STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. CLAUDE L. WALLACE (17-06-0425 AND 17-06-0426, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-1479-20
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    CLAUDE L. WALLACE,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Argued November 29, 2021 – Decided December 13, 2021
    Before Judges Sabatino and Natali.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Union County, Indictment Nos. 17-06-0425
    and 17-06-0426.
    Robert Carter Pierce argued the cause for appellant.
    Milton S. Leibowitz, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the
    cause for respondent (William A. Daniel, Union County
    Prosecutor, attorney; Milton S. Liebowitz, of counsel
    and on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    After the trial court denied his motion to suppress a firearm police seized
    from him during a traffic stop, defendant Claude L. Wallace pled guilty to
    second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1). The
    trial court sentenced him to a five-year custodial term, subject to a forty-two-
    month parole ineligibility period.
    Pursuant to Rule 3:5-7(d), defendant appeals the suppression denial. He
    argues that under search-and-seizure case law, the police were not entitled to
    seize the handgun without a warrant in the circumstances presented. As a related
    argument, defendant asserts the trial court erred in disallowing him from calling
    an additional police officer as a witness at the suppression hearing. We affirm.
    I.
    The following facts germane to these issues emerged at the suppression
    hearing.
    On February 1, 2017, defendant was driving his Nissan Murano and ran a
    red light at the intersection of Lincoln Drive and Boulevard in Kenilworth. He
    was pulled over by Sergeant Michael Scanielo of the Kenilworth Police
    Department. Before approaching defendant's car, Sergeant Scanielo searched a
    computer database and learned that defendant's vehicle registration was expired.
    A-1479-20
    2
    The sergeant walked to the passenger side door of defendant's car and
    spent four to five minutes speaking with him. 1 According to the sergeant's
    testimony, he told defendant he smelled "raw marijuana," and defendant
    responded his girlfriend had smoked marijuana in the car earlier. The sergeant
    told defendant the smell gave him probable cause to conduct a search of the car.
    The sergeant walked around the back of the car to get to the driver's side.
    As described by the sergeant, defendant then reached into the center console of
    his vehicle, grabbed an "object," then opened the door and fled. The sergeant
    and Patrolman Ryan Kernan, who was also at the scene, ran after defendant,
    tackled him, and apprehended him. During a search of defendant's person and
    the immediate area, the officers recovered and seized a Ruger LCP .380 caliber
    handgun.
    A subsequent inventory search of the car at the roadside by Officer
    Matthew Torre uncovered in the center console a closed plastic cannister
    1
    Much of the sequence of events was filmed from a police "dash-cam" mobile
    video recorder, which was provided to the trial court before the suppression
    hearing. At our request, appellate counsel supplied this video exhibit and we
    have viewed it as part of our consideration of the issues.
    A-1479-20
    3
    containing four small bags of marijuana. 2 The canister was eventually lost while
    in police custody.
    Defendant      was thereafter    charged with second-degree unlawful
    possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1); fourth-degree prohibited
    weapons and devices, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(f)(2); and third-degree resisting arrest
    and eluding an officer, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(2).
    Defendant moved to suppress the gun, arguing that the police's warrantless
    seizure of that evidence violated both the Fourth Amendment of the United
    States Constitution as well as the New Jersey Constitution. Although he did not
    contest the legality of the initial traffic stop, defendant argued the police had no
    probable cause to search the car, and that it was improper for the sergeant to tell
    him he had the grounds to conduct such a search. As part of that argument,
    defendant contended it was physically impossible for the sergeant to have
    smelled raw marijuana emanating from the car, because the only marijuana
    2
    The video includes about four seconds of footage in which Officer Torre
    appears to be carrying the plastic container out of the car and walking away with
    it. The confiscation of the container is also noted in Officer Torre's
    supplemental investigation report, which was part of the submissions to the
    motion judge. See State v. Bacome, 440. N.J. Super. 228, 239-40 (App. Div.
    2015), rev'd on other grounds, 
    228 N.J. 94
     (2017) (allowing hearsay evidence to
    be considered by the court in connection with pretrial admissibility hearings);
    see also Manata v. Pereira, 
    436 N.J. Super. 330
    , 345 (App. Div. 2014) (applying
    the hearsay exceptions for business records and public records to police reports).
    A-1479-20
    4
    present was packed away in the closed plastic container in the console.
    Defendant further argued the police unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop and
    thereby infringed unduly on his freedom of movement.3
    The State, in turn, argued that probable cause was supported by the
    sergeant's testimony recounting the "plain smell" of marijuana when he
    approached the car.    Moreover, regardless of whether probable cause of a
    marijuana offense existed, defendant had no right to flee from the car, let alone
    while carrying a handgun. Because of that unauthorized flight during a motor
    vehicle stop, the police had the authority to apprehend defendant and to search
    his person incident to that arrest. The State further asserted the police, upon
    arresting defendant, were justified in searching the interior of the car pursuant
    to State v. Witt, 
    223 N.J. 409
    , 447-48 (2015).
    The motion judge considered the testimony of Sergeant Scanielo at the
    suppression hearing and found his account to be credible. In his oral opinion
    dated January 21, 2020, the judge concluded that the sergeant's smelling of
    marijuana constituted probable cause to permit him to conduct a search of the
    car, but that defendant's flight prevented him from being able to do so. The
    3
    Responding to an argument made by defendant's trial counsel, the judge found
    no racial issue of consequence in the case.
    A-1479-20
    5
    judge found "there was no search conducted [] until after Mr. Wallace ran from
    his vehicle, was apprehended, and found with a gun" and that the defense's
    argument would be stronger if Wallace had "remained in the – in the car and
    [the officers] then searched the vehicle and found the marijuana and then he
    [ran]."
    The motion judge declined to allow defendant to call Officer Torre as a
    witness at the hearing.      Defendant proffered that Officer Torre would
    corroborate that an odor of marijuana could not have been detected through the
    what his counsel characterized as an "air-tight" plastic container, and therefore
    the sergeant's assertion that he smelled marijuana was untruthful. The judge
    discerned no need for Officer Torre's testimony, noting the court already had his
    written report describing how the marijuana was packaged when he discovered
    it in defendant's car.   In addition, the judge had the sergeant's testimony
    providing an alternative source of the marijuana odor, i.e., defendant's statement
    that his girlfriend had smoked marijuana in the car at an earlier time.
    After losing the suppression motion, defendant entered into a plea
    agreement with the State admitting his guilt of the second-degree weapons
    offense. The remaining charges were dismissed pursuant to the agreement. The
    A-1479-20
    6
    sentence imposed by the court was consistent with the plea agreement, and it is
    not challenged on appeal.
    II.
    On appeal, defendant presents the following arguments in his brief:
    POINT I:
    THE TRIAL COURT DEPRIVED MR. WALLACE OF
    HIS DUE PROCESS AND COMPULSORY PROCESS
    CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BY ORDERING THAT
    MR. WALLACE WAS PROHIBITED FROM
    CALLING OFFICER TORRE AS A DEFENSE
    WITNESS AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING, WHO
    WOULD HAVE PRESENTED EVIDENCE AND
    TESTIMONY    THAT   THE   PLAIN  SMELL
    EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
    WAS NOT APPLICABLE.
    POINT II:
    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY RULING THAT
    THE STATE HAD MET THEIR BURDEN OF PROOF
    THAT THE "SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST"
    EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
    WAS ESTABLISHED.
    In considering these arguments on appeal, we adhere to well settled
    principles. We must sustain a trial court's factual findings from a suppression
    hearing, so long as they are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the
    record. State v. Nelson, 
    237 N.J. 540
    , 551 (2019). That said, a trial court's
    A-1479-20
    7
    interpretation of the law and the legal "consequences that flow from established
    facts" are reviewed de novo. State v. Gamble, 
    218 N.J. 412
    , 425 (2014).
    Analytically, the first issue to address is whether the recovery of the gun
    incidental to defendant's arrest after fleeing from the car stop was constitutional,
    regardless of any events that preceded it.       It is well established that law
    enforcement officials may conduct a warrantless search of a person incident to
    that person's arrest if there was probable cause to arrest that person before the
    search. See Chimel v. California, 
    395 U.S. 752
    , 762-63 (1969). Probable cause
    to arrest exists when the totality of the facts and circumstances presented to the
    arresting officer would support "a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief
    that an offense has been or is being committed." State v. Sims, 
    75 N.J. 337
    , 354
    (1978) (quoting Draper v. United States, 
    358 U.S. 307
    , 313 (1959)).
    In this case, the police witnessed defendant flee from a concededly lawful
    motor vehicle stop before it was duly completed. Even if a person thinks, and a
    court later concludes, that police officers have no right to detain or search the
    driver, the law prohibits the driver from disregarding the police fleeing from the
    officers before, while, or after the officers complete their investigatory
    functions. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 
    192 N.J. 1
    , 11-13 (2007) (discussing the
    obstructing administration of law statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1); State v. Crawley,
    A-1479-20
    8
    
    187 N.J. 443
    , 460-62 (2006) (same); State v. Seymour, 
    289 N.J. Super. 80
    , 87
    (App. Div. 1996) (discussing the resisting arrest and eluding an officer statute,
    N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2).
    An officer's first-hand observation of a criminal act constitutes probable
    cause for the purposes of arresting the offender. See Maryland v. Pringle, 
    540 U.S. 366
    , 371-72 (2003); State v. O'Neal, 
    190 N.J. 601
    , 613 (2007). Because
    the officers in this case witnessed defendant violate numerous statutes by fleeing
    from the roadside stop, they had probable cause to arrest defendant and perform
    a search incident to the arrest.
    A search incident to arrest cannot exceed the arrestee's person and the area
    "within his immediate control." Chimel, 
    395 U.S. at 763
    . Here, the gun was
    recovered from underneath defendant after he was tackled to the ground, clearly
    "within his area of immediate control" from which he could possibly use it
    against the officers. This is the precise justification for the search incident to
    arrest rule. 
    Id. at 762-63
    . For these reasons, the search incident to arrest which
    resulted in the confiscation of the gun was manifestly constitutional.
    Defendant argues the events that preceded his arrest were unconstitutional
    and thereby tainted the constitutionality of the events that followed. To be sure,
    an otherwise-constitutional arrest or recovery of evidence may, at times, be
    A-1479-20
    9
    deemed unconstitutional if it is preceded by constitutional violations. See, e.g.,
    State v. Chisum, 
    236 N.J. 530
    , 551 (2019); State v. Rodriguez, 
    172 N.J. 117
    ,
    132-33 (2002).     The arrest may be invalidated and the evidence may be
    suppressed, unless one of the exceptions to the exclusionary rule applies. State
    v. Badessa, 
    185 N.J. 303
    , 311 (2005) (referencing Wong Sun v. United States,
    
    371 U.S. 471
    , 485 (1963)).
    As we have noted, defendant fled from what began as a constitutional stop,
    based on the sergeant's reasonable suspicion that he had committed a traffic
    violation. State v. Carty, 
    170 N.J. 632
    , 647, modified on other grounds, 
    174 N.J. 351
     (2002).
    Defendant further argues the police unconstitutionally prolonged the
    motor vehicle stop by conversing with him for a period of less than five minutes.
    We are unpersuaded that such a brief passage of time amounted to an
    unreasonable restriction on his freedom of movement. The police were entitled
    to take at least that modest amount of time to investigate defendant's driving and
    expired license violations before issuing him the corresponding traffic tickets.
    It is clear such reasonable suspicion existed and the stop was valid. Even
    so, defendant contends the sergeant's alleged detection of the odor of marijuana
    coming from the car, during the course of that valid stop, was patently false.
    A-1479-20
    10
    Consequently, he argues the sergeant's proclamation that he had a right to search
    the car based on the "plain smell" of marijuana was pretextual, thereby making
    the ensuing search of his person unconstitutional.
    As of the time this motor vehicle stop occurred in 2017, a police officer's
    detection of the "plain smell" of marijuana could suffice to furnish probable
    cause to conduct a warrantless search of a motor vehicle. See, e.g., State v.
    Nishina, 
    175 N.J. 502
    , 515-17 (2003). Since that time, the Legislature has
    substantially curtailed that justification, in a statute that became effective on
    February 22, 2021.4
    In any event, we need not resolve for purposes of the constitutional
    analysis whether the sergeant could, or could not have, smelled marijuana
    emanating from the car. That is because the illegal flight of defendant from the
    scene broke the chain of events and attenuated any alleged police impropriety.
    4
    The smell of marijuana is no longer deemed sufficient to constitute reasonable
    articulable suspicion of a crime, except in limited circumstances. N.J.S.A.
    2C:35-10(c). In 2021, Governor Murphy signed into law the New Jersey
    Cannabis Regulatory, Enforcement Assistance, and Marketplace Modernization
    Act, which, among other things, partially legalized the "possessing" and
    "transporting" of small quantities of cannabis. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a). Under the
    new statute, the smell of marijuana alone will not be sufficient grounds for a
    police officer to search a civilian's motor vehicle. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(c).
    However, the statute's effective date in 2021 was years after the 2017 search in
    this case, and defendant has not argued it applies retroactively here.
    A-1479-20
    11
    One of the recognized exceptions to the exclusionary rule is the
    attenuation doctrine. That doctrine applies when a certain (often momentous)
    event occurs, or a long period of time passes, between the constitutional
    violation and the recovery of the evidence, so as to conclude the "taint" of the
    constitutional violation has dissipated. See State v. Herrerra, 
    211 N.J. 308
    , 330-
    38 (2012).
    To determine whether evidence is "attenuated" for the purpose of
    introducing it against a defendant, courts must consider: "(1) the temporal
    proximity between the illegal conduct and the challenged evidence; (2) the
    presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the flagrancy and purpose of the
    [alleged] police misconduct." 
    Id. at 331
     (quoting State v. Johnson, 
    118 N.J. 639
    ,
    653 (1990)).
    A defendant's attack upon or flight from a law enforcement officer
    constitutes an intervening circumstance that can make alleged earlier
    constitutional violations sufficiently attenuated from the recovery of the
    challenged evidence. See, e.g., 
    id. at 336-37
     (deeming defendant's violent attack
    upon a police officer who pulled him over and ordered him out of the car an
    intervening circumstance that dissipated the taint of any possible illegality of
    the original stop); Williams, 
    192 N.J. at 10
     (finding defendant's resistance and
    A-1479-20
    12
    flight from an officer after he was stopped on the street purged the taint of any
    unconstitutional stop, and attenuated the post-flight recovery of a gun on his
    person).
    Defendant's sudden flight from the police, who had yet to complete his
    motor vehicle stop and issue traffic tickets, was a quintessential superseding
    event for the purposes of the attenuation doctrine. It severed the link between
    any alleged preceding unconstitutional conduct and the later recovery of the gun
    during the search incident to arrest.
    Although the temporal proximity of the events was certainly close, the
    abrupt flight of defendant—armed with a handgun that could have harmed the
    officers—was a momentous, intervening circumstance that satisfies the
    attenuation doctrine.    In addition, we are unpersuaded that the alleged
    impossibility that the sergeant could have smelled marijuana—even if it had
    been proven, contrary to the trial judge's factual findings—was sufficiently
    flagrant to delegitimatize the officer's pursuit and apprehension of the fleeing
    defendant and the confiscation of his weapon. We also note that the key focus
    of the motion in this case was to suppress the gun rather than the marijuana
    found in the car.
    A-1479-20
    13
    We do not take lightly defendant's concern that he may have been the
    object of racial stereotyping, and take note of his brief's generic allusion to
    "nationwide civil unrest over police-community relations." But the record in
    this case, at least as it was developed in the trial court, lacks an adequate
    evidential basis and particularized findings to compel relief on those exceptional
    grounds.5
    In sum, the officers' warrantless seizure of defendant's handgun under the
    circumstances presented here was constitutional. We affirm the trial court's
    decision, albeit for slightly different reasons than the judge articulated. See El-
    Sioufi v. St. Peter's Univ. Hosp., 
    382 N.J. Super. 145
    , 169 (App. Div. 2005)
    (noting "that a correct result, even if predicated on an erroneous basis in fact or
    in law, will not be overturned on appeal").
    5
    We do, however, repudiate the suggestion made by the State at oral argument
    that it can be constitutionally acceptable for a police officer to deliberately lie
    to a motorist to effectuate a warrantless search of the motorist or his vehicle.
    Although case law under the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination doctrine
    tolerates some degree of deception during the course of a police interrogation,
    see State v. L.H., 
    239 N.J. 22
    , 44 (2019), we are aware of no comparable
    authority under Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure jurisprudence, and
    counsel cited none. Nor do we adopt defendant's argument in his brief that the
    sergeant was obligated to provide him with Miranda warnings when they were
    conversing through the car window; defendant was not at that point in custo dy,
    but instead was the subject of an ongoing motor vehicle stop. Miranda v.
    Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    , 444 (1966) (specifying warnings required for "custodial"
    police interrogations).
    A-1479-20
    14
    As a final matter, given the foregoing analysis, we are not convinced the
    trial court deprived defendant of due process or abused its discretion in declining
    to have Officer Torre called to the witness stand. His anticipated testimony
    about the container found in the console would have had only limited relevance.
    It would not refute the legitimacy of the other officers' apprehension of
    defendant once he chose to run from the scene. The judge already had Officer
    Torre's police report describing the cannister, albeit without commenting on its
    smell, if any, as well as video footage. The court had the discretion to curtail
    testimony that would be, in essence, largely, if not entirely, cumulative of that
    report. N.J.R.E. 403.
    Affirmed.
    A-1479-20
    15