MANUFACTURERS AND TRADERS TRUST COMPANY VS. URBAN EDGE PROPERTIES, LP (C-000023-16, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2018 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-5305-16T4
    MANUFACTURERS AND TRADERS
    TRUST COMPANY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent/
    Cross-Appellant,
    v.
    URBAN EDGE PROPERTIES, LP,
    and LODI UE LLC,
    Defendants-Appellants/
    Cross-Respondents,
    and
    MUNICIPALITY OF LODI and
    HUDSON PARK REALTY
    ASSOCIATES, LP,
    Defendants-Respondents.
    ______________________________
    Submitted November 26, 2018 – Decided December 3, 2018
    Before Judges Sabatino, Haas and Sumners.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Chancery Division, Bergen County, Docket No. C-
    000023-16.
    Jeffer, Hopkinson & Vogel, and Riker Danzig Scherer
    Hyland & Perretti LLP, attorneys for appellants/cross-
    respondents (David H. Altman, Bethany A. Abele,
    Michael R. O'Donnell, and Jorge A. Sanchez, on the
    briefs).
    Frank T. Luciano, attorney for respondent/cross-
    appellant Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company.
    Alan P. Spiniello, attorney for respondent Borough of
    Lodi, join in the brief of respondent Manufacturers and
    Traders Trust Company.
    Joseph J. Rotolo, attorney for respondent Hudson Park
    Realty Associates, LP, join in the brief of respondent
    Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company.
    PER CURIAM
    Defendants Urban Edge Properties LP and Lodi UE LLC appeal from the
    Chancery Division's June 13, 2017 and July 7, 2017 orders, partially granting
    plaintiff Manufacturers Traders and Trust Company's motion for summary
    judgment in this dispute over plaintiff's right to use a roadway located on
    defendants' property. 1 We affirm.
    1
    The trial court denied the portion of plaintiff's motion in which it sought a
    declaration that it possessed an easement by prescription over the roadway, and
    plaintiff has filed a cross-appeal challenging that determination. In a separate
    June 13, 2017 order, the court denied defendants' motion for summary judgment.
    A-5305-16T4
    2
    All of the relevant facts underlying this matter are set forth in
    comprehensive detail in the seventy-two-page written decision rendered by
    Judge Robert P. Contillo on June 13, 2017. The parties are fully familiar with
    these facts and, therefore, they will not be repeated here.
    Suffice it to say that a fifty-foot wide road, known as Bruan Place, lies at
    the center of the controversy between the parties. Defendants own and operate
    a shopping center on the property on which Bruan Place is also situated.
    Plaintiff owns and operates a bank on an adjacent lot. The shopping center and
    the bank are located on Essex Street in Lodi. Bruan Place intersects with Essex
    Street and, for the past forty years, Bruan Place has provided the only means of
    access from Essex Street to plaintiff's and defendants' properties.
    The parties had previously entered into licensing and maintenance
    agreements under which, among other things, defendants permitted plaintiff 's
    customers to use parking spaces in its shopping center. In November 2015,
    defendants sought to raise the annual fees it charged plaintiff under these
    agreements, and plaintiff balked at paying the new assessments. As a result,
    defendants threatened to prevent plaintiff's employees and customers from using
    Bruan Place to access the bank.
    A-5305-16T4
    3
    Plaintiff then filed a complaint against defendants, and sought a
    declaration that it had the right to use Bruan Place because: (1) it held an implied
    easement over the roadway because Bruan Place had been described in the deed
    the original owner issued to plaintiff's predecessor in interest; (2) Bruan Place
    was a dedicated street and, as such, was a recognized public thoroughfare
    accessible to plaintiff and the public; and (3) it held an easement by prescription
    over Bruan Place because it had used it for over three decades. Defendants
    disagreed with plaintiff's contentions and, because the material facts were not in
    dispute, the parties eventually filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
    In his thorough and thoughtful written opinion, Judge Contillo
    meticulously considered the parties' competing arguments, made detailed
    findings of facts in which he examined the chain of title for the properties all
    the way back to 1949, and rendered sound legal rulings that were fully supported
    by the governing case law. The judge found that the deed instruments created
    an implied easement in plaintiff's favor over Bruan Place, and also ruled that
    this means of ingress and egress from Essex Street to the parties' properties was
    a dedicated public thoroughfare. However, Judge Contillo rejected plaintiff's
    claim that it had an exclusive easement by prescription permitting it to control
    access to Bruan Place.
    A-5305-16T4
    4
    Defendants have appealed the judge's determination that plaintiff was
    vested with an implied easement over and through Bruan Place, and his finding
    that this road was a dedicated thoroughfare.        In its cross-appeal, plaintiff
    challenges the judge's denial of its request for a declaration that it held an
    easement by prescription over Bruan Place. In their respective appellate briefs,
    the parties have raised the same arguments that Judge Contillo exhaustively
    considered in his seventy-two page written decision.
    Our review of a ruling on summary judgment is de novo, applying the
    same legal standard as the trial court, namely, the standard set forth in Rule 4:46-
    2(c). Conley v. Guerrero, 
    228 N.J. 339
    , 346 (2017). Thus, we consider, as Judge
    Contillo did, whether "the competent evidential materials presented, when
    viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to
    permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the
    non-moving party." Town of Kearny v. Brandt, 
    214 N.J. 76
    , 91 (2013) (quoting
    Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 
    142 N.J. 520
    , 540 (1995)). If there is no
    genuine issue of material fact, we must then decide whether the trial court
    correctly interpreted the law. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Boylan, 
    307 N.J. Super. 162
    , 167 (App. Div. 1998). We accord no deference to the trial judge's
    A-5305-16T4
    5
    conclusions on issues of law and review issues of law de novo. Nicholas v.
    Mynster, 
    213 N.J. 463
    , 478 (2013).
    We have considered the parties' contentions in light of the record and
    applicable legal principles. We are satisfied that Judge Contillo properly fou nd
    that plaintiff held an implied easement over Bruan Place, and that this road was
    a dedicated public thoroughfare. The judge also correctly rejected plaintiff's
    argument that it held an easement by prescription over the road. We therefore
    affirm for the reasons expressed by Judge Contillo in his detailed written
    opinion.
    Affirmed.
    A-5305-16T4
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-5305-16T4

Filed Date: 12/3/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/20/2019