STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. CHARLES GUEST (13-01-0201, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2018 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-4609-16T2
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    CHARLES GUEST,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________________
    Submitted October 22, 2018 – Decided December 20, 2018
    Before Judges Sabatino and Sumners.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 13-01-0201.
    Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
    appellant (John V. Molitor, Designated Counsel, on the
    brief).
    Mary Eva Colalillo, Camden County Prosecutor,
    attorney for respondent (Patrick D. Isbill, Assistant
    Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    In his post-conviction relief (PCR) petition, defendant charged that
    following his guilty plea to first-degree manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1),
    his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance at his sentencing by failing to
    present several character witnesses and argue certain mitigating factors in an
    effort to reduce his plea agreement's recommended sentence of eighteen years
    subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. He now
    appeals the PCR judge's order denying his petition without an evidentiary
    hearing, arguing:
    POINT I
    THE LAW DIVISION SHOULD NOT HAVE HELD
    DEFENDANT'S    PETITION  FOR[]    POST-
    CONVICTION RELIEF WAS PROCEDURALLY
    BARRED PURSUANT TO COURT RULE 3:22-2.
    POINT II
    THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL
    COURT'S DECISION TO DENY DEFENDANT'S
    PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF AND
    REMAND THE MATTER FOR AN EVIDENTIARY
    HEARING.
    We agree with defendant that his petition should not have been
    procedurally barred. We affirm, however, because we agree with the judge's
    determination that the alleged mitigating factors were not supported by the
    A-4609-16T2
    2
    record, and even if the witnesses testified in accordance with their certifications
    submitted in support of PCR, the judge would have still imposed the eighteen-
    year sentence.
    In the early morning hours of September 4, 2011, defendant went to the
    apartment of Ashley Williams. Admittedly intoxicated at the time, defendant
    claimed they engaged in consensual sex. At some point, apparently to heighten
    her sexual experience, she requested he choke her, and he complied. According
    to defendant, they had previously engaged in rough sex. Possibly due to his
    inebriation, he maintained that he went to sleep not aware that anything was
    wrong with Williams. When he woke up, he found her dead. But contending
    he was in shock, he did not call the police or anyone else to report her death.
    Instead, he went to a job interview at a fast food restaurant. After he returned
    to the apartment, he called the police to report Williams' death. An autopsy
    revealed that she died from blunt neck trauma.
    Defendant was arrested over a month later, and he was subsequently
    indicted for first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1), (2). Plea negotiations
    resulted in him pleading guilty to the downgraded offense of first-degree
    manslaughter in exchange for the State's recommendation that he serve an
    A-4609-16T2
    3
    eighteen-year NERA prison term.         The trial judge sentenced defendant in
    accordance with the plea agreement.
    Defendant filed a direct appeal, only challenging his sentence.            An
    excessive sentence panel of this court affirmed his sentence.         See State v.
    Charles R. Guest, No. A-2622-15 (App. Div. June 6, 2016).
    Almost three months later, defendant filed a PCR petition. He contended
    his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue mitigating factors two, five,
    nine, and twelve at his sentencing. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(2) (defendant did not
    contemplate his conduct would cause or threaten serious harm); -1(b)(5) (the
    victim induced or facilitated defendant's conduct); -1(b)(9) (defendant is
    unlikely to reoffend); and -1(b)(12) (defendant cooperated with law
    enforcement). In addition, he asserted trial counsel failed to consult with him
    to discuss the presentation of mitigating evidence at his sentencing, such as the
    four character witnesses who provided certifications evidencing his kind nature
    and volunteering efforts in his church and community.              Defendant also
    submitted a copy of the transcript of a statement by the medical examiner, whose
    autopsy of Williams concluded she died from blunt neck trauma, but indicated
    A-4609-16T2
    4
    he could not foreclose the possibility that "rough sex with somebody squeezing
    [her] neck," could have caused her death. 1
    The PCR judge, who had previously accepted defendant's plea and
    sentenced him, denied defendant relief without an evidentiary hearing. In his
    oral decision, the judge determined the PCR petition was procedurally barred
    because defendant should have raised his PCR arguments when he filed his
    direct appeal alleging his sentence was excessive. State v. Pierce, 
    115 N.J. Super. 346
    , 347 (App. Div. 1971); State v. Vance, 
    112 N.J. Super. 479
    , 481
    (App. Div. 1970).
    Nonetheless, the judge, applying the well-known standard set forth in
    Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687 (1984) and State v. Fritz, 
    105 N.J. 42
    , 58 (1987), addressed each of defendant's mitigation arguments and found
    there was no merit to the claim that counsel was ineffective.       Regarding
    mitigating factor two, the judge disagreed with defendant's contention that his
    action did not contemplate harm to Williams because choking her during rough
    sex could obviously cause serious harm. As for mitigating factor five, while
    Williams may have consented to rough sex, the judge found she did not induce
    1
    The statement was given based upon questioning from defendant's trial
    counsel prior to defendant's guilty plea.
    A-4609-16T2
    5
    or facilitate defendant's conduct because she did not consent to being strangled
    to the point of unconsciousness or death.      The judge maintained defendant
    violated Williams' trust by being so reckless as to manifest extreme indifference
    to human life. With respect to mitigating factor nine, the judge determined that
    defendant's criminal record and contact with the criminal justice system
    contradicts his contention that he is unlikely to reoffend in the future. And, the
    judge decided that mitigating factor twelve does not apply where defendant
    merely reported Williams' death, but did not help the police solve other crimes.
    State v. Dalziel, 
    182 N.J. Super. 494
    , 505-06 (2005); State v. Read, 
    397 N.J. Super. 598
    , 613 (App. Div. 2008). The judge further recognized that defendant's
    identification as being the last person seen with Williams was not a mystery,
    and when he initially spoke to the police, he tried to exculpate himself from
    liability.
    In addition, the judge determined that even if the character witnesses
    testified at sentencing, it would not have lessened defendant's sentence. The
    judge pointed to the favorable sentence that counsel negotiated with the State
    despite the evidence against defendant, and that Williams' family appeared at
    sentencing contending the sentence was too light.
    A-4609-16T2
    6
    Since the judge found there was no prima facie evidence of ineffective
    assistance of counsel, defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. State
    v. Preciose, 
    129 N.J. 451
    , 462 (1992); State v. Cummings, 
    321 N.J. Super. 154
    ,
    170 (App. Div. 1999).
    Based upon our review of the record, we take issue with the judge's
    determination that defendant's PCR petition contending ineffective assistance
    by counsel for not arguing mitigation at sentencing was procedurally barred by
    Rule 3:22-4(a) because he could have raised the assertion on direct appeal.
    Other than for enumerated exceptions, which do not apply here, Rule 3:22-4(a)2
    2
    Rule 3:22-4(a) provides:
    First Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. Any ground
    for relief not raised in the proceedings resulting in the
    conviction, or in a post-conviction proceeding brought
    and decided prior to the adoption of this rule, or in any
    appeal taken in any such proceedings is barred from
    assertion in a proceeding under this rule unless the
    court on motion or at the hearing finds:
    (1) that the ground for relief not previously asserted
    could not reasonably have been raised in any prior
    proceeding; or
    (2) that enforcement of the bar to preclude claims,
    including one for ineffective assistance of counsel,
    would result in fundamental injustice; or
    A-4609-16T2
    7
    bars a defendant from employing a PCR petition to assert a claim that could have
    been raised at trial or on direct appeal. See State v. Nash, 
    212 N.J. 518
    , 546
    (2013). However, because defendant only asserted that his trial counsel was
    ineffective in filing to provide evidence and argument in support of a sentence
    lighter than recommended in his plea agreement, the bar does not apply.
    Although we rejected his excessive sentence appeal, we did not address, nor
    could we in that proceeding, his PCR claims alleging that trial counsel was
    ineffective for not seeking a lighter sentence because such claims were outside
    the trial record. See Preciose, 
    129 N.J. at 460
     (1992).
    (3) that denial of relief would be contrary to a new rule
    of constitutional law under either the Constitution of
    the United States or the State of New Jersey.
    A ground could not reasonably have been raised in a
    prior proceeding only if defendant shows that the
    factual predicate for that ground could not have been
    discovered earlier through the exercise of reasonable
    diligence.
    A denial of relief would be contrary to a new rule of
    constitutional law only if the defendant shows that the
    claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made
    retroactive to defendant's petition by the United States
    Supreme Court or the Supreme Court of New Jersey,
    that was unavailable during the pendency of any prior
    proceedings.
    A-4609-16T2
    8
    Nevertheless, we agree with the judge's decision rejecting the merits of
    defendant's PCR contentions, and we affirm substantially for the sound reasons
    set forth in his oral decision.
    Affirmed.
    A-4609-16T2
    9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-4609-16T2

Filed Date: 12/20/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/20/2019