ALLAN B. BRAGGIN v. BOROUGH OF RAMSEY (L-6101-18, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3698-19
ALLAN B. BRAGGIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BOROUGH OF RAMSEY,
MAYOR DEIRDRE DILLON,
in her individual and official
capacity, and STEVE FORBES,
in his individual and official
capacity,
Defendants-Respondents.
___________________________
Argued September 20, 2021 – Decided January 6, 2022
Before Judges Sabatino, Mayer, and Natali.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-6101-18.
Richard D. Picini argued the cause for appellant
(Caruso Smith Picini, PC, attorneys; Richard D. Picini,
of counsel and on the briefs).
Mary C. McDonnell argued the cause for respondents
(Pfund McDonnell, PC, attorneys; David T. Pfund,
Mary C. McDonnell, and Joseph A. Keane, on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Allan B. Braggin appeals from an April 24, 2020 Law Division
order granting defendants Borough of Ramsey, Mayor Deidre Dillon and Steve
Forbes' motion for summary judgment and dismissing his two-count complaint
in which he alleged defendants violated the New Jersey Civil Rights Act
(NCRA), N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2, based on their purported selective prosecution
of the Borough's zoning laws and in retaliation for exercising his First
Amendment rights at public hearings. We affirm.
I.
In our review of the record, we viewed the facts and all reasonable
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the party against
whom summary judgment was entered. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995); R. 4:46-2(c). Applying that standard, the record
before the trial court established the following facts.
Plaintiff and his wife have lived at the same home in Ramsey for nearly
fifty years. At various times during that period, plaintiff stored approximately
seven or eight cars and flatbed trailers on his property along with at least four
canopies, or storage sheds. The condition of plaintiff's property led to three
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investigations by municipal zoning officials in 2012, 2015, and 2016 , and
ultimately to the issuance of numerous municipal summonses. We detail those
investigations to provide context for our opinion.
A. The 2012 Zoning Investigation
On October 23, 2012, plaintiff received a letter from Richard Mammone,
Ramsey's former zoning officer, notifying him that a neighbor had complained
about the condition of his property. The letter noted that Mammone had also
observed several violations at plaintiff's residence, including "[n]umerous
unregistered or junk vehicles on the property . . . [n]umerous storage sheds or
pods . . . [and] [p]roperty maintenance violations . . . [including] storage of
construction materials, metal scrap and other debris."
Plaintiff testified that when Mammone came to inspect the property he
spoke on the phone with Borough Attorney Peter Scandariato, who allegedly
told him not to worry about the canopies or sheds because they were
"grandfathered." The motion record, however, is devoid of written
documentation from the Borough confirming that plaintiff's canopies were
grandfathered, and not in violation of municipal zoning regulations.
On December 6, 2012, Mammone sent plaintiff another letter stating that
"[t]he area in the rear of [his] lot ha[d] been satisfactorily cleaned . . . [t]he area
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along the southernly side of [his] lot require[d] additional cleanup . . . [and] [a]ll
unregistered or inoperable vehicles must be removed." No summonses were
issued, however.
Plaintiff also alleged that Scandariato physically assaulted him prior to a
public meeting in 2014. According to plaintiff, Scandariato, "lunged at [him],
put his hands on the wall, came into [his] face with his body within inches of
[his] face, screaming and swearing in a red face puffed out manner, saliva
spewing on [his] face." Plaintiff, however, never filed charges against
Scandariato, nor did he name him as a defendant in this action.
B. The 2015 Investigation and Enforcement Action
On March 11, 2015, plaintiff's neighbor emailed Mammone complaining
about overgrown shrubs, dilapidated structures, and peeling paint that he
observed on plaintiff's property. On March 20, 2015, Mammone went to
plaintiff's property to investigate the complaint and plaintiff responded by
contacting the police, alleging Mammone was trespassing.
Ramsey police subsequently arrived at plaintiff's residence and completed
an investigation report. The report stated that plaintiff felt that he was being
"harassed" by Mammone, who informed the police he was investigating a
complaint in his official capacity as zoning officer.
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On March 23, 2015, Mammone sent plaintiff a letter addressing the March
20, 2015 incident. He explained that a "complaint ha[d] been received regarding
zoning violations on [plaintiff's] property," specifically, that bamboo planted on
plaintiff's property was overgrown, plaintiff had exceeded the permissible
number of sheds on the property, and the property was covered in debris. The
letter further advised plaintiff that he had thirty days to correct the violations,
and his failure to do so would result in the issuance of a summons.
On April 2, 2015, Mammone received a letter from plaintiff
acknowledging the conditions and detailing his progress to remedy the above
referenced violations. Plaintiff confirmed that he had cut the bamboo back to
his property line. Plaintiff maintained, however, that Scandariato previously
found that his "temporary" sheds were "'grandfathered' as they preceded the
local [ordinance] about them." He further noted that the matter was "closed out"
and Mammone had given him "a clear OK." Plaintiff also requested a thirty-day
extension to remediate the remaining violations.
On April 7, 2015, Mammone granted plaintiff a thirty-day extension.
Significantly, Mammone also advised plaintiff that Scandariato had no
"recollection of advising that the sheds mentioned in [his] letter of March 23,
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2015, were grandfathered." He also noted that any sheds installed after 1975
would be in violation of municipal zoning ordinances.
On May 8, 2015, plaintiff informed Mammone that he was advised by
Scandariato that as long as he made a good faith effort in correcting the
violations Mammone "would be agreeable to grant further extensions." He also
stated that the canopies had been on the property for many years and reiterated
that there was no problem with them in 2012. Further, plaintiff "sought
clarification" on why the "(shed/pod) violations" were "removed" in 2012. In
addition, plaintiff stated that due to his age and health, he needed an additional
ninety-day extension to remove the canopies as there was "years of accumulated
items" in them.
Mammone responded on May 13, 2015 that his "policy as Zoning Officer
has been to grant extensions of time if the violations are being corrected in a
timely manner." He noted, however, that he cannot make that determination
unless he was able to inspect the property and he would not grant a further
extension unless he was permitted to view the property.
Mammone further clarified that "the time frame of when the sheds were
installed could not be determined with any certitude in 2012" and that he was
provided with aerial photographs from 2002 that "indicate the sheds were
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erected after that date in violation of the maximum number of sheds permitted
by the code." On May 26, 2015, plaintiff emailed Mammone explaining that he
was "welcome to observe [the] property from [the] property line." In response,
Mammone scheduled an inspection for June 10, 2015 and notified plaintiff that
if he was "unable to verify progress in remediation of the violation a municipal
summons [would] be issued."
On June 5, 2015, plaintiff emailed Mammone confirming that he and
Mammone had agreed to conduct the inspection on June 11, 2015. Plaintiff also
stated that he intended to "purchase an enclosed trailer to secure and protect
from the weather valuable items . . . stored in the canopies." On June 11, 2015,
Mammone and Bruce Vozeh, the Borough Administrator, conducted an
inspection of plaintiff's property.
Mammone thereafter sent plaintiff a letter on July 13, 2015 from
Scandariato, dated June 23, 2015, which explained that the "sheds existing at
the subject property are not temporary storage containers" within the meaning
Chapter 27 of the Borough Code. Scandariato stated that the sheds were instead
improperly constructed "accessory buildings" subject to Chapter 34 of the
Borough Code.
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On July 30, 2015, Mammone sent a letter to plaintiff acknowledging his
demand to "rely on [his] word that the cleanup is progressing." Mammone noted
that he agreed to grant thirty-day extensions to allow plaintiff the necessary time
to "obtain a trailer that [he] believe[ed would] ameliorate the violations."
Nonetheless, Mammone stated that "prior to granting a [thirty day] extension, a
follow-up inspection" would be required.
On August 7, 2015, plaintiff wrote a letter to Mammone summarizing a
meeting he had with him on August 6, 2015. Plaintiff explained:
I repeated that on [June 11, 2015] []Vozeh, . . .
and you . . . conducted an on-site inspection and
discussion of my property witnessed by my wife. I
repeated that we had told you that no physical change
to the site would be made until the "enclosed trailer"
arrives and that we would give you progress reports as
requested which we have done.
I repeated that I had told you of the heavy racks,
6x6 timbers inside the "canopies" that had to be
removed before the "canopy" structures could be taken
down.
I noted that once the "enclosed trailer" arrives on
site I will need to move the remaining items from the
"canopies" into the trailer. I estimated – [four] weeks
or so to move the items into the trailer and to
disassemble the racks and timbers and then take down
the "canopies[.]" You … agreed.
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On August 21, 2015, Mammone informed plaintiff that he would only be
permitted to have one trailer "exclusively for the storage of the numerous items
on [the] property." A few days later, plaintiff requested that Mammone
reconsider the August 21, 2015 decision and permit him to have two trailers. At
some point thereafter, Mammone resigned from his position as Zoning Officer.
Plaintiff testified that during one of Mammone's inspections he explained
that he had a "compulsion to attend many Borough meetings." Plaintiff alleged
that Mammone responded "[w]ell now you'll have more time not to go to – to
fix the issues that we have these violations of, so you won't have to go to the
meetings, and you can spend your time repairing or mitigating the issues."
Plaintiff stated that he believed this comment was a "veiled threat" but he "didn't
really put any thought to it." Nevertheless, plaintiff kept this belief "in t he
background" and stopped attending public meetings for the remainder of 2015.
On June 1, 2016, plaintiff attended a public meeting regarding the
Borough's senior center because he "heard no correspondence from the Borough
for many, many months" about the canopy violations. Plaintiff testified that
when Scandariato recognized him in the crowd he said "[o]h Mr. Braggin, I'm
surprised to see you here attending a meeting."
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Plaintiff considered Scandariato' s expression of "surprise[]" as part of an
organized plan to "silence" him. Plaintiff also stated he received "push-back"
from Mayor Dillon, Vozeh, and Scandariato "on several of the issues he brought
up" at the meeting and believing there "was hostility" towards him.
When asked whether he had "express[ed] any hostility towards any
member of the Borough or its official employees at any meetings," he stated, "I
don't consider hostility a word. There are sometimes heated discussions on
disagreements. That is normal when people have different views, but my views
and my statements, I try to make – I try to make with the basis of facts." Plaintiff
was then asked how "hostility is not a word when it's [him] expressing [his]
opinion, but it's a word you use when [defendants] are expressing their[s]?"
Plaintiff explained:
Because I'm speaking as a public comment, which is my
right to express my opinion, and then negativity and
hostility that is garnered back is inappropriate. Even if
it's based on fact and I'm not – and if I used a louder
voice or whatever, which is my emotional compassion,
that shouldn't garner hostility and negativity. One
should in a governing body listen and learn, as General
Mattis says, leadership is listen, learn, lead.
C. The 2016 Investigation
In July 2016 defendant Steve Forbes was hired as Assistant Zoning
Officer. Forbes testified that he received a complaint regarding canopies on
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plaintiff's property and drove by the residence to investigate and document his
findings with photographs.
Thereafter, on August 17, 2016, Forbes sent plaintiff a letter stating that
he had "been reviewing open files" and referenced plaintiff's August 7, 2015
letter where he stated that he needed an "estimated [four] weeks or so to move
the items into the trailer and to dissemble the rack timbers and then remove the
'canopies.'" Forbes further explained that he "went past [plaintiff's] residence
on August 5, 2016 and did see that the trailer ha[d] arrived and [was] situated
on [the] property, but the 'canopies' [were] still in place." Forbes then requested
that plaintiff "provide a reason as to why [he had not] moved forward with the
agreed upon time frame with the Borough."
On October 21, 2016, Forbes sent plaintiff another letter informing him
that he had "recently driven by [the] property confirming that the enclosed trailer
is onsite, but the canopies remain up." Forbes also told plaintiff that he had
"[thirty] days to complete this task and remove all 'canopies'" and that failure to
do so would result in a municipal summons. On November 9, 2016, plaint iff
and his attorney met with Forbes and Scandariato to discuss the ongoing
investigation.
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On December 9, 2016, Forbes emailed plaintiff requesting a site visit to
"verify that the [one] canopy we had agreed that would be down by the end of
November has been removed." Forbes further explained that he needed "to
inspect the property and to form a time frame to complete the rest of the cleanup
and removal of the [canopies]."
That same day plaintiff responded stating "[t]he canopy located in the
middle of [the] property was removed prior to [December 1, 2016] as indicated
by the attached dated 'before and after' photographs." Plaintiff further stated
that this could "easily be viewed from [the] street or Hubbard School Lane as
there are no longer leaves on the trees that might obscure the view."
D. The Summonses
On December 16, 2016, Forbes sent a letter to plaintiff serving him with
a series of summonses indicating plaintiff violated a Borough ordinance, for
maintaining, and failing to remediate, the canopies on his property, as an
improper accessory building. The summonses were issued only against plaintiff
and not his wife, who plaintiff asserts also owns the property
After the matter was transferred to the Presiding Municipal Court Judge
of Bergen County, plaintiff moved to dismiss the summonses which the court
granted on September 7, 2017, concluding that "canopies [did] not constitute
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'buildings' within the meaning of Ramsey Borough Code, Section 34-4.5."1
Forbes testified that he did not appear for hearing on the motion to dismiss as
he "was not notified."
Plaintiff filed a notice of claim against defendants and later a two-count
complaint in which he alleged that Forbes and Mayor Dillon violated the NJCRA
(Count I), as did the Borough (Count II). According to plaintiff, defendants
engaged in a pattern of retaliatory conduct that infringed his First Amendment
rights. He maintained that he was a concerned resident who frequently attended
public meetings where he advocated for "good government, openness, and
transparency" causing municipal officials to respond "aggressively," leading to
their selective prosecution of him.
After the close of discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment.
Judge Lisa Perez Friscia considered the parties' submissions, conducted oral
argument, and granted defendants' application on April 24, 2020. In her
accompanying written decision, the judge considered and rejected plaintiff's
claims that defendants engaged in selective prosecution or constitutional
retaliation, and concluded that plaintiff's constitutional rights had not been
1
The record does not contain a copy of the transcript from the proceedings
related to the motion to dismiss.
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violated the NJCRA. The court also found that defendants Dillon and Forbes
were entitled to qualified immunity under Brown v. State, 230 N.J. 84, 89
(2017). Finally, Judge Perez Friscia concluded that plaintiff failed to establish
that any municipal official infringed upon his constitutional rights and, as such,
did not need to address the Borough's immunity.
The court explained that to establish a prima facie case of selective
prosecution a plaintiff must establish "(i) others similarly situated generally had
not [been] prosecuted for conduct similar to [plaintiff's] and (ii) the
[g]overnment's discriminatory selection was based on impermissible ground[s]
such as race, religion, or exercise of First Amendment rights." Wayte v. United
States, 470 U.S. 598, 605 (1985). Judge Perez Friscia noted that she viewed the
facts in the light most favorable plaintiff as required by Brill and determined
there were "no genuine issues of material fact remaining for a jury to decide."
The court found:
Plaintiff was notified of the zoning violations on his
property, after the Borough received a neighbor's
complaint setting forth multiple issues, on March 20,
2015, roughly twenty-one months prior to the
summonses being issued in December 2016 and
January 2017. Throughout that time, defendants
granted plaintiff many extensions to comply with
alleged zoning violations. Further, plaintiff stated in
numerous letters to Borough officials he was
attempting to comply with the zoning requirements by
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cleaning the debris on his property and was willing to
eventually remove the sheds altogether. Plaintiff's
letters clearly acknowledge the magnitude of the sheds,
canopies and items which needed addressing.
Relevantly, plaintiff does not provide any
documentation of the 2012 enforcement wherein
Borough officials conclude plaintiff's sheds were
preexisting non-conforming uses nor does plaintiff
address or dispute the alleged aerial photographs
demonstrating the sheds were built after the ordinance
was enacted. Additionally, plaintiff [did] not provide
sufficient evidence [that] the Borough ordinance was
only enforced against him and his property and not
against other properties with similar structures located
on them.
In addition, Judge Perez Friscia denied plaintiff's claim that defendants
constitutionally retaliated against him based on his civic participation after
applying the three-part test stated in Eichenlaub v. Township of Indiana, 385
F.3d 274, 282 (3d Cir. 2004). Specifically, Judge Perez Friscia explained that
"[p]laintiff must prove (1) that he engaged in constitutionally protected activity;
(2) that the government responded with retaliation; and (3) that the protected
activity caused the retaliation." In support of her decision, the judge concluded
that Mammone's purported statement that plaintiff would "have more time . . .
to fix the issues . . . so you won't have to go to the meetings" was "insufficient
to substantiate plaintiff's claims."
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Judge Perez Friscia further explained that "plaintiff provide[d] no
evidence to establish that . . . Forbes and Mayor Dillon had any actual
discussions or meetings regarding plaintiff's zoning enforcement actions and
that such enforcement was directly related to interfering [with] plaintiff's right
to speak at public hearings." On this point, the court emphasized that both
Forbes and Mayor Dillon "testified they did not speak to one another regarding"
the zoning actions.
The judge further addressed whether Mayor Dillon and Forbes were
entitled to qualified immunity. Judge Perez Friscia, citing Brown, 230 N.J. at
89, stated that "[t]o determine whether qualified immunity applies, two inquiries
are pertinent: (1) were plaintiff's constitutional rights violated; and (2) 'was the
constitutional right being violated clearly established at the time so that any
reasonable officer acting competently in the circumstances would have known
of the constitutional violations.'" The judge concluded that both Mayor Dillon
and Forbes were entitled to qualified immunity because "no facts ha[d] been
presented to suggest defendants undertook an investigation of plaintiff's
property specifically to interfere with his constitutional rights as a proper
complaint was initiated prior to any such investigation."
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Finally, the court determined that it was not necessary to address the
Borough's immunity. Relying upon N.J.S.A. 59:2-102 and Monell v. Department
of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978), the court
concluded that there was "no evidence presented [that] . . . Forbes or Mayor
Dillon acted in such a manner as to specifically interfere with plaintiff's
constitutional rights."
This appeal followed in which plaintiff raises five primary arguments. He
contends the court: 1) applied an incorrect legal standard to his First
Amendment retaliation claims, 2) erred in finding that plaintiff had not
established a prima facie case of selective prosecution, 3) failed to correctly
apply the Brill standard when there remained genuine issues of material fact, 4)
committed error in concluding Mayor Dillon and Forbes were entitled to
qualified immunity, and 5) improperly declined to address the Borough's
liability. We disagree with all of these arguments and affirm substantially for
the reasons expressed by Judge Perez Friscia in her thoughtful and
comprehensive twenty-five-page written opinion that accompanied the April 24,
2020 order.
2
N.J.S.A. 59:2-10 provides "[a] public entity is not liable for the acts or
omissions of a public employee constituting a crime, actual fraud, actual malice,
or willful misconduct."
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II.
In his first point, plaintiff argues the judge applied the incorrect standard
in evaluating his First Amendment retaliation claim, and that his claim should
have been analyzed under the three-part test delineated in Eichenlaub, 385 F.3d
at 282. Plaintiff also asserts that he satisfied the Eichenlaub test and established
a prima facie case of First Amendment retaliation.
The NJCRA is modeled on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Rezem Family Assocs., LP
v. Borough of Millstone, 423 N.J. Super. 103, 115 (App. Div. 2011). It affords
a private right of action against persons who act "under color of law" to interfere
with "rights, privileges or immunities" secured not only "by the Constitution or
laws of this State," but also "by the Constitution or laws of the United States."
N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c).
"Two types of private claims are recognized under this statute: (1) a claim
when one is 'deprived of a right,' and (2) a claim when one's rights have been
'interfered with by threats, intimidation, coercion or force.'" Lapolla v. Cnty. of
Union, 449 N.J. Super. 288, 306 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting Felicioni v. Admin.
Office of Courts, 404 N.J. Super. 382, 400 (App. Div. 2008)).
Participation at public meetings is a substantive right under the First
Amendment. See State v. Charzewski, 356 N.J. Super. 151, 155 (App. Div.
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2002). This right, however, is not "unbridled" and is "subject to reasonable time,
manner and place limitations." Id. at 156.
In Eichenlaub, the Third Circuit stated that "constitutional retaliation
claims are analyzed under a three-part test." 385 F.3d at 282. Specifically,
plaintiff "must prove (1) that he engaged in constitutionally-protected activity;
(2) that the government responded with retaliation; and (3) that the protected
activity caused the retaliation." Ibid. "The threshold requirement is that the
plaintiff identify the protected activity that allegedly spurred the retaliation."
Ibid.Plaintiff maintains that the court incorrectly applied the standard for
selective prosecution outlined in Wayte, 470 U.S. 598, to his First Amendment
retaliation claim. Plaintiff ignores the fact that the court separately evaluated
his First Amendment retaliation claim under Eichenlaub, the same standard he
asserts should have been applied. Indeed, Judge Perez Friscia conducted a
thorough analysis of the referenced claim under the Eichenlaub three-part test.
Plaintiff further argues that he has established a prima facie case of First
Amendment retaliation under Eichenlaub. In this regard, he maintains that his
participation at public meetings is a substantive right under the First Amendment
and that defendants issued the municipal summonses in retaliation for comments
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he made at public meetings. He asserts that he "has provided evidence that the
Borough of Ramsey undertook efforts to prosecute him for alleged canopy
violations in 2015 through 2017 . . . as a direct response to [his] constitutionally
protected activities." Again, we disagree.
There is no dispute that plaintiff's participation at public meetings is a
substantive right protected under the First Amendment. See Charzewski, 356
N.J. Super. at 155. Nevertheless, plaintiff's theory that defendants retaliated
against him for his comments by attempting to enforce its zoning regulations,
thereby satisfying prongs two and three under Eichenlaub, are not supported by
the record.
First, plaintiff claims that the 2015 investigation into his canopies was
retaliatory because the issue was resolved in 2012 when they were determined
to be "preexisting non-conforming structures." In support of his position,
plaintiff points to his own testimony that the canopies were "grandfathered" and
the December 6, 2012 letter from Mammone summarizing plaintiff's progress in
remediating the violations which does not reference the canopies.
Here, plaintiff correctly notes that the December 6, 2012 letter makes no
reference to the canopies. However, in Mammone's April 7, 2015 letter, he notes
that Scandariato "had no recollection of advising that the sheds . . . were
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grandfathered." Plaintiff points to no other support for his self-serving
statement, or any formal municipal action, suggesting any of his municipal
violations, which included more than the alleged illegal canopies, were
permitted uses at the time of the 2012 or 2015 letters.
Plaintiff also asserts that the 2015 investigation was instituted in
retaliation of his comments made to Mammone about his "action or inaction"
regarding his complaints about his neighbor's property violations. The record,
however, establishes that the 2015 investigation began after a neighbor emailed
Mammone on March 5, 2015, about potential property violations. Indeed, this
email notes that the neighbor was "concerned that [plaintiff] has several
structures that [l]ook as if they were meant to be temporary but have become
permanent and [are] in disrepair." We are satisfied that the record fails to create
a genuine and material question of fact that Mammone acted inconsistently or
in a retaliatory manner.
Plaintiff further contends that Mammone's "veiled threat" to stop
attending public meetings is evidence of defendants' retaliatory intent. As noted,
plaintiff testified that Mammone stated "[w]ell now you'll have more time not
to go – to fix the issues we have with these violations, so you won't have to go
to the meetings, and you can spend your time repairing or mitigating these
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issues." First, we note that despite nearly two years of discovery, plaintiff never
deposed Mammone to explore this comment. In any event, that comment,
assuming it was made, cannot be reasonably interpreted to imply a threat, as it
is simply a statement indicating that plaintiff was required to remediate the
property violations. Further, plaintiff's admission that he "didn't really put any
thought to [the comment]" supports the conclusion that he did not feel threatened
by Mammone's alleged statement.
We also note plaintiff never connects the alleged physical assault by
Scandariato to his constitutional retaliation claim. Further, the factual record
does not support an inference that Scandariato's action was part of a concerted
effort by defendants to retaliate against plaintiff in an effort to chill his speech
or prevent his attendance at future meetings. By the time of Scandariato's
confrontation with plaintiff, the 2014 investigation had already commenced, and
plaintiff thereafter attended numerous municipal hearings and meetings.
In addition, plaintiff claims that the 2016 investigation into the property
violations by Forbes only occurred because he resumed attending meetings and
received push back from Vozeh, Mayor Dillon, and Scandariato. Again,
contrary to plaintiff's contention, there is no genuine nor material dispute of fact,
to dispute that Forbes opened the 2016 investigation after he received a
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complaint regarding canopies on plaintiff's property. Plaintiff's own
correspondence confirms his efforts to remediate the conditions on the property
that, in part, formed the bases for the complaints.
Finally, there is no support in the record for plaintiff's contention that
Mayor Dillon and Forbes conspired to issue the municipal summonses in
retaliation for plaintiff's comments made at public meetings. For example ,
Forbes specifically testified that he did not "have any involvement with the
mayor in [an] official capacity" nor did he "have any communications with the
office of the mayor" throughout the 2016 investigation. Similarly, Mayor Dillon
testified that she did not "have any involvement in [the] decision to investigate
the complaints regarding [plaintiff's] property" nor did she have any
"communication with anyone in the zoning department regarding the
investigation of [plaintiff]."
In sum, plaintiff failed to present evidence that would raise a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether defendants "responded with retaliation" or that the
"protected activity caused the retaliation." Eichenlaub, 385 F.3d at 282.
Accordingly, the court did not err in finding that plaintiff failed to establish a
prima facie case of First Amendment retaliation under Eichenlaub.
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III.
Plaintiff also contends that the court erred in concluding that he had not
established a prima facie case for selective prosecution. Specifically, plaintiff
asserts that he has satisfied the two-part test delineated in Wayte, 470 U.S. at
608, because the summonses were only issued against plaintiff, not his spouse,
and defendants' motivation to prosecute the zoning violations resulted from his
exercise of First Amendment rights at public comment sessions. We are not
persuaded.
"Discriminatory enforcement of an otherwise impartial law by state and
local officials is unconstitutional." State, Twp. of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160
N.J. 156, 183 (1999). However, "[t]he conscious exercise of some selectivity in
enforcement is not a constitutional violation unless the decision to prosecute is
based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary
classification." Ibid.A party asserting selective enforcement has a "heavy" burden of proof.
State v. Di Frisco, 118 N.J. 253, 266 (1990). As our Supreme Court has held:
In order to prevail on a claim of discriminatory
enforcement, the defendant must plead and prove
intentional selectivity as well as an unjustifiable basis
for the discrimination. "[The] standards require [the
defendant] to show both that the . . . enforcement
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system had a discriminatory effect and that it was
motivated by a discriminatory purpose."
[Ibid. (first alteration in original) (quoting Wayte, 470
U.S. at 608).]
"Stated differently, in order to prevail on a selective prosecution claim, a
defendant must prove that the 'prosecutorial policy had a discriminatory effect
and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose,'" and that "'similarly
situated individuals . . . were treated differently.'" State v. Ballard, 331 N.J.
Super. 529, 540 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
241 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, "[o]nce a prima facie
showing of a discriminatory prosecution has been made, however, 'the burden
of proof shifts to the State to rebut the presumption of unconstitutional action
by showing that permissible racially neutral selection criteria and procedures
have produced the monochromatic result.'" Ibid. (quoting Washington, 426 U.S.
at 241) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, there is no evidence that defendants' decision to enforce its zoning
code was motivated by "race, religion, or other arbitrary classification."
Pennsauken, 160 N.J. at 183. For example, Forbes testified that the basis for the
2016 investigation stemmed from a complaint made by another Borough citizen.
Moreover, the record indicates that defendants had a legitimate reason for
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enforcing its zoning regulations in 2015 and 2016. Specifically, defendants
obtained aerial photographs indicating that plaintiff's canopies were constructed
after the Borough enacted the applicable ordinance, which regulated the
permissible number of accessory buildings. Moreover, Scandariato provided an
explanation stating that "[t]he subject sheds are accessory buildings which are
defined in Section 34-3 and regulated by Section 34-4.5 of Chapter 34 of the
Borough Code."
IV.
In plaintiff's third point, he contends Judge Perez Friscia erred by
misapplying the standard for summary judgment under Brill. Specifically,
plaintiff asserts that the court "misapprehend[ed], [gave] undue weight, and/or
fail[ed] to give due weight to certain key material facts." Plaintiff also maintains
that the court did not view the evidence "in light most favorable to the non -
moving party." We disagree.
We review the disposition of a summary judgment motion de novo,
applying the same standard used by the motion judge. Townsend v. Pierre, 221
N.J. 36, 59 (2015). Like the motion judge, we view "the competent evidential
materials presented . . . in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, [and
determine whether they] are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve
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the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." Town of Kearny
v. Brandt, 214 N.J. 76, 91 (2013) (quoting Brill, 142 N.J. at 540); see also R.
4:46-2(c). If "the evidence 'is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a
matter of law,'" courts will "not hesitate to grant summary judgment." Brill, 142
N.J. at 540 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).
While a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
non-movant, "[c]ompetent opposition requires 'competent evidential material'
beyond mere 'speculation' and 'fanciful arguments.'" Cortez v. Gindhart, 435
N.J. Super. 589, 605 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting Hoffman v. Asseenontv.Com,
Inc., 404 N.J. Super. 415, 426 (App. Div. 2009)). A motion for summary
judgment will not be defeated by bare conclusions lacking factual support,
Petersen v. Twp. of Raritan, 418 N.J. Super. 125, 132 (App. Div. 2011), self-
serving statements, Heyert v. Taddese, 431 N.J. Super. 388, 414 (App. Div.
2013), or disputed facts "of an insubstantial nature." Pressler & Verniero,
Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt 2.2 on R. 4:46-2 (2022).
Plaintiff first claims that the court failed to give due weight to the fact that
the "summonses and correspondence were issued only against [plaintiff] as
opposed to Ms. Braggin." Here, the court acknowledged plaintiff's selective
enforcement argument and his position that "the summonses were issued only
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against him for the property violations, and not his wife [as a] co-property
owner." The court then reviewed the evidence in the record and concluded that
"plaintiff [did] not provide sufficient evidence [that] the Borough ordinance was
only enforced against him and his property and not against other properties with
similar structures located on them." Accordingly, the court considered the fact
that the summonses were only issued against plaintiff and concluded that it was
not sufficient to establish a prima facie claim of selective enforcement. We
discern no error in that conclusion.
Plaintiff also contends that the court "misapprehend[ed] material facts"
when it stated that "[p]laintiff's letters clearly acknowledge the magnitude of the
sheds, canopies, and items which needed addressing." The court, however, did
not misapprehend this fact, as the correspondence between the parties illustrates
the "magnitude" of the "sheds, canopies, and items which needed addressing."
Indeed, plaintiff requested permission to acquire an additional trailer, in part, to
store the multitude of items that he had placed under the canopies.
Plaintiff further claims that the court "erred in finding that plaintiff . . . d id
not dispute the alleged aerial photographs of sheds being built after the
ordinance was enacted" because he did dispute the photographs in his responses
to defendants' asserted material facts. Plaintiff's claim, however, misconstrues
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the motion record. Specifically, defendants' statement of undisputed material
facts notes that:
On May 13, 2015, Mr. Mammone sent [p]laintiff a
letter denying a ninety (90) day extension because he
needed to inspect the [p]roperty. Additionally, Mr.
Mammone reiterated, as he had previously discussed
this with [p]laintiff, after the complaint by [p]laintiff's
neighbor, Mr. Mammone was provided aerial
photographs form 2002 that showed the sheds were
erected after 2002 and thus were in violation of the
maximum number of sheds permitted by Borough code.
In plaintiff's response to defendants' asserted material facts he stated:
Admit letter was sent but denied as to remainder as
judicial determination renders all of Mr. Mammone's
conclusions erroneous in light of its dismissal with
prejudice of all charges against [p]laintiff.
It is clear from plaintiff's response that he did not dispute the accuracy of
the aerial photographs. Rather, plaintiff stated that he denied there were any
zoning violations based upon the September 7, 2017, dismissal of the municipal
summonses.
Plaintiff's argument that the court improperly evaluated the motion record
contrary to Brill also lacks merit. Essentially, plaintiff reiterates his argument
that the record supports his prima facie claim for First Amendment retaliation.
As discussed above, however, after conducting a de novo review, we are
satisfied that the record failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact
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regarding plaintiff's claims, and the court did not err in concluding plaintiff
failed to satisfy the Eichenlaub factors.
Indeed, as Judge Perez Friscia noted, the record establishes that the 2015
and 2016 investigations began after neighbors made complaints about plaintiff's
property. Further, both Mayor Dillon and Forbes testified that they had no
communication about the commencement, or furtherance, of the 2015 or 2016
investigation, and the record fails to contain competent evidence to dispute that
fact or create any reasonable inferences that either Mayor Dillon or Forbe s
discussed the issues with plaintiff's property.
We also disagree with plaintiff's claims that the court made improper
credibility determinations by accepting the deposition testimony of Mayor
Dillon and Forbes as true. Specifically, plaintiff argues that because the court
did not "consider[] . . . the fact that the testimony of both defendants . . . could
be dishonest given the obvious motive to conceal any wrongdoing" the court
erred in granting summary judgment.
Plaintiff's argument misinterprets the standard for summary judgment.
Here, the court was required to review the testimony submitted "in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party," which it did. The court was not required to
accept unsupported conspiracy theories unmoored to the facts or consider a
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witness' sworn testimony untruthful simply because that witness represented an
adverse party. As such, we find no error in the court's conclusion that there
remained "no genuine issues of material fact . . . for a jury to decide."
V.
In his fourth point, plaintiff contends Judge Perez Friscia committed error
when she concluded Mayor Dillon and Forbes were entitled to qualified
immunity. Relying on Brown, 230 N.J. at 98, plaintiff again argues the motion
record contained disputed issues of material fact, and the issue should have been
submitted to a jury. We are not persuaded.
To determine if qualified immunity applies, we consider whether: (1)
plaintiff's constitutional rights violated; and (2) "was the constitutional right
being violated clearly established at the time so that any reasonable officer
acting competently in the circumstances would have known of the constitutional
violation." Brown, 230 N.J. at 89. When undertaking this inquiry, the court
must view the facts in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury.
Id. at 98.
In Brown, the Court explained qualified immunity as follows:
The affirmative defense of qualified immunity protects
government officials from personal liability for
discretionary actions taken in the course of their public
responsibilities, insofar as their conduct does not
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violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.
The defense extends to suits brought under . . . the Civil
Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2.
This state's qualified immunity doctrine tracks the
federal standard, shielding from liability all public
officials except those who are plainly incompetent or
those who knowingly violate the law.
[Id. at 97-98 (citations omitted).]
Here, plaintiff has failed to show that Mayor Dillon or Forbes violated his
First Amendment rights. Indeed, as discussed, plaintiff failed to establish either
a claim for First Amendment retaliation or selective enforcement of the
Borough's municipal code. Moreover, plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine
issue of material fact as to both these claims, and therefore, this was not a case
that needed to be "submitted to the jury to determine 'the who-what-when-
where-why type of historical fact issues.'" Id. at 98-99 (quoting Schneider v.
Simonini, 63 N.J. 336, 359 (2000).
VI.
In his final point, plaintiff contends the court erred by declining to address
the issue of the Borough's liability. Specifically, plaintiff claims that the record
contains evidence that Forbes and Mayor Dillon "acted in such a manner as to
interfere with [plaintiff's] constitutional rights." Further, plaintiff argues that
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the Borough may be liable because "there is evidence of an individual with
policy making authority who committed a tort." Again, we disagree.
A governmental unit "may not be sued under [Section] 1983 [and by
extension, the NJCRA] for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents."
Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. It cannot be held liable for the actions of its employees
solely based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. Id. at 691-95. Rather, "it
is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent
official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible
under [Section] 1983 [and by extension, the NJCRA]." Id. at 694; see also
Besler v. Bd. of Educ. of W. Windsor-Plainsboro Reg'l Sch. Dist., 201 N.J. 544,
565 (2010) (stating that a municipality can "be held liable for acts committed by
one of its employees . . . pursuant to a governmental policy or custom . . . that
violate[s] the Constitution").
A plaintiff may establish the existence of a policy or custom by presenting
proof that the municipality: (1) adopted an official policy that deprived citizens
of their constitutional rights; (2) tolerated or adopted an unofficial custom that
deprived citizens of their constitutional rights; or (3) failed to affirmatively act
to train or supervise its employees so as to prevent them from unlawfully
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depriving citizens of their constitutional rights, although the need to do so was
obvious. See Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 584 (3d Cir.
2003). A municipality also may be liable for a single decision of an official who
"possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action
ordered." Stomel v. City of Camden, 192 N.J. 137, 146 (2007) (quoting
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986)).
As noted, the record does not support plaintiff's claims for First
Amendment retaliation or selective prosecution of the Borough's zoning
regulations and plaintiff failed to establish that the Borough had a policy or
custom which deprived him of his constitutional rights. Natale, 318 F.3d at 584.
Similarly, the record does not support plaintiff's argument that an individual
with policy making authority, i.e., Mayor Dillon, committed any tort. Stomel,
192 N.J. at 146.
To the extent we have not addressed any of plaintiffs' remaining
arguments, it is because we have concluded they are of insufficient merit to
warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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