JDN Properties, LLC, a/k/a
    Land Management Associates (Bisogno, Loeffler &
    Zelley, LLC, attorneys; Frederick B. Zelley, of counsel
    and on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    In this landlord-tenant and special civil part action, plaintiff Joseph
    Bahgat appeals from (a) a July 25, 2019, order terminating the contract of sale
    between the parties and awarding defendant a judgment for possession: and (b)
    an August 2, 2019, order discharging a lis pendens and awarding attorney's fees.
    We affirm, substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Vincent LeBlon's
    well-reasoned oral opinions.
    We discern the following facts from the record. In June 2015, plaintiff, a
    licensed attorney, leased a luxury townhouse from defendants. The two-year
    lease began in July 2015 and included an option to purchase the townhouse at
    the end of the lease. In July 2017, plaintiff did not renew, and he was thereafter
    considered a holdover tenant by the operation of law. 1 He continued to rent the
    townhouse on a month-to-month basis but did not exercise his right to purchase.
    1
    A "holdover tenant" is generally defined as "[s]omeone who remains in possession
    of real property after a previous tenancy . . . expires[.]" Black's Law Dictionary
    1769 (11th ed. 2019); see also Newark Park Plaza Assocs., Ltd. v. City of Newark,
    
    227 N.J. Super. 496
    , 499 (Law Div. 1987) ("It is well-settled law in New Jersey that
    when a tenant continues to occupy a premises after the termination of a lease, his
    status becomes that of a month-to-month holdover tenant."). Accordingly, plaintiff's
    A-0114-19
    2
    On April 12, 2018, defendants filed an order to show cause (OTSC)
    against plaintiff in the Special Civil Part and a dispossession action in the
    Landlord-Tenant Section. The dispossession action was based on plaintiff's
    nonpayment of rent for several months. The OTSC sought to compel plaintiff
    to permit the showing of the premises after he had failed to exercise his purchase
    option.
    In response, on April 30, 2018, plaintiff filed an OTSC and verified
    complaint in the Chancery Division alleging that: (a) plaintiff was entitled to
    declaratory judgment stating that the purchase option was valid and enforceable
    and defendants could not evict plaintiff (count one); (b) defendants breached the
    implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (count two); (c) defendants
    breached the covenant of quiet enjoyment (count three); (d) promissory estoppel
    (count four); (e) invasion of privacy (count five); (f) defamation (count six); (g)
    violation of Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and N.J.S.A. 56:8-161 et seq. (count
    tenancy converted to a holdover tenancy on a month-to-month basis. See N.J.S.A.
    46:8-10.
    A-0114-19
    3
    seven); and (h) civil conspiracy (count eight). That same day, plaintiff filed a
    notice of lis pendens.2
    On May 15, 2018, the return date of the OTSC, the parties met with Judge
    LeBlon and attempted to mediate a resolution of the case. Later that day, the
    parties appeared before Judge LeBlon and entered the basic terms of a negotiated
    settlement on the record, under which plaintiff could purchase the premises if
    he satisfied certain conditions.         The following day, defendants' counsel
    forwarded a proposed consent order to plaintiff memorializing the terms of the
    settlement in greater detail. The parties continued negotiations until plaintiff
    signed the final version June 16, 2018.
    On June 18, 2018, Judge LeBlon signed the final consent order. The key
    provisions of the consent agreement required plaintiff to: 1) bring himself
    current in his rent; 3 2) negotiate and enter into a formal contract to purchase the
    2
    A lis pendens is defined as "[a] notice, recorded in the chain of title to real property,
    required or permitted in some jurisdictions to warn all persons that certain property
    is subject matter of litigation, and that any interests acquired during the pendency of
    the suit are subject to its outcome." Black's Law Dictionary 1117-18 (11th ed. 2019);
    N.J.S.A. 2A:15-6 to 15-17.
    3
    Plaintiff owed defendants $11,600 in overdue rent for the months of February,
    March, April, and May of 2018 at a rate of $2,900 per month. Defendants agreed to
    dismiss the April 2018 dispossession action against plaintiff in exchange for
    payment of the overdue rent.
    A-0114-19
    4
    premises with specified terms;4 3) obtain a formal mortgage commitment by July
    16, 2018; and 4) close title by August 15, 2018.
    In addition, paragraph 4 of the consent order required plaintiff to timely
    pay his rent "without deductions" for each month post-settlement that he
    continued to reside in the townhouse. Paragraph nine provided that if defendant
    properly terminated the contract in accordance with the agreement's terms,
    plaintiff would vacate by August 31, 2018.           If plaintiff failed to vacate,
    paragraph nine indicated defendant would be entitled to "a [j]udgment for
    [p]ossession of the [p]remises and to the immediate issuance of a [w]arrant for
    [r]emoval, by authority of this [c]onsent [o]rder, upon [d]efendant's submission
    to the [c]ourt a [c]ertification confirming [p]laintiff's failure to vacate."
    With respect to attorney's fees, the agreement provided that "[t]he parties'
    claims for attorney['s] fees shall be held in abeyance unless and until the issue
    is not resolved amicably by the parties and an appropriate application is made
    to the [c]ourt."
    4
    Plaintiff did negotiate and sign a contract to purchase the property. The contract
    required, consistent with the settlement agreement, that plaintiff obtain a mortgage
    commitment by July 16, 2018. The contract further provided if plaintiff was unable
    to obtain financing by that date, the seller could terminate the contract.
    A-0114-19
    5
    Plaintiff brought himself current on his past-due rent, but immediately
    violated paragraph four of the consent order by failing to pay his June and July
    rent on time. He further violated the settlement terms by unilaterally deducting
    $597 – the alleged cost of a microwave and repairs to an electrical panel. On
    July 23, 2018, defendants emailed plaintiff to advise that if he did not pay the
    remaining $597, defendants would terminate the contract for sale and seek
    possession.
    Plaintiff also violated what was arguably the central term of the agreement
    by failing to secure a mortgage commitment prior to July 16, 2018. For that
    reason, on July 25, 2018, defendants advised plaintiff that the contract was being
    terminated and submitted a proposed order to Judge LeBlon to terminate the
    contract of sale and enter judgement of possession for defendants.
    Judge LeBlon directed the parties to appear before him on July 26, 2018.
    Plaintiff's mortgage representative, Ted Ark (Ark) of Golden Mortgage
    Corporation, testified by telephone that although plaintiff had consulted with
    him in the prequalification stage of obtaining a mortgage, plaintiff had not yet
    been approved by underwriting and no firm mortgage commitment had issued.5
    5
    Plaintiff's assertion that Ark testified that he had issued a firm mortgage
    commitment is not supported by the record.
    A-0114-19
    6
    Ark could not confirm that a commitment would issue before the August 15,
    2018, closing deadline.    Based on Ark's testimony, Judge LeBlon granted
    defendants' motion for termination of the contract and possession of the
    premises. He noted that plaintiff had failed to secure a mortgage commitment
    in violation of the consent agreement, stating:
    this contract is specifically contingent upon buyer at
    buyer's sole cost and expense no later than July
    [sixteenth] of 2018, obtaining and delivering to seller's
    attorney a firm mortgage commitment for a mortgage
    on the premises in the amount of $440,000 at a
    prevailing rate of interest for a term of [thirty] years
    with only standard conditions; in parentheses, i.e. with
    no unusual conditions.
    I find and I believe that [plaintiff] has not met
    that term of the contract. It is not a [–] from the
    testimony of Mr. Ark . . . a firm mortgage commitment.
    He specifically said it was not. Even if it was
    considered a mortgage commitment, it does have an
    unusual condition requiring that computations be made,
    which I just read. So I find and I believe that [plaintiff]
    has not met [–] not met the terms of that mortgage
    commitment.
    [(2T66:19-67:11).]6
    6
    After Judge LeBlon awarded defendants possession of the premises, plaintiff
    sought a temporary stay pending appeal, which the judge denied. On August 30,
    2018, plaintiff filed a second OTSC. This application was denied by Judge LeBlon
    on September 4, 2018. On October 1, 2018, plaintiff filed an application seeking
    A-0114-19
    7
    On July 31, 2018, defendants' counsel emailed plaintiff and his real estate
    attorney a proposed discharge of the notice of lis pendens, and asked plaintiff to
    notify him of any objections. Plaintiff did not respond to this request. On
    August 21, 2018, defendants' counsel re-sent the July 31, 2018, email and
    proposed form of order. On September 16, 2018, defendants' counsel re-sent
    the July 31, 2018, and August 21, 2018, emails and proposed form of order to
    plaintiff. Defendants' counsel warned plaintiff that he would involve the court
    if he did not receive an answer.
    On July 16, 2019, defendants moved to discharge plaintiff's notice of lis
    pendens and for entry of a monetary judgment in accordance with the June 18,
    2018, consent order. Judge LeBlon granted the application, finding that:
    the applicable portion of the statute is 2A:15-17 which
    is entitled "Discharge of lis pendens when judgment is
    paid, satisfied or action settled or abandoned."
    And in the appropriate portion of the [–] that
    statute, it provides that if the judgment has been paid,
    satisfied, performed or has [–] or the action has been
    settled, but the party who filed the notice of lis pendens
    fails to file the warrant stated, the [c]ourt having
    jurisdiction of the action may, upon being satisfied of
    emergent relief from this court, which we denied. On October 8, 2018, plaintiff
    sought emergent relief from the Supreme Court, which was also denied.
    A-0114-19
    8
    the fact of such payment, satisfaction, performance,
    settlement or abandonment and upon such notice may
    by its order direct, that the notice of lis pendens be
    discharged of all claims or equities set up in the
    complaint in the action.
    Here I find that the matter was indeed settled.
    And in the attachment to the certification of the
    defendant Joseph Natale is the order of June
    [eighteenth] of 2018. The paragraph [fifteen] of that
    indeed provides subject to the enforcement of the terms
    of the consent order, all complaints and/or
    counterclaims pled or which could have been pled, and
    any and all claims raised or which could have been
    raised by [plaintiff] against [defendant], and others in
    this action, in the action bearing docket number DC and
    the LT docket number, other than the attorney fee claim
    which is addressed in paragraph [eleven] above, shall
    be and same hereby are dismissed and released without
    cost to any party. The dismissal and release being with
    prejudice as to all claims substantively settled by the
    terms of the consent order and without prejudice to any
    other claims.
    Judge LeBlon also determined that defendants were entitled to attorney's
    fees in the amount of $27,012.57 based on plaintiff's violations of the lease
    agreement and consent order. He noted that:
    [a]ll of the actions taken by the defendants were in
    accordance with the agreements between the parties.
    There is no basis for the [c]ourt not to grant the
    attorney's fees. They were all incurred I find and [–]
    and I believe reasonably given the actions of the
    plaintiff.
    And indeed the argument that Mr. Zelley that was
    in his certification that the plaintiff never prevailed on
    A-0114-19
    9
    [–] the merits is accurate. [Plaintiff] was simply trying
    to delay the resolution of this matter and delay his
    removal from the property. I [–] I don't find any of his
    [–] his actions to be with merit. And indeed they were
    just simply to delay the ultimate resolution to this
    matter.
    Plaintiff now appeals and presents the following issues for our review.
    POINT I
    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY SUA SPONTE
    DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED VERIFIED
    COMPLAINT AND THEN LATER HOLDING THAT
    PLAINTIFF SETTLED HIS CLAIMS AGAINST THE
    LANDLORD DEFENDANTS.
    POINT II
    THE TRIAL COURT'S [JULY] 26, 2018 ENTRY OF
    JUDGMENT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
    RECORD, AND THE HEARING WAS A
    FUNDAMENTALLY UNFAIR PROCEEDING THAT
    VIOLATED PLAINTIFF'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS,
    AS WELL AS N.J.S.A. [] 2A:18-61.1.
    A. The Anti-Eviction Act prohibits a trial court
    from removing a tenant without strict compliance
    of The Act, and without first holding a trial and
    finding one of the grounds for eviction
    enumerated in N.J.S.A. [ ] 2A:18-61.1.
    B. It was improper for the trial judge to serve as
    a mediator for the case, and then turn around and
    assume the roles of fact finder and judge of the
    law.
    A-0114-19
    10
    POINT III
    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF
    LAW BY AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE
    LANDLORD WITHOUT FIRST HOLDING A TRIAL,
    HAVING EVIDENCE THAT THE TENANT
    BREACHED THE LEASE, AND FINDING THAT
    THE COUNSEL FEES CLAIMED BY THE
    LANDLORD WERE INCURRED AS A DIRECT
    RESULT OF THE TENANT'S BREACH(ES) OF ONE
    OR MORE OF THE LEASE PROVISIONS.
    POINT IV
    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DISCHARGING
    THE NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS BECAUSE THE
    CASE WAS NOT SETTLED.
    Plaintiff's arguments lack merit. We affirm.
    On May 15, 2018, faced with imminent eviction, plaintiff elected to settle
    the dispossession matter with his landlord rather than proceed to trial. At that
    juncture, plaintiff had limited options as a holdover tenant who was three months
    in arrears on his rent. Nor had he exercised his right to purchase the premises
    in July 2017 when the lease expired. Based on plaintiff's professed eagerness to
    purchase the property, however, the landlord agreed to afford plaintiff a limited
    opportunity to consummate the purchase of the townhouse.
    We reject plaintiff's argument that the court violated his procedural rights
    under the Anti-Eviction Act by terminating the contract and awarding defendant
    A-0114-19
    11
    possession. Having voluntarily executed the consent order memorializing the
    parties' settlement, plaintiff's right to possession was governed solely by the
    terms of that consent order. We treat settlement agreements like contracts,
    which are "to be enforced, as written, absent a demonstration of fraud or other
    compelling circumstances." Willingboro Mall, Ltd. v. 240/242 Franklin Ave.,
    L.L.C., 
    421 N.J. Super. 445
    , 451 (App. Div. 2011). The court did not err in
    enforcing the mortgage contingency provision of the order as written.
    Plaintiff next argues that the judge – having assisted the parties in reaching
    a settlement-in-principle and thereafter signing the consent order executed by
    the parties – was precluded from enforcing the settlement agreement. We are
    unpersuaded.
    Minkowitz v. Israeli, 
    433 N.J. Super. 111
    , 142, (App. Div. 2013), on
    which plaintiff relies, is factually inapposite.     In Minkowitz, an arbitrator
    appointed under the New Jersey Arbitration Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 to 2A:23B-
    32, assumed the role of mediator, wrote up a mediation agreement, then resumed
    the role of arbitrator and converted the mediation agreement into a binding
    arbitration award. In Minkowitz we reasoned a mediator could not later serve
    as an arbitrator because "the differences in the roles of these two types of dispute
    resolution professionals necessitate that a mediator, who may become privy to
    A-0114-19
    12
    party confidences in guiding disputants to a mediated resolution, cannot
    thereafter retain the appearance of a neutral factfinder necessary to conduct a
    binding arbitration proceeding." Minkowitz, 433 N.J. Super. at 142.
    In Kernahan v. Home Warranty Administrator of Florida, Inc., 
    236 N.J. 301
    , 323 (2019), the Supreme Court also addressed the differences between
    mediation and arbitration. The Court highlighted that "a mediator does not reach
    a final decision on the matter. Instead, the mediator, albeit remaining neutral,
    encourages the participants to resolve their differences and reach an agreement."
    
    Ibid.
     Conversely, "[t]he object of arbitration is the final disposition, in a speedy,
    inexpensive, expeditious, and perhaps less formal manner, of the controversial
    differences between the parties." Id. at 324 (quoting Hojnowski v. Vans Skate
    Park, 
    187 N.J. 323
    , 343 (2006)).
    Although both Minkowitz and Kernahan were specific to the context
    comparing the roles of a mediator and an arbitrator, and they did not address the
    role of a judge who participates in settlement discussions, we do not distinguish
    them on that basis. Indeed, Kernahan expressly stated that "[m]uch like a
    judicial factfinder, '[a]rbitrators essentially weigh evidence, assess credibility,
    and apply the law when determining whether a party has proven his or her
    request for relief.'" 
    Ibid.
     (quoting Minkowitz, 433 N.J. Super. at 144). We
    A-0114-19
    13
    conclude, however, that a critical factual distinction renders Minkowitz
    inapplicable.
    In this case, Judge LeBlon acted as "mediator" in conferencing about a
    possible settlement. When the case settled, there was no need for an "arbitrator,"
    or trial judge, to adjudicate the dispossession case, and Judge LeBlon did not act
    in that capacity.7 Rather, after the settlement, his sole role was to enforce the
    terms of the settlement to which the parties had agreed. We conclude that the
    judge's enforcement actions were entirely appropriate and reject plaintiff's
    assertions to the contrary.
    We also reject plaintiff's claim that he was deprived of due process
    because the judge agreed to hear the application on short notice. Judge LeBlon
    indicated that he was exercising his discretion pursuant to Rule 1:1-2 to hear the
    matter on short notice because the parties had been before him only ten days
    earlier, at which time plaintiff indicated that he had a firm mortgage
    commitment. Moreover, when asked, plaintiff could not identify any relevant
    evidence that would be forthcoming if he was afforded additional time to
    respond.
    7
    The prohibition on judges participating in failed settlement discussions and then
    participating as the trial judge is limited to bench trials. In a jury trial, the judge is
    not the factfinder, so the prohibition does not apply.
    A-0114-19
    14
    THE COURT: Let me just ask [plaintiff], what [–] what
    [–] what more do you need time for? You've been given
    an opportunity to be heard. You had notice and you're
    having a hearing. What [–] what more would you have
    done to prepare for this today?
    [PLAINTIFF]: I would have gotten all of the [–]
    emails, text messages [–]
    THE COURT: And you have all of them on your
    computer [–]
    [PLAINTIFF]: [–] from the landlord.
    THE COURT: [–] there that [–] yeah, you have in front
    [–]
    [PLAINTIFF]: [–] I have some [–]
    THE COURT: [–] of you; right?
    [PLAINTIFF]: [–] I have some of them.
    THE COURT: Okay.
    [PLAINTIFF]: Some of them I've saved screenshots of
    and they're in the [–] you know, I would have printed
    them out with – you know, with [–] with captions [–]
    with labels so that [–]
    THE COURT: And what would have been relevant?
    [PLAINTIFF]: It would have shown that the [–] that
    this is [–] this is how we've been [–] this is how the
    parties have been corresponding for the [–]
    THE COURT: Under the[–]
    [PLAINTIFF]: [–] past three years.
    A-0114-19
    15
    THE COURT: [–] terms of the lease, not [–] not [–] not
    under the terms of the contract.
    [PLAINTIFF]: Correct.
    The judge correctly determined that the proffered evidence, which relates
    to the parties' "course of conduct" over the three years preceding the settlement,
    has no relevance to whether plaintiff timely obtained a mortgage commitment.
    Rather, the correspondence relates to plaintiff's deductions from his rent over
    the years for various repairs to the townhouse. Plaintiff claims this shows he
    did not violate paragraph four of the consent order by unilaterally deducting the
    $597 for the microwave because making such deductions was routinely
    permitted under the lease.
    The judge, however, correctly noted that the terms and related practices
    under the lease did not govern. Rather, the terms of the consent order superseded
    the terms of the lease, and the order required timely payment without deductions.
    Regardless, the judge did not terminate the contract based on the deduction from
    the rent; rather, his decision was based entirely on plaintiff's indisputable failure
    to timely obtain a mortgage commitment.
    Plaintiff also argued that the emails would have shown he was under
    pressure to agree to the terms and that defendant "used the date" to leverage a
    settlement.
    A-0114-19
    16
    THE COURT: Okay; okay. Anything else that you
    would have brought with you [other than] the exhibits?
    What else?
    [PLAINTIFF]: The [–] well I would have brought the
    [–] something from my [–] my real estate attorney for
    my [–] who's doing the closing, with his negotiation[–]
    something with his correspondence with Mr. Zelley
    about the inspection report and the [–] also the red lined
    versions of the contract that went back and forth to
    show [–]
    THE COURT: And how would [–] how would that have
    been relevant?
    [PLAINTIFF]: To show that Mr. Zelley waited until the
    last minute and then used [–] used the [–] the date as a
    [–] as a means to [–] to [–] to force the contract, so that
    [–] because the consent order said that it had to be
    signed by June [first].
    THE COURT: Negotiations of the contract would not
    be relevant, so that [–] that wouldn't have made a
    difference here at all. Anything else? 8
    [PLAINTIFF]: Off the top of my head, no.
    [(2T38:2-40:2).]
    We agree with Judge LeBlon that the details of the settlement negotiations,
    which occurred between May 15 and June 16, are not relevant to whether
    8
    Moreover, the month-long negotiation belies any assertion that plaintiff was
    unduly pressured to settle. Rather, the record reflects that after a month of
    negotiations, defendant indicated it would make no further concessions. Had
    plaintiff not agreed with the final version, he could have opted to proceed to trial.
    A-0114-19
    17
    plaintiff timely obtained a mortgage. Further, because plaintiff failed to identify
    any relevant evidence that would be produced given additional time, the judge
    did not abuse his discretion by hearing the matter on short notice pursuant to
    Rule 1-1:2.9
    Plaintiff's argument that a trial must occur before attorney's fees may be
    awarded is without merit.          In Community Realty Management, Inc. for
    Wrightstown Arms Apartments v. Harris, the Supreme Court explained that:
    [i]t is clear that a tenant in New Jersey may
    contractually agree to pay reasonable legal fees related
    to an eviction. It is equally clear that New Jersey courts
    are required to enforce the provisions of a lease in the
    absence of contravening public policy.             Courts
    generally uphold provisions in leases calling for the
    payment of reasonable attorneys' fees. Courts also
    generally enforce provisions that define rent to include
    damages in absence of contravening public policy. The
    written lease, however, must expressly permit a
    landlord to recover reasonable attorney's fees in a
    summary       dispossess       proceeding     before     a
    landlord/tenant may consider those expenses as
    additional rent.
    [
    155 N.J. 212
    , 234 (1998) (citations omitted).]
    9
    Both parties supplemented the record with the parties' communications referenced
    by plaintiff. Because we find plaintiff's own proffer sufficient to justify the judge's
    proceeding on short notice, we find it unnecessary to discuss the contents at length.
    We note, however, that we observed nothing to contradict or undermine the judge's
    finding that neither the parties' course of conduct nor the settlement negotiations are
    relevant to whether plaintiff timely obtained a mortgage commitment.
    A-0114-19
    18
    Here, plaintiff and defendants clearly provided for payment of attorney's
    fees in the lease agreement. Specifically, paragraph ten states that "[t]he [t]enant
    is liable for all damages caused by the [t]enant's violation of any agreement in
    this lease. This includes reasonable attorney's fees and costs." Plaintiff, by
    virtue of the consent order, agreed to hold attorney's fees in abeyance. When
    plaintiff violated the terms of the consent order, the motion judge awarded
    defendants attorney's fees in accordance with paragraph eleven of the consent
    order. He determined that the attorney's fees sought by defendants were
    "warranted" and "fair and reasonable." The judge found, correctly, that all the
    fees were incurred in enforcing the terms of the lease, including defending
    against unsuccessful Orders to Show Cause and emergent applications to this
    court and the Supreme Court. We discern no error in the judge's award of
    attorney's fees.
    We conclude that plaintiff's argument that the case was not settled, as well
    as any of the parties' remaining arguments to the extent we have not addressed
    them, are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.
    See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
    Affirmed.
    A-0114-19
    19