F.C. v. M.J.-B. (FD-07-3451-18, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2289-20
F.C.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
M.J.-B.,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Submitted March 22, 2022 – Decided July 6, 2022
Before Judges DeAlmeida and Smith.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket
No. FD-07-3451-18.
Schwartz Barkin & Mitchell, attorneys for appellant
(Gail J. Mitchell, on the briefs).
Courtney M. Gaccione, Essex County Counsel,
attorney for respondent Essex County Division of
Family Assistance and Benefits (Nicole Fisher,
Assistant County Counsel, on the brief).
Respondent F.C. has not filed a brief.
PER CURIAM
After the trial court entered an order denying defendant M.J.-B.'s1 motion
to vacate a 2018 child support order, he appealed. He argues that relief from the
child support award is appropriate under Rule 4:50-1(c) and (f), N.J.S.A. 2A:17-
56.23a, and the equitable doctrines of laches and unjust enrichment because
plaintiff F.C. fraudulently misrepresented his income at the 2018 hearing. We
reject defendant's arguments and affirm.
I.
The parties were never married but have one child, S.B., who was born
February 9, 2018. Shortly after S.B.'s birth, defendant moved to Florida while
plaintiff resided in New Jersey.
On June 5, 2018, plaintiff filed a complaint for child support. A copy of
the complaint was sent to defendant's address in Florida. The return date of
plaintiff's child support application was originally August 1, 2018, but the court
relisted it to September 17, 2018, due to interpreter unavailability. Defendant
failed to appear on September 17, and also missed the hearing on October 26,
1
We use fictitious names and initials to protect the identity of the parties and
family members. R. 1:38-3(d).
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2018.2 At the hearing, the trial court took testimony from the plaintiff regarding
defendant's occupation. The court learned that defendant was a contractor, and
it imputed the median salary for contractors at that time, $138,000, to him. After
imputing the income, the court entered a weekly child support order, dated
October 26, 2018, against defendant in the amount of $299 per week.
Approximately sixteen months later, on February 11, 2020, defendant
filed a motion to modify the child support order. Defendant attributed the delay
in filing to his treatment from injuries he suffered in a car accident while living
in Haiti. He also argued that general civil unrest in Haiti as well as passport
issues delayed his return to the United States for more than a year, thereby
contributing to delay.
After hearing testimony and other evidence, the court made findings. The
court found defendant worked as an independent contractor for a courier service
company, and he earned a gross income of $392 per week. The court reduced
defendant's weekly child support obligation to $142 per week, plus $45 per week
towards arrears. The court also found defendant still owed $41,014.88 in
arrears.
2
The record shows defendant received notice for both the postponed September
17 hearing as well as the October 26 hearing.
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The court rejected defendant's request to modify arrears accrued prior to
his February 26, 2020, motion filing date. It found defendant was not entitled
to any adjustment of arrears accruing prior to the filing date due to N.J.S.A.
2A:17-56.23a. The court found defendant admitted receiving notice of the 2018
hearings while still living in Florida. The court also found defendant elected not
to attend the hearing or contact a lawyer to represent his interests in 2018. The
court concluded defendant "had the opportunity to take action with respect to
this order prior to leaving the country." The trial court found defendant was
entitled to a modification of child support arrears, but only from the date the
motion was filed.
Defendant appeals, arguing that he should get relief from the February 11,
2020 order using one of three legal pathways: Rule 4:50-1(c) and (f); N.J.S.A.
2A:17-56.23a; or the equitable doctrines of laches and unjust enrichment.
II.
Our review of Family Part orders is limited. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J.
394, 411 (1998). We "accord particular deference to the Family Part because of
its 'special jurisdiction and expertise' in family matters." Harte v. Hand, 433
N.J. Super. 457, 461 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 413).
Generally, "findings by the trial court are binding on appeal when supported by
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adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411-12 (citing
Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). As
such, we will defer to the Family Part's factual findings and legal conclusions
unless convinced they are "manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the
competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests
of justice." Ricci v. Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. 546, 564 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting
Elrom v. Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. 424, 433 (App. Div. 2015)). Challenges to
legal conclusions, as well as a trial court's interpretation of the law, are subject
to de novo review. Amzler v. Amzler, 463 N.J. Super. 187, 197 (App. Div.
2020).
III.
Defendant argues that the February 11, 2020 order should be vacated
pursuant to Rule 4:50-1(c) and (f) because the order was based on fraudulent
information provided by plaintiff, and enforcement of the order would be
fundamentally unfair to him. He argues that his child support obligation should
be eliminated because the annual income of $138,000 was wrongly imputed to
him in October 2018. We are not persuaded, as defendant is time-barred under
the rule.
Rule 4:50-1 provides in pertinent part:
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On motion, with briefs, and upon such terms as are just,
the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment
or order for the following reasons: . . .; (c) fraud . . .,
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse
party . . .; or (f) any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment or order.
"The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (a),
(b), and (c) of [Rule] 4:50-1 not more than one year after the judgment, order or
proceeding was entered or taken." R. 4:50-2. We have explained that a
reasonable time is determined based upon the totality of the circumstances, and
in regard to motions brought under Rule 4:50-1 (a), (b) and (c) that one year
"represents only the outermost time limit for the filing of a motion." Orner v.
Liu, 419 N.J. Super. 431, 437 (App. Div. 2011).
Defendant moved to vacate approximately sixteen months after the court's
order, therefore we find defendant's argument under Rule 4:50-1(c) is time-
barred pursuant to Rule 4:50-2. Under defendant's Rule 4:50-1(f) theory, he
fails to show any facts which support a finding that he filed his motion to vacate
within a reasonable time. Nothing in this record suggests defendant was
unaware of the pending litigation or was deprived of an opportunity to defend.
Rather, defendant twice elected not to appear in 2018 and offered no compelling
explanation for his delay in filing his motion. We are satisfied that his sixteen-
month delay, from October 26, 2018, to February 11, 2020, was not reasonable
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under the circumstances in this case. See Orner, 149 N.J. Super. at 437-38 (364-
day delay in filing a motion to vacate was unreasonable under the
circumstances).
Since we consider defendant's request for relief under Rule 4:50-1(c) and
(f) time barred, we need not comment on his argument that plaintiff made a
"fraudulent" child support claim which justified relief under subsection (c).
Defendant next argues the court erred by relying on what he characterizes
as a "misrepresentation in income" in finding that N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.23a barred
the vacation of arrears prior to his filing date. N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.23a prohibits
retroactive modification of child support and child support arrearages. Keegan
v. Keegan, 326 N.J. Super. 289, 293 (App. Div. 1999). He contends that an
exception to application of the statute should be made because of plaintiff's
"misrepresentation." We disagree.
Under the statute, a court may retroactively modify a child support
obligation under an existing court order back to the filing date of an "application
for modification," or forty-five days earlier upon service of advance notice. See
Cameron v. Cameron, 440 N.J. Super. 158, 166 (Ch. Div. 2014). The statute
"was enacted to [ensure] that ongoing support obligations that became due were
paid." Mahoney v. Pennell, 285 N.J. Super. 638, 643 (App. Div. 1995).
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Defendant's bald assertion that plaintiff fraudulently misrepresented his
income at the October 2018 hearing is unsupported. Defendant failed to appear
and presented no income evidence at that hearing. It is well-established that if
a court is required to impute income because a parent has failed to provide
financial information, it may do so with reasonable information that is available
to it as long as the court "made a conscientious effort to fairly apply the child
support guidelines . . . ." Tash v. Tash, 353 N.J. Super. 94, 99 (App. Div. 2002).
The income imputed to defendant was supported by credible evidence in the
record. We see no basis in the record to disturb the court's findings as to
defendant's income, and we are satisfied the court correctly applied N.J.S.A.
2A:17-56.23a. On the equities, defendant has pointed to nothing in the record
to justify relief of any kind, and his remaining arguments are without sufficient
merit to warrant further discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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