K.B. VS. CITY OF NEWARK (L-8043-16, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2492-16T4
K.B.,1
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF NEWARK,
Defendant-Respondent,
and
NEWARK POLICE DEPARTMENT
a/k/a CITY OF NEWARK DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SAFETY POLICE DIVISION,
and K.G.,
Defendants.
Argued October 15, 2018 – Decided November 30, 2018
Before Judges Messano, Fasciale and Rose.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-8043-16.
1
We use initials to protect the privacy of K.B.
Samuel A. Anyan, Jr., argued the cause for appellant
(Wapner, Newman, Wigrizer, Brecher & Miller, PC,
attorneys; Samuel A. Anyan, Jr., on the briefs).
Gary S. Lipshutz, Assistant Corporation Counsel,
argued the cause for respondent City of Newark
(Kenyatta K. Stewart, Acting Corporation Counsel,
attorney; Handel T. Destinvil, Assistant Corporation
Counsel, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff K.B. appeals from a January 6, 2017 Law Division order denying
her motion for leave to file a late notice of tort claim against defendant City of
Newark.2 For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
We derive the pertinent facts from the motion record. On November 29,
2015, while plaintiff was working as a confidential informant (CI) for defendant
police department, she was locked in an office of a Newark police precinct by
then Detective K.G., who forced her to perform oral sex. K.G. told plaintiff, "If
you don't suck my penis I am going to fuck your life up." Plaintiff reported the
incident to the Internal Affairs Department (IAD). The sexual assault was video
2
Co-defendant Newark Police Department a/k/a City of Newark Department of
Public Safety Police Division was improperly pled and, as such, did not
participate in this appeal. Co-defendant K.G. did not respond to the appeal.
A-2492-16T4
2
recorded on a camera stationed in the office. Thereafter, K.G. was arrested and
charged with sexual assault and coercion.
In support of her motion, plaintiff filed an affidavit, claiming IAD
investigators assured her "that any potential civil or criminal claims arising from
the incident would be taken care of without any action needed on [her] part."
Believing the IAD was handling her claims, plaintiff did not seek legal
representation or contact "any other public entities." She also feared that further
discussions would lead to disclosure of her identity to the media and the public.
Plaintiff included news articles, dated May 4, 2016, regarding K.G.'s arrest as
exhibits to her motion.
Shortly after the ninety-day notice of claim filing period expired, plaintiff
was imprisoned from March 11, 2016 to August 18, 2016. According to
plaintiff's affidavit, "Upon [her] release from incarceration, [she] attempted to
seek information regarding [her] civil complaints against . . . defendants[, but
her] requests for information were ignored." In September 2016, plaintiff
retained counsel who "informed [her] of the [n]otice of [c]aim process."
As further support for her motion, plaintiff included a five-page written
report of David Salvage, M.D., F.A.P.M. Following his forensic psychiatric
examination of plaintiff on November 10, 2016, Dr. Salvage opined:
A-2492-16T4
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[Plaintiff]'s psychiatric condition is consistent with a
diagnosis of [PTSD] which is a direct result of the
sexual trauma which she endured while working for the
police department. She experiences an admixture of
symptoms which include aspects of intrusive thoughts,
avoidance of situations that trigger recollections of the
event, negative alt[e]rations in her cognition and mood,
and alterations in her level of arousal and reactivity.
The trauma has had a significant impact on her life,
particularly in the area of her marriage, social, and
occupational functioning. She displays a significant
decrease in her global level of functioning. Because
this trauma occurred in her workplace, this has created
a significant additional level of complexity – because
although she would like to return to work, her
workplace is a strong trigger for anxiety because it is
precisely the place where the trauma occurred. She
experiences a strong sense of conflict and cognitive
dissonance, because as she herself worded this
succinctly, "The police are supposed to protect you and
keep you safe. And that's why I became an informant.
But the opposite happened here."
On November 23, 2016, plaintiff moved for leave to file a late tort claim
notice, which defendant opposed. Although plaintiff requested oral argument if
the motion was opposed, the trial court decided the motion "on the papers." At
the bottom of the order, the court affixed the following handwritten statement:
Plaintiff has failed to meet [her] burden of showing
extraordinary circumstances pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:8-
9. See D.D. v. [Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J.], 213
N.J. 130 (2013).
This appeal ensued.
A-2492-16T4
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On appeal, plaintiff claims the trial court erred by failing to consider the
"collective impact" of the reasons underlying the delay in filing a notice of
claim, i.e., her reliance on IAD investigator's representations, "prolonged
incarceration," and "severe mental distress." 3 Although not briefed as a point
heading, plaintiff indicates the court denied her request for oral argument.
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:8-8, claims for damages against public entities
must be filed within ninety days of their accrual. Beauchamp v. Amedio, 164
N.J. 111, 116 (2000) (discussing the procedural requirements of the Tort Claims
Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3). Although the period for filing is short, any
harshness is alleviated by N.J.S.A. 59:8-9, which permits the filing of late
claims. Rogers v. Cape May Cty. Office of the Pub. Def., 208 N.J. 414, 420
(2011). Leave to file a late notice of claim may be granted within one year of
the accrual of the action upon a showing of "sufficient reasons constituting
extraordinary circumstances" for the plaintiff's failure to file a timely notic e of
claim, as long as the public entity is not "substantially prejudiced." N.J.S.A.
59:8-9.
3
Plaintiff also contends defendant was not substantially prejudiced by her late
notice because the incident received extensive media coverage. Defendant
concedes, for purposes of this motion, that it did not suffer substantial prejudice.
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The statutory framework governing the "extraordinary circumstances"
exception to the ninety-day requirement has been extensively and definitively
detailed elsewhere, and need not be repeated here. See, e.g., D.D., 213 N.J. at
146-49. Ordinarily, the decision to grant permission is one "left to the sound
discretion of the trial court, and will be sustained on appeal in the absence of a
showing of an abuse thereof." Mendez v. S. Jersey Transp. Auth., 416 N.J.
Super. 525, 532-33 (App. Div. 2010); see also D.D., 213 N.J. at 147. "Although
deference will ordinarily be given to the factual findings that undergird the trial
court's decision, the court's conclusions will be overturned if they were reached
under a misconception of the law." D.D., 213 N.J. at 147; see also McDade v.
Siazon, 208 N.J. 463, 473-74 (2011).
Decisions denying an application to file a late claim are "examine[d] more
carefully . . . to the end that wherever possible cases may be heard on their
merits, and any doubts which may exist should be resolved in favor of
[permitting] the application." Lowe v. Zarghami, 158 N.J. 606, 629 (1999)
(internal quotation marks omitted). In making that determination, all of the
circumstances in combination are to be considered. See ibid.Because the trial court's terse statement affixed to its order denying
plaintiff's motion is devoid of any factual findings, we cannot accord our usual
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deference in the present case. See R. 1:7-4(a) (requiring that a trial court, "by
an opinion or memorandum decision, either written or oral, find the facts and
state its conclusions of law . . . on every motion decided by a written order that
is appealable as of right"). A trial court "must state clearly [its] factual findings
and correlate them with relevant legal conclusions, so that parties and the
appellate courts [are] informed of the rationale underlying th[ose]
conclusion[s]." Avelino-Catabran v. Catabran, 445 N.J. Super. 574, 594-95
(App. Div. 2016) (alterations in original).
Moreover, our review of the record does not support the trial court's
cursory legal conclusion that plaintiff failed to satisfy her burden of
demonstrating extraordinary circumstances pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:8-9 and
D.D.4
In D.D., the Court held than an attorney's neglect in filing a timely notice
of claim, coupled with the plaintiff's non-debilitating medical symptoms,
4
Although not argued by plaintiff, we find the trial court also erred in failing
to hold oral argument. Raspantini v. Arocho, 364 N.J. Super. 528, 531-34 (App.
Div. 2003) (where a request for oral argument on a substantive motion is
properly made, denial, absent articulation of specific reasons for denial on the
record, constitutes reversible error); see also R. 1:6-2(d) (Civil Part motions
must be listed for oral argument if "a party requests oral argument in the moving
papers."); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea, Inc. v. Checchio, 335 N.J. Super. 495, 497-98
(App. Div. 2000) (a request for oral argument by a party is required to be granted
as of right).
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following the unauthorized release of her medical information by the defendant
public entity, did not constitute extraordinary circumstances pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 59:8-9. 213 N.J. at 150-51. The Court determined that to qualify as
extraordinary, medical conditions must be "severe or debilitating" and have a
"consequential impact on the claimant's very ability to pursue redress and attend
to the filing of a claim." Id. at 149-50. A brief note from the plaintiff's doctor
that neither attested to the severe or debilitating nature of plaintiff's condition,
nor tied that condition to the statutory ninety-day filing period, was insufficient
to support a finding of extraordinary circumstances. Id. at 151.
Unlike the plaintiff in D.D., here we conclude the combination of
plaintiff's circumstances constitutes extraordinary circumstances. See Lowe,
158 N.J. at 629. Initially, plaintiff certified that during the operative ninety-day
period, she relied on the representations of IAD investigators that criminal and
civil actions would be filed against K.G., without "any action" from her. Indeed,
that representation was partly satisfied when K.G. was arrested and charged
criminally during plaintiff's five-month incarceration. However, upon her
release from imprisonment, plaintiff's attempts to determine the status of the
IAD's representations regarding her civil claims were ignored. Within one
month, she retained counsel who, in turn, promptly retained Dr. Salvage.
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Further, unlike the plaintiff in D.D., the severity of plaintiff's condition is
set forth at length in Dr. Salvage's comprehensive report. Although not
explicitly stated, when objectively viewed, Dr. Salvage's report supports
plaintiff's willingness to rely on IAD's representations, and her "significant fear
that discussion of the claims with any other entities or representatives would
result in the media and public finding out her identity." Indeed, the very nature
of the sexual assault crime here, and the psychological ramifications that flow
therefrom, underscore Dr. Salvage's opinion that plaintiff "avoid[s] . . .
situations that trigger recollections of the event." See R.L. v. State-Operated
School Dist., 387 N.J. Super. 331, 340-41 (App. Div. 2006) (meeting the
extraordinary circumstances test where a high school student was preoccupied
with thoughts of death after learning he contracted HIV infection from a sexual
relationship with his teacher).
For the foregoing reasons, we find the trial court's legal conclusion is
unsupported by the record. D.D., 213 N.J. at 147; McDade, 208 N.J. at 473-74.
We therefore conclude that, in this unique case, exceptional circumstances
warrant the filing of a late tort claim notice.
Reversed.
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