STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JULIO A. ROSARIO (11-09-1603, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2257-17T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JULIO A. ROSARIO, a/k/a
JULIO SANTOS,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________
Submitted January 15, 2019 – Decided January 31, 2019
Before Judges Fisher and Geiger.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Bergen County, Indictment No. 11-09-1603.
Parsekian & Solomon, PC, attorneys for appellant
(Melvin R. Solomon, on the brief).
Dennis Calo, Acting Bergen County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Ian C. Kennedy, Special
Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor,
of counsel and on the brief; John J. Scaliti, Legal
Assistant, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Julio A. Rosario appeals from a December 8, 2017 order
denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary
hearing. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for an evidentiary
hearing.
I.
On June 11, 2011, defendant brandished a kitchen knife while attempting
to rob three customers of a pizzeria of their cellular phones. A grand jury
indicted him for first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-l; third-degree possession
of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d); and fourth-degree
unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d).
Defendant is not a citizen of the United States. He is a native and citizen
of the Dominican Republic. Defendant was admitted to the United States in
1983 as a legal permanent resident. He is now fifty-three years old. This was
his first criminal offense.
Defendant is not fluent in English; an interpreter was used during his court
appearances. Defendant asserts he has diminished mental capacity and suffers
from severe mental illness. He dropped out of school after the eighth grade.
Defendant was found incompetent to stand trial in July 2012. An April
2013 reevaluation found him competent to stand trial. The reevaluation report
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states defendant was diagnosed with Schizoaffective Disorder, depressed type
and was treated with antipsychotic and antidepressant medications. 1
On July 7, 2014, defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement,
pleading guilty to an amended charge of second-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-
l, in exchange for a recommendation he be sentenced as a third-degree offender
to a three-year prison term under the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2,
and dismissal of the remaining charges.
On September 12, 2014, defendant was sentenced in accordance with the
negotiated plea agreement. He did not file a direct appeal of his conviction or
sentence. Because he had accrued 1045 days credit for time served, defendant
was eligible for immediate release. Defendant was subsequently detained by
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) because he is subject to
mandatory deportation as a result of his robbery conviction, which constituted
an aggravated felony under federal immigration law because he was sentenced
to a term of imprisonment greater than one year. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(G),
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
1
The report explains "[i]ndividuals with Schizoaffective Disorder have an
impaired sense of reality. Symptoms may include: fixed, false beliefs
(delusions), impaired sensory perceptions (hallucinations), bizarre affect,
disorganized speech, disordered thought processes, and bizarre behavior."
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In July 2017, defendant moved to vacate his guilty plea or to modify his
sentence from a three-year term to 364 days, claiming his guilty plea was not
made knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently because trial counsel did not
explain the effect of pleading guilty to an aggravated felony or the probability
of automatic deportation. In his supporting affidavit, defendant states: "At no
time either before I entered the plea or at the time of the plea were the
immigration consequences of the plea explained to me or was I told to speak to
an attorney familiar with immigration law or given an opportunity to do so." He
further states he was not aware of the "sharp difference in the immigration
consequences of . . . accepting a three-year sentence or agreeing to a sentence
of 364 days." He claims he did not understand a three-year sentence exposed
him "to almost certain removal while a sentence of less than one year . . . would
have no immigration consequences."
Defendant also addressed his responses to questions on the plea form:
My response to these questions must be evaluated
in light of my limited education and my mental
capacity. It was never explained to me that the length
of my sentence rather than the crime would affect my
immigration status. In fact on the Plea Form which is
attached as Exhibit D, several of the questions relating
to the immigration consequences of the plea are not
answered or overwritten. For example there is no reply
to the question "Do you understand that if you are not
a citizen of the United States, this guilty plea may result
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in your removal from the United States and/or stop you
from being able to legally enter or re-enter the United
States." As to the question 17[e] as to whether or not I
would like to speak to immigration attorney about the
consequences of the plea there is no response as the
circled "No" is crossed out.
Defendant contends he never received advice from an attorney familiar
with the nuances of immigration law and the different sentencing alternatives
available. He also emphasizes that the plea hearing judge did not tell him that
he should speak to an immigration attorney before accepting the plea or that his
deportation was virtually assured while a lesser sentence would have no
immigration consequences.
Following oral argument, the PCR court issued a written opinion denying
defendant's petition. This appeal followed.
Defendant argues:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR POST
CONVICTION RELIEF WITHOUT AFFORDING
HIM AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING AS HE WAS
ENTITLED TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA ON
THE BASIS OF RECEIVING INEFFECTIVE
COUNSEL REGARDING THE IMMIGRATION
CONSEQUENCES ARISING FROM HIS PLEA
AGREEMENT.
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POINT II
IN ADDITION TO VACATING THE GUILTY PLEA,
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE SENTENCE SHOULD
BE MODIFIED TO THREE HUNDRED SIXTY
FOUR (364) DAYS AS THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
BY NOT RULING ON THE MOTION TO RE
SENTENCE.
II.
Under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a criminal
defendant is guaranteed the effective assistance of legal counsel in his defense.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To establish a deprivation
of that right, a convicted defendant must satisfy the two-part test enunciated in
Strickland by demonstrating that: (1) counsel's performance was deficient, and
(2) the deficient performance actually prejudiced the accused's defense. Id. at
687; accord State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987) (adopting the Strickland two-
part test in New Jersey).
When a guilty plea is involved, a defendant must satisfy two criteria to set
aside the plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Nunez-Valdez,
200 N.J. 129, 139 (2009). The defendant must demonstrate that "(i) counsel's
assistance was not 'within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases'; and (ii) 'that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have pled guilty and would have
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insisted on going to trial.'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting State v.
DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994)).
The "defendant satisfie[s] the prejudice prong of the ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel analysis by showing that he would not have pled guilty
but for inaccurate information from counsel concerning the deportation
consequences of his plea." Nunez-Valdez, 200 N.J. at 143. Counsel's duty is
not limited to avoiding false or misleading information. The prejudice prong is
also satisfied if counsel fails to inform a defendant entering a guilty plea of the
relevant law pertaining to mandatory deportation. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S.
356, 369 (2010).2
If "the law is not succinct and straightforward," then counsel "need do no
more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a
risk of adverse immigration consequences." Ibid. "However, where the 'terms
of the relevant immigration statute are succinct, clear and explicit in defining
the removal consequence,' then an attorney is obliged to be 'equally clear.'"
State v. Blake, 444 N.J. Super. 285, 295 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting Padilla, 559
U.S. at 368-69). Consequently, "an attorney's failure to advise a noncitizen
2
The PCR court erred by not applying the standard adopted in Padilla even
though the plea hearing occurred several years after the decision in Padilla was
issued.
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client that a guilty plea will lead to mandatory deportation deprives the client of
the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment." State
v. Barros, 425 N.J. Super. 329, 331 (App. Div. 2012) (citing Padilla, 559 U.S.
at 369); see also State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 380, (2012) (noting criminal
defense counsel must "point out to a noncitizen client that he or she is pleading
to a mandatorily removable offense"). Counsel must also instruct clients to seek
immigration counseling. Gaitan, 209 N.J. at 381.
Here, defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree robbery and was
sentenced to a three-year prison term. The immigration consequences of this
aggravated felony conviction mandate removal. Because the deportation
consequences are truly clear, defendant's attorney was obliged to provide advice
that was equally clear. Other than defendant's affidavit, the record before us
does not indicate what, if any, advice counsel gave defendant regarding the
mandatory deportation consequences of his plea, or whether counsel instructed
defendant to seek immigration counseling.
Although we recognize the colloquy between the court and defendant at
the plea hearing briefly addressed the immigration consequences of his plea, the
colloquy was not a sufficient substitute for appropriate advice from defendant's
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counsel, especially given his mental health issues, alleged diminished mental
capacity, limited education, and need for an interpreter.
Thus, an evidentiary hearing is necessary to determine: (1) the advice
given by defense counsel, or the lack thereof, regarding the immigration
consequences of the plea; (2) whether any potential misadvice was clarified by
the exchange with the court during the plea colloquy, such that defendant
understood the immigration consequences of his plea; and (3) whether counsel
instructed defendant to seek immigration counseling. Accordingly, we reverse
and remand for an evidentiary hearing.
Following the evidentiary hearing, the Law Division judge shall make
findings and conclusions regarding each of these issues and determine if counsel
was ineffective.
In light of our ruling, we do not reach Point II regarding the denial of
defendant's application to modify his sentence to 364 days.
Reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
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