D.J. VS. T.L. (FD-03-1274-14, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1378-17T3
D.J.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
T.L.,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________
Submitted December 4, 2018 – Decided January 9, 2019
Before Judges Geiger and Firko.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Burlington County,
Docket No. FD-03-1274-14.
Felsenfeld & Clopton, PC, attorneys for appellant
(Howard L. Felsenfeld, on the brief).
Martone Law Group, LLC, attorneys for respondent
(Kelli M. Martone, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant T.L., 1 father, appeals from an October 4, 2017 order modifying
the parenting time schedule for the parties' son, K.L.,2 arguing there was no
plenary hearing or finding of a substantial change of circumstances to warrant
the modification. After consideration of the record and relevant law, we affirm.
I.
A brief dating relationship between the parties resulted in the birth of their
son, K.L., now five years old. Before K.L. was born, the parties separated and
never lived together as a family. In response to a non-dissolution application
filed by plaintiff D.J., K.L.'s mother, defendant filed a cross-application seeking
custody and parenting time. On August 13, 2014, a prior judge noted that:
"[d]efendant seeks reconsideration of support order and split custody[.]"3 That
judge ruled as follows:
Based upon sworn testimony, parties granted joint legal
custody with [p]laintiff designated Parent of Primary
Residence (PPR) and [d]efendant designated Parent of
Alternate Residence (PAR). Defendant's parenting
1
We use initials to protect the identity of the parties and the minor child.
2
K.L.'s date of birth is December 26, 2013.
3
This prior order is not a part of this record. Based upon our review of the
record before us, the reference to "split" custody is inaccurate because a fifty -
fifty parenting time arrangement was never implemented. Therefore, we view
this as a joint custody case.
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time shall be alternate weekends from 6:00 [p.m.]
Friday to 6:00 [p.m.] Sunday; every Wednesday
evening after practice until 7:00 p.m.; anytime at the
babysitter/daycare as his schedule allows. Defendant
may pick-up the child at daycare and return the child to
[p]laintiff at the Wawa on Route 541 in Burlington
Township. Defendant shall provide (high school)
regular basketball and practice schedule to [p]laintiff
by Monday August 18, 2014. Plaintiff consents to
maintain medical coverage for the minor child.
Defendant's request to re-calculate child support
guidelines due to increase in [p]laintiff's salary is
denied, based upon guideline figures calculated
previously.
Another order was entered on December 10, 2014 by the prior judge,
absent a hearing, increasing defendant's parenting time to include every
Wednesday overnight with a drop off to K.L.'s daycare on Thursday morning.
The order also directed defendant to serve copies of his 2014 W-2 forms and tax
returns by February 15, 2015, and further provided that: "[a]ll other visitation
orders are still in effect. [Child support] [g]uidelines are rerun per the
[defendant's] request." The re-calculation resulted in a downward modification
of defendant's prior child support from $210 weekly ($192 basic child support
and $18 towards arrearages) to $103 weekly, retroactive to September 11, 2014.
Plaintiff claimed defendant really never had an interest in parenting their
child, as evidenced by the fact that visitation did not become an issue until her
child support application was filed nine months after K.L.'s birth. She contends
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that he has seven children and a hectic schedule, including teaching and
coaching basketball. Pick-ups and drop-offs were problematic. Oftentimes,
defendant's mother or sister would show up to exchange the child in his stead,
to the chagrin of plaintiff. After being addressed by the court, defendant was
ordered to be present for exchanges with his sister. He defied the order by either
not showing up or having his sister appear alone. In plaintiff's view, defendant's
contumacious behavior and aggression led to his preclusion from the child's day
care centers. He threatened to sue one of them.
Once K.L. enrolled in the Burlington County Early Intervention Program,
defendant was described as being "aggressive" and "problematic" with the staff ,
including the child's speech therapist. Oftentimes defendant was late getting
K.L. to the school bus stop and he did not provide him with a nutritious lunch,
resulting in Lydia Lopez, in her capacity as an Early Childhood Educator,
writing to plaintiff about it. Lopez's letter also states that defendant did not
supply an "actual lunch" and "[j]uice, pudding and chips" do not suffice for a
healthy meal. Plaintiff also claims defendant rarely drove the child to his
swimming lessons and activities, which she had to pay for regardless of whether
he attended same. Defendant frequently moved and did not disclose his new
addresses to plaintiff, even though they were joint custodial parents, in
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contravention of basic co-parenting principles. Instead of spending his
parenting time with K.L., defendant's mother would often babysit him alone.
Defendant was also substantiated for abuse and neglect with respect to another
one of his children, causing great concern to plaintiff. The parenting time was
described as a "circus" by plaintiff's counsel at oral argument.
Because the parties continued to have conflicts, the prior judge entered an
order on July 15, 2015, extending defendant's parenting time to include a Sunday
overnight on his weekends until Monday mornings, dropping the child off at
daycare whenever possible, in order to avoid contact between the parties. This
FD order was entered in the aftermath of two domestic violence restraining
orders being entered,4 and was an attempt by the judge to limit confrontation
between the parties. No plenary hearing was conducted to effectuate this change
and the parties did not object to the modification.
Defendant denied missing his parenting time or having problems with
exchanging the child. At the July 15, 2015 hearing, the prior judge tersely
stated: "So now, [T.L.], [you have] heard everyone's concerns . . . . Parenting
4
The domestic violence orders were entered following a physical altercation
between the parties at a hospital where K.L. was being treated for burns he
suffered during defendant's parenting time.
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time is parenting time . . . . So you don't show up [I will] cut you off at the
knees."
T.L. raises three points on appeal.
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER
OF LAW IN ITS FAILURE TO REQUIRE A
HEARING TO DETERMINE FACTUAL DISPUTES
OF THE PARTIES' CONFLICTING
CERTIFICATIONS AND TO FURTHER
DETERMINE THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD
AS TO THE PARENTING TIME SCHEDULE.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MODIFYING
THE PARENTING TIME SCHEDULE WITHOUT A
SHOWING OF CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES BY
THE PLAINTIFF AND [IN] ACCORDANCE WITH
THE ESTABLISHED LAW OF NEW JERSEY.
III. THE COURT FAILED TO MAKE ADEQUATE
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW CONSISTENT WITH RULE 1:7-4.
II.
The scope of appellate review of a trial court's findings of fact is limited.
Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998). "Because of the family courts'
special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters, appellate courts should
accord deference to family court factfinding." Id. at 413. A reviewing court
will only disturb the findings when they are "so manifestly unsupported by or
inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to
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offend the interest of justice[.]" Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co. of
Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974) (quoting Fagliarone v. Twp. of No. Bergen, 78
N.J. Super. 154, 155 (App. Div. 1963)).
We first address defendant's contention in Point I of his brief, that the trial
court should have ordered a plenary hearing in order to resolve conflicting
statements in the parties' certifications and to determine a parenting time
schedule, utilizing the best interest standard.
It is well-established that a plenary hearing is necessary when a genuine
issue exists as to a material fact. Tretola v. Tretola, 389 N.J. Super. 15, 20 (App.
Div. 2006) (citing Fusco v. Fusco, 186 N.J. Super. 321, 329 (App. Div. 1982)).
A plenary hearing is only necessary to resolve a genuine issue of a material fact,
as "trial judges cannot resolve material factual disputes upon conflicting
affidavits and certifications." Harrington v. Harrington, 281 N.J. Super. 39, 47
(App. Div. 1995); see Eaton v. Grau, 368 N.J. Super. 215, 222 (App. Div. 2004).
A plenary hearing is usually appropriate before the entry of an order affecting
the custody of a child. See Fusco, 186 N.J. Super. at 327-29.
Fifteen hearings and twelve orders were entered by the time the successor
judge reduced defendant's parenting time on October 4, 2017, to weekends only.
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When the parties appeared for oral argument that day, both were represented by
counsel, and the judge took some limited testimony. The trial judge decided:
The application to modify the current order for the
[d]efendant's parenting time, is granted. The
[d]efendant shall have weekend parenting time only, for
the reasons stated on the record, [a]nd based on the
[c]ourt's findings as to the credibility of the parties.
Pick up and drop off shall be in accordance with the
prior order. The application of the [p]laintiff for
counsel fees is granted, the [d]efendant shall be
responsible for $500 to be paid within [forty-five] days
to [p]laintiff's attorney. The application of the
[plaintiff] [m]other to be allowed to obtain a passport
for the child. The [p]laintiff may obtain the passport
without the permission of the [d]efendant [f]ather.
The trial judge stated on the record that he spent three hours reviewing the
extensive record and that he developed a feel for the case. In his well-reasoned
oral opinion, the judge found:
I've considered the argument of counsel, I've
considered the testimony of the witnesses, I've noted
the demeanor of the plaintiff and I've noted the
demeanor of the defendant. I've also reviewed the
certifications and the submissions of counsel and the
[twelve] prior orders that are present in this case.
The plaintiff's demeanor in this matter has been calm,
cool and collected. She has maintained her composure
throughout. I find that she is more credible with regard
to the defendant's appearances at the pickup and
dropoff than the defendant. The defendant's demeanor
has been perhaps passionate and - - but argumentative.
He has interrupted his attorney.
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And the record does seem to reflect that there has been
difficulties with daycares such that there are three
daycares that there have been difficulty with so there
does appear to be a pattern.
....
All right, so I do find it more credible that the plaintiff's
testimony with regard to the difficulties of pickup and
dropoff. It does seem that it is a large problem. And
the [c]ourt's . . . sense of the case is that the fact that the
defendant is requesting that his fiancé participate in the
pickup and dropoff causes a problem for the plaintiff in
that there are differences that go into the employment
situation into her employment and that defendant is - -
so I will enter an order in which I will alter the
parenting time arrangement such that it will be on the
weekends only and that the weekday parenting time
will be changed and I will make the amendment to the
child support obligation because of that.
The record that I have in front of me and the testimony
that I have from the parties is just such that I find the
plaintiff to be more believable as to the defendant's
ability or inability to comply with the prior orders of
the [c]ourt so that will be my decision and we will
calculate the child support obligation accordingly. So
I will reduce the parenting time.
III.
We have no quarrel with the judge's exercised discretion in not holding a
plenary hearing. We defer to the trial judge's determination as to whether to
schedule a plenary hearing. Jacoby v. Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. 109, 123 (App.
Div. 2012). Given the judge's discrete findings of fact, his extensive record
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review, and questioning of the parties, we do not view defendant's contention
that there were "conflicting" certifications warranting a hearing to have any
merit. Any doubts in the trial judge's mind were resolved after hearing extensive
oral argument and querying the parties. Where a prior court order exists
specifying the terms of residential custody and parenting time, a parent seeking
to alter those terms has the burden of demonstrating a material change in
circumstances that affects the welfare of the child. Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J.
Super. 102, 105 (App. Div. 2007) (citing Borys v. Borys, 76 N.J. 103, 115-16
(1978)).
In defining what constitutes a "material" change in circumstances, this
court has provided fact-specific scenarios: an "evidentiary hearing [was]
required prior to entry of order of joint custody and unsupervised visitation with
father who had been accused of sexually abusing his child." Id. at 106 (citing
P.T. v. M.S., 325 N.J. Super. 193, 215 (App. Div. 1999)); see Mackowski v.
Mackowski, 317 N.J. Super. 8, (App. Div. 1998) (holding that a father's motion
to transfer custody of sixteen-year-old daughter should not have been decided
without a plenary hearing); see also Fusco, 186 N.J. Super. at 329 (holding that
a plenary hearing was necessary to ascertain parameters of visitation for a father
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who was serving a thirty-two-year prison term for first-degree murder). These
circumstances are far more compelling than the issues in the present case.
Here, the record amply supported the judge's decision to modify parenting
time and essentially revert the schedule back to the original order entered in this
matter. Because the proofs were insufficient to warrant a plenary hearing, we
find no abuse of discretion by the trial judge. Hand, 391 N.J. Super. at 112.
Defendant failed to present a factual dispute or a material change in
circumstances for which a plenary hearing would be helpful in reaching
resolution. Fusco, 186 N.J. Super. at 329.
IV.
In his next point heading, defendant argues that the trial judge erred by
modifying parenting time absent a showing of changed circumstances. We have
considered his arguments in light of the record and controlling legal principles
and do not find them persuasive.
"The Family Court possesses broad equitable powers to accomplish
substantial justice." Finger v. Zenn, 335 N.J. Super. 438, 446 (App. Div. 2000)
(citing Weitzman v. Weitzman, 228 N.J. Super. 346, 358 (App. Div. 1988)). We
"accord great deference to discretionary decisions of Family Part judges." Milne
v. Goldenberg, 428 N.J. Super. 184, 197 (App. Div. 2012) (citing Donnelly v.
A-1378-17T3
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Donnelly, 405 N.J. Super. 117, 127 (App. Div. 2009)). Such discretion "takes
into account the law and the particular circumstances of the case before the
court." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hand, 391 N.J. Super.
at 111). However, we will not defer to a family court's decision where the court
abused its discretion. See, e.g., State ex rel. J.A., 195 N.J. 324, 340 (2008). "An
abuse of discretion 'arises when a decision is "made without a rational
explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an
impermissible basis."'" Milne, 428 N.J. Super. at 197 (quoting Flagg v. Essex
Cty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)). The family judge's legal decisions
are subject to this court's plenary review. Crespo v. Crespo, 395 N.J. Super.
190, 194 (App. Div. 2007).
We find no error here. No prima facie showing was made that there was
a substantial change of circumstances, or anything material warranting
discovery or a plenary hearing.
V.
Turning to defendant's third point heading, Rule 1:7-4(a) clearly states
that a trial "court shall, by an opinion or memorandum decision, either written
or oral, find the facts and state its conclusions of law thereon . . . on every motion
decided by a written order that is appealable as of right . . . ." See Shulas v.
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Estabrook, 385 N.J. Super. 91, 96 (App. Div. 2006) (requiring an adequate
explanation of basis for court's action). "Meaningful appellate review is
inhibited unless the judge sets forth the reasons for his or her opinion." Strahan
v. Strahan, 402 N.J. Super. 298, 310 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting Salch v. Salch,
240 N.J. Super. 441, 443 (App. Div. 1990)). The failure to provide findings of
fact and conclusions of law "constitutes a disservice to the litigants, the
attorneys and the appellate court." Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 569-70
(1980) (quoting Kenwood Assocs. v. Board of Adjustment, 141 N.J. Super. 1, 4
(App. Div. 1976)).
From our review of the record, we are satisfied that the judge made
adequate findings of fact. He assessed credibility by observing the parties'
demeanor and considering their testimony. Defendant failed to comply with
multiple prior court orders directing him on parenting issues, specifically being
present and not delegating his responsibilities to family members. Plaintiff
testified that defendant missed "four visits" between July 5 and October 4, 2017,
and he "was under narcotics for one visit." He was not present for pickups
according to plaintiff's testimony found credible by the judge. Defendant
testified that his mother and sister were no longer available for exchanges and
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the location was changed to the Westampton Police Station for that reason, and
in his view, "there was no need for a third-party."
In light of the minor change in parenting time made in eliminating
defendant's Wednesday overnights, we find appropriate findings were made by
the trial judge and no error.
VI.
In his brief, defendant argues that the trial judge failed to address
modification of child support in light of plaintiff's increased income that was
included in his motion for reconsideration. While defendant did not raise this
latter issue in a point heading to be argued in his brief as required by Rule 2:6-
2(1), we will address it.
Child support is necessary to ensure that parents provide for the "basic
needs" of their children. Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 590 (1995). A party
seeking modification of a child support obligation has the burden of
demonstrating a change in circumstances warranting an adjustment. Lepis v.
Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 157 (1980). The decision must be made in accordance with
the Guidelines and the best interests of the child. See Caplan v. Caplan, 182
N.J. 250, 266 (2005). The trial court's discretion in determining the amount of
child support is limited by the foregoing principles and the Guidelines, which
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are designed to result in a fair allocation of the parental responsibility to provide
appropriate child support given the parents' resources. See Id. at 267-68.
The parties are required to file updated matrimonial case information
statements in support of an application to modify child support. R. 5:5-4(a).
Defendant failed to do that, therefore, the issue is not properly before us.
Notwithstanding that deficiency, the judge stated on the record that "defendant
did not comply with my order of July 5th, 2017 to provide proof that Tayasha 5
was a student within [fourteen] days of that order." Relief was apparently given
to defendant without his providing the necessary documentation.
Additionally, both parties have children from other relationships. The
Other Dependent Deduction (ODD) was apparently calculated for plaintiff but
not for defendant in reviewing the Child Support Guidelines Worksheet s
submitted in the appendices.
The child support calculation cannot be viewed in a vacuum here.
Adjustments are appropriate for the support of other legal dependents when
addressing multiple family obligations. Child Support Guidelines, Pressler &
5
Defendant's child from another relationship. The record indicates that she
attended Montclair State University.
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Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, Appendix IX-A to R. 5:6A at P10(a) and
(b), www.gannlaw.com (2017). The issue has been decided by this court:
The Guidelines require the court to consider multiple
family obligations to obtain an equitable resolution that
does not favor any family. The Guidelines also
anticipate an adjustment when an obligor must support
more than one family. Pursuant to the Guidelines, prior
child support orders must be deducted from an obligor's
weekly income because such an obligation "represents
income that is not available for determining the current
child support obligation . . . ." Thus, "the amount of
such orders must deducted from the obligor's total
weekly [a]djusted [g]ross [t]axable [i]ncome."
[Harte v. Hand, 433 N.J. Super. 457, 462 (App. Div.
2013) (citations omitted).]
Defendant's application was never properly before the trial court for these
reasons, and therefore, we cannot reach this remaining issue on appeal. The
parties may file whatever applications they deem appropriate with the trial court
to address child support.
Affirmed.
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