GEORGE ADINOLFI VS. ANNELIE MULLEN (DC-010952-16, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2118-17T3
GEORGE ADINOLFI,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ANNELIE MULLEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Submitted January 16, 2019 – Decided February 4, 2019
Before Judges Currier and Mayer.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Middlesex County, Docket No.
DC-010952-16.
Annelie Mullen, appellant pro se.
George Adinolfi, respondent pro se.
PER CURIAM
Defendant Annelie Mullen appeals from a Special Civil Part order
awarding judgment in favor of plaintiff George Adinolfi in the amount of $4434,
representing the return of plaintiff's security deposit after doubling the sum
pursuant to the Security Deposit Act, N.J.S.A. 46:8-21.1, and attorney's fees.
We affirm.
The facts giving rise to this appeal are not complicated. Plaintiff leased a
single-family home from defendant pursuant to a written agreement. At the
expiration of the lease term, plaintiff demanded the return of his security deposit.
Defendant refused to return plaintiff's security deposit, claiming the right to
withhold the entire amount for damages to the leased premises during plaintiff's
tenancy. Defendant claimed plaintiff damaged the floors, failed to repair and
replace certain items, and stayed beyond the lease term.
Plaintiff filed suit to recover his security deposit. The matter was tried
before a Special Civil Part judge on February 27, 2017.
After hearing the testimony of the parties and considering the
documentary evidence, the judge determined plaintiff was entitled to the return
of a portion of his security deposit. The judge concluded that certain amounts
deducted by defendant from the security deposit, such as landscaping, power
washing of the patio, and replacement of a cork floor in the kitchen, amounted
to normal wear-and-tear and should not be categorized as damages caused by
plaintiff's occupancy of the premises.
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The judge also rejected defendant's assertion that she was entitled to a
doubling of the rent during plaintiff's holdover tenancy. He found defendant
allowed plaintiff to stay an extra two days beyond the lease term because
plaintiff needed additional time to remove his belongings. The judge calculated
rent for the additional two days amounted to $147 and deducted that sum from
plaintiff's security deposit.
Defendant also withheld money for the replacement of ceiling tiles and
light covers in the basement. The ceiling tiles were removed due to an
unpleasant odor caused by the prior tenant's pets. Plaintiff removed the tiles and
light covers, but never replaced the items during his tenancy despite agreeing to
do so. Defendant had to replace the ceiling tiles and light covers. The judge
reviewed emails reflecting defendant's intention to replace the tiles and light
covers and bill plaintiff for the cost. Instead of billing plaintiff, defendant
deducted the cost of these items from plaintiff's security deposit. He determined
this to be in accordance with the parties' intentions and therefore allowed
defendant to deduct $564 from plaintiff's security deposit.1
1
Based on defendant's testimony and evidence, the judge found the replacement
cost for the ceiling tiles was $507 and the cost for replacing the light covers was
$57.
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After reviewing photographs of damage to the hardwood floor near the
master bedroom, the judge permitted defendant to deduct the cost of repairing a
gouge in the floor in the amount of $300. Regarding the damage to the cork
floor in the kitchen, the judge noted cork is a soft surface and apt to wear quicker
than a hardwood floor. The judge allowed defendant to deduct $183,
representing the value of a six-year-old cork floor.
In total, the judge allowed defendant to deduct $1194 from plaintiff's
security deposit, finding plaintiff was entitled to $1006 of his total security
deposit. Applying the Security Deposit Act, which requires the doubling of a
security deposit improperly withheld by a landlord, the judge awarded the sum
of $2012, plus costs, for a total of $2094 to plaintiff. The judge instructed
plaintiff's counsel to file a separate application for attorney's fees and then
granted fees in the amount of $2340. 2 The total judgment entered against
defendant was $4434.
2
Plaintiff requested $3072 in attorney's fees, representing 7.2 hours of legal
time expended at $425 per hour, plus costs of $12. Defendant objected to the
award of attorney's fees, but did not challenge the number of hours or the hourly
rate. Based on counsel's certification in support of the fee award, the judge
assessed the legal tasks performed by counsel and the time expended, ultimately
awarding $100 less per hour than requested and rejecting the requested costs,
for a fee award in the amount of $2340.
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On appeal, defendant claims she presented evidence of the cost of the
materials related to the repairs, but failed to include the labor cost for the repair
work.3 Defendant argues the judge failed to consider all expenses incurred in
repairing damage to the property caused during plaintiff's tenancy. 4
"The scope of appellate review of a trial court's fact-finding function is
limited." Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011)
(quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998)). Ordinarily, the trial
court's findings "are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial,
credible evidence." Ibid. (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412). "[W]e do not disturb
the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless we are
convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the
competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests
of justice." In re Forfeiture of Pers. Weapons & Firearms Identification Card
Belonging to F.M., 225 N.J. 487, 506 (2016) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc.
3
Defendant attempted to introduce evidence of the labor costs associated with
the repairs in her motion for reconsideration. The judge denied the
reconsideration motion because the defendant failed to present those costs at the
time of trial.
4
Defendant also contends she lost money because she was unable to list the
house for sale when plaintiff vacated the premises. However, she fails to explain
in her merits brief why she was unable to list the house for sale. Moreover,
defendant never presented evidence at trial to support such a claim.
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v. Inv'rs Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). We defer to the trial judge's fact-
findings especially "when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves
questions of credibility." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412 (quoting In re Return of
Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 117 (1997)). "The trial court's legal
determinations, in contrast, are reviewed de novo." Sipko v. Koger, Inc., 214
N.J. 364, 379 (2013) (quoting Manalapan Realty, LP v. Twp. Comm. of
Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).
Here, the judge found plaintiff's testimony credible concerning the
purported damages to the leased premises when viewed with the photographs
submitted at trial. The court's decision accepting plaintiff's testimony and
rejecting defendant's testimony was within its fact-finding function.
Given our limited review, we are not convinced the judge's fact-findings
were so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant
and reasonably credible evidence in this case as to offend the interests of justice.
Rova Farms Resorts, Inc., 65 N.J. at 484. Having reviewed the record, we will
not disturb the court's judgment.
Affirmed.
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