HAZEL PATRICK, ETC. v. ELMWOOD EVESHAM ASSOCIATES, LLC (L-2764-17, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1753-19
HAZEL PATRICK, Administrator
Ad Prosequendum of the
ESTATE OF ALFONZER
PATRICK, deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ELMWOOD EVESHAM
ASSOCIATES, LLC, d/b/a
CARE ONE AT EVESHAM,
CARE ONE, LLC,
HEALTHBRIDGE
MANAGEMENT, LLC,
KESSLER INSTITUTE FOR
REHABILITATION, d/b/a
MARLTON REHABILITATION
HOSPITAL, VIRTUA MEMORIAL
HOSPITAL MT. HOLLY, VIRTUA
MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, VIRTUA
MARLTON HOSPITAL, and
VIRTUA HEALTH, INC.,
Defendants-Respondents.
______________________________
Argued September 15, 2021 – Decided January 6, 2022
Before Judges Hoffman, Geiger, and Susswein.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Camden County, Docket No. L-2764-17.
Anton Tupa argued the cause for appellant (Swartz
Culleton, PC, attorneys; Christopher J. Culleton, on the
briefs).
Anthony Cocca argued the cause for respondents
Elmwood Evesham Associates, LLC, d/b/a Care One at
Evesham, Care One, LLC, and Healthbridge
Management, LLC (Cocca & Cutinello, LLP, attorneys;
Anthony Cocca and Katelyn E. Cutinello, of counsel
and on the brief).
Brian D. Pagano argued the cause for respondents
Kessler Institute for Rehabilitation and 92 Brick Road
Operating Company, LLC, d/b/a Marlton
Rehabilitation Hospital (Burns White, LLC, attorneys;
Brian D. Pagano, of counsel and on the brief; Meghan
E. Sibiski, on the brief).
Kathryn A. Rivera argued the cause for respondents
Virtua Health, Inc., Virtua Memorial Hospital
Burlington County, Inc., and Vitrtua-West Jersey
Health System, Inc. (Parker McCay, PA, attorneys;
Kathryn A. Rivera, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
In this medical negligence case, plaintiff appeals from trial court orders
that collectively resulted in the dismissal of plaintiff's claims against defendants .
Following our review of the record and applicable law, we vacate the trial court
orders that denied plaintiff's motion to extend discovery to allow for a physician
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expert to opine on causation and granted defendants' motions for summary
judgment.
I.
On January 8, 2016, seventy-nine-year-old Alfonzer Patrick (decedent)
underwent elective spine surgery at defendant Virtua Memorial Hospital of
Burlington County (Virtua). Decedent had a lengthy medical history and
numerous preexisting conditions, including atrial fibrillation, hyperlipidemia,
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, obstructive sleep apnea, coronary artery
disease, gastroesophageal reflux disease, congestive heart failure, peripheral
vascular disease, hyperglycemia, morbid obesity, and pulmonary hypertension.
Decedent required surgery to address severe cervical stenosis and myelopathy
that developed over the previous eight months, limiting his ability to walk and
use his arms.
Following his surgery, decedent was admitted to Virtua's intensive care
unit (ICU). On January 9, ICU nurses established decedent's plan of care, which
identified the risk of a pressure ulcer as a problem. To address that issue, a
pressure ulcer risk assessment was ordered every twelve hours, yielding scores
of high risk to mild risk. ICU records show decedent was turned and positioned
every two hours while in the ICU, but the records after decedent left the ICU
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did not document turning and repositioning every two hours. ICU nurses noted
four pink areas described as scarring from old pressure ulcers; however,
decedent's son and wife (plaintiff) testified at deposition that decedent never had
any wounds to his buttocks or sacrum at any time prior to this hospitalization.
On January 14, 2016, decedent was moved from the ICU to a regular
hospital bed; the next day, Virtua discharged him to defendant Marlton
Rehabilitation Hospital (Marlton Rehab). Virtua's discharge instructions and
transfer form did not list any skin problems for decedent; in contrast, the
admission records for Marlton Rehab indicated decedent had an open wound on
his right buttock. On January 19, a nurse noted that decedent had a stage II
pressure sore. This pressure sore was again documented on January 27, but with
an increase in size.
While at Marlton Rehab, decedent experienced worsening respiratory
problems; as a result, on February 6, 2016, he was transported to the emergency
room at Virtua and then admitted to the ICU for "chronic respiratory failure,
sepsis, atrial fibrillation, and acute renal failure syndrome, as well as MRSA
pneumonia." The following day, an examination revealed "a stage II to stage III
sacral buttock decubitus," with a nurse describing decedent "as having a boil
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which is healed on his leg and a stage III-IV pressure ulcer." Another nurse
documented two stage III pressure injuries.
Decedent continued to experience respiratory issues and because of his
continued medical needs, on February 19, 2016, he was transferred to defendant
Care One of Evesham (Care One), a skilled nursing facility, for further
rehabilitation. Upon admission, decedent's sacral ulcers were documented at
stage II. In March, these wounds grew and merged.
On March 12, 2016, decedent was discharged to his home, where Virtua
Home Care continued to provide care. Throughout the month, decedent's
pressure injury grew and worsened. On March 31, decedent reported respiratory
difficulty, increased weakness, and "intolerable pain in his buttocks and hips."
Decedent returned to Virtua. On April 4, 2016, decedent "underwent excisional
debridement of the sacral decubitus and pulse irrigation of the wound . . . ."
Thereafter, the pressure injury was larger and deemed stage IV.
Decedent's respiratory issues continued, and on April 17, 2016, decedent
went into cardiac arrest, requiring resuscitation and intubation. Thereafter,
decedent's family opted for comfort care and changed his status to do-not-
resuscitate. He died on April 19 and his death certificate listed "acute [and]
chronic respiratory failure" as the cause of death.
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In 2017, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants alleging decedent
suffered injuries "caused by the negligence and carelessness of the [d]efendants'
respective nursing and administrative staffs, and these injuries caused and/or
contributed to his death." The complaint included identical counts against each
defendant, asserting survival and wrongful death claims "[a]s a direct and
proximate cause of" defendants' deficient care; in addition, plaintiff asserted a
claim against Care One alleging a violation of the Nursing Home Residents' Bill
of Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 30:13-5 to -11.
Discovery ensued; ultimately, the discovery period lasted 879 days,
including five extensions. On August 16, 2019, the trial court entered an Order
Extending Discovery, which established the following schedule for the
completion of discovery:
1. Plaintiff's expert reports shall be served no later
than September 16, 2019.
2. Defendants' expert reports shall be served no
later than November 18, 2019.
3. All expert depositions shall be completed by
January 3, 2020.
4. Discovery will end on January 17, 2020.
5. Trial is adjourned to March 2, 2020, to allow time
for the filing of all dispositive motions.
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On July 30, 2019, plaintiff served an expert report from Audrey M. Lalli,
R.N. A registered nurse for over thirty years, Nurse Lalli's resume lists her
extensive experience in geriatric care, including pressure injury prevention and
treatment, as well as administrative experience including case management, care
plan development, and nurse education and supervision.
In her report, Nurse Lalli opined that decedent "did not receive an
acceptable level of nursing care and treatment from the nursing staff at Virtua
Hospital, Marlton Rehab and Care One." She stated that decedent "had multiple
risk factors for skin breakdown," but "[e]ven with these risks, if attention had
been paid particularly to proper assessment and pressure relief, turning and a
specialty mattress and sitting surface, monitoring more closely of nutrition, and
controlling moisture, this pressure ulcer was preventable and could have been
reversed in the early stages." Nurse Lalli also cited the nursing staffs' lack of
communication, incorrect assessment of the pressure injury, and failure to
implement programming to address incontinency as deficient care.
Nurse Lalli concluded the treating nurses' failure to provide care worsened
decedent's wound, which "caused him intolerable pain and limited his ability to
'tolerate good positioning' and have 'active participation in therapeutic
interventions."' She explained that defendants' substandard nursing care led to
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the surgery performed on the wound, and such "activity ultimately affects a
patient's respiratory status and contributes to a decline in that function and
contributed 1 to his eventual death."
On October 23 and 31, 2019, defendants filed motions to bar Nurse Lalli
from rendering opinions on medical causation. On November 8, 2019, the trial
court heard oral argument on the defendants' motions to bar plaintiff's expert,
Nurse Lalli, from offering opinions on causation. At the start of the hearing, the
motion judge clarified that "[t]he defense is not arguing that the plaintiff's
nursing expert can't express opinions on deviation. They're arguing that the
nurse can't express opinions on proximate cause to damages." Thus, the judge
framed the issue before the court as follows: "[I]s a nurse qualified to give any
type of proximate cause opinion[?] And to make it worse in this case, it's not
an obvious one."
Plaintiff argued that N.J.R.E. 702 allows Nurse Lalli's to use her
specialized knowledge as a registered nurse with extensive nursing education
1
While Nurse Lalli's report clearly addressed issues of causation, defendants
did not advise plaintiff's attorney of any objection to her expression of causation
opinions until they filed their motions to bar Nurse Lalli's testimony, in late
October 2019, five weeks after the deadline for plaintiff's expert reports.
Plaintiff served Nurse Lalli's expert report at the end of July 2019, six weeks
before the deadline for plaintiff's expert reports.
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and experience, including experience in geriatric care, to assist the jury to
understand that defendants' substandard nursing care caused decedent's
problems which led to his death.
The defense countered that New Jersey's statutes and regulations
governing nursing practice prohibit nurses from opining on causation,
diagnoses, and underlying causes of conditions. Thus, they argued that Nurse
Lalli could not offer an opinion on the effect of nursing care on decedent's
pressure injury and health since it would pertain to underlying cause and
diagnosis, especially in light of decedent's numerous comorbidities.
The motion judge agreed with defendants, finding it inappropriate for a
nurse to provide proximate cause testimony in this case, considering decedent's
complicated medical history involving multiple serious comorbidities. The
judge acknowledged "[t]here may be cases where a nurse is qualified to express
an opinion that hits on proximate cause[,]" but "[t]his case [wa]s a very bad case
to try to shoehorn that in." In short, the judge ruled that Nurse Lalli was not
qualified "to give the punch line to the jury that these sores contributed to the
decedent's death."
Plaintiff argued that Nurse Lalli should at least be permitted to testify that
the nurses' breached duty of care caused decedent's pressure injury, but the judge
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rejected that argument, concluding that only a doctor could parse what exactly
was caused by the confluence of defendants' alleged substandard care and
decedent's poor medical condition. Thus, the judge barred Nurse Lalli from
testifying to "any and all causation opinions." Still, the judge stated that Nurse
Lalli could testify about breach of care and stated, "[s]he may very well be
qualified to testify about these sores and what potential impacts they have in
terms of patient mobility."
At the conclusion of the hearing, the motion judge memorialized his
decision by entering orders granting the motions to bar Nurse Lalli "from
proffering any and all causation opinions." Based upon these orders, within a
few days, each defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. On November
20, 2019, plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the orders precluding
Nurse Lalli from proffering any causation opinions, along with a motion to
extend expert discovery. On November 25, plaintiff served defendants with a
report and curriculum vitae from a proposed physician expert, Dr. Richard
Stefanacci, D.O., and a certification of due diligence from plaintiff's counsel. In
the certification, plaintiff's counsel set forth the following explanation for not
providing a report from Dr. Stefanacci sooner:
Plaintiff was unable to obtain the report of Dr.
Stefanacci prior to the September 16, 2019 . . .
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expert[-]report deadline because, prior to November 8,
2019, plaintiff's counsel was unable to anticipate that
the [c]ourt would require plaintiff to produce a
physician expert to establish prima facie causation with
respect to decedent's pressure wounds. Plaintiff did not
anticipate the court's ruling because in the scores of
New Jersey pressure wound cases that counsel has
handled on behalf of patients and their families, no
court had barred the plaintiff nursing care expert from
providing opinions on the cause of the injured patient's
pressure wounds, or ruled that a physician opinion was
required to establish prima facie cause of a pressure
wound, and no New Jersey appellate court has ruled
that proof concerning pressure wound causation
requires a medical opinion to establish a prima facie
case.
On December 6, 2019, the motion judge heard oral argument on these
motions. The judge first denied plaintiff's motion for the court to reconsider its
earlier decision barring Nurse Lalli from rendering causation opinions. The
judge noted the motion focused on unpublished opinions, and ruled that it would
be inappropriate for him to reverse himself based on non-authoritative cases that
he was prohibited from citing by Rule 1:36-3. Citing N.J.S.A. 45:11-23(b) and
this court's opinion in One Marlin Rifle, 319 N.J. Super. 359 (App. Div. 1999), 2
2
In One Marlin Rifle, we held that a wife, who was a certified clinical nurse
specialist and an advanced practice nurse in mental health and psychiatric
nursing, was not qualified to render an expert opinion "with respect to a medical
diagnosis of her former husband's mental condition[,]" at a gun forfeiture
hearing. Id. at 368.
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the judge reiterated that while nurses may identify and treat pressure injuries,
they cannot opine as to their cause, as that involves a medical diagnosis of a
disease process, the breakdown of skin.
Next, the judge denied plaintiff's motion to extend discovery to allow
plaintiff to include the expert opinion of Dr. Stefanacci. Citing Ponden v.
Ponden, 374 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2004), the judge found there were no
exceptional circumstances justifying the extension of discovery because
plaintiff's counsel should have known a medical expert was necessary to
establish proximate cause in this case. Since plaintiff had already submitted the
report of her proposed physician expert with her motion papers, plaintiff argued
there would be no need to move the trial date; however, the judge rejected this
argument, reasoning the defense would necessarily need time to respond to the
new expert's report.
Finally, the judge addressed the summary judgment motions. Since
plaintiff now had "no expert testimony on the issue of proximate cause to
anything," the judge granted defendants' summary judgment motions.
This appeal followed, with plaintiff presenting the following points of
argument:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO BAR
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PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT NURSE LALLI FROM
OPINING A[S] TO CAUSATION.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
TO GRANT RECONSIDERATION OF ITS
ORDERS GRANTING THE MOTIONS TO
BAR PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT NURSE LALLI
FROM OPINING AS TO CAUSATION; AS
WELL AS ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO EXTEND EXPERT DISCOVERY.
III. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
II.
To prevail in a medical malpractice action, "ordinarily, a plaintiff must
present expert testimony establishing (1) the applicable standard of care; (2) a
deviation from that standard of care; and (3) that the deviation proximately
caused the injury." Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 478 (2013) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Such expert testimony "is permitted to
'assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.'"
Ibid. (quoting N.J.R.E. 702). Further, an expert must be qualified to testify,
meaning the expert must have the requisite "knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education . . . ." N.J.R.E. 702.
"The admission or exclusion of expert testimony is committed to the
sound discretion of the trial court." Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 52 (2015)
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(citation omitted). "[W]e apply [a] deferential approach to a trial court's
decision to admit expert testimony, reviewing it against an abuse of discretion
standard." Id., 221 N.J. at 53 (second alteration in original) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). The trial judge's determination will not be disturbed
"unless a clear abuse of discretion appears." State v. Chatman, 156 N.J. Super.
35, 40 (App. Div. 1978) (quoting Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32
N.J. 358, 411 (1960)); however, we accord no such discretion to a ruling that is
"inconsistent with applicable law." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court
Rules, cmt 4.7 on R. 2:10-2 (2022).
Moreover, an expert witness's conclusions can be based on his or her
qualifications and personal experience, without citation to academic literature.
State v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473, 495 (2006) (allowing opinion testimony based
on the expert's "education, training, and most importantly, her experience");
Rosenberg v. Tavorath, 352 N.J. Super. 385, 403 (App. Div. 2002) ("Evidential
support for an expert opinion is not limited to treatises or any type of
documentary support, but may include what the witness has learned from
personal experience."). "The requirements for expert qualifications are in the
disjunctive. The requisite knowledge can be based on either knowledge, training
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or experience." Bellardini v. Krikorian, 222 N.J. Super. 457, 463 (App. Div.
1988).
III.
On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial judge erred by barring Nurse Lalli's
causation opinions, asserting her extensive background, training, and experience
qualified her to render opinion testimony on the issue of causation, including
decedent's death. Plaintiff contends the judge committed further error when he
denied plaintiff's motion to extend discovery to allow for a physician expert to
opine on causation and granted defendants' motions for summary judgment. We
address these arguments in turn.
A.
Given the complexity of the medical causation in this case, we cannot
conclude the motion judge clearly abused his discretion in concluding Nurse
Lalli was not qualified to render the requisite opinion on causation,
notwithstanding her extensive experience. We agree with the motion judge that
[T]here are nurses out there, including perhaps Nurse
Lalli, that in a real world sense may very well be able
to competently determine a lot of proximate cause
issues. But it seems to me, to the extent that the law
encourages bright line tests, that everybody can
understand and comply with, this is a very bad vehicle
to argue that a nurse should be giving any proximate
cause testimony.
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. . . .
There may be cases where a nurse is qualified to
express an opinion that hits on proximate cause. This
case is a very bad case to try to shoehorn that in.
This patient had a complicated medical history. He was
elderly, he was very sick, and he had a somewhat
complicated history after the first cervical [surgery].
It’s not like he had the surgery on Monday and died on
Tuesday. It was months later[,] after three separate
hospitalizations . . . .
We conclude the decision to bar the causation testimony of Nurse Lalli
under N.J.R.E. 702 did not constitute a clear mistaken exercise of discretion, in
light of "the claim involved, the specific allegations made, and the opinions that
the expert propose[d] to offer at trial." Garden Howe Urban Renewal Assocs.,
L.L.C. v. HACBM Architects Eng'rs Planners, L.L.C., 439 N.J. Super. 446, 456
(App. Div. 2015). We therefore affirm the judge's orders barring Nurse Lalli
from providing causation opinions at trial.
B.
Plaintiff next contends the motion judge committed reversible error when
he denied plaintiff's motion to extend plaintiff's expert-witness deadline to allow
for a physician expert to render the requisite opinion on causation. This
argument has merit.
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Our system of justice favors the fair disposition of cases on their merits.
See Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 101 N.J. 538, 547 (1986). On the other hand, the
system also strives to make litigation "expeditious and efficient." Leitner v.
Toms River Reg'l Sch., 392 N.J. Super. 80, 91 (App. Div. 2007). The Rules of
Court are designed to achieve, among other goals, certainty in trial dates. Ibid.As we have recognized, however, exceptional circumstances can arise, where
trial dates or other litigation deadlines should be extended in the interests of
justice and to avoid punishing litigants unfairly. Id. at 91-94. The fair balance
between fairness and trial-date certainty is reflected in Rule 4:24-1(c) governing
extensions of discovery, which provides in pertinent part: "No extension of the
discovery period may be permitted after an arbitration or trial date is fixed,
unless exceptional circumstances are shown."
To demonstrate exceptional circumstances, we generally require a
showing that the attorney diligently pursued the information sought during the
discovery period but was frustrated from obtaining the discovery by
circumstances largely beyond counsel's control. Bender v. Adelson, 187 N.J.
411, 429 (2006). Specifically, the moving party must show: (1) why discovery
was incomplete and the diligence in pursuing discovery; (2) the additional
discovery is essential; (3) an explanation for why an extension was not sought
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within the original discovery period; and (4) the circumstances were beyond the
party's and counsel's control. Garden Howe Urban Renewal Assocs., LLC, 439
N.J. Super. at 460.
As noted, because a trial date had already been set, plaintiffs were required
to demonstrate "exceptional circumstances." At oral argument, it initially
appeared that the judge was inclined to grant plaintiff's motion, based on these
comments:
I don't really mind reopening the case and postponing
the trial. The earth is not [going to] spin off its axis. It's
not like your decision to go with Nurse Lalli was
malpractice and incompetent. You're representing to
me that this is the first time you've ever had a judge
disqualify the nurse on the issue of proximate cause. If
that's true, then I certainly can't blame you . . .
After stating that he was inclined to grant plaintiff's motion and reopen
discovery, the judge added, "I don't think the defense is prejudiced in the types
of prejudice that normally bars reopening of discovery. I'll give them . . . ample
time to get a response expert if they want. If [defendants] want to depose Dr.
[Stefanacci], [plaintiff will] have to pay for it . . . ."
Notwithstanding these comments, the judge ultimately denied the motion
to extend the deadline for plaintiff's experts to include Dr. Stefanacci, finding
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plaintiff had not demonstrated exceptional circumstances justifying a further
extension of discovery, including the deadline for serving expert reports.
In our view, the motion judge mistakenly exercised his discretion by
refusing to extend the time-deadline for plaintiff's expert reports to include the
report of Dr. Stefanacci. Plaintiff was diligent in pursuing discovery, and served
an expert witness report addressing negligence and causation from Nurse Lalli,
six weeks before the deadline for the report. Rather than inform plaintiff of their
objections to the causation opinions included in the report, defendants waited
until five weeks after plaintiff's expert-report deadline to file their motions to
bar Nurse Lalli's testimony.
In Mellwig v. Kebalo, 264 N.J. Super. 168, 171 (App. Div. 1993), we held
that "[i]t is inappropriate to treat objections to de bene esse deposition testimony
as concealed weapons to brandish at a future trial." In the context of this case,
we similarly find it inappropriate to treat unannounced objections to the
competency of an expert witness as concealed weapons to brandish at future
motions to preclude the witness from offering critical testimony, particularly
when the filing of the motions appear to be tactically delayed. When motions
to preclude expert testimony are pocketed until after the discovery deadline has
passed, the trial court has less options available to "fashion a fair remedy
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suggested by all of the circumstances, including the amount of time remaining
before trial." Id. at 172.
Moreover, plaintiff's counsel provided a reasonable explanation for not
having provided a report from Dr. Stefanacci sooner, based on his own
experience "in the scores of New Jersey pressure wound cases" that he had
handled. In none of those cases did a court bar his nursing care expert from
providing opinions on causation of pressure wounds, or rule that a physician
opinion was required to establish causation; in addition, no New Jersey appellate
court had ruled that proof concerning pressure wound causation required a
medical opinion to establish a prima facie case. Nothing in the record disputes
the experience recounted by plaintiff's counsel with these types of cases. We
therefore conclude that, under the circumstances, the discovery extension should
have been granted.
Assuming the judge correctly decided that all of Nurse Lalli's causation
opinions should be barred, as we have ruled, the judge mistakenly exercised his
discretion when he denied plaintiff leave to proceed with Dr. Stefanacci as a
causation expert. Considering the unsettled law in this area and the prior
experience of plaintiff's counsel, along with the fact that defendants did not
move to bar the causation opinions of Nurse Lalli until five weeks after the
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discovery the deadline for plaintiff's expert reports, we are satisfied that plaintiff
presented exceptional circumstances that warranted granting the requested
extension of time. We further note that the motion judge could have granted
plaintiff's motion to extend expert discovery without moving the trial date since
defendants had the report of Dr. Stefanacci in hand and the scheduled trial date
was almost three months way.
On remand, the trial court shall conduct a case management conference
within thirty days and then enter an order allowing plaintiff to serve the expert
report of Dr Stefanacci as within time, and a final management order
establishing new deadlines for the completion of discovery and setting a new
trial date.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings in
conformity with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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