C.F.J. VS. DIVISION OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE AND HEALTH SERVICES (DIVISION OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE AND HEALTH SERVICES) ( 2018 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-4385-16T4
    C.F.J.,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    v.
    DIVISION OF MEDICAL
    ASSISTANCE AND HEALTH
    SERVICES and HUDSON
    COUNTY BOARD OF SOCIAL
    SERVICES,
    Respondents-Respondents.
    _________________________________
    Submitted October 23, 2018 – Decided December 11, 2018
    Before Judges Yannotti and Rothstadt.
    On appeal from New Jersey Department of Human
    Services, Division of Medical Assistance and Health
    Services.
    SB2 Inc., attorneys for appellant (John P. Pendergast
    and Laurie M. Higgins, on the briefs).
    Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
    respondent Division of Medical Assistance and Health
    Services (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney
    General, of counsel; Patrick Jhoo, Deputy Attorney
    General, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    C.F.J. appeals from a final administrative decision of the Director of the
    Division of Medical Assistance and Health Services (DMAHS), which upheld
    the denial of her applications for Medicaid benefits because she failed to submit
    certain records required to verify her eligibility for benefits. We affirm.
    I.
    In June 2014, C.F.J. was admitted to a nursing home in Jersey City. In
    August 2014, an application for Medicaid benefits was submitted on C.F.J.'s
    behalf to the Hudson County Board of Social Services, the county welfare
    agency (CWA). On September 12, 2014, the CWA requested that C.F.J. submit:
    (1) her Direct Express debit card statements from August 2009 to August 2014;
    (2) proof that the nursing home is receiving C.F.J.'s social security benefits; (3)
    a personal-needs accounting by the nursing home; and (4) power-of-attorney
    documentation.    On October 3, 2014, the CWA denied C.F.J.'s application
    because she had not submitted the requested Direct Express debit card
    statements and the power-of-attorney documents.
    In December 2014, another application for Medicaid benefits was
    submitted on behalf of C.F.J. to the CWA. On February 23, 2015, the CWA
    A-4385-16T4
    2
    again requested that C.F.J. submit the aforementioned Direct Express debit card
    statements and a physician's certification. On March 4, 2015, the CWA denied
    the application because C.F.J. had not provided the requested information.
    C.F.J.'s representative challenged the denials of benefits and requested a
    hearing.   The DMAHS thereafter transmitted the matter to the Office of
    Administrative Law (OAL) for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
    (ALJ). In May 2015, C.F.J.'s attorney provided the ALJ with copies of some
    Direct Express statements.    The CWA noted, however, that C.F.J. had not
    submitted all of the Direct Express statements it had requested.
    In June 2015, C.F.J.'s attorney issued a subpoena for the missing records
    to Comerica Bank (Comerica), the issuer of the Direct Express card. On June
    25, 2015, C.F.J.'s attorney provided the ALJ with copies of the Direct Express
    statements for January 2012 through August 2012. In a letter provided in
    response to the subpoena, Comerica's analyst asserted that statements for
    C.F.J.'s account were only available from August 2011 through August 2014
    because the account was inactive prior to August 2011.
    The ALJ filed an initial decision dated August 7, 2015. In the decision,
    the ALJ noted that a motion for summary decision had been made. The ALJ
    observed that generally the CWA and the applicant both have responsibilities in
    A-4385-16T4
    3
    the Medicaid application process, and the applicant must assist the CWA in
    securing necessary records to determine Medicaid eligibility.
    The ALJ stated that under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(c), the CWA may continue
    the application in pending status to afford an applicant additional time to
    develop evidence in support of Medicaid eligibility. The ALJ noted that C.F.J.
    and her nursing home had not been able to provide the requested Direct Express
    statements. According to the ALJ, C.F.J. and the nursing home required the
    assistance of an attorney, who eventually was able to obtain the Direct Express
    statements after issuing a subpoena.
    The ALJ concluded that the CWA erred by denying the application
    because C.F.J. and the nursing home had difficulty obtaining the Direct Express
    statements and the records had been provided during the appeal process. The
    ALJ vacated the denial of Medicaid benefits and remanded the matter to the
    CWA to process C.F.J.'s application.
    The Director of the DMAHS reviewed the ALJ's opinion, and on
    September 17, 2015, issued an interim decision on the appeal. The Director
    noted that it was not clear from the record which party had filed the motion for
    summary decision, and the briefs submitted by the parties did not contain a
    statement of material facts. The Director also noted that the parties had not
    A-4385-16T4
    4
    presented the ALJ with supporting affidavits in support of their respective
    arguments. The Director reversed the ALJ's initial decision and remanded the
    matter to the OAL for further proceedings "to determine whether the parties
    fulfilled their obligations with regard to the Medicaid application process."
    The ALJ conducted the remand hearing and issued another decision dated
    January 31, 2017. The ALJ observed that "[t]he CWA is required to verify all
    factors related to eligibility, including sources of income and resources.
    N.J.A.C. 10:72-2.3(a)." The ALJ stated that Congress had passed legislation
    requiring all participating states to implement electronic asset verification
    systems (AVS) so that state agencies participating in the Medicaid program
    could obtain information regarding the eligibility of applicants for benefits.
    The ALJ also stated that caseworkers for a CWA could obtain information
    about a Medicaid applicant using the Public Assistance Reporting Information
    System (PARIS).      The ALJ found that if a caseworker could not obtain
    information electronically using AVS or PARIS, federal law "requires" the
    caseworker to request the information directly from other state and federal
    agencies or third-party sources.
    The ALJ observed that federal law "prohibits" caseworkers from requiring
    applicants to obtain verifications of information if they are readily available
    A-4385-16T4
    5
    through an electronic system or from another source. The ALJ stated that under
    the applicable federal regulations, state Medicaid agencies have an affirmative
    duty to obtain certain information regarding an applicant's eligibility for
    Medicaid benefits, and these agencies may not ask applicants to provide
    additional information unless it is not available electronically or from other
    sources.
    The ALJ found that in this case, the caseworker: (1) did not seek to obtain
    C.F.J.'s Direct Express statements electronically through an AVS or PARIS; (2)
    did not attempt to obtain this information from a secondary source; and (3) erred
    by placing the entire burden of providing this information on C.F.J. The ALJ
    concluded that the CWA violated federal and state Medicaid regulations because
    it "failed to make any attempt to obtain the verification it needed to process
    C.F.J.'s Medicaid applications."    The ALJ reversed the denial of C.F.J.'s
    application.
    On April 27, 2017, the Director issued her final decision. The Director
    noted that the ALJ found the caseworker was obligated to obtain C.F.J.'s Direct
    Express records through an AVS or PARIS, but New Jersey had not
    implemented its AVS system until July 2016, which was after the CWA had
    denied the applications. The Director nevertheless pointed out that there was a
    A-4385-16T4
    6
    question as to whether the Direct Express records would even be available
    through the AVS system. The Director observed that the Direct Express website
    indicates that federal privacy laws prohibit government agencies from obtaining
    information about an individual's account without the individual's consent.
    The Director found that there was no evidence that C.F.J. or her
    representative made any attempt to obtain the requested Direct Express records
    until June 4, 2015, which was well after the motion for summary decision was
    presented to the ALJ. The Director found that C.F.J. "would [have been] able
    to access her statements and provide them to Hudson County" had she attempted
    to do so.
    The Director also noted that pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(a), CWAs
    must determine Medicaid eligibility for elderly applicants within forty-five days
    after the application is submitted. The Director stated that the regulation allows
    that timeframe to be extended when "exceptional circumstances" prevent the
    processing of the application within the prescribed time limits. The Director
    stated that "[t]here is simply nothing in the record to demonstrate that there were
    exceptional circumstances warranting additional time to provide the requested
    verifications."
    A-4385-16T4
    7
    The Director concluded that the CWA correctly denied C.F.J.'s
    applications for Medicaid benefits because she failed to provide the information
    required to verify her eligibility within the time required by regulations. This
    appeal followed.
    II.
    We note initially that the scope of our review in an appeal from a final
    decision of a state administrative agency is limited. Circus Liquors, Inc. v.
    Governing Body of Middletown Twp., 
    199 N.J. 1
    , 9 (2009). An agency's
    decision will not be set aside unless the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or
    unreasonable, or lacks fair support in the record. 
    Id. at 9-10
    ; see also In re
    Herrmann, 
    192 N.J. 19
    , 27-28 (2007). In reviewing the agency's decision, we
    consider
    (1) whether the agency's action violates express or
    implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency
    follow the law; (2) whether the record contains
    substantial evidence to support the findings on which
    the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying
    the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly
    erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably
    have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.
    [Circus Liquors, 
    199 N.J. at
    10 (citing Mazza v. Bd. of
    Trs., 
    143 N.J. 22
    , 25 (1995)).]
    A-4385-16T4
    8
    When considering these factors, we must defer to the agency's "expertise
    and superior knowledge of a particular field." 
    Ibid.
     (quoting Greenwood v. State
    Police Training Ctr., 
    127 N.J. 500
    , 513 (1992)). Furthermore, deference to an
    agency's decision "is particularly appropriate" when the matter involves the
    interpretation and application of the agency's own regulations. R.S. v. Div. of
    Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 
    434 N.J. Super. 250
    , 261 (App. Div. 2014)
    (quoting I.L. v. N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., Div. of Medical Assistance &
    Health Servs., 
    389 N.J. Super. 354
    , 364 (App. Div. 2006)).
    "Medicaid is a federal-state program 'created to provide medical
    assistance to the poor at the expense of the public.'" Estate of DeMartino v. Div.
    of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 
    373 N.J. Super. 210
    , 217 (App. Div. 2004)
    (quoting Mistrick v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 
    154 N.J. 158
    , 165
    (1998)). States that participate in the Medicaid program must adopt assistance
    plans that comply with federal law. 
    Ibid.
     (citing Harris v. McRae, 
    448 U.S. 297
    ,
    300-01 (1980)). New Jersey has elected to participate in the program, through
    the enactment of the Medical Assistance and Health Services Act. N.J.S.A.
    30:4D-1 to -42.
    Under the Act and the implementing regulations, a local CWA reviews
    applications for Medicaid benefits. N.J.S.A. 30:4D-7(a); N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2(a);
    A-4385-16T4
    9
    N.J.A.C. 10:71-3.15. When doing so, the CWA considers an applicant's income
    and resources. N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.10(b)(3). The applicant is required to provide
    the CWA with verification of his or her resources during a specified "look-back"
    period. N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.10. The CWA must process the applications of elderly
    applicants within forty-five days, except in unusual or exceptional
    circumstances. N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(a); 
    42 C.F.R. § 435.912
    (c)(3).
    III.
    On appeal, C.F.J. first argues that the CWA violated federal law by failing
    to obtain her Direct Express debit card statements through an AVS.             We
    disagree.
    Federal regulations provide that a state Medicaid agency "must request
    and use information relevant to verifying an individual's eligibility for Medicaid
    in accordance with § 435.948 through § 435.956 of this subpart." 
    42 C.F.R. § 435.945
    (b). State Medicaid agencies must request certain information if such
    information is "useful to verifying" an applicant's eligibility for benefits. 
    42 C.F.R. § 435.948
    (a). The agency is required to request
    (1) [i]nformation related to wages, net earnings from
    self-employment, unearned income and resources from
    the State Wage Information Collection Agency
    (SWICA), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the
    Social Security Administration (SSA), the agencies
    administering the State unemployment compensation
    A-4385-16T4
    10
    laws, the State-administered supplementary payment
    programs under section 1616(a) of the Act, and any
    State program administered under a plan approved
    under Titles I, X, XIV, or XVI of the Act; and (2)
    Information related to eligibility or enrollment from the
    Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, the State
    program funded under part A of title IV of the Act, and
    other insurance affordability programs.
    [
    42 C.F.R. § 435.948
    (a)(1)-(2).]
    The federal regulations further provide that "[t]o the extent that the
    information identified in paragraph (a) of this section is available through the
    electronic service established in accordance with § 435.949 of this subpart, the
    [state Medicaid] agency must obtain the information through such service." 
    42 C.F.R. § 435.948
    (b).    A state Medicaid agency may not require additional
    verifications when the information is available electronically.     
    42 C.F.R. § 435.952
    (c). However, this restriction applies only to the information that the
    agency is required to request under 
    42 C.F.R. § 435.948
    , 
    42 C.F.R. § 435.949
    ,
    and 
    42 C.F.R. § 435.956
    . 
    Ibid.
    Notwithstanding C.F.J.'s arguments to the contrary, the federal regulations
    did not require the CWA to obtain C.F.J.'s Direct Express debit card statements
    electronically.   As the record shows, when the CWA reviewed C.F.J.'s
    applications, New Jersey's AVS was not operational. C.F.J. contends New
    Jersey was not in compliance with the federal mandate, which required the State
    A-4385-16T4
    11
    to establish an AVS by the end of the federal fiscal year 2009, but that is beside
    the point. The AVS had not been established and the records could not be
    obtained through that source.
    In any event, there is no indication that the CWA could have obtained
    C.F.J.'s Direct Express statements through the AVS even if it had been
    functioning. As the Director noted in her decision, the Direct Express website
    indicates that federal privacy laws may preclude Direct Express from providing
    government agencies with information about an individual's account without the
    individual's consent.
    Furthermore, as we noted previously, 
    42 C.F.R. § 435.948
     requires state
    Medicaid agencies to obtain information about an applicant's wages, net
    earnings from self-employment, and unearned income from certain specified
    sources, such as the IRS, the SSA, or other federal and state agencies. Bank
    records like the Direct Express debit card statements at issue here do not come
    within the purview of 
    42 C.F.R. § 435.948
    .
    In addition, 
    42 C.F.R. § 435.949
     did not require the CWA to obtain the
    Direct Express debit card statements directly from Comerica, the issuing bank.
    The regulation requires states to verify information with, or obtain information
    from certain federal agencies, if available through an electronic service
    A-4385-16T4
    12
    established by the federal government. 
    Ibid.
     C.F.J.'s bank records were not
    available through that source. Moreover, 
    42 C.F.R. § 435.956
     requires state
    Medicaid agencies to verify an applicant's citizenship and immigration status
    through an electronic service established by the federal government or some
    alternative source. The regulation pertains to non-financial information. It does
    not apply to an applicant's bank records, such as the Direct Express statements
    at issue here.
    Thus, the Director correctly found that C.F.J. had the burden of providing
    the Direct Express statements within the time required for the CWA to process
    her applications. The CWA properly determined that a review of C.F.J.'s Direct
    Express debit card statements was necessary. However, the Direct Express
    records were not available through an electronic service, and the CWA was not
    required to obtain them directly. The CWA acted consistently with federal and
    state Medicaid regulations by requesting C.F.J. to provide the records.
    IV.
    Next, C.F.J. argues that the CWA violated state Medicaid regulations by
    failing to "assist" her in completing the application. We cannot agree.
    In support of her argument, C.F.J. relies upon N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.10, which
    addresses a caseworker's "[c]ollateral investigation" of a Medicaid application.
    A-4385-16T4
    13
    The regulation states that a collateral investigation consists of "contacts with
    individuals other than members of [the] applicant's immediate household, made
    with the knowledge and consent of the applicant(s)." N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.10(a).
    The regulation also provides that "[t]he primary purpose of [the] collateral
    contacts is to verify, supplement[,] or clarify essential information." N.J.A.C.
    10:71-2.10(b).
    The regulation therefore indicates that a caseworker may contact certain
    individuals to verify information that is deemed essential to the CWA's
    eligibility determination, but such contacts may only be made with the
    applicant's "knowledge and consent." N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.10(a). The regulation
    does not require a caseworker to obtain an applicant's debit card statements
    directly from an issuing bank.
    In addition, C.F.J. relies upon N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.2(b)(3), which states that
    "[t]he CWA shall verify the existence or nonexistence of any cash, savings[,] or
    checking accounts[.]" The regulation also states that "[v]erification shall be
    accomplished through contact with financial institutions[.]"         
    Ibid.
       The
    regulation provides that at a minimum, "the CWA shall contact those financial
    institutions . . . which currently provide or previously provided services to the
    applicant." 
    Ibid.
    A-4385-16T4
    14
    Therefore, N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.2(b)(3) only requires the CWA to contact
    financial institutions to verify the existence of an applicant's accounts. The
    regulation does not, however, require a caseworker to obtain copies of any
    records directly from a financial institution.
    C.F.J. also relies upon N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.1(d)(3), which provides that
    "[t]he CWA shall verify the equity value of resources through appropriate and
    credible sources." The regulation also states that "[i]f necessary, the applicant
    shall provide written authorization allowing the CWA to secure the appropriate
    information." N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.1(d)(3)(i).
    This regulation therefore requires the CWA to verify the equity value of
    certain resources, but states that the applicant must provide the necessary
    authorization to allow the agency to do so. The regulation does not, however,
    require the CWA to obtain records, such as the debit card statements at issue in
    this case.
    Accordingly, we reject C.F.J.'s contention that the CWA violated State
    Medicaid regulations by failing to "assist" C.F.J complete her application. The
    CWA reasonably assisted C.F.J. in completing her application by identifying the
    bank statements required and by asking that she provide them. The record shows
    A-4385-16T4
    15
    that C.F.J. could have obtained the records. Indeed, her own attorney was able
    to do so by issuing a subpoena.
    IV.
    C.F.J. further argues that in making the final decision on her Medicaid
    application, the Director should have considered the Direct Express statements
    that her representatives obtained during the pendency of the administrative
    appeal and presented to the ALJ. Again, we disagree.
    Here, the issue before the Director was whether C.F.J. had provided the
    CWA with the information required to establish her eligibility for Medicaid
    benefits in a timely manner. The record shows that C.F.J. failed to present all
    of the Direct Express debit card statements the CWA had requested within the
    time specified for the CWA to process the applications.
    C.F.J.'s administrative appeal did not extend the time for C.F.J. to submit
    the information the CWA had requested, nor did the appeal extend the time
    within which the CWA was required to process the applications. The Director
    had to decide the administrative appeal based on the information that C.F.J.
    presented to the CWA before the CWA issued its decision denying benefits.
    A-4385-16T4
    16
    We therefore conclude the Director did not err by deciding the appeal
    based on the evidence that C.F.J. and her representatives presented to the CWA
    before the CWA denied her applications.
    Affirmed.
    A-4385-16T4
    17