DCPP VS. A.R. AND S.A., IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF J.A. (FG-02-0044-17, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2019 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5010-17T3
NEW JERSEY DIVISION
OF CHILD PROTECTION
AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
A.R.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
S.A.,
Defendant.
———————————————
IN THE MATTER OF THE
GUARDIANSHIP OF J.A.,
a Minor.
———————————————
Submitted May 1, 2019 – Decided May 16, 2019
Before Judges Nugent, Reisner and Mawla.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen County,
Docket No. FG-02-0044-17.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Lauren Derasmo, Designated Counsel, on
the briefs).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Jason W. Rockwell, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Elizabeth Erb Cashin, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian,
attorney for minor (Meredith A. Pollock, Deputy Public
Defender, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant A.R. (Allie)1 appeals from a June 20, 2018 judgment
terminating her parental rights to her son J.A. (Jake). The law guardian, on
behalf of Jake, takes no position on the appeal. S.A. (Sean), the child's father,
does not challenge the judgment. We affirm for the reasons expressed by Judge
William R. Delorenzo, Jr. in his thorough and well-reasoned fifty-two page
written decision.
The facts are set forth in detail in the judge's opinion. A summary will
suffice here. Jake was born in 2007. The Division of Child Protection and
1
We utilize fictitious names to protect the parties' privacy.
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2
Permanency (Division) began receiving referrals of odd behavior by Allie
virtually since Jake's birth. The Division removed Jake from Allie's care when
he was approximately two months old as a result of intractable psychiatric issues
affecting Allie's ability to safely parent the child, including two failed suicide
attempts, Bipolar Disorder and Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, and
prescription drug abuse. The Division placed Jake with Sean, but he proved to
be an unreliable parent, due to illicit drug use and chronic criminality, which led
to his incarceration. Thus, for the better part of this litigation, Jake has resided
with his paternal grandmother, L.A. (Lisa), who is willing to adopt him.
The Division implemented services for both parents since the onset of this
matter, which lasted for a period of years. None of the services succeeded in
abating Allie's drug abuse, or ameliorating her mental health issues and concerns
for her ability to safely parent Jake.
Specifically, Allie received the benefit of multiple psychological,
psychiatric, and substance abuse evaluations. Allie was also required to undergo
random urine screens, attend individual counseling and medication monitoring,
and comply with recommendations, all of which were unsuccessful.
Nonetheless, the Division continued to implement services, including a referral
to a Mentally Ill Chemical Abuser (MICA) Partial Hospitalization Program. The
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Division attempted to facilitate visitation by offering Allie parenting classes and
enrolling her and Jake in three therapeutic programs, but its efforts met with
little success because Allie failed to comply and Jake expressed no desire to see
her. Visitation dwindled and ultimately ceased altogether.
Allie and Jake participated in psychological evaluations, which resulted
in a recommendation that Jake receive individual therapy and have no
unsupervised contact with either parent because he was experiencing significant
anxiety. Allie received two separate psychological evaluations, which
confirmed her mental health issues would expose Jake to a significant risk of
harm.
Dr. Robert Miller performed a psychological evaluation of Allie. He
concluded she did not fully understand the extent of her mental illness and
denied the need to be on medication for the rest of her life. He found Allie did
not "demonstrate minimal capacity for parenting in that she denie[d] need for
psychiatric care, [her] symptoms remain poorly managed, and [she was]
superficially compliant with services."
Dr. Miller conducted bonding evaluations between Allie and Jake, and
Lisa and Jake, and a second psychological evaluation of Allie, and concluded:
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[Allie] continues to demonstrate deficits to
provide minimal parental safety, care, and emotional
nurturance for [Jake]. . . .
[Jake] has indicated by his behavior and
statements he no longer wishes to see his mother,
appears to have demonstrated improved functioning in
the care and custody of the paternal grandmother, and
appears identified with his biological father who
remains incarcerated.
[Jake] has demonstrated emotional and
psychological problems that have resulted from
exposure to pathological parenting/emotional neglect.
He has required services, and will require services into
the future. [Allie] is unable to recognize his special
needs and placement of [Jake] in her care and custody
would likely result [in] increasing risk of harm for
emotional neglect.
[Jake] should remain in the home of the paternal
grandmother for the purpose of adoption. The paternal
grandmother has demonstrated her capacity to help
[Jake] overcome emotional and psychological problems
that have resulted from [a] history of exposure to
pathological parenting and emotional neglect.
[Jake] will not experience immediate or long-
term enduring or significant harm if separated from
[Allie] by the court. [Allie] will be unable to help
[Jake] overcome expected harm if separated from the
home of the paternal grandmother and his relationship
with her.
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At the guardianship trial, the Division presented expert testimony from
Dr. Miller and Dr. Samiris Sostre,2 and fact testimony from the Division
caseworker and Jake's therapist Dr. Daniel Bromberg—all of whom Judge
Delorenzo found credible. Allie offered no testimony and Sean did not appear
for trial.
The judge concluded the Division had proven the four prongs of the best
interests test under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). He concluded Allie had endangered
Jake's safety and would continue to do so because she failed to remediate her
mental health and substance abuse issues. The judge found Allie had caused
Jake psychological harm. The judge concluded Allie was not committed to care
for Jake because she had only minimally complied with services and exercised
visitation inconsistently.
The judge concluded Allie was unable to overcome the harm she had
caused and would continue to cause Jake because she was in denial and unable
to address her serious mental health and substance abuse issues. Also, Allie was
unable to support herself, let alone meet Jake's needs. Conversely, Jake had
2
Dr. Sostre performed a psychiatric evaluation of Allie on behalf of the
Division.
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bonded with Lisa and was thriving in her custody. The judge concluded Jake
would not suffer harm if the court terminated Allie's parental rights.
The judge found the Division had offered Allie a litany of services, which
had not proven successful in remediating her parenting deficits because Allie
failed to comply with services except in a superficial manner. The judge also
found the Division had considered kinship legal guardianship, but Lisa wished
to adopt Jake. The judge concluded a termination of parental rights followed by
adoption would not do more harm than good because Jake had been in Lisa's
custody since October 2015, had bonded with her, and had "severed his tie" to
Allie.
On this appeal, Allie raises the following points for our consideration:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING
[ALLIE] WAS UNABLE TO ELIMINATE THE
HARM TO HER CHILD BECAUSE THE COURT
FAILED TO CONSIDER HOW [ALLIE] HAD
COMPLIED WITH EVERY DEMAND [THE
DIVISION] PLACED ON HER.
II. THE RECORD DOES NOT CONTAIN
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FINDING
THAT [THE DIVISION] MET ITS BURDEN OF
PROOF UNDER THE THIRD PRONG BECAUSE ITS
EFFORTS TO REUNITE DID NOT INCLUDE
FOLLOWING ITS OWN EXPERTS’
RECOMMENDATIONS AND [THE DIVISION]
FAILED TO PROVIDE THE FAMILY WITH
ADEQUATE MEDICAL TREATMENT.
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A. [The Division]'s Minimal Efforts To Reunify [Allie]
And Her Child Were Not Reasonable Because [The
Division] Was Consistently Notified By Its Own
Experts That [Allie]’s Prescribed Mental Health
Treatment Was Ineffective But It Did Nothing to
Implement Its Own Expert’s Recommendations.
B. [The Division] Failed to Properly Facilitate
Visitation Between [Allie] and [Jake].
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that these arguments are without
sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
We add only these comments.
In reviewing Judge Delorenzo's decision, we must defer to his factual
findings unless they "went so wide of the mark that a mistake must have been
made." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007)
(citation omitted). So long as "they are 'supported by adequate, substantial and
credible evidence,'" a trial judge's factual findings will not be disturbed on
appeal. In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 188 (App. Div. 1993)
(citations omitted). We owe special deference to the trial judge's expertise in
handling family issues. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-13 (1998).
Under the "best interest of the child" standard, the Division must prove by
clear and convincing evidence:
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(1) The child's safety, health, or development has been
or will continue to be endangered by the parental
relationship;
(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the
harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to
provide a safe and stable home for the child and the
delay of permanent placement will add to the harm.
Such harm may include evidence that separating the
child from his resource family parents would cause
serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm
to the child;
(3) The [D]ivision has made reasonable efforts to
provide services to help the parent correct the
circumstances which led to the child's placement
outside the home and the court has considered
alternatives to termination of parental rights; and
(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more
harm than good.
[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).]
"Importantly, those four prongs are not 'discrete and separate,' but 'relate to and
overlap with one another to provide a comprehensive standard that identifies
[the] child's best interests.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L., 191
N.J. 596, 606-07 (2007) (quoting In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337,
348 (1999)).
Having reviewed the record, we conclude Judge Delorenzo's factual
findings are based on sufficient credible evidence, and in light of those findings,
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his legal conclusions are unassailable. There was no credible evidence adduced
at trial to indicate an adjustment of Allie's medication or better coordination of
her medicine regimen would have ameliorated her parental deficits. Rather, the
expert testimony supported the judge's conclusion that Allie was incapable of
remediating the harm and remained a substantial risk of harm to Jake, despite
receiving substantial services from the Division.
Finally, the Division provided a host of visitation services targeted to
facilitate Allie's reunification with Jake. The credible evidence in the record
demonstrates the Division met its reasonable efforts obligation to provide
services designed to remedy the parental deficiencies which led to Jake's
removal. The decision to grant the judgment of guardianship and terminate
parental rights is in Jake's best interests.
Affirmed.
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