IN THE MATTER OF THE CIVIL COMMITMENT OF I.O. (SVP-440-06, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2019 )


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  •                                     RECORD IMPOUNDED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-1905-18T5
    IN THE MATTER OF THE
    CIVIL COMMITMENT OF
    I.O., SVP-440-06.
    _____________________________
    Argued May 14, 2019 – Decided May 24, 2019
    Before Judges Fisher, Hoffman and Suter.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Essex County, SVP-440-06.
    Joan D. Van Pelt, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
    argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora,
    Public Defender, attorney).
    Victoria Ply, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
    cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney
    General, attorney).
    PER CURIAM
    I.O. is a resident of the Special Treatment Unit (STU), the secure
    custodial facility designated for the treatment of persons in need of
    commitment under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-
    27.24 to -27.38. See N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.34a. He appeals from a December 21,
    2018 order that continues his commitment. 1 We affirm substantially for the
    reasons stated by Judge Philip M. Freedman in his oral decision.
    A person who has committed a sexually violent offense may be confined
    only if suffering from an abnormality that causes serious difficulty in
    controlling sexually violent behavior such that commission of a sexually
    violent offense is highly likely without confinement "in a secure facility for
    control, care and treatment." In re Commitment of W.Z., 
    173 N.J. 109
    , 120,
    132 (2002). Annual review hearings to determine whether the person remains
    in need of commitment despite treatment are also required. N.J.S.A. 30:4-
    27.35; N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.32.2 An order of continued commitment under the
    SVPA, like an initial order, must be based on "clear and convincing evidence
    that an individual who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense, suffers
    from a mental abnormality or personality disorder, and presently has serious
    difficulty controlling harmful sexually violent behavior such that it is highly
    likely the individual will reoffend" if not committed. In re Civil Commitment
    1
    I.O. was initially committed in 2006 and his commitment has been continued
    since. See, e.g., In re Civil Commitment of I.O., No. A-1807-16 (App. Div.
    July 9, 2018); In re Civil Commitment of I.O., No. A-4270-09 (App. Div. Sept.
    17, 2010).
    2
    In addition, if the STU "treatment team determines that the person's mental
    condition has so changed that the person is not likely to engage in acts of
    sexual violence if released, the treatment team [must] recommend"
    authorization for a petition for discharge. N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.36a.
    A-1905-18T5
    2
    of G.G.N., 
    372 N.J. Super. 42
    , 46-47 (App. Div. 2004); see also In re
    Commitment of R.F., 
    217 N.J. 152
    , 173 (2014); W.Z., 173 N.J. at 132; In re
    Civil Commitment of J.J.F., 
    365 N.J. Super. 486
    , 496-501 (App. Div. 2004); In
    re Civil Commitment of V.A., 
    357 N.J. Super. 55
    , 63 (App. Div. 2003); In re
    Civil Commitment of E.D., 
    353 N.J. Super. 450
    , 455-56 (App. Div. 2002);
    N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26; N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.32; N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.35. "[O]nce the
    legal standard for commitment no longer exists, the committee is subject to
    release." E.D., 
    353 N.J. Super. at 455
    ; see also W.Z., 173 N.J. at 133; N.J.S.A.
    30:4-27.32; N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.35.
    Our review is "extremely narrow." R.F., 217 N.J. at 174; see also V.A.,
    
    357 N.J. Super. at 63
    . Trial judges who hear these matters are "'specialists'
    and 'their expertise in the subject' is entitled to 'special deference.'" R.F., 217
    N.J. at 174 (quoting In re Civil Commitment of T.J.N., 
    390 N.J. Super. 218
    ,
    226 (App. Div. 2007)).      So, we give a judge's determination the "utmost
    deference" and will intervene or modify the determination "only where the
    record reveals a clear abuse of discretion."        Ibid.; see also In re Civil
    Commitment of J.P., 
    339 N.J. Super. 443
    , 459 (App. Div. 2001). The judge's
    decision, when compared to the record on appeal, commands that deference.
    The commitment order under review is adequately supported by the record and
    consistent with the controlling legal principles. Judge Freedman credited the
    A-1905-18T5
    3
    State's proofs and rejected appellant's testimony, finding that the appellant was
    "not a credible witness" and, "[u]nfortunately, . . . [had] only made a little bit
    of progress" since his situation was last reviewed. We have been offered no
    principled reason for second-guessing the experienced judge's fact findings.
    Affirmed.
    A-1905-18T5
    4