RICHARD NOBIS VS. STEVEN BELMONTE (L-3595-14, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2018 )


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  •                                  NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-2890-16T1
    RICHARD NOBIS and
    CHRISTINA NOBIS,
    Plaintiffs,
    v.
    STEVEN BELMONTE and
    DWYONIA BELMONTE,
    Defendants-Appellants,
    and
    WILLIAM V. LANE, JOHNSTONE,
    SKOK, LAUGHLIN & LANE,
    MATTHEW TAL, HOSPITALITY
    SOLUTIONS REALTY SERVICES,
    LLC, HOSPITALITY SOLUTIONS,
    LLC, HOSPITALITY SOLUTIONS
    WORLDWIDE, LLC, RE/MAX
    FIRST CHOICE REALTORS,
    and PATRICIA DiGERONIMO,
    Defendants,
    and
    LAURIE BOGAARD,
    Defendant-Respondent.
    Argued September 20, 2018 – Decided December 13, 2018
    Before Judges Alvarez and Nugent.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Union County, Docket No. L-3595-14.
    Anthony M. Bedwell argued the cause for appellants
    (Jardim, Meisner & Susser, PC, and Bedwell & Pyrich,
    LLC, attorneys; Anthony M. Bedwell, of counsel and
    on the briefs).
    Gregg S. Kahn argued the cause for respondents Laurie
    Bogaard and Bogaard & Associates, LLC (Wilson,
    Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP, attorneys;
    Gregg S. Kahn, of counsel and on the brief; John P.
    O'Toole, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendants Steven Belmonte and Dwyonia Belmonte appeal the February
    1, 2017 grant of partial summary judgment to defendants Bogaard & Associates,
    LLC, and Laurie Bogaard, Esquire, (Bogaard) dismissing the Belmonte's
    crossclaim for legal malpractice. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
    In January 2011, the Belmontes entered into an agreement to sell their
    home to plaintiffs Richard and Christina Nobis. 1 The agreement was contingent
    1
    The plaintiffs and the Belmonte defendants will be referred to by their first
    names where necessary to avoid confusion.
    A-2890-16T1
    2
    upon the Nobises obtaining a satisfactory home inspection.              The home
    inspection report noted that the attic space above the garage had been painted
    white, and that a fan had been installed in the den. Concerned that those two
    circumstances might indicate a mold problem, the inspector suggested follow-
    up.
    On February 10, 2011, the Nobises' attorney, Bogaard, sent the Belmonte's
    attorney, William Lane, a copy of the report. At the end of the letter, Bogaard
    asked for an explanation of the painting in the attic and the fan in the den. Lane
    responded, stating that "what the purchaser has seen is self-explanatory." He
    made no mention of any mold problem.
    On February 22, 2011, Bogaard inquired about possible mold conditions,
    stating:
    My clients still have concern over the issue as to why
    the attic was painted white. Please advise if the sellers
    have ever experienced any type of mold or other issues
    in the attic and if so, how same was remediated.
    Lane responded on February 23, 2011:
    My clients have never experienced a mold problem in
    the attic. The attic was painted white, assumably
    because that was a personal preference. However, as a
    result of an overflowed toilet during a short term
    tenancy, there was the appearance of a small amount of
    mold in the garage and in a small area in the basement.
    My clients engaged a licensed certified mold
    A-2890-16T1
    3
    remediation company who tested the entire house and
    then remediated the affected area. That remediation
    came with a warranty (see copy attached), which
    remains in full force and effect.
    No copy of the warranty was attached, however.
    On February 24, 2011, Bogaard again wrote to Lane: "[a]fter speaking
    with my clients, the purchasers find the sellers' response to their concerns
    acceptable, with exception to the pool." When deposed, Richard acknowledged
    that he had a conversation with Steven around February 24, 2011, during which
    Steven mentioned the word "mold," and acknowledged the presence of a small
    amount of mold in the basement. During depositions, the Nobises disputed the
    extent of the information they had been provided regarding the source and
    treatment of the mold, and their receipt of relevant documents. Richard also
    said that Steven assured him during the call that the amount of mold in the garage
    was small but that mold spores travel. Both Nobises insisted the first time they
    actually learned about the existence of the mold was two days prior to closing
    when informed by Steven, and that he assured them that the problem had been
    addressed. The Nobises assumed the mold report and the warranty would be
    produced at closing, which took place on March 1, 2011. They were not given
    the documents at that time.
    A-2890-16T1
    4
    When deposed, Lane claimed that he heard Bogaard advise the Nobises at
    closing that they had remedies beyond the closing if the mold remediation
    documents were not provided. That fall, the Nobises filed suit against their
    attorney, the attorney's firm, and the Belmontes. That triggered the Belmontes'
    third-party complaint against the Bogaard defendants alleging legal malpractice
    and seeking attorney's fees and costs.
    The Belmontes contend that Bogaard owed them a duty of care arising
    from Bogaard's representation of the Nobises. Furthermore, they allege that
    Bogaard told the Belmontes that she had discussed the mold condition and the
    warranty with the Nobises, that the information was acceptable, and that they
    went through with the sale relying on the assurance.
    In the February 1, 2017 written order, the trial court said:
    Buyer's attorney does not breach a duty to seller for
    failing to represent Buyer properly.         Petrillo v.
    2
    Bachenberg[ ] is not applicable, as it addresses duty of
    Seller's attorney to a Buyer whom Seller's attorney
    knows will rely on his misrepresentations. Reasons to
    be set forth more fully on the record at 3 p.m. on Feb.
    2, 2017.
    On February 2, 2017, the trial judge granted the Bogaard defendants'
    motion for summary judgment. She concluded as a matter of law that the
    2
    
    139 N.J. 472
     (1995).
    A-2890-16T1
    5
    Belmontes, who were non-clients, could not assert a legal malpractice claim
    against the Bogaard defendants because they failed to establish that the Bogaard
    defendants owed any sort of duty to them.
    On February 2, 2017, the court explained:
    If Bogaard told the Belmontes that she discussed the
    mold problem and didn't, I still don't see how this gives
    the Belmontes a cause of action against Bogaard. It
    may well give . . . the Nobises a cause of action for
    breach of their own attorneys' duties, but not the sellers,
    who, of course, it should be noted, were represented by
    counsel themselves, and everything, basically, flowed
    through Mr. Lane or in some circumstances there are
    allegations that Mr. No[b]is – or Mr. Belmonte himself
    made some statements.
    So Petrillo says that under some circumstances . . . an
    attorney assumes a duty to a non-client, which is what
    the Belmontes want here, to provide reliable
    information. That is not the situation we have . . . .
    [T]he buyer's claim is, in large part, against their own
    lawyer, who failed to do her job. But . . . for the sellers
    to say, yes, and now we're in this lawsuit because . . .
    that buyer's attorney didn't do her job, I think there's no
    basis for a cause of action on that.
    There's no duty between the – between the two, and
    certainly it's not the type of situation – if –if I permitted
    that, we would basically be making every adversary's
    or other party to an action's attorney liable to the party
    they're not representing.
    This is too broad a rule, and – and I don't think Petrillo
    makes that rule. . . .          Petrillo says in some
    A-2890-16T1
    6
    circumstances, if you expect that a buyer is going to
    rely on the seller's attorney's representations, and the
    buyer is harmed, then the buyer will have a – a cause of
    action. But under any facts that are alleged by either
    side here, I don't see where the Belmontes get a cause
    of action against the Bogaard defendants.
    In dismissing the Belmontes' claim for attorneys' fees and expenses, the
    trial court added:
    We've talked about Innes verses Marzano-Lesnovich,
    which is the most recent – recent statement at 
    224 N.J. 584
     [(2016)] talking about the fiduciary duty that arises
    as an escrow agent in that case, although these people
    happened to be a – attorneys for one of the parties.
    ....
    [T]here is no case that says a non-client can get
    attorney's fees in an action. . . .
    [A]s the Court noted in Innes, departures from the
    American Rule are the exception. We have awarded
    counsel fees to a prevailing plaintiff in a legal
    malpractice action premised upon professional
    negligence because of the unique nature of the
    attorney/client relationship. Not the unique nature of
    the fiduciary relationship – the unique nature of the
    attorney/client relationship.     And certainly, the
    Belmontes can look to their lawyer, and the Nobises can
    look to their lawyer for those damages.
    But now we are in a situation where they're looking to
    the other party's lawyer, when they do not have the
    unique attorney/client relationship. So – and the Court
    goes on to say [in Innes,] we have never held that a non-
    A-2890-16T1
    7
    client is entitled to a fee-shifting award for an attorney's
    negligence.
    ....
    There's – there's not authority for finding an
    attorney/client relationship. There . . . could be a
    finding that a – fiduciary obligation was breached, but
    that does not necessarily . . . flow from there that the
    attorney/client relationship allowing the recoupment of
    attorney's fees would be permissible. And I note that
    everybody's attorney is already in this case.
    Prior to trial, scheduled for February 6, 2017, all of the claims were
    dismissed except for the Nobises' and the Belmontes' claim against Bogaard.
    Before trial commenced, the Nobises settled their claims against Bogaard.
    Now on appeal, the Belmontes allege the following points of error:
    POINT I
    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
    BOGAARD     DEFENDANTS'    MOTION    FOR
    PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST THE
    BELMONTES BECAUSE (A) THE TRIAL COURT
    COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY HOLDING
    THAT AS A MATTER OF LAW A SELLER OF REAL
    ESTATE CANNOT MAINTAIN A CAUSE OF
    ACTION FOR PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE
    AGAINST THE BUYER'S ATTORNEY AND (B)
    MATERIAL DISPUTED FACTS TAKEN IN A
    LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE BELMONTES
    PROHIBIT GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
    A.    THE    TRIAL   COURT    COMMITTED
    REVERSIBLE ERROR BY HOLDING THAT
    AS A MATTER OF LAW A SELLER OF REAL
    A-2890-16T1
    8
    PROPERTY CANNOT MAINTAIN A CAUSE
    OF   ACTION    FOR   PROFESSIONAL
    NEGLIGENCE AGAINST THE REAL ESTATE
    BUYER'S ATTORNEY.
    B.    MATERIAL DISPUTED FACTS TAKEN IN A
    LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE
    BELMONTES     PROHIBIT   GRANTING
    SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THOSE
    FACTS TAKEN IN A LIGHT MOST
    FAVORABLE TO THE NON-MOVING
    PARTY PROVIDE SUFFICIENT FACTS TO
    CONCLUDE    THAT    THE  BOGAARD
    RESPONDENTS BREACHED THEIR DUTY
    OF CARE OWED TO THE BELMONTES AND
    THAT THE BOGAARD'S BREACH OF DUTY
    PROXIMATELY CAUSED DAMAGES TO
    THE BELMONTES.
    POINT II
    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING THE
    BOGAARD DEFENDANTS' PARTIAL SUMMARY
    JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE BELMONTE'S
    CLAIM FOR RECOVERY OF FEES AND COSTS
    INCURRED IN PROSECUTING THE CLAIMS
    AGAINST THE BOGAARD DEFENDANTS.
    I.
    We review summary judgment decisions de novo, applying the same
    standard used by the trial court. Rowe v. Mazel Thirty, LLC, 
    209 N.J. 35
    , 41
    (2012) (citing Henry v. N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., 
    204 N.J. 320
    , 330 (2010)).
    Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine issue of material fact
    exists, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the non -moving
    A-2890-16T1
    9
    party, and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. 
    Ibid.
     (citing
    Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 
    142 N.J. 520
    , 529 (1995)); R. 4:46-2(c).
    Any issue of material fact has to be "genuine."           Brill, 
    142 N.J. at 529
    .
    "[Q]uestions of law [are] particularly suited for summary judgment." Badiali v.
    N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Grp., 
    220 N.J. 544
    , 555 (2015) (citation omitted). Such is the
    case in this appeal.
    In order to succeed on a legal malpractice claim, the proponents must
    establish: (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship that creates a duty
    of care upon the attorney; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) proximate causation of
    the damages claimed by the plaintiff; and (4) actual damages. See Cortez v.
    Gindhart, 
    435 N.J. Super. 589
    , 598 (App. Div. 2014); see also Sommers v.
    McKinney, 
    287 N.J. Super. 1
    , 9-10 (App. Div. 1996).
    Not surprisingly, where no attorney-client relationship exists, the standard
    is considerably more stringent. The duty owed by counsel to a non-client
    requires close scrutiny—"balancing the attorney's duty to represent clients
    vigorously, [RPC 1.3], with the duty not to provide misleading information on
    which third parties foreseeably will rely, [RPC 4.1]." Petrillo, 
    139 N.J. at 479
    .
    In Petrillo, the Supreme Court recognized that "[t]he determination of the
    existence of a duty is a question of law for the court.” 
    Id. at 479
    . Furthermore,
    A-2890-16T1
    10
    "attorneys may owe a duty of care to non-clients when the attorneys know, or
    should know, that non-clients will rely on the attorneys['] representations and
    the non-clients are not too remote from the attorneys to be entitled to protection."
    
    Id. at 483-84
    .
    Nonetheless, the nature of the relationship between the attorney and the
    non-client is critical to the determination. Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 
    184 N.J. 161
    , 180 (2005). "[I]f the attorney does absolutely nothing to induce
    reasonable reliance by a third party, there is no relationship to substitute for the
    privity requirement." 
    Ibid.
     As the Court phrased it, "the invitation to rely and
    reliance are the linchpins of attorney liability to third parties." 
    Id. at 180-81
    .
    Indeed, in determining the nature of privity between third parties and an
    attorney, the latter's duty is limited to those situations in which the attorney
    intended or should have foreseen that the third party would rely on the lawyer's
    work. Petrillo 
    139 N.J. at 482
    . The attorney must have withheld information or
    made outright misrepresentations knowing that the non-client will rely on the
    information. 
    Ibid.
    In this case, the Belmontes were represented by their own attorney.
    Communications regarding the upcoming closing took place between counsel,
    not between the Bogaard defendants and the sellers. From this record, it seems
    A-2890-16T1
    11
    clear that other than seeing Bogaard's letters to Lane, there was no direct
    communication between the Bogaard defendants and the sellers. The Belmontes
    did not even attend the closing. In fact, when Steven spoke to the Nobises on
    the phone, he attempted to reassure them about the mold problem, about which
    his own attorney had initially claimed no knowledge.
    To state that no duty of care existed between the Bogaard defendants and
    the Belmontes under these circumstances is to state the obvious. The Belmontes
    claim that the Bogaard defendants misrepresented to the Belmontes' attorney
    that Bogaard had discussed the mold condition and the related warranty with the
    Nobises, and that it was acceptable to them. This mischaracterizes the record.
    No mention of the mold was made in Bogaard's February 24, 2011 letter.
    Bogaard was merely attempting to update the Belmontes' attorney as to the status
    of the sale. Nothing in that letter indicated she had discussed the mold condition
    or the warranty with the Nobises.
    As we have said, Lane initially denied knowledge of any mold problem.
    When on February 28, 2011, Bogaard wrote again requesting all the paperwork
    regarding mold remediation along with a copy of the warranty, nothing was
    forthcoming before or at the closing. Bogaard did not know the extent of the
    mold condition, nor did she make any representations on which the Belmontes
    A-2890-16T1
    12
    relied. The record presented to the judge who decided the motion for summary
    judgment did not include any genuine disputes of material fact. The Bogaard
    defendants were not party to the telephone conference during which Steven
    appeared to have minimized, at least according to the Nobises, the extent of the
    mold condition.
    The judge did not err by granting the motion. To have done otherwise
    would have distorted the meaning of Petrillo. That case simply did not make
    attorneys liable to third parties represented by their own counsel for any alleged
    malpractice in circumstances such as these.
    II.
    The Belmontes also challenge the award of summary judgment on their
    request for counsel fees, based on Saffer v. Willoughby, 
    143 N.J. 256
    , 271
    (1996). However, as the Supreme Court pronounced in Innes, attorney's fees
    and costs are not recoverable by a non-client against a lawyer in a negligence
    case. See Innes v. Marzano-Lesnevich, 
    224 N.J. 584
    , 597 (2016). The Innes
    Court reiterated that departures from the American rule are the exception, and
    that a non-client is not entitled to a fee-shifting award for an attorney's alleged
    negligence. 
    Ibid.
    Affirmed.
    A-2890-16T1
    13