L.G. VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES (DIVISION OF MENTAL HEALTH AND ADDICTION SERVICES) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2018 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5263-16T4
L.G.,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT
OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Respondent-Respondent.
____________________________
Submitted November 26, 2018 – Decided December 11, 2018
Before Judges Haas and Mitterhoff.
On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Human
Services, Division of Mental Health and Addiction
Services.
L.G., appellant pro se.
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Angela Juneau Bezer, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
L.G. appeals from the New Jersey Department of Human Services,
Division of Mental Health and Addiction Services' (DMHAS) final
administrative decision to administer psychotropic medication to her without
her consent. We affirm.
On October 23, 2009, L.G. was involuntarily committed to Greystone Park
Psychiatric Hospital (GPPH). Her treating psychiatrist, Dr. Roberto Caga-Anan,
diagnosed her with schizophrenia. On July 6, 2017, in accordance with written
protocols developed by the DMHAS, L.G.'s psychiatrist prepared an Involuntary
Medication Administration Report (IMAR), documenting L.G.'s condition and
the medications involved in the treatment plan. 1 The IMAR indicated that L.G.
suffered from schizophrenia and becomes "irritable and angry if her delusions
are challenged."
L.G. initially signed a form consenting to voluntarily take her prescribed
psychiatric medications. However, L.G. began to refuse the medication after
several days, claiming that the pill was too large and that the dose was too high.
1
The DMHAS delegates to psychiatric hospitals the responsibility of
"assur[ing] that the [involuntary] administration of psychotropic medication
. . . conforms to the standards of N.J.S.A. 30:4-24 et seq.[]" See N.J. Dep't of
Human Servs., Div. of Mental Health and Addiction Servs., Administrative
Bulletin A.B. 5:04B (Effective June 4, 2012),
https://www.state.nj.us/humanservices/dmhas/regulations/bulletins/Mental%20
Health/5_04B.pdf.
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L.G. then claimed that she suffered from a traumatic brain injury (TBI), rather
than from a mental illness, and requested a transfer to the TBI unit. L.G. began
to refuse to go outside, claiming that the sun will "make her sag and give her
life threatening edema of her arms and legs." She also began showering only
once per week, claiming that the warm water from the shower made her sag. On
July 10, 2017, L.G. received notice of a panel review hearing, which was
scheduled for, and took place on, July 13, 2017.
At the hearing, L.G.'s treating psychiatrist testified that L.G. maintains
delusions about the sun causing edema in her legs and arms. She also testified
that L.G. believes that she has a TBI, which is aggravated by showering. As a
result, L.G. showers only once a week and she has previously contracted lice.
Dr. Caga-Anan opined that involuntary medication was needed because, when
she is noncompliant with medication, L.G. is likely to cause serious harm to
herself.
L.G. testified that she does not have any mental illness and only has a TBI.
She further testified that she is not a danger to herself or others.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the panel determined that L.G. required
medication. After being provided with the required notice, L.G. appealed the
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determination. The GPPH Clinical Director conducted a review and upheld the
decision. This appeal followed.
On appeal, L.G. asserts that GPPH erred by determining the she should be
medicated without her consent because her mental illness causes her to be
dangerous to herself and others when not medicated. We disagree.
Our scope of review of an administrative agency's final determination is
limited. In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27 (2007). "[A] strong presumption of
reasonableness attaches" to the agency's decision. In re Carroll, 339 N.J. Super.
429, 437 (App. Div. 2001) (quoting In re Vey, 272 N.J. Super. 199, 205 (App.
Div. 1993), aff'd, 135 N.J. 306 (1994)). The burden is upon the appellant to
demonstrate grounds for reversal. McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 347 N.J.
Super. 544, 563 (App. Div. 2002). To that end, we will "not disturb an
administrative agency's determinations or findings unless there is a clear
showing that (1) the agency did not follow the law; (2) the decision was
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; or (3) the decision was not supported by
substantial evidence." In re Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees for a Certificate
of Need, 194 N.J. 413, 422 (2008).
Applying this standard, we conclude that GPPH's decision to involuntarily
medicate L.G. was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. GPPH followed
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the DMHAS involuntary medication policy and procedures. Its decision was
based on the judgment of independent clinicians following a hearing and after
an administrative appeal.
Affirmed.
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