Princeton South Investors, LLC v. First American Title Insurance Insurance Company ( 2014 )


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  •                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-0850-12T3
    PRINCETON SOUTH INVESTORS, LLC,
    APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    September 8, 2014
    v.
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE
    COMPANY,
    Defendant-Respondent.
    _________________________________
    Argued January 22, 2014 – Decided September 8, 2014
    Before Judges Reisner, Ostrer and Carroll.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New
    Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County, Docket
    No. L-3122-11.
    Brian P. Flaherty of the Pennsylvania Bar,
    admitted pro hac vice, argued the cause for
    appellant (Cozen O'Connor, PC, attorneys;
    Mr. Flaherty and Diana J. Lin, on the
    brief).
    Robert L. Grundlock, Jr., argued the cause
    for respondent (Rubin, Ehrlich & Buckley,
    PC, attorneys; Mr. Grundlock, on the brief).
    The opinion of the court was delivered by
    REISNER, P.J.A.D.
    In   this   insurance   coverage    dispute,   plaintiff   Princeton
    South Investors (Princeton South or plaintiff) appeals from a
    trial court order dated September 28, 2012, granting summary
    judgment in favor of defendant First American Title Insurance
    Company (First American).     The case presents two issues:        in the
    context of a title insurance claim, whether a pending but as-
    yet-undecided tax appeal by a municipality, asserting that a
    property has been under-assessed, creates a defect in or an
    encumbrance on the property owner's title, or renders the title
    unmarketable; and, based on the policy language, whether the
    First American policy covered plaintiff's claim.         We answer both
    questions in the negative and, therefore, affirm the order on
    appeal.
    I
    To   summarize,    plaintiff       bought   foreclosed     commercial
    property at a sheriff's sale.1      The conditions of sale included a
    provision that the property was being sold "subject to . . .
    unpaid taxes or assessments." There were no delinquent taxes
    outstanding at the time of the sale or on the effective date of
    1
    Princeton South's parent company, Rubenstein Properties Fund
    LP, was the successful bidder at the sheriff's sale and
    negotiated the title policy. Rubenstein created Princeton South
    as an entity to take title to the property.     We will refer to
    Princeton South and Rubenstein, collectively, as plaintiff.
    2                             A-0850-12T3
    the First American title policy.                    However, plaintiff contends
    that municipal tax appeals covering several prior tax years,
    which     were     pending     at   the      time       it    bought    the    property,
    constituted a title defect covered by the policy.2                             Plaintiff
    cites no cases from this State or from any other jurisdictions
    that so hold.
    On the other hand, defendant cites case law from other
    jurisdictions that is both on point and persuasive.                             Defendant
    further relies on language in the title policy, both in terms of
    what    is   covered     and    what   is    excluded,         that,   read    together,
    convinces     us      that    the   policy       does    not    insure       against   the
    imposition       of   taxes    assessed      after      the    date    the    policy   was
    issued.
    2
    There is no dispute that before plaintiff closed on the
    property, its representatives knew that the tax assessment of
    the property was based on an unrealistically low value. Before
    closing on the property, plaintiff did not bring that
    information to First American's attention, ask the current owner
    or the municipal tax office about possible pending tax appeals,
    or order a tax search from the municipal tax office.         See
    N.J.S.A. 54:5-12.    While negotiating the terms of the title
    policy, but without disclosing its concerns about the low
    assessment, plaintiff asked First American to delete a policy
    exclusion for omitted or added assessments.      First American
    refused to do so. Plaintiff claims it had no actual knowledge
    that there were pending tax appeals, until after the closing
    occurred. On the record before us, there is a material dispute
    of fact as to that issue. If plaintiff knew about the pending
    tax appeals before the closing, its claim would probably be
    barred by a policy exclusion for known risks the insured
    voluntarily undertook without disclosing those risks to First
    American.
    3                                   A-0850-12T3
    II
    We review an order granting summary judgment de novo, using
    the same legal standard employed by the trial court.                         Henry v.
    N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., 
    204 N.J. 320
    , 330 (2010).                        Likewise,
    we owe no deference to the trial court's legal interpretations,
    including       its   construction    of       an    insurance     policy    or     other
    contract.       
    Ibid. A title insurance
    policy is a "'contract that protects a
    landowner against loss caused by defective title to the land.'"
    N.J. Lawyers' Fund for Client Prot. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co.,
    
    203 N.J. 208
    , 217 (2010) (quoting Shotmeyer v. N.J. Realty Title
    Ins. Co., 
    195 N.J. 72
    , 82 (2008)).                    Title insurance protects a
    buyer against the risk of defects that exist at the time the
    policy is purchased, but not against the risk of defects that
    may arise in the future.         
    Shotmeyer, supra
    , 195 N.J. at 82.                     "In
    that sense, title insurance covers 'a state of ownership at a
    specific point in time.'"            
    Ibid. (quoting 11 Couch
    on Insurance
    § 159:5 (3d ed. 1998)).
    Like other types of insurance, a title insurance policy
    should be "'liberally construed in favor of the insured and
    strictly    construed      against     the          insurer.'"       
    Ibid. (quoting Sandler v.
       N.J.   Realty   Title     Ins.       Co.,   
    36 N.J. 471
    ,    478-79
    (1962)).        However,   courts     will      enforce      the    title    insurance
    4                                     A-0850-12T3
    policy as written and will not rewrite a more favorable policy
    for the insured than the one purchased.                    See ibid.; Amidano v.
    Donnelly, 
    260 N.J. Super. 148
    , 154 (App. Div. 1992), certif.
    denied, 
    133 N.J. 435
    (1993).
    A.
    Before focusing on the title policy at issue in this case,
    it is helpful to consider the way annual property taxes are
    assessed in New Jersey.             First, the municipal tax assessor must
    assess    all   property       as    of    October    1    of    the   pretax     year.
    N.J.S.A.    54:4-23.       After      completing      the       preparation     of   the
    municipal tax assessment list, the assessor files the list with
    the County Board of Taxation (Board), which may examine, revise
    and correct the proposed assessments.                     N.J.S.A. 54:4-35.          The
    annual taxes on a particular property are set by multiplying the
    municipal   tax   rate     –   previously       set   by    the    Board   –    by   the
    property's assessed value.                See East Orange v. Palmer, 
    47 N.J. 307
    , 317 (1966).         The annual tax then "becomes due in four
    installments on February 1, May 1, August 1 and November 1." 
    Id. at 318.
    Once taxes are assessed, they give rise to a lien on the
    property which continues unless they are paid.                         See N.J.S.A.
    54:5-6 ("Taxes on lands shall be a continuous lien on the land
    on which they are assessed . . . ." (emphasis added)).                         "A lien
    5                                  A-0850-12T3
    arises against the real estate on which the taxes are assessed
    in the event of non-payment."                    S & R Assocs. v. Lynn Realty
    Corp., 
    338 N.J. Super. 350
    , 360 (App. Div. 2001).                        In Princeton
    Office Park v. Plymouth Park Tax Services, LLC, ___ N.J. ___,
    ___ (2014), the Court recently observed that N.J.S.A. 54:5-6
    "confers on a municipality . . . 'a continuous lien on the
    land'" for delinquent taxes, and provides that any subsequent
    delinquent taxes are added to the lien.                 Id. at ___ (slip op. at
    11) (quoting Simon v. Cronecker, 
    189 N.J. 304
    , 318 (2007)).
    Here, there were no delinquent taxes at the time First American
    issued    the   policy,    and    any      potential    taxes     that    might    have
    arisen in the future, following a successful tax appeal, had not
    yet been "assessed."          N.J.S.A. 54:5-6.
    If a taxpayer wishes to challenge the assessed valuation of
    the    taxpayer's     property,      or     if    a   taxing     district     "feel[s]
    discriminated against by the assessed valuation of property in
    the taxing district," N.J.S.A. 54:3-21(a)(1), the taxpayer or
    taxing district may file an appeal with the Board.                            N.J.S.A.
    54:3-21(a)(1).        If the assessed valuation of the property is in
    excess of $1,000,000, the complaint can be filed directly in the
    Tax Court, provided it is filed "on or before April 1, or 45
    days     from   the    date    the        bulk    mailing   of    notification        of
    assessment      is    completed      in    the    taxing    district      .   .   .   ."
    6                                 A-0850-12T3
    N.J.S.A.       54:3-21(a)(1).        Here,    the   municipality    filed       its
    appeals for this property for tax years 2009, 2010, and 2011,
    directly with the Tax Court.              See N.J.S.A. 54:51A-2.           If the
    municipality prevails on its appeal, the Tax Court will "enter
    judgment revising the taxable value of the property."                  N.J.S.A.
    54:51A-6(a).          Based on that revised taxable value, additional
    taxes may be assessed which, if not paid, will give rise to a
    lien.       See S & R 
    Assocs., supra
    , 338 N.J. Super. at 360.
    In addition to the regular annual tax assessments, the tax
    statutes make provisions for omitted or added assessments.                      The
    term "omitted assessment" refers to a situation where properties
    have    been     inadvertently,      or   intentionally    but     incorrectly,
    omitted from an annual assessment.
    In any year or in the next succeeding
    year, the county board of taxation may, in
    accordance with the provisions of this act,
    assess any taxable property omitted from the
    assessment for the particular year.
    [N.J.S.A. 54:4-63.12.]
    An    "added    assessment"   taxes    improvements   to    real    estate
    that are substantially ready for their intended use after the
    assessor has completed the annual October 1 assessment.
    [W]hen any parcel of real property contains
    any building or other structure which has
    been erected, added to or improved after
    October 1 in any year and completed before
    January 1 following, the assessor shall,
    after examination and inquiry, determine the
    7                               A-0850-12T3
    taxable value of such parcel of real
    property as of the first day of the month
    following completion . . . and . . . if such
    value so determined exceeds the assessment
    made   as  of   October   1  preceding,  the
    assessor, shall enter the amount of . . .
    such excess, as an assessment or an added
    assessment against such parcel of real
    property, for the subsequent tax year in a
    list to be known as the "Added Assessment
    List, 19 . . . " (inserting the name of the
    year in which the assessment is made); . . .
    . In addition, the assessor shall enter in
    such added assessment list an assessment for
    that portion of the pretax year between the
    first day of the month following completion
    . . . and December 31 to be determined by
    multiplying the amount of such assessment or
    such excess by the number of whole months
    remaining in the pretax year after the
    completion . . . of said property, and by
    dividing the result by 12.
    [N.J.S.A. 54:4-63.2.]
    The    tax   statutes     give   prospective      purchasers    of    real
    property a means of protecting themselves against unanticipated
    assessments or outstanding taxes at the time of purchase.                   By
    statute,   ordering   a     municipal    tax   lien    search   protects     a
    prospective   buyer   against    assessments     not    disclosed    in    the
    search.    Within fifteen days after receiving a search request
    and the required fee, the tax official must
    issue a certificate certifying the taxes,
    assessments or other municipal liens or
    charges, levied or assessed against the
    property described in the application, which
    are liens thereon at the date of the
    certificate.   He shall include therein all
    unpaid     installments    of    assessments
    8                              A-0850-12T3
    theretofore levied and in force, whether due
    or not . . . .
    [N.J.S.A. 54:5-12.]
    The purchaser is thereafter protected against municipal liens
    not disclosed on the certificate:
    A   bona  fide  purchaser,   lessee  or
    mortgagee who shall acquire for a valuable
    consideration an interest in lands covered
    by an official tax search and in reliance on
    said search shall hold such interest free
    from any municipal lien . . . not shown on
    that search.
    [N.J.S.A. 54:5-17.]
    At least one case also holds that a municipality's failure
    to disclose its pending appeal of a tax assessment, in response
    to a prospective purchaser's tax search request, will preclude
    the municipality from collecting additional taxes based on the
    appeal.    Go-Lit Realty Co. of N.J. v. City of Jersey City, 
    120 N.J.L. 592
    , 594 (Sup. Ct. 1938).              Thus, the Legislature has
    required municipalities to "turn square corners" by disclosing
    in a tax search financial information that would be important to
    a prospective purchaser in deciding whether to buy the property.
    Ibid.; see Belles v. East Amwell Twp., 
    178 N.J. Super. 63
    , 73-
    74,   2   N.J.   Tax   103,   112-13   (Tax   1981)   (municipality   must
    disclose in a tax search report the "virtual certainty [] of an
    omitted assessment"); F.M.C. Stores Co. v. Borough of Morris
    9                         A-0850-12T3
    Plains,    
    100 N.J. 418
    ,   427    (1985)     (discussing       square     corners
    doctrine).3
    B.
    Against     that    background,      we    consider     the    First     American
    title    policy.        The   policy    protects        plaintiff    from     "Covered
    Risks"    subject   to    certain      exclusions.         The    pertinent     policy
    language    provides     coverage      for     "[a]ny    defect     in   or   lien    or
    encumbrance on the Title.4          This Covered Risk includes but is not
    limited to insurance against loss from" a list of stated risks.
    3
    In this case, rather than ordering a municipal tax search,
    plaintiff's counsel simply called the municipal tax office to
    inquire about any outstanding taxes.    In so noting, we are not
    implying that counsel was negligent.       Due to the upcoming
    sheriff's sale, at which plaintiff needed to place a bid or lose
    the chance to buy the property, time was of the essence.
    Plaintiff might have decided to take a calculated business risk
    by having its counsel perform a telephone inquiry rather than
    waiting for the results of a municipal tax search.
    4
    First American's Underwriting Library, a copy of which is
    included in appellant's appendix, contains a list of definitions
    applicable to its policies. The Library defines "defect" as: "A
    blemish, imperfection or deficiency.   A defective title is one
    that is irregular and faulty."       The term "encumbrance" is
    defined as: "A claim, right, or lien upon the title to real
    estate, held by someone other than the real estate owner."
    (Emphasis added). In turn, "claim" is defined as: "A right to
    assert, or the assertion of, a demand for payment of money due,
    or the surrender or delivery of possession of property or the
    recognition of some right.     A demand for something as one's
    rightful due."   A "lien" is defined as: "The liability of real
    estate as security for payment of a debt. Such liability may be
    created by contract, such as a mortgage, or by operation of law,
    such as a mechanics lien."
    10                                   A-0850-12T3
    Those   stated    risks      include    unpaid    taxes   that   were   due   and
    payable, but unpaid, at the time the policy took effect:
    SUBJECT TO THE EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE, THE
    EXCEPTIONS    FROM  COVERAGE   CONTAINED   IN
    SCHEDULE   B,   AND  THE  CONDITIONS,   FIRST
    AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY . . .
    insures, as of Date of Policy . . . against
    loss or damage, not exceeding the Amount of
    Insurance, sustained or incurred by the
    Insured by reason of:
    . . . .
    2. Any defect in or lien or encumbrance on
    the Title.   This covered Risk includes but
    is not limited to insurance against loss
    from
    . . . .
    (b) The lien of real estate taxes or
    assessments imposed on the Title by a
    governmental authority due or payable, but
    unpaid.
    . . . .
    3. Unmarketable Title.
    [Emphasis added.]
    The next section of the policy is entitled "Exclusions from
    Coverage" and specifically excepts from coverage: "Any lien on
    the   Title    for    real     estate   taxes    or   assessments   imposed    by
    governmental authority and created or attaching between Date of
    Policy and the date of recording of the deed."                   Paragraph 3(d)
    of the Exclusions section also excepts from coverage: "Defects,
    11                             A-0850-12T3
    liens, encumbrances, adverse claims, or other matters . . . (d)
    attaching or created subsequent to Date of Policy."
    An     additional     section    entitled   "Schedule     B"   details
    Exceptions from Coverage, including:
    [T]he Company will not pay loss or damage,
    costs, attorney's fees or expenses that
    arise by reason of:
    . . . .
    2. Lien of unpaid taxes for the year 2011.
    Taxes are paid through the 2nd quarter of
    2011.   2011 3rd quarter taxes, a lien, due
    but not delinquent.
    . . . .
    3. Subject to added or omitted assessments
    pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:4-63.1 et seq. not
    yet due and payable.
    [Emphasis added.]
    It is clearly inferable from Exclusion 3(d), particularly read
    together   with   the    other   policy   provisions   that   specifically
    address taxes, that the policy does not cover tax liens created
    after the policy was written.
    III
    We     turn   next   to   plaintiff's   central    argument    on   this
    appeal.    Plaintiff claims that the municipality's pending tax
    appeals, in themselves, create a defect in or encumbrance on its
    12                            A-0850-12T3
    title, or render the title unmarketable.5                       Plaintiff contends
    that the appeals cloud the title, because they have the capacity
    to eventually result in a higher assessment of the property,
    which in turn would result in the imposition of additional taxes
    which, if unpaid, will become a lien on the property.
    Plaintiff's     argument,    however,           proves    too   much.            The
    underlying    issue    in   the    tax    appeals       is     the   alleged     under-
    valuation     of     plaintiff's     property          by    the     tax    assessor.
    Accepting    plaintiff's     argument          would    mean    that    any      time    a
    property was assigned too low a value by the tax assessor, the
    property's title would be considered defective or unmarketable
    due to the risk of a tax appeal and a reassessment.                              But to
    intelligently insure against such a risk, a title insurer would
    have to research the assessed value of every property to be
    insured, and analyze its potential for a tax appeal and a higher
    revaluation.       Plaintiff did not present an expert report to the
    trial court – and cites no legal authority on this appeal – to
    support the proposition that a title insurer has a duty to make
    such an analysis.       Further, we consider it likely that imposing
    such    a   new    obligation     could    drive        up   the     cost   of    title
    insurance.        See 
    Shotmeyer, supra
    , 195 N.J. at 83 (stating that
    5
    For purposes of this opinion, we refer to the existence of any
    of these title problems as a "cloud" on the title.
    13                                   A-0850-12T3
    "because insurance premiums and coverage provisions are based on
    predictable      levels       of   risk,   title    insurers      need   to     rely    on
    certain    consistent         conditions    in     order     to   calculate     premium
    rates reliably").6
    Pursuing         plaintiff's     argument        further    only   reveals       its
    additional weakness.               Taxes do not actually become a lien on
    property until they are assessed.                  See N.J.S.A. 54:5-6.            Until
    then, they are only a potential expense which the owner may have
    to   pay   in    the     future.      Future     assessments,        however,    cannot
    logically be considered a cloud on title, because taxes are a
    known, predictable, constantly-recurring phenomenon.                      Taxes will
    be assessed on plaintiff's property this year, next year, and on
    into the future ad infinitum.              If a property's potential for the
    future assessment of taxes were considered a cloud on title, it
    would be impossible to pass marketable title to any property.
    As the court explained in Keown v. West Jersey Title &
    Guarantee       Co.,    161   N.J.    Super.     19,    23   (App.    Div.),    certif.
    denied, 
    78 N.J. 405
    (1978):
    A marketable title is one that is relatively
    free from doubt, such that in a suit for
    6
    Moreover, if the property's condition of being under-assessed
    were a title defect, this was a risk plaintiff knew about before
    it bid on the property, and which it failed to disclose to First
    American.    Hence, it would probably fall under the policy
    exception for known risks which the prospective insured failed
    to disclose to the insurer.
    14                                   A-0850-12T3
    specific performance a court would compel
    the prospective purchaser to accept the
    title. 4 American Law of Property § 18.7 at
    670 (1952).    If it is reasonably probable
    that the purchaser would be exposed to
    litigation   not   of  a   frivolous    nature
    concerning the title, or would have to bring
    an action to quiet title, then specific
    performance   would   be   denied    to    the
    prospective seller and the title would be
    considered unmarketable.
    A municipality's tax appeal is not "litigation . . . concerning
    the    title"    to     property,     such       as,    for    example,    a    suit    to
    foreclose an existing lien, challenge a boundary, or enforce
    "restrictive covenants on the use of the property."                           
    Id. at 23-
    24.         Rather,   a   tax    appeal      is    litigation         challenging      the
    property's      valuation       for   tax    purposes.          See    N.J.S.A.      54:3-
    21(a)(1).
    In     support     of    its   appeal,          plaintiff      cites    the     Law
    Division's opinion in Bel-Air Motel Corp. v. Title Insurance
    Corp., 
    183 N.J. Super. 551
    (Law Div. 1981).                     That case concerned
    an omitted assessment for a local sewer improvement, a condition
    that   would     be     specifically        excluded      by   the     First    American
    policy.       By statute, the local improvement assessment became a
    lien "upon confirmation by the governing body, or by the court."
    N.J.S.A. 40:56-33.7            In other words, as soon as the governing
    7
    The statute was amended in 2002. L. 2002, c. 15, § 2.                         We quote
    the version in effect in 1981.
    15                                  A-0850-12T3
    body    confirmed         the    assessment     for    the    sewer     improvement,     it
    became       a     lien     "upon      the    real     estate        described    in    the
    assessment."         N.J.S.A. 40:56-33.            The assessment in Bel-Air was
    confirmed in 1967, three years before the plaintiff bought the
    property in 1970, but the assessment was invalidated in 1968,
    and    a   reassessment          was   not    completed       until    1976.      
    Bel-Air, supra
    , 183 N.J. Super. at 552.
    The       court      observed     that      N.J.S.A.        54:5-18.1     required
    municipalities to provide "official certificates of searches as
    to     municipal         improvements        authorized       by     ordinance    of    the
    municipality but not assessed."                    
    Id. at 554.8
             The court also
    observed that, by statute, one who acquires land in reliance on
    such a certificate showing no assessment, takes the land free
    from any subsequent municipal lien for improvements.                           
    Id. at 554
    (citing          N.J.S.A.       54:5-18.5).           Based     on     those     statutory
    provisions,         the     court      reasoned       that     the     Legislature      had
    recognized that an enacted assessment ordinance created a defect
    8
    This section applies to assessments that are certain to be
    imposed, even if not presently quantified in amount: "[T]he
    governing body of each municipality shall provide by resolution
    for the making of official certificates of searches as to
    municipal   improvements   authorized   by  ordinance   of   the
    municipality, but not assessed, affecting any parcel or tract of
    land in said municipality in that a future assessment will be
    made thereon pursuant to such ordinance."     N.J.S.A. 54:5-18.1
    (emphasis added).
    16                                  A-0850-12T3
    in title as to the properties subject to the assessment, even if
    the amount of the assessment was not yet approved.
    In reaching that conclusion the judge reasoned that "[a]
    'defect'   in   a   title   is   something   different   from   a   'lien   or
    encumbrance,'" and could be considered as "'the want or absence
    of something necessary for completeness or perfection.'"              
    Id. at 555
    (quoting McMinn v. Damurjian, 
    105 N.J. Super. 132
    , 139 (Ch.
    Div. 1969)).        See also Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Greenlands
    Realty L.L.C., 
    58 F. Supp. 2d 370
    , 382 (D.N.J. 1999) (noting
    that a defect "is something less than 'unmarketability.'").                  He
    concluded that a defect existed due to the certainty of the
    assessment:
    I   conclude   a   title    defect   affecting
    plaintiff's property existed in 1970 when it
    was purchased; it was created in 1967 when
    the improvement was completed and therefore
    prior to the purchase and the issuance of
    the defendant's policy.     The ordinance was
    effective whether or not the commissioners'
    report had been filed.     The fact that the
    local improvement had been completed made
    the eventual assessment of the property a
    certainty. The only question then remaining
    was the amount of the assessment.     Bel-Air,
    therefore, bought its property subject to a
    liability:   the   obligation    to  pay   the
    assessment when its amount was fixed, an
    obligation which would ripen into a lien
    when the assessment was confirmed.         The
    Legislature recognized the fact that the
    local improvement ordinance itself created a
    title defect when it adopted N.J.S.A. 54:5-
    18.1,   mandating   searches   for   municipal
    improvements   not   assessed   in  order   to
    17                             A-0850-12T3
    protect prospective purchasers of property.
    The ordinance contains a description of the
    areas in the municipality in which the
    improvement was to be constructed.           If
    examined,   it   would   have    revealed   the
    liability to which plaintiff's property was
    subject.   The fact that this property was
    not included in the list of assessments
    which accompanied the initial report of the
    assessment commissioners is of no moment.
    The ordinance provided appropriate notice
    that   it    was   subject    to    assessment.
    Furthermore, N.J.S.A. 40:56-33 makes the
    omission immaterial; it states that the
    assessment is a lien "notwithstanding any
    mistake in the name or names of any owner."
    [
    Bel-Air, supra
    , 183 N.J. Super. at 555-56
    (emphasis added).]
    The court also reasoned that the title was unmarketable
    because the "property was subject to a definite liability.                              It
    would     be    assessed     for     part       of   the     cost    of   the      local
    improvement,"         and   "[t]he      assessment,        when    confirmed,      would
    become a lien against the property."                 
    Id. at 557
    (first emphasis
    added, second emphasis in the original).
    Bel-Air is not binding on this court and we need not decide
    whether    it     was   correctly       decided.       It     is    distinguishable,
    because it addressed a local assessment that was a certainty,
    based     on    the     passage    of     a     municipal     ordinance     and       the
    installation of a physical improvement affecting the property.
    See Strass v. District-Realty Title Ins. Corp., 
    358 A.2d 251
    ,
    258 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976) (holding that "the assessments in
    18                                   A-0850-12T3
    this case were not encumbrances until they were inevitable").
    By contrast, the case before us concerns additional taxes that
    have not been assessed and may never be assessed.                      We also find
    the case inapplicable here, for the same reasons we find that
    un-assessed property taxes generally are not a cloud on title.
    All future taxes are a potential lien on property; the fact that
    their imposition is "inevitable" does not make them clouds on
    title for purposes of title insurance.
    We     also    reject    plaintiff's       invitation     to    construe      an
    exception to the First American policy for added or omitted
    taxes as an implied extension of coverage for other types of
    future assessments.            See Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 
    81 N.J. 233
    ,    247    (1979).         Instead     of    inferring   coverage        from   the
    language of this exception, we look first to the affirmative
    statement of coverage for taxes.                  That language is limited to
    the "lien" of taxes which have already been assessed and are
    "due and payable but unpaid."               The potential additional taxes,
    which   might        be    assessed   if   the    municipality        wins   its    tax
    appeals, do not fit any of the quoted criteria.
    While it may be argued that the paragraph covering taxes
    due and owing but unpaid, is part of a non-exclusive list of
    covered       title       defects,    policy     exclusion     3(d)    specifically
    excludes from coverage liens and other title defects "attaching
    19                                 A-0850-12T3
    or created" after the date of the policy.           The fact that a
    policy exception also specifically excepts from coverage added
    or omitted assessments serves, at most, to emphasize that future
    taxes are not covered.9
    Our conclusion, that the First American policy does not
    cover the pending municipal tax appeals, is supported by out-of-
    State authority holding that "the mere prospect of future taxes"
    is insufficient to create an encumbrance or other covered title
    defect under a policy of title insurance.       Rhone v. First Am.
    Title Ins. Co., 
    928 N.E.2d 1185
    , 1195 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
    "[I]n the context of a title insurance policy, we reject the
    Rhones' reliance on a broad use of the term 'encumbrance' to
    bring their claim regarding unassessed and unlevied [property]
    taxes within the title policy."    
    Id. at 1194.10
    9
    The record does not reflect when this provision became part of
    the standard policy. It may have been added in response to the
    Bel-Air decision.   Or it may have been a response to 
    Belles, supra
    , a Tax Court decision stating that, to be consistent with
    the purpose of the legislation authorizing omitted assessments,
    they are considered liens as of the tax year in which they
    should have been assessed.    
    Belles, supra
    , 178 N.J. Super. at
    
    68-69, 2 N.J. Tax at 107-08
    .
    10
    In Rhone, the court recognized that "[e]ncumbrances 'include
    not merely liens such as mortgages, judgment liens, [or] taxes
    *** but also attachments, leases, inchoate dower rights, water
    rights, easements, restrictions on use, or any right in a third
    party which diminishes the value or limits the use of the land
    granted.'" 
    Id. at 1190
    (citations omitted).
    20                        A-0850-12T3
    The Utah Supreme Court cogently addressed the issue in the
    following language, which we find persuasive:
    Unlike other insurance contracts, title
    insurance does not insure against future
    events. Thus, in order for a defect, lien,
    or encumbrance to fall within the insurance
    policy's coverage, it must have been in
    existence as of the effective date of the
    policy.     At   a   minimum,   an  existing
    assessment that has been recorded would be
    considered a defect in the title and would
    be covered unless it had been otherwise
    exempted or excluded.    The more difficult
    question, and the one before us now, is
    whether   the   recorded   notice   of   the
    possibility of a future assessment also
    rises to the level of a defect, lien, or
    encumbrance. We conclude that it does not.
    [Vestin Mortg., Inc. v. First Am. Title Ins.
    Co., 
    139 P.3d 1055
    , 1057 (Utah 2006)
    (footnote omitted) (citing 43 Am. Jur. 2d
    Insurance § 529 (2003)).]
    See also Edwards v. St. Paul Title Ins. Co., 
    563 P.2d 979
    , 980-
    81 (Colo. App. 1977) (holding that "the prospect of taxes in the
    future was not a lien, encumbrance, or defect as of the date of
    issuance of the policy" and did not affect the marketability of
    the title); Butcher v. Burton Abstract Title Co., 
    216 N.W.2d 434
    , 436-37 (Mich. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 
    419 U.S. 998
    , 95 S.
    Ct. 314, 
    42 L. Ed. 2d 293
    (1974).
    In   conclusion,   summary   judgment   was   properly   granted,
    because (a) the pending tax appeals did not render the title
    unmarketable or constitute a defect in or encumbrance on the
    21                          A-0850-12T3
    title, and (b) the First American policy, by its terms, did not
    cover the potential future lien of taxes that might be assessed
    after the policy was issued.11
    Affirmed.
    11
    To the extent not specifically addressed here, plaintiff's
    arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in
    a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
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