STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. RODNEY CAUTHEN (15-06-0710 AND 15-01-0017, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4136-16T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
RODNEY CAUTHEN, a/k/a
RAHMAN H. MUHAMMAD,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
Submitted October 2, 2018 – Decided November 19, 2018
Before Judges Fisher and Suter.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Middlesex County, Indictment Nos. 15-06-
0710 and 15-01-0017.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Daniel S. Rockoff, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Andrew C. Carey, Middlesex County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Joie D. Piderit, Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Rodney Cauthen appeals his conviction for fourth-degree
obstruction, N.J.S.A 2C:29-1(b), claiming the trial court did not make a finding
he "obstruct[ed] the detection or investigation of a crime or the prosecution of a
person for a crime," as required for a fourth-degree conviction. He urges us to
mold the verdict to a disorderly persons offense or remand his case for additional
findings. Defendant also appeals his five-year sentence for third-degree
possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) (heroin), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-
10(a)(1), claiming the judge was influenced by the erroneous conviction for
fourth-degree obstruction. We reverse the obstruction conviction because the
trial court did not make findings that defendant committed all of the elements
required for a fourth-degree offense and remand that charge for further findings
and resentencing. We affirm defendant's conviction and five-year sentence for
third-degree CDS possession.
I.
Detective Lloyd McNelly of the South Plainfield Police Department was
on routine patrol when he drove past defendant and another person walking on
the opposite side of the road. McNelly could not remember defendant's name,
but was familiar with him from previous police matters. After learning
defendant's name and that there was an open warrant for him, defendant was
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stopped. He tried to flee from the police, was subdued and arrested. The police
found six folds of suspected heroin in defendant's pocket. Defendant was
charged with third-degree heroin possession.1
Less than two months later, a resident of South Plainfield was walking his
dog at 3:30 a.m., when he saw two feet "hanging out of a Jeep" that was parked
in the neighborhood. Defendant claimed it was his Jeep but then "took off"
when the resident called 9-1-1.
Officer Mark Bullock arrived with his canine partner, Blitz, and they
searched the area for about forty minutes. Blitz was able to track defendant to
the backyard of a neighboring house two streets away from the Jeep. Officer
Bullock found defendant "laying on his side up alongside the house like as if he
was trying to hide." Defendant stood up and was "looking and panning and
scanning." Defendant was placed under arrest, but kept his arms "stiffed out,"
which prevented Bullock from handcuffing him. Defendant then "jerk[ed] his
arm up . . . in a fast motion," provoking Blitz, who bit defendant in the arm.
Bullock testified "[defendant was] basically compliant at that point."
1
Defendant has not appealed the denial of his motion to suppress or conviction
for this possession of CDS offense.
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The neighbor identified defendant as the person he saw in the Jeep. The
Jeep owner testified that no one but family members had permission to drive the
vehicle.
Defendant was charged with third-degree possession of heroin under
indictment 15-01-17, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1). A few months later, he was
charged under indictment 15-06-0710 with fourth-degree obstruction, N.J.S.A.
2C:29-1(b) and third-degree burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2.
The bench trial on the CDS charge was conducted following denial of
defendant's motion to suppress. The trial court convicted defendant of third-
degree possession of a CDS, finding the State had proven defendant possessed
heroin, knowing it was a Schedule I controlled dangerous substance.
The bench trial on the burglary and obstruction charges was held several
months later. Defendant was acquitted of burglary because the court found the
State had not proven defendant's entry into the Jeep was "with the purpose to
commit an offense therein." The court convicted defendant of fourth-degree
obstructing the administration of law or other governmental function, finding:
the defendant committed an act of physical
interference. That this act was committed with the
further purpose of preventing a public servant from
lawfully performing an official function and that in
committing the act, the defendant did prevent a public
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servant from lawfully performing the official function
of placing him under arrest.
In February 2017, the trial court denied defendant's motion for a new trial
on the obstruction charge. The court stated that although defendant initially
seemed to comply with his arrest, he ultimately did not. There was "flight from
the original location" but the court was not certain that "played a major role in
[his] decision making." Rather, "it was more . . . the physical interference that
had . . . no lawful purpose" that the court considered.
The court also denied the State's motion to sentence defendant to an
extended term as a persistent offender. In considering the aggravating and
mitigating factors, the court found aggravating factors three (risk of re-offense),
six (criminal history) and nine (deterrence). See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a). The court
gave "heavy" weight to factor nine. It found no mitigating factors. N.J.S.A.
2C:44-1(b). Defendant was sentenced to a five-year term on the CDS third-
degree possession charge and a concurrent term of eighteen months on the
fourth-degree obstruction charge.
On appeal, defendant raises the following issues:
POINT I. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE
CONVICTION FOR FOURTH DEGREE
OBSTRUCTION, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1.
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A. After a Bench Trial, The Court Failed To Make
Any Findings On An Element Of Fourth Degree
Obstruction
B. Because The Evidence Was Legally Insufficient
To Support Fourth Degree Obstruction, This Court
Should Mold The Verdict To A Disorderly Persons
Conviction
C. Alternatively, This Court Must Remand For
Findings On The Element Not Addressed By The Trial
Court
POINT II. THIS COURT SHOULD REMAND FOR
RESENTENCING BECAUSE THE MAXIMUM FIVE
YEAR PRISON TERM IS EXCESSIVE FOR AN
INDIVIDUAL WITH A SEVERE SUBSTANCE USE
DISORDER WHO WAS CONVICTED OF
POSSESSING THE SUBSTANCE TO WHICH HE IS
ADDICTED
A. The Trial Court Erred by Weighing the
Aggravating Factors Too Heavily
B. The Trial Court Erred by Failing to Recognize
Addiction as a Mitigating Factor for Possession of the
Substance to Which the Defendant is Addicted
II.
"The State in a criminal prosecution is bound to prove every element of
the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Delibero, 149 N.J. 90,
99 (1997) citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). "[O]ur Legislature has
. . . provid[ed] that '[n]o person may be convicted of an offense unless each
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element of such offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.' N.J.S.A. 2C:1 –
13(a)." State ex rel L.W., 333 N.J. Super. 492, 496 (App. Div. 2000) (internal
alterations in original). Defendant contends he should not have been convicted
of fourth-degree obstruction because the court did not find he committed all the
required elements of that offense.
Under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a) a person commits the offense of obstructing
administration of law or other governmental function where,
[H]e purposely obstructs, impairs or perverts the
administration of law or other governmental function or
prevents or attempts to prevent a public servant from
lawfully performing an official function by means of
flight, intimidation, force, violence, or physical
interference or obstacle, or by means of any
independently unlawful act. This section does not apply
to failure to perform a legal duty other than an official
duty, or any other means of avoiding compliance with
law without affirmative interference with governmental
functions.
That offense becomes a crime of the fourth-degree, however, if the person
"obstructs the detection or investigation of a crime or the prosecution of a person
for a crime, otherwise it is a disorderly persons offense." N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(b).
The court found the defendant "committed the act of physical
interference," and that this was done "with the further purpose of preventing a
public servant from lawfully performing an official function." The court then
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found that in committing this act, "defendant did prevent a public servant from
lawfully performing the official function of placing him under arrest." However,
the court did not make a finding that "defendant obstructed the investigation or
detection of a crime, or prosecution of a person for a crime," as required for a
conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(b). As such, we are constrained to reverse
defendant's conviction for fourth-degree obstruction.
Defendant requests we mold the verdict to a disorderly person's offense
or in the alternative, remand the case for additional findings. Because the trial
court did not include the required element in making its findings, and did not
find any facts about this requirement, we are satisfied that the appropriate
remedy is to remand "for further findings of fact and conclusions of law on the
record already made." State v. Smith, 253 N.J. Super. 145, 149 (App. Div.
1992). We have not found insufficient evidence to sustain the fourth-degree
conviction and thus, "there is no jeopardy consequence precluding such a
remand." Ibid.Further, although defendant was acquitted of burglary, that does not
preclude a finding of fourth-degree obstruction. The trial court must determine
whether there was enough evidence in the record to find defendant obstructed
"the detection or investigation of a crime or the prosecution of a person for a
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crime," which is separate from whether he actually committed burglary.
Because we have reversed the conviction for fourth-degree obstruction, we also
reverse his eighteen-month sentence for that charge and remand for
resentencing.
Defendant also appeals his five-year term of incarceration for third-degree
possession of CDS. He argues the court weighed the aggravating factors too
heavily because of his conviction for fourth-degree obstruction and should have
recognized defendant's addiction as a mitigating factor. Our review of a
sentencing determination is limited. State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 363-65 (1984).
We review a judge's sentencing decision under an abuse of discretion standard.
Id. at 363-64. See State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014).
The record here does not show an abuse of discretion. Defendant was
sentenced within the sentencing guidelines for a third-degree offense, which is
three to five years. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(a)(3). The court's analysis of aggravating
and mitigating factors was based on competent and credible evidence in the
record. The court considered defendant's drug use, addiction and criminal
history. Although the court found defendant "met all the qualifications for an
extended term pursuant to [N.J.S.A.] 2C:43-4(a)," he did not sentence defendant
under that statute. However, the court found the need to deter defendant from
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violating the law weighed heavily in the court's consideration. The court did not
find any mitigating factors. There was nothing in the record to indicate
defendant's sentence on the CDS charge was influenced by his fourth-degree
obstruction charge.
Defendant argues that drug addiction should have been considered by the
trial court in mitigation of his sentence. The record showed the trial court was
aware of defendant's drug use and addiction as well as his past refusal to attend
a drug treatment program. The court clearly took all of that into consideration
in sentencing defendant.
The Court has held in State v. Ghertler, 114 N.J. 383, 390 (1989), that
drug dependency is not a mitigating factor. State v. Clark, 203 N.J. 166, 182
(2010) relied on by defendant, does not require a different result. Clark
addressed whether the court must conduct a plenary hearing when there is an
objection to an applicant's admission into drug court. In concluding that a
plenary hearing is not required, the Court stated that "[b]ecause the decision
whether to admit the applicant into [d]rug [c]ourt is essentially a sentencing one,
the 'trial judge is required to consider all of the aggravating and mitigating
factors and to find those supported by the evidence.'" Id. at 177 (quoting State
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v. Dalziel, 182 N.J. 494, 505 (2005)). Clark did not cite to Ghertler or say that
addiction itself is a mitigating factor.
Defendant's conviction for fourth-degree obstruction is reversed and
remanded for further findings of fact and conclusions of law based on the record
already made. Defendant's sentence for third-degree possession of CDS is
affirmed.
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