JAMES MURRAY VS. COMCAST CORP. (L-2552-16, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1987-17T4
JAMES MURRAY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
v.
January 8, 2019
(1) COMCAST CORP., a
APPELLATE DIVISION
Pennsylvania corporation,
(2) GARY KOTZEN, individually
and as Senior Manager of Comcast,
(3) VICTOR KRUZ, individually
and Director of Comcast,
(4) THOMAS O'KANE, individually
and Manager of Comcast,
Defendants-Appellants.
________________________________
Argued September 26, 2018 – Decided January 8, 2019
Before Judges Fuentes, Accurso, and Moynihan.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Atlantic County, Docket No. L-2552-16.
Frank A. Chernak argued the cause for appellants
(Montgomery McCracken Walker & Rhoads, LLC,
attorneys; Frank A. Chernak and Erin K. Clarke, on
the briefs).
Louis P. McFadden, Jr. argued the cause for
respondent (McFadden Law Firm, PC, attorney for
respondent; Louis P. McFadden, Jr., on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FUENTES, P.J.A.D.
On November 17, 2016, plaintiff James Murray filed a two-count
complaint against defendants Comcast Corporation, 1 Gary Kotzen, Victor
Kruz,2 and Thomas O'Kane alleging violations of (1) the Conscientious
Employee Protection Act, N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -14 and (2) the New Jersey Law
Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49. On March 15, 2017, plaintiff
filed an amended complaint adding a third count for breach of contract. On
the same date, defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration and stay
proceedings. By mutual consent of the parties, defendants withdrew their
motion because it was filed before service of plaintiff's amended complaint.
On April 21, 2017, defendants filed a second motion to compel arbitration and
stay proceedings.
On June 9, 2017, the trial judge granted defendants' motion to compel
arbitration and stayed the proceeding pending the outcome of the arbitration
hearing. On July 20, 2017, plaintiff sent for filing a motion for reconsiderati on
of the court's June 9, 2017 order under Rule 4:49-2. Plaintiff's motion for
1
The actual name of plaintiff's employer is Comcast Cable Communications
Management, LLC.
2
This defendant's last name was misspelled by plaintiff in his complaint. The
correct spelling of this defendant's last name is Cruz.
A-1987-17T4
2
reconsideration was received by the Law Division on July 26, 2017. Plaintiff's
motion for reconsideration was filed forty-seven days after the court's June 9,
2017 order compelling arbitration. The trial judge granted plaintiff's motion
for reconsideration on November 16, 2017.
Defendants appeal from the November 16, 2017 order granting plaintiff's
motion for reconsideration and vacating the June 9, 2017 order compelling
arbitration. When this matter came before this court for oral argument, we
questioned, sua sponte, whether this court had subject matter jurisdiction to
review the Law Division's November 16, 2017 order pursuant to our decision
in Hayes v. Turnersville Chrysler Jeep, 453 N.J. Super. 309 (App. Div. 2018).
In Hayes, we noted the Supreme Court has made clear that "all orders
compelling and denying arbitration shall be deemed final for purposes of
appeal, regardless of whether such orders dispose of all issues and all parties,
and the time for appeal therefrom starts from the date of the entry of that
order." Id. at 312 (quoting GMAC v. Pittella, 205 N.J. 572, 587 (2011)). We
emphasized that "[t]o dispel any lingering doubts about the need to seek timely
appellate review of such an order, the Court also included the following
admonition: 'Because the order shall be deemed final, a timely appeal on the
issue must be taken then or not at all.'" Hayes, 453 N.J. Super. at 312 (quoting
GMAC, 205 N.J. at 586).
A-1987-17T4
3
On October 3, 2018, plaintiff filed a post-argument motion seeking leave
from this court to file a supplemental brief addressing this issue. In an order
dated October 5, 2018, we granted plaintiff's motion and directed the parties to
submit, within twenty days from the date of the order, supplemental briefs
limited to a maximum of twenty pages, regarding the legal question: "Did the
trial court have subject matter jurisdiction to decide plaintiff's motion for
reconsideration filed under Rule 4:49-2 based on this court's decision in Hayes
v. Turnersville Chrysler Jeep, 453 N.J. Super. 309 (App. Div. 2018)?"
On October 29, 2018, twenty-four days after our October 5, 2018 order,
plaintiff filed a motion seeking "to extend [the] time to file [a] supplemental
brief to November 8, 2018." We granted the motion with the proviso that "no
further extension will be granted." Defendants filed a timely supplemental
brief.3 In their supplemental submission, defendants argue that pursuant to
Rule 4:49-2, a party seeking reconsideration "to alter or amend a judgment or
order shall be served not later than 20 days after service of the judgment or
3
Plaintiff submitted an untimely "letter in lieu of a more formal
memorandum" which adopted defendants' legal position. This "letter
memorandum" is dated November 12, 2018, and was received by the Appellate
Division Clerk's Office on November 16, 2018. Plaintiff's counsel did not
provide any explanation for his dilatory behavior. Because this submission
was filed beyond the November 8, 2018 deadline, we will not consider it in
any manner in deciding this appeal.
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4
order upon all parties by the party obtaining it." (Emphasis added). Here,
defendants claim "[t]he parties did not receive the [o]rder from the trial court
until June 30, 2017." Defendants argue that "in this case [p]laintiff Murray
filed a motion for reconsideration on July 20, 2017, exactly 20 days after all
parties received on June 30, 2017, the [o]rder granting
[d]efendants/[a]ppellants' motion to compel arbitration. This motion was,
therefore, timely under Rule 4:49-2."4 (Emphasis added).
We agree that the twenty-day time frame in Rule 4:49-2 starts from the
date of service of the order, not from the date of entry. However, although
plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is dated July 20, 2017, the Law Division
did not receive and file the motion papers until July 26, 2017, twenty-six days
after plaintiff's counsel was served with the order compelling arbitration. We
4
In a footnote in their supplemental brief, defendants observe that our
Supreme Court has stated that, "[c]ourts may reconsider final judgments or
orders within twenty days of entry." Lee v. Brown, 232 N.J. 114, 126 (2018)
(emphasis added) (citing R. 4:49-2). After a careful review of the Court's
decision in Lee, we conclude this apparent incongruity with the plain language
in Rule 4:49-2 is based on a misapprehension of the Court's reasoning. The
plaintiffs in Lee moved for reconsideration of an interlocutory summary
judgment under Rule 4:49-2. Ibid. As Judge Pressler held "unequivocally"
more than thirty years ago, "review of interlocutory orders by the court prior to
final judgment is . . . a matter committed to the sound discretion of the court."
Johnson v. Cyklop Strapping Corp., 220 N.J. Super. 250, 263 (App. Div.
1987). This construction of Rule 4:49-2 is so engrained in our motion practice
jurisprudence that we infer the Supreme Court believed it was not necessary to
clarify it given the procedural posture of the case.
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5
also note defendants do not claim their counsel was served with plaintiff's
motion papers on July 20, 2017. Pursuant to Rule 1:6-3(c), "service of motion
papers is complete only on receipt at the office of adverse counsel or the
address of a pro se party. If service is by ordinary mail, receipt will be
presumed on the third business day after mailing." The third business day
after Thursday July 20, 2017 was Tuesday July 25, 2017. Thus, even
assuming plaintiff mailed the notice of motion and supporting papers on J uly
20, 2017, defendants were not served within the twenty-day time frame
mandated by Rule 4:49-2.
We nevertheless commend defendants' appellate counsel's forthrightness,
especially since the argument he advanced favored plaintiff's position in this
appeal. Defendants' appellate counsel's conduct exemplifies the type of
professional candor we expect from the attorneys who practice law in our
State. See R.P.C. 3.3(a)(3).
We now return to the issues before us in this appeal. In Hayes, we
addressed the interplay between Rule 4:49-2 and Rule 1:3-4(c), which
expressly prohibits the relaxation of the twenty-day time restriction for filing a
motion for reconsideration. We noted that Rule 1:3-4(c) "expressly" prohibits
"the parties" and "the court" from enlarging the time specified by Rule 4:49-2.
A-1987-17T4
6
Hayes, 453 N.J. Super. at 313. Our Supreme Court has defined "jurisdiction"
as
the right to adjudicate concerning the subject matter in
the given case. To constitute this there are three
essentials: (1) the court must have cognizance of the
class of cases to which the one to be adjudicated
belongs; (2) the proper parties must be present, and (3)
the point to be decided must be, in substance and
effect, within the issue.
[Petersen v. Falzarano, 6 N.J. 447, 453 (1951).]
Furthermore, as noted by Justice Pashman on behalf of a unanimous
Court more than forty years ago, "[t]he principle is well established that a
court cannot hear a case as to which it lacks subject matter jurisdiction even
though all parties thereto desire an adjudication on the merits." Peper v.
Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trs., 77 N.J. 55, 65-66 (1978). Subject matter
jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties' failure to object, nor conferred
upon the court by the parties' agreement. Ibid. Whether presiding over a case
or deciding an appeal, judges have an independent, non-delegable duty to raise
and determine whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case
whenever there is a reasonable basis to do so. 5
5
Although a party may raise "at any time" a "challenge" to the court's subject
matter jurisdiction, see Lall v. Shivani, 448 N.J. Super. 38, 48 (App. Div.
2016), that general proposition does not aid plaintiff in the present context.
Plaintiff's untimely motion did not attempt to "challenge" the court's
(continued)
A-1987-17T4
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Here, there is no question that the Law Division judge granted
defendants' motion to compel arbitration on June 9, 2017. For reasons not
clear, that order was not transmitted to the parties until June 30. Plaintiff's
motion for reconsideration under Rule 4:49-2 was not received by the Law
Division until July 26, 2017, twenty-seven days after service of the order and
forty-seven days after the court entered the order compelling arbitration. The
record also shows plaintiff did not serve defendants' counsel with the motion
for reconsideration within the twenty-day time frame mandated by Rule 4:49-
2. We thus hold the Law Division did not have subject matter jurisdiction at
the time it granted plaintiff's untimely motion under Rule 4:49-2 for
reconsideration of its June 9, 2017 final judgment granting defendants' motion
to compel arbitration.
The trial court's November 16, 2017 order is vacated accordingly and the
matter is remanded to allow the parties to proceed to arbitration.
(continued)
jurisdiction. Instead, he sought to the contrary: to have the court maintain
jurisdiction and disallow proceedings in an arbitral forum. In making such an
application, plaintiff was obligated to adhere to time limits specified in the
Rules of Court.
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