STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. EDWARD RASKIN (18-07-0433, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2022 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1903-20
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
EDWARD RASKIN, a/k/a
EDWARD GINSBURG,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________
Argued June 8, 2022 – Decided June 23, 2022
Before Judges Hoffman, Geiger, and Susswein.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Union County, Indictment No. 18-07-0433.
Patricia B. Quelch argued the cause for appellant
(Helmer, Conley & Kasselman, PA, and Fernandez
Garcia, LLC, attorneys; Michael Garcia, of counsel;
Patricia B. Quelch, of counsel and on the brief).
Michele C. Buckley, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the
cause for respondent (William A. Daniel, Union County
Prosecutor, attorney; Michele C. Buckley, of counsel
and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Edward Raskin, a previously licensed acupuncturist, appeals
from his conviction and sentence for sexually assaulting and criminally sexually
contacting a patient, L.V. (Lori).1 We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
I.
A Union County grand jury issued an indictment charging defendant with
second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1), and fourth-degree
criminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b), against the same victim on
December 30, 2017.
The State moved to permit J.C., the victim's mother, to testify as a fresh
complaint witness pursuant to N.J.R.E. 803(c)(2). Defendant opposed this
motion. The court conducted a N.J.R.E. 104 hearing. Defendant argued that a
portion of J.C.'s statement was tainted because detectives showed her Lori's
statement and the police report. Defendant acknowledges that at the time of this
hearing, his trial strategy was not generally known. The court issued a written
order and written decision granting the motion. The court found that J.C. was a
"natural confidante" based on their close relationship and living together at the
1
We refer to the victim and certain witnesses by initials or pseudonyms to
protect the identity of the victim. R. 1:38-3(c)(9); N.J.S.A. 2A:82-46.
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time of the offense, and it was "clear" that J.C. was someone Lori would turn to
for "sympathy, protection, or advice." The court found Lori's disclosure "to her
mother [was] made within a reasonable time after the alleged sexual assault."
The court also found that the disclosure was "voluntary" and "not in response to
any coercive questioning by [J.C.]." "Rather, [Lori] volunteered the details
about what happened, unprompted by any questioning."
The court noted that J.C. was not shown Lori's statement until after "[J.C.]
had already informed the officer that her daughter had told her that the
acupuncturist had 'sexually molested' [Lori]' and 'that’s when my mind went
off.'" The court found "[J.C.] credible with regard to her daughter making an
almost immediate complaint to her regarding an unwanted touching of a sexual
nature during her acupuncture treatment on December 30, 2017." The court
reminded the State "that only the facts that are minimally necessary to identify
the subject matter of the complaint should be admitted; the fresh complaint
testimony is not to be used 'to corroborate the victim's allegations concerning
the crime.'" (quoting State v. Bethune, 121 N.J. 137, 146 (1990)).
Defendant waived his right to a jury trial. We take the following facts
from the evidence presented at trial. Defendant was a licensed acupuncturist
practicing in New Jersey and New York. Beginning on October 15, 2017, and
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ending on December 30, 2017, Lori sought treatment for pain in her right
shoulder through acupuncture and was treated by defendant at his office in
Springfield.
During her first appointment, defendant assessed Lori's injury and
explained how he would treat Lori's shoulder and asked her to enter a treatment
room. Lori entered the room, removed her shirt but left on her sports bra, leaving
her shoulder uncovered for insertion of the acupuncture needles. Defendant
entered the room, inserted the acupuncture needles, connected the needles to a
machine, and after leaving the room, checked on Lori periodically. The
treatment lasted about one hour. Defendant asserts there was only minimal
improvement from the first treatment, and he showed Lori stretching exercises
to do between her weekly appointments. This treatment session set the pattern
for subsequent appointments.
Defendant and Lori agree that during the third appointment, defendant
added massage to Lori's treatment program, focusing on her right shoulder.
During the massage portion of the fourth or fifth visit, defendant decided that
Lori's bra strap was interfering with the success of the massage, and asked Lori
if he could unhook her bra. After this visit, Lori assumed that her bra would be
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too restrictive for later treatments, so she began removing her shirt and bra and
then lying face down on the treatment table each time.
During Lori's ninth appointment, defendant told her that a key
acupuncture point ran from the nipple of the breast to the back. Lori allowed
defendant to pull her right shoulder up from the table and run the side of his
hand from her nipple to her back, for the purpose of treatment. When Lori went
home that day, she researched whether this type of treatment was legitimate and
found it was accepted practice.
Lori's last appointment with defendant was on December 30, 2017. The
events on that day led to the charges filed against defendant. Lori arrived, was
led to the treatment room, and undressed behind the privacy curtain as usual.
The acupuncture treatment proceeded as normal. As usual, defendant then
began to massage Lori's shoulder, and ran his hand from her nipple to her back.
Defendant then slid his arms under her breasts and squeezed her breasts three or
four times. Lori quickly pulled her arms and elbows to her sides and remained
frozen on her stomach. Defendant continued massaging Lori. Because she was
stunned by her breasts being squeezed, Lori was unable to express her fears.
Defendant then slipped his hands under the waistband of Lori's sweatpants
and massaged her buttocks and thighs. Defendant admitted he grazed Lori's
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vagina with his hand over her underwear. Lori responded by stating: "Whoa."
Defendant apologized while removing his hands from her pants but continu ed
massaging her back. Lori remained frozen when defendant pulled down Lori's
sweatpants and underwear. Defendant rubbed Lori's legs and inserted his finger
into her vagina. When Lori told defendant "No" he again apologized. Lori then
turned onto her side, pulled her legs into her chest, and assumed a fetal position.
Defendant then lifted Lori's leg and licked her vagina. Lori again told defendant
to stop, and defendant left the room. Lori then got dressed and left the office.
Once at home, Lori told her mother, J.C., that she had been "molested"
and explained what happened. Lori then went to her girlfriend E.C.'s house and
told her what happened. The next day, December 31, 2017, Lori and E.C. went
to the police to report the sexual assault. Lori was interviewed by a female
officer and gave a full statement. Lori's mother, J.C., went to the police station
a few days later to give a recorded statement and to turn over the underwear that
Lori wore on December 30.
Lori and defendant's later recounting of the December 30 events are
consistent up until the last half-hour of the treatment session. Defendant
reported that he kissed Lori's thigh whereas Lori reported that defendant inserted
his fingers into her vagina and licked her vagina.
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On January 4, 2018, defendant sent Lori a text message. Defendant stated
he had herbs for Lori's father. Defendant explained he was from Belarus and
Lori told him that her father worked in Russia for a while and was currently
experiencing health issues. Lori explained she was just making "polite
conversation," but defendant took it upon himself to get her father the herbs.
Lori showed the text message to the police, and they arranged for her to make a
telephone call that would be recorded. The recorded phone call took place on
February 15, 2018. During the call, Lori stated that she wanted to return to the
office for treatment, but that sexual conduct was inappropriate, and she would
not tolerate it happening again. Defendant responded, "I understand," "Yeah,
you have my word that's not, you know – nothing like that." Defendant states
he suffers from hearing loss and when Lori told him that she did not want to be
probed, he took that to mean she did not want "his manipulation of her shoulder
following treatment." Lori had no further contact with defendant after this call.
Defendant testified and recounted most of the same facts as Lori had.
Defendant admitted that on November 4, 2017, after Lori removed her shirt and
bra and was laying on her stomach for treatment, defendant entered the treatment
room and was attracted to Lori, stating she had a "beautiful body." Defendant
admitted that while the massages he administered following acupuncture
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treatments had a general "medical purpose," they were also partly "intimate
massages" because "[he] was touching her breasts" which was not "medically
necessary." Defendant stated he cupped Lori's breasts on those occasions
because he "thought she was enjoying it[.]"
Regarding the appointment on December 30, defendant testified that after
the acupuncture treatment, he began massaging Lori's shoulder and lower back.
He then massaged her left thigh and when he moved his hand further up, Lori
stated, "whoa or wow" and defendant testified he believed he accidentally
pressed too hard on an acupuncture point and apologized. Defendant stated there
is an acupuncture point near the vagina called "CV1" which is located between
the genitals and anus, but it is unclear whether a needle was previously inserted
there or if the acupuncture treatment there related to the shoulder region.
Defendant continued to massage Lori's body, mainly her "lower back, the
buttocks, and upper thighs in the back" for another ten to fifteen minutes " just
to continue the intimate touch." Defendant testified that Lori then lowered her
pants and rolled to her side at which point, defendant fully removed her pants
and placed them on a table. Defendant then caressed Lori's right thigh and
"instinctively went down and kissed" the inside of her left thigh. Defendant told
Lori that she had a beautiful body and she said: "Come on, Ed." Defendant
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believed Lori did not want to "continue the intimate part anymore." Defendant
admitted that the massage was not "medically necessary" but was part of their
"intimate relationship which progressed and evolved over the course of the []
number of treatments."
On cross-examination, defendant admitted that during the time Lori was
seeking treatment, they did not call, text, or email each other and never met
outside of the office.
Defendant called Lori's girlfriend, E.C., as a witness. The court sustained
numerous other objections based on lack of relevance or because the questions
called for hearsay. Near the end of his direct examination, defense counsel twice
attempted to question E.C. through leading questions. The State objected on
those two occasions. Defense counsel did not request the court to declare E.C.
a hostile witness. The objections were sustained by the court. The court noted
the witness was answering the questions. On redirect, defense counsel did not
attempt to ask leading questions.
Both the State and defendant presented DNA expert testimony regarding
samples that were recovered from Lori's underwear. The State's expert testified
that she performed tests on the underwear to look for the presence of amylase,
an enzyme found in human saliva and DNA. The underwear was sent for
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forensic testing and revealed DNA from two males, one of whom was defendant.
The underwear was negative for saliva. The State's expert testified that
defendant could not be excluded as a possible contributor to the mixture of DNA
that was found on the underwear. Defendant's expert testified that there was the
possibility of transference of DNA from a person's thigh to their underwear.
Both experts acknowledged that improper handling of the underwear could have
affected the results.
On February 3, 2020, the court issued an oral decision that began by
recounting the facts. Regarding the sexual assault charge, the court explained
the elements of the offense and its credibility findings, including the
believability of Lori's version of events and the "incredible" nature of
defendant's "self-serving" version.
The court noted that if defendant and Lori had an intimate relationship,
why then did defendant follow "proper protocol" of treatment by walking Lori
to the treatment room, leaving her alone to change, and only entering when she
was ready and lying face down. The court questioned why there were there no
communications between the two, especially when Lori missed several
appointments because of pneumonia. The court also questioned why "no one
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else in the office" reacted to defendant's actions if he was in an intimate
relationship with a patient.
The court found defendant's version of the December 30 incident was
"incredible" because there was "no way" defendant believed he accidentally
touched Lori's CV1 spot during the massage. The court also found defendant's
"explanation of how [Lori's] sweatpants were removed that day" was also
"incredible" and that defendant attempted to "spin it to his favor" to "comport
with [Lori's] testimony."
The court found the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant committed an act of sexual assault through insertion of his finger in
Lori's vagina and by performing cunnilingus on her.
The court likewise found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
criminal sexual contact, "when he scooped his hands under and squeezed [Lori's]
breasts, as well as when he touched her vagina" without Lori "freely and
affirmative[ly] giv[ing] permission for the defendant to touch her."
Defendant subsequently moved for a directed verdict and, in the
alternative, for a new trial. The court limited defendant's conviction for criminal
sexual contact to his touching the victim's vagina and not the touching of her
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breasts because defendant was not put on notice of that allegation. The State
agreed with that limitation during the motion hearing.
The court denied the motions, finding there had been "no denial of
justice." The court reiterated that it did not find defendant's testimony credible
and even if he had not testified, Lori was "very credible." Because defendant
chose to testify, the court explained it was permitted to "rely on his complete
lack of veracity."
Defendant was sentenced on February 25, 2021. The court found
aggravating factor nine (need for deterrence), N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9), and
mitigating factors seven (no prior delinquency or criminal record), eight
(defendant's conduct resulted from circumstances unlikely to recur), and nine
(defendant unlikely to reoffend), N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7), (8), and (9), and was
clearly convinced that the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors.
The court rejected defendant's request to sentence count one in the third-
degree range. The court noted that it "[did] not find that the mitigating factors
substantially outweigh the aggravating factors" and considering the severity of
the offense, did not find any compelling reasons that demanded a downgrade in
the interests of justice.
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Without engaging in a full analysis, the court declined to merge the
criminal sexual contact conviction into the sexual assault conviction, noting that
the criminal sexual contact "is different that penetration or cunnilingus." The
court recognized, however, that both offenses occurred during "one incident."
Defendant received a five-year term on the second-degree sexual assault,
subject to the eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility and mandatory
parole supervision under the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.
Defendant was required to comply with the registration requirements imposed
by Megan's Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23, and placed on parole supervision for
life, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4. Defendant received a concurrent one-year term on the
fourth-degree criminal sexual contact. Appropriate fines, penalties, and
assessments were applied. This appeal followed.
Appellant raises the following points for our consideration:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION IS BASED UPON
CREDIBILITY FINDINGS NOT SUPPORTED BY
THE FACTS PRESENTED AT TRIAL.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING [J.C.] TO
TESTIFY AS A FRESH COMPLAINT WITNESS.
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POINT III
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BY
CUMULATIVE ERRORS AND IRREGULARITIES.
POINT IV
DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE IS EXCESSIVE.
II.
We first address defendant's claim that that the trial court's decision is
based upon credibility findings not supported by evidence adduced at trial.
Defendant challenges the court's finding that the victim was credible, and he
was not.
Our review of a judge's verdict following a bench trial is limited. The
standard is not whether "the verdict was against the weight of the evidence," but
rather "whether there is sufficient credible evidence in the record to support the
judge's determination." State in the Int. of R.V., 280 N.J. Super. 118, 120-21
(App. Div. 1995). We are obliged to "give deference to those findings of the
trial judge which are substantially influenced by [the] opportunity to hear and
see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the case, which a reviewing court
cannot enjoy.'" State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999) (quoting State v.
Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)). "Deference is especially appropriate when
the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility."
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Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011) (quoting Cesare
v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)). "We will set aside a trial court's
findings of fact only when such findings 'are clearly mistaken.'" State v. Dunbar,
229 N.J. 521, 538 (2017) (quoting State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 262 (2015)).
"A trial court's interpretation of the law, however, and the consequences
that that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. A
trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo." Hubbard, 222 N.J. at 263.
Applying these standards, we discern no basis to disturb the trial court's
factual findings and credibility determinations, which are amply supported by
the credible evidence presented at trial. The court made detailed findings,
including setting forth examples of the testimony it found most significant, and
the aspects of defendant's testimony that were not believable. The fact that much
of defendant's testimony was consistent with the victim's does not undermine
the court's conclusion that his testimony on critical facts was not credible where
it diverged from the victim's. Based on our careful review of the record, we are
convinced that the court's findings "could reasonably have been reached on
sufficient credible evidence present in the record." Johnson, 42 N.J. at 162.
Accordingly, our "task is complete." Ibid. Defendant's attempts to bolster his
credibility, attack the victim's veracity, and attack the trial court's credibility
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findings lack sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in this opinion. R.
2:11-3(e)(2).
III.
We next address defendant's argument that the court erred by permitting
J.C. to testify as a fresh complaint witness. He contends that by the time of trial,
"it was evident that the defendant had no intention of denying that certain
intimate contact had taken place on December 30, 2017." Defendant asserts that
based on this admission, there was no need for a fresh complaint witness to
testify. We reject this argument.
We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, as
"the decision to admit or exclude evidence is one firmly entrusted to the trial
court's discretion." State v. Prall, 231 N.J. 567, 580 (2018) (quoting Est. of
Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 383-84 (2010)). Trial
judges have broad discretion in ruling on evidentiary questions. State v. Harris,
209 N.J. 431, 439 (2012). Appellate courts may not substitute their own
judgment for the trial court's absent a "clear error in judgment" so erroneous that
"a manifest denial of justice resulted." State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 469, 479 (2017)
(quoting State v. Perry, 225 N.J. 222, 233 (2016)). We disregard harmless
errors, bur errors capable of causing an unjust result the jury "otherwise might
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not have reached" require reversal. Prall, 231 N.J. at 581 (quoting State v.
Daniels, 182 N.J. 80, 95 (2004)).
The fresh complaint doctrine allows "evidence of a victim's complaint of
sexual abuse, otherwise inadmissible as hearsay, to negate the inference that the
victim's initial silence or delay indicates that the charge is fabricated." State v.
R.K., 220 N.J. 444, 455 (2015); see also State v. Hill, 121 N.J. 150, 163 (1990)
(noting that "fresh-complaint evidence serves a narrow purpose . . . [to] allow[]
the State to negate the inference that the victim was not sexually assaulted
because of her silence"). Consistent with that limited purpose, "the fresh
complaint testimony is not to be used 'to corroborate the victim's allegations
concerning the crime.'" R.K., 220 N.J. at 456 (quoting Bethune, 121 N.J. at
146).
A jury, or a court sitting without a jury, may not consider fresh-complaint
testimony "as substantive evidence of guilt, or as bolstering the credibility of
the victim; it may only be considered for the limited purpose of confirming that
a complaint was made." Ibid. For that reason, the testimony must exclude
details of the assault that the complaint may have conveyed. "Only the facts that
are minimally necessary to identify the subject matter of the complaint should
be admitted." Ibid. Also, given the testimony's "narrow purpose of negating
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inferences that the victim had failed to complain," a trial court must "assess . . .
whether repeated testimony of the victim's complaint is irrelevant or prejudicial
to the defendant." Hill, 121 N.J. at 169. "[T]o qualify as fresh complaint, the
victim's statements to someone she would ordinarily turn to for support must
have been made within a reasonable time after the alleged assault and must have
been spontaneous and voluntary." Id. at 163.
Here, after hearing the testimony at the Rule 104 hearing, the trial court
found J.C. to be credible and that J.C., the victim's mother who she lived with,
was obviously a "natural confidante" and is someone that she would turn to for
"sympathy, protection, or advice." The court also found that the fresh complaint
was made within a reasonable time after the alleged sexual assault and was
voluntary and not the product of any coercive questioning. These findings are
amply supported by the record.
Defendant takes issue with the fact that J.C.'s statement was "tainted"
because detectives showed Lori's statement and the police report to J.C. but at
the same time acknowledges that the tainted portions were not introduced at
trial. Moreover, the court found that J.C. was not shown Lori's statement until
after J.C. disclosed the fresh complaint information to police.
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At trial, J.C.'s testimony was limited in scope to Lori's demeanor when
she arrived home after her acupuncture appointment on December 30, and her
statement that defendant sexually assaulted her, massaged her breasts, and
licked her. J.C. followed the prosecutor's instruction that she could not present
any details of their conversation.
The trial court described the fresh complaint testimony and its limited use:
[J.C.], [the victim's mother] also testified as a
fresh complaint witness. She explained that on
December 30th her daughter came home sometime in
the afternoon while she was in the living room watching
television.
[J.C.] testified that [Lori] looked very sad and
was very quiet when she . . . returned home from her
appointment and went straight to her bedroom. When
[Lori] did return to the living room she told her that the
defendant had sexually assaulted her[.]
This [c]ourt has only considered this fresh
complaint evidence to counter any inference that might
be drawn that [Lori's] behavior was inconsistent with
the claim of sexual abuse. It is not considered to bolster
[Lori's] credibility or prove the underlying truth of
sexual assault charges. I did find [J.C.] to be a credible
witness.
The fresh complaint testimony was properly admitted, appropriately
considered by the trial court, and not used to bolster Lori's credibility. We
discern no abuse of discretion or clear error in judgment.
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IV.
Defendant's remaining arguments regarding alleged trial errors lack
sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Defendant contends he was denied a fair trial by cumulative errors and
irregularities, including the prejudicial effect of inadmissible testimony and bias
towards the defendant. Defendant argues: (1) Lori testified contradictorily
through hand motions on the stand from her prior statement to police on
December 31, 2017; (2) the court was biased against him because the court
stated she was "watching" him; (3) the court should not have accused him of
tailoring his testimony to Lori's testimony or allowed this to factor into her
credibility assessments; (4) the court improperly questioned Lori during her
testimony; (5) the court employed a preponderance of the evidence standard
rather than deciding his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; (6) the trial court
abused discretion in limiting cross-examination of Lori and direct examination
of her girlfriend, E.C.; (7) the State should have been required to secure Lori as
a witness for a longer period of time; and (8) the court abused its discretion by
not treating E.C. as a hostile witness.
Defendant complains that Lori used certain hand motions during her
testimony and argues that the court's allowance of this constituted an
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endorsement of Lori's credibility. While Lori was testifying, defense counsel
played a portion of her statement to police. During the statement, Lori stated
defendant massaged her leg and she motioned with her hands towards the front
of her pants. For clarification, Lori agreed that although she motioned toward
the front of her pants, she was not indicating that defendant massaged the front
of her body. In response to an objection, the court explained: "[Lori] had an
opportunity to explain how and why she used the hand motions toward the front,
which she did explain -- so it's not a contradictory statement, this court finds."
Lori was seated when explaining how she was massaged; it would be difficult
to demonstrate while seated how another person massaged the back of their legs.
The court made a common-sense evidentiary ruling and overruled the objection.
This allegation of contradictory testimony or judicial endorsement of a witness's
credibility is unfounded.
During defendant's cross-examination, the prosecutor objected on two
occasions to defendant looking to his attorney before answering questions. The
court replied, "I'm not going to tell him where to look . . . but I'm watching . . .
and I'm observing the testimony." Observing the defendant's testimony during
a bench trial is hardly improper. Such observations are an important part of
determining a witness's demeanor, which can often influence credibility
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determinations. See Locurto, 157 N.J. at 474 ("credibility findings . . . are often
influenced by matters such as observations of the character and demeanor of
witnesses"). Neither the court's observations nor its comments evidenced any
bias against defendant.
Defendant argues the trial court also showed bias towards him while
ruling on his motion for a new trial. He asserts that the court improperly accused
him of generically tailoring his testimony. We disagree. The tailoring
accusation was specific to a set of facts that Lori and the defendant testified
about differently. The court found defendant's testimony concerning the way
Lori's pants were removed on December 30 to be "incredible." The court
explained:
In an effort to comport with her testimony, yet spin it
to his favor, defendant seals his lack of veracity.
According to defendant he begins to remove
[Lori's] sweatpants and underwear during massage.
[Lori] then turns on her left side in an effort to help
defendant remove her pants.
She then tries to grab her sweats with her right
hand but couldn't reach so he removed the pants and
underwear and placed them on the table. This doesn't
make sense.
If [Lori] wanted to take her pants off, it defies
logic that she would put herself in a more difficult
position to effectuate that result. If she wanted to take
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her pants off, she would have taken her pants off. Also,
if she wanted defendant to touch her, why would she
stay on her left side touching (sic) away from the
defendant?
What makes sense and what the [c]ourt finds
credible is the detailed recollection of events testified
to by [Lori].
The court did not state that defendant listened to the testimony given by
the other witnesses and crafted his version to accommodate their testimony. The
court essentially stated that defendant's testimony was fashioned to avoid some
of the inconsistencies between his story and Lori's version. Notably, there were
other factors which lent themselves to rejecting defendant's incredible version
of the events. We find no impermissible accusation of generic tailoring.
Defendant argues the court was biased against him "in the manner the trial
was conducted" because the court posed clarifying questions to Lori on two
occasions about the same topic. While Lori was testifying about the penetrative
act defendant committed against her, the court intervened and asked "How far
did his finger go in? I'm sorry to be so crud[e]." Defendant argues that the
prosecutor was about the ask the question next and without this interruption,
"the information would have been placed into evidence without the unnecessary
intervention of the court, exposing the court's bias."
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Judges are authorized to question witnesses. N.J.R.E. 614. A trial judge
errs when her inquiries give the jury the impression that she takes one party's
side or that she believes one version of an event and not another. State v.
Taffaro, 195 N.J. 442, 451 (2008). In determining whether a judge erred in
questioning a witness, we examine the record wholly and consider the impact of
the court's questions. Id. at 454. This was a bench trial. Thus, there was no
risk of influencing a jury. See State v. Ross, 229 N.J. 389, 408 (2017).
Furthermore, the question was relevant. Sexual penetration is an element of
sexual assault. N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c). Digital sexual penetration is defined as
insertion of the finger into the anus or vagina. N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1(a). While the
depth of insertion is not relevant, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1(c), the question clarified
whether penetration had in fact occurred because at an earlier point, defendant
had testified that he "grazed" Lori's vagina with his hand. We discern no error
or evidence of bias.
Defendant next argues that the court employed a preponderance of the
evidence standard. He points to the court commenting during sentencing that
Lori's testimony was more likely true than the defendant's testimony. We reject
this argument. Defendant conflates comparing the relative credibility of
witnesses with determining whether the State proved each element of the
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offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. Comparing the credibility of witnesses
who give different versions of critical facts is not improper; it is a basic part of
determining the weight to be given to conflicting testimony.
Defendant argues that counsel wished to explore other issues with Lori
and her girlfriend and the trial court's limiting of that testimony constituted an
abuse of discretion. Essentially, counsel wished to explore more fully whether
Lori consented to the touching of her CV1 spot.
As part of defendant's motion for a directed verdict or new trial, defense
counsel indicated that he wanted to show Lori a diagram of the CV1 spot in
acupuncture to see if it would change her testimony, thereby impacting her
credibility. As the State explained in response, the defense was allowed "to
challenge the veracity of [Lori] at length. She was actually on the stand for over
two days . . . The victim was clear in her testimony. She did not consent." The
court explained that the proposed line of questioning was irrelevant and that a
proper foundation had been laid that Lori did not consent to the acts defendant
committed against her on December 30. We discern no abuse of discretion.
Defendant claims the State should have been required to secure Lori as a
witness for the time necessary for her to testify in full. He further claims the
court should not have released Lori to leave New Jersey until her testimony was
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completed. At the time of trial, Lori resided in Pittsburgh. The State contended
that Lori was available and would have returned if necessary. We discern no
deficiency by the State and no abuse of discretion by the court.
Defendant further claims the court erred by refusing to treat Lori's
girlfriend, E.C., as a hostile witness. Defendant argues the court abused its
discretion in precluding defense counsel from asking her leading questions
during direct examination. Defendant asserts he should have been permitted to
explore, through the E.C.'s testimony, what was said when Lori went to her
house on December 30, "not for the purposes of hearsay" but "for the purposes
of examining [] her credibility." The State noted that E.C. was not a fresh
complaint witness. Therefore, any testimony regarding the conversation
between Lori and E.C. was hearsay.
Our rules of evidence provide that "[t]he court shall exercise reasonable
control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses . . . ." N.J.R.E. 611.
The rule "is comparable to the broad discretion invested by the common law in
trial judges to control the scope and mode of examination of witnesses, during
both direct and cross-examination." Biunno, Weissbard & Zegas, Current N.J.
Rules of Evidence, cmt. 1 to N.J.R.E. 611 (2021-2022); see e.g., Cestero v.
Ferrara, 110 N.J. Super. 264, 273 (App. Div. 1970), aff'd, 57 N.J. 497 (1971).
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Such discretion is specifically embedded in Rule 611(c) concerning leading
questions:
(c) Leading questions. Leading questions should not be
used on the direct examination of a witness except as
may be necessary to develop the witness' testimony.
Ordinarily, leading questions should be permitted on
cross-examination. When a party calls an adverse party
or a witness identified with an adverse party, or when a
witness demonstrates hostility or unresponsiveness,
interrogation may be by leading questions, subject to
the discretion of the court.
[N.J.R.E. 611(c).]
The court noted that E.C. responded to the defendant's subpoena to appear
and testify at trial. It found that Lori's girlfriend "was not a hostile witness based
on the totality of the factors." The court also found that cross-examination
regarding what Lori told her girlfriend would be used for the truth of its contents
and would be inadmissible hearsay. We agree. E.C.'s answers to defense
counsel's questions were not evasive or non-responsive. Her testimony did not
display the characteristics of a hostile witness. More fundamentally, defense
counsel neither requested the court to declare E.C. a hostile witness, nor
responded to the State's objections on that basis. We discern no abuse of
discretion.
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Finally, defendant argues that cumulative error requires a retrial. Our
Supreme Court has "recognized . . . that even when an individual error or series
of errors does not rise to reversible error, when considered in combination, their
cumulative effect can cast sufficient doubt on a verdict to require reversal."
State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440, 473 (2008). Considering our analysis of the
issues raised and ruling, defendant's cumulative error argument lacks merit. The
alleged but unsubstantiated cumulative impact does not "cast sufficient doubt on
[the] verdict to require reversal." Ibid.V.
Defendant argues that his sentence was excessive, claiming that the record
demonstrated that the mitigating factors substantially outweighed the
aggravating factors, and he should have been sentenced in the third-degree
range. We are unpersuaded.
Appellate courts review sentencing determinations deferentially. State v.
Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014). The reviewing court must not substitute its
judgment for that of the sentencing court. Ibid. We affirm a sentence unless:
(1) the sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the
aggravating and mitigating factors found by the
sentencing court were not based upon competent and
credible evidence in the record; or (3) "the application
of the guidelines to the facts of [the] case makes the
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sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the
judicial conscience."
[Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Roth, 95
N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)).]
The court found that the mitigating factors slightly outweighed the
aggravating factors. Defendant was sentenced to the bottom of the second-
degree range on the sexual assault count and received a concurrent term on the
sexual contact term. Therefore, the only mechanism to impose a shorter term of
imprisonment would be to downgrade the offense one degree lower for
sentencing purposes pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2).
A sentencing downgrade under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2) is appropriate only
if "the court is clearly convinced that the mitigating factors substantially
outweigh the aggravating factors and where the interest of justice demands" the
downgrade. See also State v. Megargel, 143 N.J. 484, 496 (1996); State v. L.V.,
410 N.J. Super. 90, 112-13 (App. Div. 2009). "[T]he court must find that there
are 'compelling' reasons 'in addition to, and separate from,' the mitigating
factors, which require the downgrade in the interest of justice." State v. Locane,
454 N.J. Super. 98, 121 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting State v. Jones, 197 N.J. Super.
604, 607 (App. Div. 1984)); see also Megargel, 143 N.J. at 505; L.V., 410 N.J.
Super. at 112-13. "The interest of justice analysis does not include consideration
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of defendant's overall character or contributions to the community." Locane,
454 N.J. Super. at 122 (citing State v. Lake, 408 N.J. Super. 313, 328-29 (App.
Div. 2009)).
"The focus remains on the crime, as the downgrade statute 'is an offense-
oriented provision.'" Id. at 121 (quoting Lake, 408 N.J. Super. at 328). "The
paramount reason we focus on the severity of the crime is to assure the
protection of the public and the deterrence of others. The higher the degree of
the crime, the greater the public need for protection and the more need for
deterrence." Id. at 122 (quoting Megargel, 143 N.J. at 500). In deciding whether
to downgrade an offense, the court should consider the degree of the crime,
whether the surrounding circumstances make the offense similar to one of a
lesser degree, and defendant's characteristics as they relate to the offense.
Megargel, 143 N.J. at 500-01; State v. Rice, 425 N.J. Super. 375, 384 (App. Div.
2012). The severity of the crime is the most important factor. Megargel, 143
N.J. at 500. "Where the crime includes an enhanced penalty, . . . 'trial courts
must exercise extreme caution[]' before ordering a downgrade." Locane, 454
N.J. Super. at 122 (second alteration in original) (quoting Mergergel, 143 N.J.
at 502). See also Cannel, N.J. Criminal Code Annotated, cmt. 10 on N.J.S.A.
2C:44-1 (2021) ("A court should sentence to one degree lower only where the
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'interest of justice' so requires, and it should be reluctant for crimes so serious
that they carry sentences higher than those normal for the degree of crime."
(citing State v. Mirakaj, 268 N.J. Super. 48 (App. Div. 1993))). The "interests
of justice" did not require sentencing defendant one degree lower.
Moreover, where the Legislature has provided an enhanced penalty for an
offense, "the downgrade of that offense requires more compelling reasons than
the downgrade of an offense for which the Legislature has not attached an
enhanced penalty." Rice, 425 N.J. Super. at 385 (quoting Megargel, 143 N.J. at
502). A sentencing court should not use its discretion to circumvent the
legislative design. State v. Lopez, 395 N.J. Super. 98, 108-09 (App. Div. 2007).
Sexual assault is a serious crime. The Legislature subjected second-degree
sexual assault to the parole ineligibility and mandatory parole supervision under
NERA, the registration requirements of Megan's Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23,
and parole supervision for life, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4.
Here, the judge rejected the defendant's contention that the mitigating
factors substantially outweighed the aggravating factors. The record supports
that finding. We discern no abuse of discretion. The interests of justice did not
demand a sentencing downgrade. Accordingly, sentencing the sexual assault in
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the second-degree range was appropriate. The sentence is neither manifestly
excessive nor unduly punitive and does not shock the judicial conscience.
VI.
Finally, we address defendant's argument that the sexual contact
conviction should have been merged into the sexual assault conviction.
N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1) provides:
c. An actor is guilty of sexual assault if the actor
commits an act of sexual penetration with another
person under any one of the following circumstances:
(1) The actor commits the act using coercion or without
the victim's affirmative and freely-given permission,
but the victim does not sustain severe personal injury;
In turn, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b) provides: "An actor is guilty of criminal sexual
contact if he commits an act of sexual contact with the victim under any of the
circumstances set forth in section 2C:14-2(c)(1) through (5)." Only subsection
(c)(1) is relevant to this case.
"Merger stems from the well-settled principle that 'an accused [who] has
committed only one offense . . . cannot be punished as if for two.'" State v. Cole,
120 N.J. 321, 326 (1990) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Miller, 108
N.J. 112, 116 (1987)). Merger of convictions ensures that a defendant will avoid
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"double punishment for a single wrongdoing." State v. Diaz, 144 N.J. 628, 637
(1996).
New Jersey courts eschew "technisms and inflexibility" when resolving
merger issues. Cole, 120 N.J. at 326. Rather, merger analysis focuses on the
elements of the crime and the Legislature's intent in creating them, and the facts
of each case. Id. at 327. The specific elements of the offenses must be
considered in light of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(a)(4), which defines when conduct
constitutes more than one offense. Cole, 120 N.J. at 327-28. Thus, courts
consider
the time and place of each purported violation; whether
the proof submitted as to one count of the indictment
would be a necessary ingredient to a conviction under
another count; whether one act was an integral part of
a larger scheme or episode; the intent of the accused;
and the consequences of the criminal standards
transgressed.
[State v. Davis, 68 N.J. 69, 81 (1975).]
Thus, merger may be appropriate even where a single course of conduct
constitutes a violation of two different criminal statutes. State v. Miller, 108
N.J. 112, 118 (1987). Our case law "emphasize[s] the importance of considering
the facts and the status of the victim in deciding merger." State v. Adams, 227
N.J. Super. 51, 62 (App. Div. 1988).
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During oral argument before this court, the State contended that the act
giving rise to the criminal sexual contact charge was defendant's touching of
Lori's breasts, which occurred prior to the penetrative sexual assault. 2 Defendant
contends that the State did not provide evidence to the grand jury of defendant's
touching of the victim's breast during an incident separate from the sexual
assault incident. The trial court ruled that defendant did not receive adequate
notice of the breast touching as the act of the criminal sexual contact. The State
agreed with that limitation and did not cross-appeal from that ruling. We
therefore do not consider the touching of the victim's breasts in our merger
analysis.
Considering the Davis factors, we note that defendant first inserted his
hands under Lori's sweatpants and rubbed near her vagina above her underwear.
Shortly thereafter, during the same incident, defendant removed her sweatpants
and underwear and licked and digitally penetrated her vagina. Penetration was
an element of the sexual assault but not the criminal sexual contact. The initial
touching of the victim's vagina occurred before her sweatpants and underwear
were removed. It satisfied the elements of criminal sexual contact. It did not
satisfy the penetration element of second-degree sexual assault.
2
The State's brief did not address the merger issue.
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In State v. Adams, the court reasoned that the defendant should not be
allowed the free crime of burglary simply because his attack escalated to
attempted aggravated sexual assault. 227 N.J. Super. 51, 62 (App. Div. 1988).
The Adams court recognized, however, that it was "a close question whether the
criminal sexual contact conviction should merge with the attempted aggravated
sexual assault conviction." Id. at 67. The court explained:
The criminal sexual contact conviction was based upon
defendant's fondling of the victim's breasts and genital
area in addition to the physical abuse he inflicted upon
her. The facts supporting each of these offenses are
different in this case. Hence, merger of the fourth
degree criminal sexual contact conviction into the
second degree attempted aggravated sexual assault
conviction would not be warranted.
[Id. at 68.]
Guided by these principles, we conclude that merger of the criminal sexual
contact conviction into the sexual assault conviction was warranted. The
controlling facts in Adams are distinguishable. Here, the offenses occurred in a
continuous sequence during a single episode, involved improperly touching the
same body part, and quickly escalated into the sexual assault. Accordingly, we
vacate defendant's sentence on count two and remand for entry of a corrected
judgment of conviction stating that count two is merged into count one and
deleting defendant's sentence and assessments on count two.
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Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
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