STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. MOHAMED K. ELSAYED (15-02-0129, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1372-16T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MOHAMED K. ELSAYED,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________
Submitted January 8, 2019 – Decided January 31, 2019
Before Judge Fisher and Hoffman.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Passaic County, Indictment No. 15-02-0129.
Sethi and Mazaheri, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Reza
Mazaheri, on the brief).
Camelia M. Valdes, Passaic County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Christopher W. Hsieh, Chief
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
While awaiting sentencing, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his
guilty plea, after he learned of reports of misconduct involving an important
witness for the State. In this appeal, defendant challenges the denial of his
motion. Because we conclude the trial judge mistakenly exercised his
discretion, we reverse the order denying defendant's motion to withdraw his
guilty plea and remand for further proceedings.
I
On February 26, 2015, a grand jury indicted defendant, charging him with
1) fourth-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS),
(marijuana), N. J. S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(3); 2) third-degree possession of CDS with
the intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and 2C:35-5(b)(11); 3) third-
degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute within 1000 feet of school
property, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7; 4) third-degree possession of CDS (MDMA),1
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1); and 5) second-degree possession of CDS (MDMA),
with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1).
The charges arose from a traffic stop, where defendant was the driver of
the vehicle stopped, and his co-defendant was a passenger. According to
1
MDMA, or methylenedioxymethamphetamine, is a CDS commonly known by
the street names Ecstasy or Molly.
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defendant, following the stop, "I insisted to the officer that they would find
nothing in the car and invited him to search it." In the consent search that
followed, police discovered CDS inside a hidden compartment in the vehicle.
On February 26, 2016, defendant pleaded guilty to fourth-degree
possession of a CDS (marijuana) and third-degree possession of CDS (MDMA),
pursuant to a plea agreement;2 under the agreement, the State agreed to
recommend dismissal of the remaining charges — the three distribution counts.
According to defendant, in advance of his plea hearing, his attorney reviewed
all discovery with him and discussed potential defenses:
One piece of evidence that was provided to my
attorney at that time was the lab report[3] that was
prepared and certified by Kamalkant Shah. At the time,
my attorney and I believed the content of the report to
be true and accurate and difficult to challenge.
Some time after my guilty plea, it was discovered
that Mr. Shah had been removed from his position and
disciplined for falsifying lab results in CDS related
cases.[4]
2
The plea agreement was contingent upon both defendant and co-defendant
pleading guilty.
3
The report reviewed was dated September 24, 2014.
4
Shah was a forensic scientist in the State Police crime lab. According to the
trial judge, Shah "had been conducting what is known as 'dry labbing'" where he
"failed to test and subsequently falsified lab results. . . ."
A-1372-16T2
3
On June 28, 2016, the Passaic County Prosecutor's Office provided
defendant's counsel with the results of a second laboratory report, this one dated
June 16, 2016, regarding testing conducted by a different lab analyst. This
second report indicated the items analyzed tested positive for marijuana and
Ecstasy, consistent with the first report; however, upon reviewing the second
report, defendant's counsel discovered discrepancies between the two laboratory
reports regarding the weights of the substances analyzed.
On August 26, 2016, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
Defendant's attorney argued that withdrawal of the plea was warranted "based
on newly discovered evidence." In a supporting certification, defendant stated,
Although I was not guilty as charged, I decided
to accept the plea offer because I am not a [U.S.]
citizen. Based on information at the time, I understood
that although my conviction would have immigration
consequences, the risk of deportation would not be as
great as being convicted of a crime related to the sale
of CDS. For this reason I did not want to take I did not
want to risk taking the case to trial;
In reality, I was not responsible over the items
found in the car on the date. I had no knowledge that
such items were present. I insisted to the officer that
they would find nothing in the car and invited them to
search. Any items they found were not in the area I was
sitting. I told the officers that the discovered items
were not mine but must have belonged to the passenger.
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4
Defense counsel argued that withdrawal of the plea was warranted under
the four-prong analysis established in State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145, 150 (2009).5
On October 28, 2016, the court denied defendant's motion, and sentenced
defendant to an aggregate three-year prison term, in accordance with defendant's
plea agreement. This appeal followed.
On appeal, defendant raises the following argument for our consideration:
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO DENY
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS
GUILTY PLEA WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
II
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is committed to the judge's sound
discretion. Id. at 156. That discretion should ordinarily be exercised liberally
where the motion is made before sentencing. Ibid. "In a close case, the 'scales
should usually tip in favor of defendant.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Taylor, 80 N.J.
353, 365 (1979)).
5
Under this analysis, the trial judge must consider and balance four factors:
"(1) whether the defendant has asserted a colorable claim of innocence; (2) the
nature and strength of defendant's reasons for withdrawal; (3) the existence of a
plea bargain; and (4) whether withdrawal would result in unfair prejudice to the
State or unfair advantage to the accused." Id. at 157-58. "No single Slater factor
is dispositive; 'if one is missing, that does not automatically disqualify or dictate
relief.'" State v. McDonald, 211 N.J. 4, 16-17 (2012) (quoting Slater, 198 N.J.
at 162).
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5
In an oral decision, the trial judge reviewed the Slater factors. The judge
found that defendant failed to assert a colorable claim of innocence because he
"was driving the vehicle in which the CDS was found." While the judge
acknowledged "the CDS was found inside a hidden floor compartment in the
vehicle," he concluded defendant "had constructive possession, if not actual
possession of the seized CDS, which negates [his] claim that it solely belonged
to his co-defendant." In addition, the judge minimized the significance of Shah's
misconduct because of the second test results, which confirmed the items seized
tested positive for marijuana and Ecstasy. The judge determined the remaining
Slater factors did not favor defendant's motion to withdraw his plea.
"Although the ordinary 'abuse of discretion' standard defies precise
definition, it arises when a decision is 'made without a rational explanation,
inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible
basis.'" Flagg v. Essex Cty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (quoting
Achacos-Sanchez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 779 F.2d 1260, 1265
(7th Cir. 1985)). We find that to be the case here.
In reaching the conclusion that defendant failed to assert a colorable claim
of innocence, the trial judge inexplicably failed to consider that defendant
openly invited the police to search the car and that upon discovery of the alleged
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contraband in the car, he immediately insisted that his co-defendant was
responsible for the presence of the contraband. In addition, the judge mistakenly
minimized the significance of Shah's misconduct, and failed to acknowledge the
potential adverse impact for the State's case created by the discrepancy in the
weights of the tested items between the first and second tests.
We are satisfied that evidence of Shah's misconduct is admissible and
relevant to defendant's guilt or innocence. In this regard,
Our Supreme Court has held that "a lower standard of
degree of similarity of offenses may justly be required
of a defendant using other-crimes evidence defensively
than is exacted from the State when such evidence is
used incriminitorily." State v. Garfole, 76 N.J. 445, 452
(1978). In that respect, the Court emphasized that "an
accused is entitled to advance in his defense any
evidence which may rationally tend to refute his guilt
or buttress his innocence of the charge made." Id. at
453. Application of a modified requirement of
relevancy to the proffer by a defendant "is additionally
justified by the consideration that the [accused] need
only engender reasonable doubt of his guilt whereas the
State must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
Ibid.; see also State v. Williams, 214 N.J. Super. 12, 20-
21 (App. Div. 1986).
[State v. Dickerson, 268 N.J. Super. 33, 36-37 (App.
Div. 1993).]
As we previously noted in State v. Landano, "in an unbroken line of
decisions, our courts have held that the pendency of charges or an investigation
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relating to a prosecution witness is an appropriate topic for cross-examination."
271 N.J. Super. 1, 40 (App. Div. 1994). In fact, our Supreme Court has held,
"Due process requires that the State disclose information it possesses which is
material to the defense, even where it concerns only the credibility of a State's
witness." State v. Spano, 69 N.J. 231, 235 (1976).
We are satisfied the Law Division judge mistakenly determined that
defendant did not assert a colorable claim of innocence. This error in turn
caused the judge to mistakenly exercise his discretion when he denied
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Accordingly, we reverse the
order under review and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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