Khashayar Vosough, M.D. v. Roger Kierce, M.D. , 437 N.J. Super. 218 ( 2014 )


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  •                     NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-3017-11T1
    KHASHAYAR VOSOUGH, M.D., an
    APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
    individual, CHARLES G. HADDAD,
    M.D., an individual, MAHIPA                  August 27, 2014
    PALLIMULLA, M.D., an individual,
    and COMPREHENSIVE WOMEN'S                   APPELLATE DIVISION
    HEALTHCARE, P.C., a corporation
    of the State of New Jersey,
    Plaintiffs-Respondents/
    Cross-Appellants,
    v.
    ROGER KIERCE, M.D., an individual,
    WILLIAM A. MCDONALD, an individual,
    ST. JOSEPH'S REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
    a New Jersey non-profit corporation,
    Defendants-Appellants/
    Cross-Respondents,
    and
    MARIAN H. SPEID, ESQ., an individual,
    Defendant.
    __________________________________________
    Argued May 12, 2014 – Decided August 27, 2014
    Before Judges Yannotti, Ashrafi, and Leone.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No.
    L-6420-09.
    Lance J. Kalik argued the cause for
    appellants/cross-respondents Roger Kierce,
    M.D., and William A. McDonald (Riker Danzig
    Scherer Hyland & Perretti, L.L.P.,
    attorneys; Mr. Kalik, of counsel and on the
    joint brief; Tracey K. Wishert and John
    Atkin, on the joint brief).
    Thomas E. Hastings argued the cause for
    appellant/cross-respondent St. Joseph's
    Regional Medical Center (Smith, Stratton,
    Wise, Heher & Brennan, L.L.P., attorneys;
    Mr. Hastings, of counsel and on the joint
    brief; Kimberly M. Parson, on the joint
    brief).
    Barry D. Epstein argued the cause for
    respondents/cross-appellants (The Epstein
    Law Firm, P.A., attorneys; Mr. Epstein, of
    counsel and on the brief; George B. Forbes
    and Michael A. Rabasca, on the brief).
    The opinion of the court was delivered by
    ASHRAFI, J.A.D.
    In this lawsuit for breach of contract and tortious
    interference with contract and economic advantage, plaintiffs
    are three doctors specializing in obstetrics and gynecology,
    Khashayar Vosough, M.D., Charles G. Haddad, M.D., and Mahipa
    Pallimulla, M.D., and also their medical practice, Comprehensive
    Women's Healthcare, P.C. ("CWH" or "CWHC").   Defendants are St.
    Joseph's Regional Medical Center located in Paterson, its chief
    executive officer, William A. McDonald, and the chairman of its
    department of obstetrics and gynecology, Roger Kierce, M.D.
    2                          A-3017-11T1
    After a sixteen-day trial, defendants appeal from the
    jury's verdict awarding $423,026.33 against each of the three
    defendants, totaling $1,269,079.     Plaintiffs cross-appeal from
    exclusion of their expert testimony alleging a higher amount of
    future anticipated losses, and the trial court's denial of their
    claims for punitive damages and prejudgment interest.     We
    reverse the judgment and dismiss the cross-appeal.
    I.
    Plaintiffs filed a four-count complaint in 2009 alleging
    breach of contract by the hospital, tortious interference with
    contract and with prospective economic advantage by the
    individual defendants, and respondeat superior liability of the
    hospital for the negligent conduct of the individual defendants.1
    The negligence allegations did not survive the trial and are not
    an issue on appeal.2   The jury awarded damages against the
    hospital for breach of contract and against the individual
    defendants for the tortious interference counts of plaintiffs'
    complaint.
    1
    "Respondeat superior liability" means "vicarious liability" for
    the wrongful conduct of an employee or agent. See Davis v.
    Devereux Foundation, 
    209 N.J. 269
    , 287 n.2 (2012).
    2
    The trial court also dismissed plaintiffs' claims against a
    third individual defendant, Marian Speid, who was legal counsel
    to the hospital.
    3                             A-3017-11T1
    To summarize plaintiffs' lawsuit, we quote directly from
    the preliminary statement in their brief on this appeal:
    This appeal and cross-appeal follow a
    verdict in favor of a medical group CWH and
    its shareholders against a defendant
    hospital and two of its executive officers
    arising out [of] intolerable situations and
    intimidation which forced the group and its
    doctors to resign lucrative independent
    contractor agreements ("ICAs") and
    ultimately their staff privileges thereby
    causing substantial financial losses.
    The initial reason for defendants'
    coordinated effort of harassment was alleged
    untruthful testimony that one member of CWH
    gave during a deposition concerning the
    hospital's OB/GYN department policy. St.
    Joseph's Regional Medical Center's officials
    reacted negatively to this testimony and
    retaliated against [CWH] in response,
    eventually forcing plaintiffs to resign
    their independent contractor agreements.
    The main aggressor against plaintiffs was
    defendant Roger Kierce, M.D. Kierce is the
    head of St. Joseph's OB/GYN department, and
    was plaintiffs' direct supervisor. To this
    end, Kierce engaged in a course of conduct
    that included but was not limited to
    humiliating Dr. Khashayar Vosough in front
    of colleagues by asserting that he committed
    the crime of perjury, threatening
    plaintiffs' position with the hospital by
    stating that he was going to "rip their
    skulls from their skeletons and keep a head
    count" if they failed to attend a department
    meeting, even though no attending physician
    had ever been disciplined for missing a
    department meeting, and threatening
    plaintiffs that he would fire them from
    their positions at St. Mary's hospital once
    St. Joseph's and St. Mary's merged.
    4                           A-3017-11T1
    To stop Kierce's abuse, plaintiffs
    invoked their rights and sought the
    protection of St. Joseph's CEO, William
    McDonald pursuant to the hospital bylaws.
    However, McDonald did not consider Kierce's
    abuse to be a serious issue, and failed to
    perform any meaningful investigation into
    plaintiffs' complaints. In fact, McDonald
    considered Kierce's statements to be little
    more than jokes. Realizing that there would
    be no relief from Kierce's abusive behavior,
    plaintiffs were forced to tender their
    hospital privilege resignations, and suffer
    the losses alleged.
    Describing the case thus in the best light from plaintiffs'
    point of view, plaintiffs allege they were constructively
    discharged and were entitled to compensation because of
    harassment, abuse, and retaliation by their supervisor at the
    hospital and failure of the hospital's CEO to stop that wrongful
    conduct.
    It is important to keep in mind that plaintiffs did not and
    could not allege constructive discharge resulting from unlawful
    discrimination or from any conduct of plaintiffs that was
    protected by law or a clear mandate of public policy.
    Plaintiffs' claims of a hostile work environment and retaliation
    are not a cause of action under New Jersey's Law Against
    Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49; under a
    constitutional provision or any federal statute prohibiting
    discrimination; under New Jersey's Conscientious Employee
    Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -8; or under Pierce
    5                           A-3017-11T1
    v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 
    84 N.J. 58
     (1980), the common law
    antecedent of CEPA.   This case is simply a common law contract
    and tort case.
    When considering defendants' several pretrial and trial
    motions seeking judgment in their favor, the trial court should
    have viewed with more circumspection the tenuous nature of
    plaintiffs' allegations in a common law contract and tort case.
    Our common law recognizes no cause of action for a hostile work
    environment simply because an employee is mistreated by a nasty
    boss.   The common law does not protect employees generally
    against an unpleasant work environment, or the failure of the
    employer to address incivility in the workplace.   Cf. Oncale v.
    Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 
    523 U.S. 75
    , 80, 
    118 S. Ct. 998
    , 1002, 
    140 L. Ed. 2d 201
    , 207 (1998) (Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §
    2000e, prohibits workplace harassment only if members of a
    protected class are treated differently from non-members).
    With respect to St. Joseph's hospital, plaintiffs' claim
    was viable only if they could prove breach of contract and
    damages caused by that breach.   Furthermore, since their
    contracts were with the hospital and not with the individual
    defendants, their claims against McDonald and Kierce could be
    maintained only if plaintiffs could prove that the conduct of
    the individual defendants that constituted their alleged
    6                          A-3017-11T1
    tortious interference was outside the scope of their employment
    with the hospital.
    If the individuals were acting outside the scope of their
    employment, however, then those same acts were not committed on
    behalf of the hospital, and plaintiffs' breach of contract claim
    against the hospital was not viable.   The same conduct of the
    individual defendants could not be both breach of contract by
    their employer and tortious interference by them individually.
    In the end, none of plaintiffs' claims should have survived
    summary judgment or a directed verdict at trial.
    II.
    Because we will apply the standard of review applicable to
    summary judgment, R. 4:46-2(c); Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.
    of Am., 
    142 N.J. 520
    , 540 (1995), and that applicable to a
    directed verdict or judgment in favor of defendants at the time
    of trial, R. 4:37-2(b); R. 4:40-1; R. 4:40-2(b); Verdicchio v.
    Ricca, 
    179 N.J. 1
    , 30 (2004), we will recite favorably to
    plaintiffs the facts of the case and all reasonable inferences
    that could be drawn from the evidence.   In other words, our
    recitation of the facts omits defendants' responses and defenses
    to plaintiffs' allegations and assumes that the jury would or
    did believe plaintiffs' version of the facts.
    7                            A-3017-11T1
    Plaintiff doctors, Vosough, Haddad, and Pallimulla, are
    highly-regarded OB/GYN specialists.     They completed their
    residencies in that field under defendant Kierce at St. Joseph's
    hospital.     After their residencies, plaintiffs formed CWH to
    practice their specialty, and they had admitting privileges at
    St. Joseph's and other hospitals in the region.
    Each plaintiff had an independent contractor agreement
    (ICA) with St. Joseph's hospital to be an "attending physician"
    in the OB/GYN department on a schedule assigned by the hospital.
    An attending physician supervised residents, fellows, and
    medical students; provided physician coverage at the hospital
    for all "unassigned" patients, meaning patients who came to the
    hospital without their own doctors; and responded immediately to
    "in-house obstetrical and gynecological emergencies."     The ICAs
    provided that the doctors would be paid $100 an hour by the
    hospital for their services as attending physicians and they
    would not bill patients separately for those services.
    Plaintiffs' ICAs went into effect on March 1, 2002, and
    were to continue until terminated in accordance with the terms
    of the ICA.    The ICAs permitted "either party" to terminate the
    agreement "without cause, reason or justification upon sixty
    (60) days' prior written notice to the other party," or to
    8                            A-3017-11T1
    terminate the agreement "immediately upon a material breach of
    this Agreement by the other party."
    Plaintiffs also had staff privileges at St. Joseph's
    hospital, which means they were permitted to admit their own
    patients for care at the hospital.    They billed separately for
    their physician services to their own patients.    As previously
    stated, plaintiffs had staff privileges as well at other
    hospitals in the area.
    Kierce was the chairman of the OB/GYN department at St.
    Joseph's hospital.   He had a reputation of striving for an
    unreasonable level of perfection and being a hard-hearted and
    belligerent taskmaster.    He was inclined to disparage and insult
    physicians and staff under his supervision.    In addition to the
    three plaintiff doctors, several other doctors testified that
    Kierce would use profanity and demeaning comments to reprimand
    physicians and hospital staff, including publicly.    Kierce
    admitted in his testimony that he would use "biting language"
    and be "harsh" and "stern" in his treatment of doctors and staff
    under his supervision.    He acknowledged he had made "mistakes"
    but rationalized his lack of professionalism and civility on the
    ground that he had high expectations "to have perfect outcome
    with the patients" and would not "tolerate people that do not
    respect the privilege to take care of patients."
    9                         A-3017-11T1
    Kierce's conduct violated the Medical Staff Bylaws adopted
    by St. Joseph's hospital.     The bylaws stated that "[i]t is the
    policy of St. Joseph's Regional Medical Center that all persons
    within its facilities be treated with courtesy, dignity and
    respect."     The purpose of this policy was "to prevent or
    eliminate conduct that disrupts operations at [the hospital],
    affects the ability of others to do their jobs, creates a
    hostile work environment for employees or other medical staff
    members or interferes with their ability to work competently."
    The bylaws described prohibited conduct to include: "[v]erbal or
    physical attacks, hostility, threats of violence or retaliation
    . . . [c]riticism addressed to the recipient in such a way as to
    unreasonably intimidate, undermine confidence, belittle or imply
    stupidity or incompetence."
    The ICAs required that plaintiffs adhere to the bylaws, and
    plaintiffs expected that other physicians at the hospital would
    also be required to adhere to the same bylaws.     They alleged in
    their lawsuit that the hospital was impliedly bound by their
    ICAs to enforce the bylaws and to take action against Kierce's
    violations.    They alleged that the hospital, through McDonald's
    inaction, breached their ICAs by failing to enforce the bylaws
    and to discipline Kierce.
    10                          A-3017-11T1
    Three discrete incidents formed the heart of plaintiffs'
    case.   First, plaintiffs claimed that Kierce publicly accused
    Vosough at a department staff meeting of committing perjury in
    deposition testimony he gave in a malpractice lawsuit brought
    against Vosough and St. Joseph's hospital.   In that testimony,
    Vosough disclaimed responsibility for the patient's condition on
    the ground that he had not been notified by other staff at the
    hospital that the patient had been admitted and was in need of
    his services.   He testified there was a "chain of command" at
    the hospital, like in "an army," and the attending physician,
    like "a general," could only act on information that those in
    the chain had provided to him.
    Kierce privately told Vosough that he disagreed with
    Vosough's disclaimer and considered his testimony to be perjury
    because an attending physician should take responsibility for
    the treatment of patients during his schedule whether or not he
    was specifically notified of a patient's need for his services.
    According to Vosough, at the staff meeting, Kierce gazed
    straight at him for about five seconds while telling the twelve
    to fifteen people assembled, "some people perjure themselves on
    the stand."   Vosough considered this perjury comment to be a
    public accusation against him intended to intimidate him and all
    the staff in the OB/GYN department.   In the same context,
    11                          A-3017-11T1
    plaintiffs also alleged that Kierce insulted all attending
    physicians by calling them "vultures."
    At the same time as this incident, Kierce announced a new
    department policy that attending physicians would be responsible
    for all patients within the scope of their duties, whether or
    not the attending physician had specific notification of the
    patient's admission and need for services.    This change in
    policy was of great concern to plaintiffs, and Vosough voiced
    his objections to Kierce.    Vosough testified that Kierce
    responded with a disrespectful comment: "you don't like it,
    don't let the door hit you – don't let the door slap you in the
    ass."
    In Vosough's opinion, the policy change would cause
    increased medical malpractice exposure to the point where the
    doctors would not be able to practice medicine.    Vosough
    complained to CEO McDonald and to Ed Jimenez, the hospital's
    director of physician relations, about the change in policy and
    requested that it be rescinded.    McDonald attempted to allay
    Vosough's fears, but decided that the new policy would remain
    unchanged.
    On February 25, 2006, plaintiffs gave written notice that
    they were terminating their ICAs as attending physicians.      Their
    resignation letter stated:
    12                         A-3017-11T1
    Dear Dr. Kierce
    It has always been an honor and pleasure to
    work with you. As our group is expanding
    and concentrating in the new and exciting
    field of complete laparascopic minimally
    invasive surgery as well as robotic surgery,
    we feel that in order to pursue our goals we
    no longer can commit to working weekends in
    St. Joseph's Hospital.
    Furthermore with the new changes that were
    instituted for attending physicians covering
    house, CWHC feels that we are at grave risk
    for a malpractice fiasco. Our insurance
    carrier has strongly suggested that we no
    longer cover service calls at St. Joseph's
    Hospital. We would like to stop coverage as
    of March 1, 2006 or April 1, 2006. We know
    that there are many physicians who are eager
    and waiting to take this position. Thus
    this seems a great chance to pass the torch
    to them. Clearly if there is an emergent
    need, we may help until you find suitable
    replacements. CWHC shall continue to bring
    private patients to this fine institution as
    we always have.
    According to Vosough's testimony, this letter was not
    entirely truthful, and the reasons for the resignation were
    stated in this way so that plaintiffs would remain on good terms
    with defendants.   He testified that plaintiffs would need future
    references from Kierce, and they did not wish to cause further
    animosity.   He claimed that he and the other plaintiffs resigned
    from their attending physician contracts because of the policy
    change and because of Kierce's abusive conduct.
    13                        A-3017-11T1
    Kierce attempted to convince plaintiffs to change their
    minds about resigning as attending physicians.    The second
    discrete incident occurred when Kierce called them to a meeting
    and discussed the termination of their ICAs, which were valued
    at about $700,000 in annual income.   When plaintiffs were not
    persuaded, Kierce became angry and threatened to sever their
    association with a different hospital, St. Mary's, after its
    anticipated merger with St. Joseph's hospital.    According to
    Vosough, Kierce said that he had seen plaintiffs' contracts with
    St. Mary's and that he would change those contracts because St.
    Mary's overpaid them.    Kierce also insulted plaintiffs and said
    they should be "good little boys" and withdraw their
    resignations.
    Plaintiffs complained again to McDonald and Jimenez about
    Kierce's threat, but again the hospital executives took no
    action against Kierce.    As it turned out, St. Joseph's did not
    merge with St. Mary's and Kierce had no influence on plaintiffs'
    contracts with St. Mary's.
    The third incident occurred in May 2006 when plaintiffs
    were no longer serving as attending physicians.    Kierce had
    scheduled a "Residents Research Day" where department staff,
    including physicians, were told they must attend a meeting to
    14                        A-3017-11T1
    hear hospital residents make presentations on research projects
    they had completed.    Plaintiffs did not attend the meeting.
    In the presence of about twenty people at the meeting,
    Kierce yelled to Dr. Shihad, who was also associated with CWH,
    "where are your boys," meaning plaintiffs and other doctors
    associated with CWH.   Kierce then said in a loud voice: "Tell
    them if they don't attend the meeting, I'm going to rip their
    skulls from their skeletons and keep a headcount."
    Shihad immediately conveyed this message to Vosough, who
    called Kierce to complain about the threat.    Kierce responded
    that Vosough should calm down because he meant it as a joke.
    Vosough asked Kierce to assemble the people who heard the remark
    and tell them publicly that he was joking.    Kierce responded,
    "keep dreaming."   Vosough then complained about Kierce's public
    threat to Jimenez and Dr. Labagnara, the vice-president of the
    hospital for medical affairs.    Subsequently, he spoke to
    McDonald about the incident and said that Kierce's remark made
    his practice group feel unsafe at the hospital.
    McDonald and Jimenez went to CWH's Ridgewood office and met
    with plaintiffs and other CWH doctors to hear their complaints
    about Kierce.   Vosough demanded that Kierce be fired and that
    Vosough and other attending physicians have a greater voice in
    running the OB/GYN department.    McDonald promised that an
    15                           A-3017-11T1
    investigation of Kierce's conduct would be undertaken by Jimenez
    and Labagnara.     According to plaintiffs, the investigation was a
    sham, and McDonald and the hospital took no action to discipline
    Kierce for his "rip your skulls" threat.
    On June 8, 2006, plaintiffs resigned from their staff
    privileges at St. Joseph's hospital.     Vosough wrote:
    Due to Dr. Roger Kierce's public threat to
    "Rip Our Skulls from your Skeletons" in
    front of St. Joseph's Labor and Delivery
    Staff, and his further statement "I keep a
    headcount": CWHC does not feel safe
    practicing in St. Joseph's Healthcare
    System.
    Although I have nothing but the best of
    comments to bestow upon the staff at the
    Wayne Campus, I am currently stepping down
    to courtesy privileges at Wayne and hereby
    resign from St. Joseph's Regional Medical
    Center, effective immediately. This
    includes all physicians currently employed
    by CWHC except Dr. Shihad and Dr. Kuegler.
    In my opinion in a wor[l]d where big
    corporations no longer tolerate sexual
    harassment, hospital should no longer
    tolerate these comments, coming from their
    chairmen to their staff, in any way, shape
    or form.
    Upon sending the June 2006 resignation letter, plaintiffs
    immediately stopped admitting patients at St. Joseph's Paterson
    facility, but they continued to admit patients to the hospital's
    Wayne facility for a while because of certain contractual
    obligations.     The CWH Paterson office was across the street from
    16                        A-3017-11T1
    St. Joseph's hospital, and Vosough described it as "the most
    convenient office I have ever had."    That office had allowed his
    practice group to have many hospital employees as patients.
    According to Vosough, their termination of the ICAs and
    relinquishment of staff privileges "crushed" CWH's practice,
    requiring Vosough to work "incredible hours" to save the
    practice.   After the resignations, he and the other CWH doctors
    worked more at Valley Hospital and St. Mary's, and eventually
    also expanded to Mountainside Hospital in Montclair.   In time
    plaintiffs closed CWH's Paterson office, which had been the hub
    of their offices, and the closing set the practice back by four
    or five years, according to Vosough.
    Plaintiffs presented testimony from a forensic accountant
    regarding their loss of anticipated future income that resulted
    from the termination of their ICAs and resignation from
    admitting privileges at St. Joseph's hospital.   The expert's
    December 2010 report calculated total losses of $1,269,079 for
    calendar years 2007 through 2010, and estimated additional
    losses of $1,450,000 for the following five years through 2015.
    Upon defendants' objection to the anticipated expert testimony,
    the trial court conducted a hearing under N.J.R.E. 104(a) and
    ruled that the expert could testify about his calculation
    through the time of the report, ending in 2010, but that his
    17                          A-3017-11T1
    estimate of future losses beyond the time of the report was
    speculative and would not be admitted in evidence.3
    After deliberating for only thirty-five minutes, the jury
    returned a verdict finding St. Joseph's hospital liable for
    breach of contract and Kierce and McDonald liable for
    interference with plaintiffs' contracts and prospective economic
    advantage.   The jury awarded total damages of $1,500,000,
    assigning one-third of that amount to each defendant.
    Because the jury's award was more than the $1,269,079 in
    losses alleged by plaintiffs' expert and admitted in evidence,
    the trial court instructed the jury that its damage award was
    improper and that it should deliberate further on damages based
    on the evidence that was admitted.   The jury returned after a
    few additional minutes of deliberation with a verdict of
    $423,026.33 against each of the three defendants, thus totaling
    the maximum amount in plaintiffs' case, $1,269,079.
    3
    In response to plaintiffs' forensic accounting evidence,
    defendants presented expert testimony that plaintiffs' tax
    returns actually showed increase in revenues after their
    resignations from St. Joseph's, and therefore, they suffered no
    loss of income as a result of the resignations. The defense
    expert also testified that any damages alleged by plaintiffs
    should be limited to the sixty-day notice of termination clause
    of their ICAs and that plaintiffs presented no evidence that
    they suffered any monetary losses during the sixty days after
    their resignation letters of February 25 and June 8, 2006.
    18                           A-3017-11T1
    The trial court dismissed plaintiffs' claim for punitive
    damages and denied all other post-trial motions, both the
    motions filed by defendants for judgment in their favor or a new
    trial and the motion filed by plaintiffs to add prejudgment
    interest to the jury's award.   This appeal and cross-appeal
    followed.
    III.
    We first address plaintiffs' claims of tortious inter-
    ference with their ICAs and with their prospective economic
    advantage of using their staff privileges at St. Joseph's
    hospital to treat patients and derive income.
    Because plaintiffs' ICAs were contracts with the hospital
    and not with its individual executives and managers, McDonald
    and Kierce could not be held personally liable to plaintiffs for
    their actions that constituted alleged breach of the ICAs.      "[A]
    corporation is an artificial entity that lacks the ability to
    function except through the actions of its officers, directors,
    agents, and servants," but those individuals "are not parties to
    any contract" of the corporation.      Printing Mart-Morristown v.
    Sharp Elec. Corp., 
    116 N.J. 739
    , 761 (1989).      "A corporation is
    regarded in law as an entity distinct from its individual
    officers, directors, and agents."      Ibid.; see also Saltiel v.
    GSI Consultants, Inc., 
    170 N.J. 297
    , 303-05 (2002) (corporate
    19                          A-3017-11T1
    officers and employees may be charged individually under a
    participation theory with a tort committed by the corporate
    employer, but not for breach of contract by the corporation).
    Recognizing this basic concept of contract and agency law,
    plaintiffs charged only the hospital with breach of contract in
    the first count of their complaint.
    Conversely, the hospital could not be charged with tortious
    interference with its own contract.   Printing Mart, 
    supra,
     
    116 N.J. at 752
    ; see also Cappiello v. Ragen Precision Industries,
    Inc., 
    192 N.J. Super. 523
    , 529 (App. Div. 1984) ("[I]nterference
    with one's own contract is merely a breach of that contract.").
    Consequently, the individual defendants alone were charged in
    the second and third counts of plaintiffs' complaint.
    "The tort of interference with a business relation or
    contract contains four elements: (1) a protected interest;
    (2) malice — that is, defendant's intentional interference
    without justification; (3) a reasonable likelihood that the
    interference caused the loss of the prospective gain; and
    (4) resulting damages."   DiMaria Const., Inc. v. Interarch, 
    351 N.J. Super. 558
    , 567 (App. Div. 2001), aff'd o.b., 
    172 N.J. 182
    (2002); accord MacDougall v. Weichert, 
    144 N.J. 380
    , 404 (1996);
    Printing Mart, 
    supra,
     
    116 N.J. at 751-52
    .
    20                          A-3017-11T1
    Theoretically, employees and agents of a corporation can be
    charged with the tort of intentional interference with a
    plaintiff's contract with the corporation.    Printing Mart,
    
    supra,
     
    116 N.J. at 761-63
    .   However, "if an employee or agent is
    acting on behalf of his or her employer or principal, then no
    action for tortious interference will lie."   DiMaria Const.,
    supra, 
    351 N.J. Super. at 568
    .   "[A]n action for tortious
    interference will lie" only if "the employee or agent is acting
    outside the scope of his or her employment or agency."     
    Ibid.
    To recover for tortious interference, plaintiffs were
    required to prove that the alleged wrongful actions of Kierce
    and McDonald were outside the scope of their employment and done
    for personal motives, out of malice, beyond their authority, and
    otherwise not in good faith in the interests of the hospital.
    See 
    ibid.
     (citing Varrallo v. Hammond Inc., 
    94 F.3d 842
    , 849
    n.11 (3d Cir. 1996); George A. Fuller Co. v. Chicago Coll. of
    Osteopathic Med., 
    719 F.2d 1326
    , 1333 (7th Cir. 1983)).      In this
    context, "malice is defined to mean that the harm was inflicted
    intentionally and without justification or excuse."   Printing
    Mart, 
    supra,
     
    116 N.J. at
    751 (citing Rainier's Dairies v.
    Raritan Valley Farms, Inc., 
    19 N.J. 552
    , 563 (1955)).
    Kierce and McDonald contend that no rational jury could
    conclude they acted outside the scope of their employment in the
    21                          A-3017-11T1
    matters alleged by plaintiffs.     Plaintiffs' allegations against
    Kierce are that he was insulting, demeaning, and belligerent in
    his verbal communications with them when he was supervising them
    in the OB/GYN department and that he threatened them regarding
    their contracts with St. Mary's hospital in an effort to
    persuade them not to resign as staff physicians.      Their
    allegations against McDonald are only that he failed to do more
    to investigate Kierce's behavior and to discipline him for
    violating the hospital's bylaws.      Defendants argue that the
    actions alleged against them are directly linked to the
    performance of their job duties within the scope of their
    employment by the hospital.
    Plaintiffs respond that whether the individual defendants
    were acting within the scope of their employment was a fact
    issue properly reserved for the jury to decide.
    The question of whether an individual acted within or
    outside the scope of employment often arises in the context of
    intentional wrongful acts of the individual employee that the
    corporation disavows in order to avoid respondeat superior
    liability.   A number of cases in which a plaintiff alleged
    intentional or reckless assault have found that the employee
    nevertheless was or could be found to have acted within the
    scope of his employment although he exceeded lawful or proper
    22                           A-3017-11T1
    means in carrying out his duties.    See, e.g., Gibson v. Kennedy,
    
    23 N.J. 150
    , 154-57 (1957) (train conductor who assaulted
    passenger for failing to get off train was acting within the
    scope of his employment); Mason v. Sportsman's Pub, 
    305 N.J. Super. 482
    , 499-501 (App. Div. 1997) (tavern's bouncer was
    acting within the scope of his employment when his physical
    ejection of a patron resulted in injury to the patron); Schisano
    v. Brickseal Refractory Co., 
    62 N.J. Super. 269
    , 275-76 (App.
    Div. 1960) (employee who punched decedent during an argument
    about parking in his employer's private lot, causing him to
    suffer a fatal heart attack, could be found to have been acting
    within the scope of his employment); Smith v. Bosco, 
    126 N.J.L. 452
    , 453-54 (E. & A. 1941) (bridge employee's attack on
    plaintiff who refused to move his truck could be within the
    scope of his employment); Gates v. St. James Operating Co., 
    122 N.J.L. 610
    , 611-12 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (assistant manager who
    slapped patron for disregarding his instruction to "take your
    feet down" could have been acting within the scope of his
    employment).   The fact that the employee's conduct is
    intentional and wrongful does not in itself take it outside the
    scope of his employment.
    On the other hand, the employee's wrongful conduct may be
    so far removed from the scope of his duties that the conduct
    23                          A-3017-11T1
    cannot be viewed as within the scope of the employment.   See
    Davis v. Devereux Foundation, 
    209 N.J. 269
    , 305-06 (2012)
    (employee of residential facility who intentionally scalded
    developmentally disabled resident with hot water was personally
    motivated by a desire to punish the resident for striking her
    earlier and was not acting within the scope of her employment in
    trying to control the resident); Di Cosala v. Kay, 
    91 N.J. 159
    ,
    165, 169 (1982) (Boy Scout Council was not vicariously liable
    for camp counselor's reckless act of pointing a gun at a child
    and pulling the trigger during a purely social visit because the
    counselor's interaction with the victim was not part of his work
    duties or done during his work time); Cosgrove v. Lawrence, 
    214 N.J. Super. 670
    , 679 (Law. Div. 1986), aff'd, 
    215 N.J. Super. 561
     (App. Div. 1987) (county social worker's initiation of a
    sexual relationship with his patient "was too little actuated by
    a purpose to serve" the employer's goals).
    Describing the test to be applied in intentional assault
    cases, Chief Justice Weintraub wrote in Gibson, 
    supra,
     
    23 N.J. at
    158:
    Assaults and batteries rarely, if ever,
    redound to the economic advantage of the
    employer, and it may readily be assumed the
    employer would not wish them. The
    outrageous quality of an employee's act may
    well be persuasive in considering whether
    his motivation was purely personal, but if
    the employee is within the scope of
    24                           A-3017-11T1
    employment   and intends to further the
    employer's   business, the employer is
    chargeable   even though the employee's
    conduct be   "imbecilic."
    [(citation omitted) (quoting Nelson v. Am.-
    W. African Line, Inc., 
    86 F.2d 730
    , 732 (2d
    Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 
    300 U.S. 665
    , 
    57 S. Ct. 509
    , 
    81 L. Ed. 873
     (1937)).]
    As Judge Learned Hand had observed in Nelson, 
    supra,
     
    86 F.2d at 731-32
    , "motives may be mixed; men may vent their spleen upon
    others and yet mean to further their master's business; that
    meaning, that intention is the test."
    Relying on this understanding of the law, defendants argue
    that, even if the evidence were sufficient to show they had a
    personal motive, at least part of their intention was to perform
    their duties as an employee or officer of the hospital.   We
    agree.   There is no question that Kierce and McDonald were
    performing their duties, respectively as chairman of the OB/GYN
    department and as CEO of the hospital, when they engaged in the
    acts alleged by plaintiffs.
    In Davis, supra, 209 N.J. at 302-03, our Supreme Court
    analyzed further how courts should distinguish between conduct
    that is within the scope of employment and conduct that is
    outside that scope:
    "The scope of employment standard,
    concededly imprecise, . . . 'refers to those
    acts which are so closely connected with
    what the servant is employed to do, and so
    25                       A-3017-11T1
    fairly and reasonably incidental to it, that
    they may be regarded as methods, even though
    quite improper ones, of carrying out the
    objectives of the employment.'"
    [Id. at 302 (quoting Di Cosala, 
    supra,
     
    91 N.J. at 169
     (quoting W. Prosser, Law of
    Torts 460-61 (4th ed. 1971)).]
    The Davis Court listed four factors "that collectively
    support a finding that an employee's act is within the scope of
    his or her employment," quoting the factors from the Restatement
    (Second) of Agency § 228(1) (1958):
    (a)   it is of the kind he is employed to
    perform;
    (b)   it occurs substantially within the
    authorized time and space limits;
    (c)   it is actuated, at least in part, by a
    purpose to serve the master; and
    (d)   if force is intentionally used by the
    servant against another, the use of
    force is not unexpectable by the
    master.
    [Davis, supra, 209 N.J. at 303.]
    The Court added that "[c]onversely, an employee's act is outside
    of the scope of his or her employment 'if it is different in
    kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time or
    space limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the
    master.'"    Ibid. (quoting Restatement, supra, § 228(2)).
    Applying these tests and factors, we conclude that
    plaintiffs had no evidence that McDonald was acting outside the
    26                         A-3017-11T1
    scope of his employment when he promised to investigate Kierce's
    misconduct but his efforts were allegedly inadequate and
    ineffective.   McDonald's representation that he would
    investigate was the kind of task he was employed by the hospital
    to perform, it occurred at the time and place he was performing
    his duties for the hospital, and it was intended to serve the
    purposes of the hospital in managing its staff.   Plaintiffs'
    allegation that McDonald performed his duties poorly does not
    place his conduct outside the scope of his employment and permit
    plaintiffs to recover damages from him under tort law.     See New
    Mea Constr. Corp. v. Harper, 
    203 N.J. Super. 486
    , 494 (App. Div.
    1985) ("There is no tort liability for nonfeasance, i.e., for
    failing to do what one has promised to do in the absence of a
    duty to act apart from the promise made." (quoting Prosser and
    Keeton, Law of Torts, § 92 at 655 (1984))); see also Saltiel,
    
    supra,
     
    170 N.J. at 316
     ("[A] tort remedy does not arise from a
    contractual relationship unless the breaching party owes an
    independent duty imposed by law.").
    Plaintiffs were dissatisfied with McDonald's performance
    and his failure to enforce the hospital's physician bylaws and
    to rescind the new policy announced by Kierce.    But plaintiffs'
    dissatisfaction was not evidence of conduct outside McDonald's
    scope of employment.
    27                          A-3017-11T1
    Similarly, with respect to Kierce, all the incidents
    occurred in the course of Kierce's employment as the chairman of
    the OB/GYN department, they occurred at the time and place where
    Kierce performed his duties as chairman, and he was motivated,
    however misguidedly, by his desire to supervise in his own way
    the work and performance of physicians and employees in his
    department.   Whether his methods were good or bad does not
    change their nature and purpose as acts performed on behalf of
    the employer.
    In Davis, supra, 209 N.J. at 305, the Court noted an
    important consideration in attributing wrongful conduct to the
    scope of employment — "the starting point of each incident: the
    employee's attempt to serve the employer."   Here, the evidence
    allowed no finding other than both Kierce and McDonald were
    attempting to serve their employer, St. Joseph's hospital, even
    if their methods were improper or their diligence subject to
    criticism.
    Plaintiffs emphasize the holding of DiMaria, supra, 
    351 N.J. Super. 558
    , in support of their contention that the
    evidence permitted the jury to conclude that the actions of
    Kierce and McDonald were outside the scope of their employment.
    In DiMaria, however, evidence was presented from which the jury
    could conclude the plaintiff's contract was terminated without
    28                         A-3017-11T1
    justification, and on the basis of false information given by
    the individual defendants, and at their urging.     
    Id. at 570
    .
    Also, there was evidence that the individual defendants stood to
    benefit personally by the termination of the plaintiff's
    contract.   
    Id. at 573
    .
    Similarly, plaintiffs' strong reliance on Cappiello, 
    supra,
    192 N.J. Super. 523
    , is misplaced.   In that case, we confirmed
    that the plaintiff's corporate employer could breach but could
    not tortiously interfere with its own contractual obligation to
    pay commissions to the plaintiff.    
    Id. at 529
    .   The president of
    the corporation and the plaintiff's supervisor could be liable
    for tortious interference because, as the jury specifically
    found, they had agreed to deprive the plaintiff of commissions
    that were due to him so that they could procure those
    commissions for their own economic benefit.    
    Ibid.
    Here, in contrast to DiMaria and Cappiello, plaintiffs had
    no similar evidence from which the jury could conclude that
    Kierce and McDonald intended to harm plaintiffs with respect to
    their ICAs or staff privileges because defendants stood to gain
    personally from plaintiffs' resignations.     There was no evidence
    of economic or other personal benefit to Kierce and McDonald
    resulting from plaintiffs' resignations.
    29                           A-3017-11T1
    Furthermore, as we have stated, the conduct of Kierce and
    McDonald that plaintiffs alleged constituted tortious
    interference was the same conduct on behalf of St. Joseph's
    hospital that plaintiffs alleged constituted the hospital's
    breach of contract.   While it is not improper to plead and
    attempt to prove alternative theories of recovery, the two
    theories could not co-exist in the jury's verdict.   The trial
    court erred in allowing the jury to find liability and award
    damages simultaneously on both contract and tort causes of
    action by treating precisely the same conduct as both within and
    outside the scope of employment.
    Defendants were entitled to judgment dismissing counts two
    and three of plaintiffs' complaint because the evidence did not
    permit a rational jury to conclude that Kierce and McDonald
    acted outside the scope of their employment when they engaged in
    the wrongful conduct alleged by plaintiffs.
    Having reached that conclusion, we need not address
    defendants' alternative arguments that plain error in the jury
    instruction, error in the verdict sheet, erroneous admission of
    evidence, and insufficiency of evidence of wrongful purpose also
    entitle them to judgment in their favor or a new trial on counts
    two and three.
    30                        A-3017-11T1
    IV.
    Our difficulty with the breach of contract claim alleged in
    count one stems from a different deficiency in plaintiffs'
    theory of recovery — the absence of compensable damages
    resulting from the alleged breach by St. Joseph's hospital.      The
    ICAs did not guarantee any period of time beyond sixty days that
    the hospital was contractually obligated to plaintiffs, and the
    implied terms of the ICAs that plaintiffs claimed the hospital
    breached were not ones the hospital was legally or contractually
    obligated to retain beyond those sixty days.
    Initially, we note that we may conduct plenary review on
    appeal regarding matters of contract interpretation.     Selective
    Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hudson E. Pain Mgmt. Osteopathic Med. &
    Physical Therapy, 
    210 N.J. 597
    , 605 (2012).    In Kieffer v. Best
    Buy, 
    205 N.J. 213
     (2011), the Court stated: "The interpretation
    of a contract is subject to de novo review by an appellate
    court.   Accordingly, we pay no special deference to the trial
    court's interpretation and look at the contract with fresh
    eyes."   
    Id. at 222-23
     (citation and footnote omitted); see also
    Jennings v. Pinto, 
    5 N.J. 562
    , 569-70 (1950) ("general rule that
    the construction of a contract is a question of law").     The
    court's ultimate goal is to determine the intent of the parties,
    as expressed in the language they used in the contract and as
    31                          A-3017-11T1
    determined by the circumstances of the parties' relationship and
    their objectives.   Celanese Ltd. v. Essex Cnty. Improvement
    Auth., 
    404 N.J. Super. 514
    , 528 (App. Div. 2009).
    On this record, the hospital could not be held liable to
    compensate plaintiffs for their financial losses indefinitely
    into the future, or through 2010 as allowed by the trial court,
    even if the resignations could rationally be deemed to be a
    constructive termination of the ICAs by the hospital.      That is
    so because plaintiffs' claim of breach of contract is entirely
    dependent on the hospital's alleged contractual undertaking to
    enforce its own bylaws and its prior policy on the responsi-
    bilities of attending physicians, and the hospital had no
    obligation to retain those allegedly implied terms of its ICAs.
    First, with respect to the change in policy that attending
    physicians would be responsible for all patients during their
    duty hours, nothing in plaintiffs' ICAs restricted defendants'
    right to set hospital policy.   While the hospital could
    voluntarily take into account views of the plaintiffs and other
    attending physicians in setting hospital policy, plaintiffs'
    contracts gave them no policymaking rights.   If plaintiffs were
    dissatisfied with a change in hospital policy, they had a right
    to terminate their ICAs.   Assuming that the jury credited
    plaintiffs' allegations and did not accept defendants'
    32                           A-3017-11T1
    contentions, the change in policy nevertheless did not support
    plaintiffs' claims of breach of contract.4
    Second, with respect to the hospital's failure to enforce
    the bylaws, if plaintiffs' February 25, 2006 resignation is
    considered to be a constructive termination of their ICAs, the
    hospital's breach could only be for a period of sixty days
    because the hospital had an absolute right to terminate the ICAs
    without cause or justification on sixty days' notice.     Had
    plaintiffs openly complained to the hospital that they
    considered it in breach of the ICAs because it failed to enforce
    the bylaws,5 the hospital had a right to terminate the ICAs on
    sixty days' notice and to clarify that, thereafter, it would
    undertake no obligation to enforce the bylaws at plaintiffs'
    urging.
    Without a legal or contractual duty to perform as
    plaintiffs would have had the hospital perform, the hospital
    4
    For the same reason, the decision of Kierce to change his
    department's policy and that of McDonald to support that change
    could not be the basis for plaintiffs' claim of tortious
    interference with their contractual rights.
    5
    We note that plaintiffs' February 25, 2006 resignation letter
    from the ICAs did not allege breach of contract by St. Joseph's
    hospital for failing to enforce the bylaws. Although the June
    8, 2006 resignation from staff privileges may be read to have
    done so, the ICAs were no longer in effect at that time, and
    plaintiffs' breach of contract claim was based on the ICAs.
    33                           A-3017-11T1
    cannot be held liable for the future consequential or
    anticipatory damages that the jury awarded to plaintiffs.6
    There is no question that Kierce's conduct violated several
    provisions of the bylaws that we previously quoted.   Defendants
    contend that the hospital was not obligated to do anything about
    Kierce's violations.   They dispute plaintiffs' contention that
    the physician bylaws bound the hospital as well as the plaintiff
    physicians and required that the hospital enforce the bylaws.
    We will accept the jury's apparent finding that the bylaws bound
    the hospital as well as the physicians.   We will also accept the
    jury's apparent finding that the hospital was obligated to
    enforce the bylaws and to discipline a physician who violated
    them.   Granting plaintiffs the favorable findings of the jury on
    these disputed issues, we also accept for purposes of our
    analysis the jury's apparent finding that, by failing to enforce
    its bylaws, the hospital breached the ICAs.
    A material breach of a contract relieves an aggrieved party
    of its obligations under the contract.    Nolan v. Lee Ho, 
    120 N.J. 465
    , 472 (1990); Magnet Res., Inc. v. Summit MRI, Inc., 318
    6
    Plaintiffs claimed loss of profits from resignation of their
    staff privileges as consequential loss of future profits on
    their breach of contract claim and as damages attributable to
    the individual defendants' alleged tortious interference with
    economic advantage. However, neither the court's instructions
    nor the jury verdict sheet delineated what the jury's damage
    award of $423,026.33 against each defendant encompassed.
    34                          A-3017-11T1
    N.J. Super. 275, 285 (App. Div. 1998).     Here, such a right was
    explicitly stated as a term of the ICAs.    Plaintiffs exercised
    their right to cease performing under their ICAs when they
    resigned their attending physician positions by their letter of
    February 25, 2006.
    Another right or remedy resulting from a breach of contract
    is the recovery of monetary damages that resulted from the
    breach.   In Preston v. Claridge Hotel & Casino, Ltd., 
    231 N.J. Super. 81
    , 88 (App. Div. 1989), we stated that:
    The recovery of damages in breach of
    contract actions is limited by the general
    principles that:
    (1) the damages are those arising naturally
    according to the usual course of things from
    the breach of the contract, or such as may
    fairly and reasonably be supposed to have
    been in the contemplation of the parties to
    the contract at the time it was made, as a
    probable result of the breach; and (2) there
    must be reasonably certain and definite
    consequences of the breach as distinguished
    from the mere quantitative uncertainty.
    [(citing Tessmar v. Grosner, 
    23 N.J. 193
    ,
    203 (1957))].
    The issue here is what damages arose naturally from the
    hospital's breach of the ICAs, or what obligations and potential
    damages in the event of a breach were reasonably in the
    contemplation of the parties when they entered into the ICAs.
    Plaintiffs claim they are entitled to recover their anticipated
    35                          A-3017-11T1
    net income that would have been derived from continuing
    indefinitely their ICAs and staff privileges because that was
    their intent when they executed their ICAs.     Defendants contend
    that plaintiffs are not entitled to any such recovery for an
    indefinite period because the ICAs were "at will" contracts that
    either party could terminate on sixty days' notice.
    Analogizing plaintiffs' ICAs to employment contracts, "an
    employer may fire an employee for good reason, bad reason, or no
    reason at all under the employment-at-will doctrine."     Wade v.
    Kessler Inst., 
    172 N.J. 327
    , 338 (2002).    "An employment
    relationship remains terminable at the will of either an
    employer or employee, unless an agreement exists that provides
    otherwise."   
    Ibid.
        (citing Witkowski v. Thomas J. Lipton, Inc.,
    
    136 N.J. 385
    , 397 (1994)).
    In Shebar v. Sanyo Business Systems Corp., 
    111 N.J. 276
    ,
    285 (1988), the Court confirmed the long-standing at-will
    employment doctrine.    The Court quoted as follows from Savarese
    v. Pyrene Manufacturing Co., 
    9 N.J. 595
    , 600-01 (1952), which in
    turn was quoting Eilen v. Tappin's, Inc., 
    16 N.J. Super. 53
    , 55
    (Law Div. 1951):
    [I]n the absence of additional express or
    implied stipulations as to duration, a
    contract for permanent employment, for life
    employment or for other terms purporting
    permanent employment, where the employee
    furnishes no consideration additional to the
    36                         A-3017-11T1
    services incident to the employment, amounts
    to an indefinite general hiring terminable
    at the will of either party, and therefore,
    a discharge without cause does not
    constitute a breach of such contract
    justifying recovery of money damages
    therefor.
    There are exceptions, however, to the at-will employment
    doctrine.    "For example, an employer's grounds for termination
    cannot be contrary to public policy, or based on impermissible
    factors such as race."    Wade, 
    supra,
     172 N.J. at 338-39 (citing
    Pierce, 
    supra,
     
    84 N.J. at 71-72
    ; Witkowski, 
    supra,
     
    136 N.J. at 398
    ).   In addition, bad faith interference with the other
    party's right to benefit from the "fruits of the contract" may
    constitute breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
    dealing that is implied in every contract, and may result in
    compensable damages despite the right of the party that acted in
    bad faith to terminate an at-will contract.    Sons of Thunder,
    Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 
    148 N.J. 396
    , 420-21, 424-25 (1997).
    In this case, since remedies against discrimination or
    other protected activity are not at issue, the exception to the
    at-will employment doctrine that comes closest to plaintiffs'
    claims is an implied contractual exception established by the
    Supreme Court in Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 
    99 N.J. 284
    , modified on other grounds, 
    101 N.J. 10
     (1985).    The Court
    held that an employer may be bound by an implied promise
    37                          A-3017-11T1
    contained in an employee handbook that an at-will employee would
    not be terminated without cause and without adhering to
    procedural protections.    Id. at 297-98.   Such "job security
    provisions" of a handbook, id. at 297, without a clear and
    prominent disclaimer, id. at 309, would be deemed a promise that
    the employer made to the employee to induce the employee to
    continue in that employment.    Id. at 302.   The employer could
    not promise job security and later withdraw it.     See id. at 299-
    300.
    The holding of Woolley, however, focused on enforceable
    termination and job security provisions of a unilateral offer of
    employment made by the employer and upon which the employee
    relied.    Ibid.   Neither Woolley nor any of the cases that have
    applied its holding and guiding principles were intended to
    prevent the parties from altering other terms of a contract that
    were not job security provisions.
    In this case, the ICAs contained no job security provision.
    The hospital did not promise that it would not terminate
    plaintiffs' ICAs without good cause or for no reason.     In fact,
    the contract explicitly gave the parties mutual rights to
    terminate the ICAs on sixty days' notice without good cause and
    for no reason or justification.
    38                        A-3017-11T1
    The bylaws that plaintiffs alleged the hospital violated
    and the policy that defendants changed are not job security
    provisions of the ICAs.   Assuming they are implied terms of the
    contracts between the parties, they could be altered or
    modified, just as, for example, the $100 hourly rate of the ICAs
    could be modified with proper notice.     If the hospital wished to
    modify the ICAs to clarify that it did not consider itself bound
    to enforce the bylaws, the hospital could terminate the existing
    ICAs and add an explicit modifying term to a renewed ICA.
    Plaintiffs could then accept or reject the new terms of the ICA.
    In the absence of a legal or contractual obligation to
    retain a specific term of the contract, plaintiffs could not
    reasonably expect that they would be indefinitely entitled to a
    contract with such a term, and thus be entitled to recover their
    losses because the hospital declined to abide by that term.
    Nor does the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
    convert all terms of an at-will employment contract into an
    immutable and binding contract for an indefinite time.     The
    facts of this case are distinguishable from Sons of Thunder,
    
    supra,
     
    148 N.J. at 401-02, 427
    , where the Court permitted
    recovery of anticipated future profits for a defined time period
    although the contract contained an at-will termination clause
    similar to the one in this case.     In Sons of Thunder, the jury
    39                          A-3017-11T1
    actually found that the defendant had breached the implied
    covenant of good faith and fair dealing by encouraging the
    plaintiff to invest in assets to carry out a five-year contract
    and then the defendant's new executives completely cut off the
    plaintiff's ability to earn income from the contract.    
    Id. at 402-06, 412-13
    .
    In this case, St. Joseph's hospital did not represent to
    plaintiffs that the ICAs would endure for any longer than sixty
    days, and moreover, plaintiffs were not deprived of the ability
    to earn income as they had before through their association with
    the hospital.   The implied terms of the ICAs that the hospital
    allegedly breached, enforcement of the bylaws and change of the
    policy pertaining to the responsibilities of attending
    physicians, may have affected plaintiffs' work conditions, but
    the breach did not destroy the right of plaintiffs "to receive
    the fruits of the contract."   See 
    id. at 420
    .   Every breach of
    contract is not a breach of the implied covenant of good faith
    and fair dealing that converts an open-ended at-will contract
    into one that binds the parties indefinitely to all its terms.
    Where a contract has been breached, "[c]ompensatory damages
    are designed 'to put the injured party in as good a position as
    he would have had if performance had been rendered as
    promised.'"   525 Main St. Corp. v. Eagle Roofing Co., 
    34 N.J. 40
                             A-3017-11T1
    251, 254 (1961) (quoting 5 Corbin, Contracts § 992 at 5 (1951);
    citing 1 Restatement, Contracts § 329, comment a (1932)); accord
    In re Liquidation of Integrity Ins. Co., 
    147 N.J. 128
    , 136
    (1996); Donovan v. Bachstadt, 
    91 N.J. 434
    , 444 (1982).     So the
    question here is what would plaintiffs have derived from their
    ICAs and staff privileges if the hospital had not breached the
    contract by failing to enforce the bylaws.     The hospital's
    promise did not assure plaintiffs of any period that their ICAs
    would remain in effect beyond sixty days or, more important for
    purposes of the issue in dispute, any period of time beyond
    sixty days during which the bylaws and prior policy would remain
    in effect and bind the hospital to enforce them.
    If the hospital materially breached the ICAs by failing to
    enforce the bylaws and by changing a policy, plaintiffs could
    stop performing their duties, as they did.     They could then file
    suit for their lost income or profits.     But their damages would
    not extend indefinitely into the future.    If the breach was a
    unilateral modification of terms of the contract, plaintiffs
    could recover their losses arising from the hospital's failure
    to give them sixty days' notice of termination of the existing
    contract and substitution of a new one with the altered terms.
    "When a wrongful discharge of an employee occurs the
    measure of damages is usually the employee's salary for the
    41                           A-3017-11T1
    remainder of the employment period."   Goodman v. London Metals
    Exch., Inc., 
    86 N.J. 19
    , 34 (1981) (citing Moore v. Central
    Foundry Co., 
    68 N.J.L. 14
    , 15 (Sup. Ct. 1902)).    The "employment
    period" in this case was sixty days, that is, the durational
    limit of each party's promise to the other that it would perform
    in accordance with the terms of the ICAs.    In effect, the
    enforceable at-will term of the ICAs, as modified by a sixty-day
    notice provision, defined the expectations of the parties with
    respect to the obligations of each to the other.    Concomitantly,
    it capped the potential anticipatory damages of the parties to
    losses incurred during that sixty-day period.
    Plaintiffs presented no evidence that they suffered any
    losses during the sixty-day period before or after their
    February 25, 2006 resignation as attending physicians.     They
    were paid for the hours they worked.   Their expert accounting
    evidence commenced calculation of their lost income in calendar
    year 2007, some ten months after they terminated their ICAs.
    Plaintiffs' resignation from staff privileges provided even
    less ground for recovery of future income and profits from the
    hospital.   The hospital had made no promise that the bylaws and
    policies upon which plaintiffs agreed to be associated with the
    hospital would be retained indefinitely.    Plaintiffs were not
    required to continue their relationship with the hospital any
    42                            A-3017-11T1
    more than the hospital was required to retain plaintiffs' staff
    privileges on the same terms that applied when those privileges
    were initially granted.     Plaintiffs simply had no enforceable
    expectation of income and profits from continuation of their
    staff privileges on terms that they desired and demanded.
    In short, plaintiffs did not have a viable breach of
    contract claim against St. Joseph's hospital because the
    hospital had limited obligations to them under the ICAs and
    their staff privileges, and the termination of the relationship,
    even if caused by the hospital's actions, was within the rights
    retained by the hospital.     Consequently, as a matter of law,
    plaintiffs' loss of future income and profits outside the sixty-
    day obligations of the parties pursuant to the ICAs could not be
    attributed to wrongful termination of their ICAs or staff
    privileges.   Plaintiffs presented no evidence that they suffered
    any compensable damages as a result of the acts of the
    hospital's agents.   The trial court should have granted the
    hospital's motions to dismiss count one of the complaint.7
    7
    In their several motions for summary judgment and judgment
    during and after the trial, defendants made multiple arguments
    as to why plaintiffs' evidence was not sufficient to recover the
    damages they claimed. Our analysis as discussed in this opinion
    was not clearly and articulately presented to the trial court in
    defendants' arguments, but the argument that plaintiffs were not
    entitled to damages for an indefinite period was made and
    (continued)
    43                        A-3017-11T1
    V.
    Because we have determined that all defendants were
    entitled to judgment in their favor, plaintiffs' cross-appeal is
    moot, and it will be dismissed.
    The judgment awarding damages against defendants is
    reversed.
    (continued)
    defendants' expert testified that plaintiffs could not have been
    damaged beyond the sixty-day notice period of their ICAs.
    44                      A-3017-11T1