STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. SUPREME LIFE (18-04-0537, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5005-18
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent, APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
July 7, 2022
v.
APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPREME LIFE, a/k/a
CHARLES E. HOSKINS, III,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________
Argued April 4, 2022 – Decided July 7, 2022
Before Judges Messano, Rose and Marczyk.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Burlington County, Indictment No. 18-
04-0537.
Alison Gifford, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora,
Public Defender, attorney; Alison Gifford, of counsel
and on the briefs).
Alexis R. Agre, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause
for respondent (Scott A. Coffina, Burlington County
Prosecutor, attorney; Alexis R. Agre, of counsel and
on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MESSANO, P.J.A.D.
A Burlington County grand jury indicted defendant, Supreme Life a/k/a
Charles E. Hoskins, III, and his son, Antoine L. Ketler, for the first-degree
murder of Moriah Walker, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1), and 2C:11-3(a)(2); first-
degree attempted murder of Raheem Williams, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1(a)(3) and
2C:11-3(a)(1); and defendant alone for two counts of third-degree possession
of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d); and fourth-degree
unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d). The jury acquitted
Ketler of all charges but convicted defendant of the lesser-included offense of
second-degree passion/provocation manslaughter, the attempted murder of
Williams, and the weapons offenses. 1 After appropriate mergers, the judge
sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of seven years' imprisonment on the
manslaughter conviction and thirteen years' imprisonment on the attempted
murder conviction, both subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A.
2C:43-7.2.
Before us, defendant raises the following arguments:
POINT I
IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE
PROSECUTOR TO REPEATEDLY CALL THE
TESTIFYING DEFENDANT A LIAR IN
SUMMATION. (Not Raised Below).
1
The judge had earlier dismissed the murder charge against Ketler.
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POINT II
THE JURY INSTRUCTION ON SELF-DEFENSE
IMPROPERLY LIMITED SELF-DEFENSE TO THE
CRIME OF MURDER. (Not Raised Below).
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT OMITTED A CRUCIAL
PORTION OF THE MODEL JURY CHARGE ON
POSSESSION OF A WEAPON FOR AN
UNLAWFUL PURPOSE WHICH INSTRUCTS THE
JURY ON PROTECTIVE PURPOSE. (Not Raised
Below).
POINT IV
DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHTS
TO DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL
BECAUSE THE STATE INTRODUCED A PRIOR
INCONSISTENT STATEMENT OF ITS OWN
WITNESS WITHOUT SATISFYING THE
REQUIREMENTS OF N.J.R.E. 803(A)(1).
POINT V
THE CUMULATIVE IMPACT OF THE ERRORS
DENIED DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL. (Not Raised
Below).
POINT VI[2]
DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE IS EXCESSIVE
BECAUSE THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS
OF AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING
2
We eliminated the subpoints of this argument contained in defendant's brief.
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FACTORS, AND THE COURT INCORRECTLY
CONDUCTED ITS YARBOUGH ANALYSIS. [3]
Having considered these arguments in light of the record and applicable legal
standards, we reverse.
I.
On February 4, 2018, Raheem Williams, his girlfriend, Niani Skinner,
and his roommate, Moriah Walker, rented a car and drove from their residence
in New York City to Lumberton to attend a Super Bowl party at the home of
Vera VanKline, Williams' aunt. After the game, the trio intended to drive into
Philadelphia to celebrate the Eagles' victory, but they soon realized their cell
phones needed to be charged to access their GPS. As they tried to find their
way back to VanKline's house, they passed defendant's home, which was just
around the corner. Defendant, his wife, and other Eagles fans were outside
celebrating. Ketler, a Dallas Cowboys fan, was also outside.
The testimony at trial diverged as to what happened next. Undisputedly,
Williams, Walker, Ketler, and defendant got into a physical altercation. The
State's witnesses painted defendant and his son as the aggressors, continuing
the altercation after Williams and Walker tried to leave, and following them
back toward the VanKline house. When eventually Williams and Walker
3
State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985).
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returned to safety inside VanKline's residence, everyone saw Williams and
Walker had both been stabbed.
VanKline called 9-1-1, and both men were taken to the hospital for
emergency surgery. Williams survived, but despite medical attention, Walker
did not. The medical examiner testified Walker died from multiple stab
wounds to the chest. The autopsy revealed that in addition to being stabbed
twice in the chest, Walker was stabbed once in the back of the leg, and once in
the arm. The medical examiner characterized the wound to Walker's arm as a
defensive wound.
Defendant testified at trial. He said he was inside his house after the
game when he saw Ketler being assaulted by two men. He ran across the street
to defend his son and break up the altercation. Defendant claimed he carried a
knife on his belt every day for work as a landscaper. When defendant heard
his wife say one of the men had a gun, defendant took his knife from his belt.
Defendant testified he was only defending himself from Walker as the
two wrestled on the ground. He never intended to stab Walker, but Walker's
own body weight caused the knife to penetrate his chest. Defendant said that
Williams, who was assaulting Ketler, soon came at him, and defendant held
out his knife to ward off Williams. Defendant never intended to stab Williams
either.
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Defendant provided a statement to police on the night of the stabbings,
which the prosecutor used during cross-examination.4 Defendant admitted he
lied to police, telling them he had not seen his son since noontime on the day
of the Super Bowl, and he never told police that Ketler was at the scene.
Defendant also never told police that he heard his wife mention a gun, nor did
he admit in his statement to stabbing Williams or Walker.
II.
Defendant contends that the prosecutor's repeated statements during
summation accusing defendant of lying in his testimony and calling him a liar,
combined with a passing reference to the prosecutor's personal belief in
defendant's guilt, denied defendant a fair trial. It is axiomatic that "[t]he duty
of the prosecutor 'is as much . . . to refrain from improper methods calculated
to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring
about a just one.'" State v. Williams, 244 N.J. 592, 607 (2021) (alteration in
original) (quoting State v. Smith, 212 N.J. 365, 403 (2012)). "While
'prosecutors in criminal cases are expected to make vigorous and forceful
closing arguments to juries' and are 'afforded considerable leeway,' 'their
4
The State did not introduce defendant's statement during its case-in-chief,
and although the statement was marked for identification at trial during
defendant's direct testimony, it was not introduced into evidence and is not in
the appellate record.
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comments [should be] reasonably related to the scope of the evidence
presented.'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76,
82 (1999)).
Furthermore, even when a prosecutor's remarks
stray over the line of permissible commentary, our
inquiry does not end. Rather, we weigh "the severity
of the misconduct and its prejudicial effect on the
defendant's right to a fair trial," and we reverse a
conviction on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct
only if "the conduct was so egregious as to deprive
defendant of a fair trial."
[State v. McNeil-Thomas, 238 N.J. 256, 275 (2019)
(quoting State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 437
(2007)).]
"In deciding whether prosecutorial conduct deprived a defendant of a
fair trial, 'an appellate court must take into account the tenor of the trial and
the degree of responsiveness of both counsel and the court to improprieties
when they occurred.'" Williams, 244 N.J. at 608 (quoting Frost, 158 N.J. at
83). "To warrant the remedy of a new trial, there must have been 'some degree
of possibility that [the prosecutor's comments] led to an unjust result.'"
McNeil-Thomas, 238 N.J. at 276 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. R.B.,
183 N.J. 308, 330 (2005)). Defense counsel never objected during the
prosecutor's summation, so we review the alleged impropriety for plain error.
R. 2:10-2.
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Defendant admitted lying to police in his statement after the stabbings
— the prosecutor's opening salvo early in summation was defendant "lied his
rear end off" — but the prosecutor did not limit his characterization of
defendant as a liar to the falsity of that version of events. Instead, the
prosecutor used defendant's admission that he lied to police as a cudgel to
explicitly argue defendant's testimony at trial was more lies told by an
admitted liar.
In addition to simply calling defendant a "liar" numerous times, the
prosecutor wove the accusation into an attack on defendant's claims of self -
defense and defense of another, seemingly blurring which party had the burden
of proof:
I also want to include an explanation of self-
defense and defense of others and why they don't
apply in this case. Because for any of those things to
apply, there's one thing that you would have to find.
You have to find that this man is not a liar.
Something he got on that stand and admitted to you he
was. You'd have to believe him in order to believe the
lesser includeds. You would have to believe him in
order to find self-defense or that he acted in the
defense of others.
You can't believe a word that man says. Based
on his testimony yesterday we know he's a liar.
....
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Well, we know that is a lie because he g[ot] on
the stand and t[old] you he lied.
....
. . . Then he takes the stand yesterday, his story
changes completely.
That's what liars do. When they get caught in a
lie, they have to come up with something to justify it.
. . . They lie to get out of trouble.
....
It's a story that's created by a liar.
....
. . . Again, he's a liar, he's not worthy of belief.
You have to believe him to find passion/provocation.
You have to believe him to find self-defense or
defense of others. 5
[(Emphasis added).]
5
The prosecutor made only passing reference later to the State's burden of
disproving the elements of passion/provocation manslaughter. See Model Jury
Charges (Criminal), "Murder, Passion/Provocation and Aggravated/Reckless
Manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2); 2C:11-4(a), (b)(1)and (b)(2))"
(rev. June 8, 2015) at 4–6. During his summation, the prosecutor did not
remind jurors that the State bore the burden of proving defendant did not act in
self-defense or in defense of another. See Model Jury Charges (Criminal),
"Justification-Self Defense In Self-Protection (N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4)" (rev. June 13,
2021) at 4; Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Justification — Use of Force in
Protection of Others (N.J.S.A. 2C:3-5)" (approved Oct. 17, 1988) at 2.
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At another point, early in the summation, the prosecutor told jurors his
personal opinion that defendant "is definitely guilty of the murder of Moriah
Walker."
"It is improper for a prosecutor to express his personal opinion on the
veracity of any witness." State v. Rivera, 437 N.J. Super. 434, 463 (App. Div.
2014) (citing State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 154 (1991)). A prosecutor may
attempt to persuade the jury that a witness is not credible and in doing so,
"may point out discrepancies in a witness's testimony or a witness's interests in
presenting a particular version of events." State v. Johnson, 287 N.J. Super.
247, 267 (App. Div. 1996) (citing State v. Purnell, 126 N.J. 518, 538 (1992)).
It is, however, improper for a prosecutor to use derogatory epithets to
describe a defendant. State v. Pennington, 119 N.J. 547, 576–77 (1990).
"[B]y no stretch of the imagination can it be said that describing defendant as a
'coward,' 'liar,' or 'jackal' is not derogatory. . . . Epithets are especially
egregious when . . . the prosecutor pursues a persistent pattern of misconduct
throughout the trial." Wakefield, 190 N.J. at 466–67 (quoting Pennington, 119
N.J. at 577); see also State v. Acker, 265 N.J. Super. 351, 356 (App. Div.
1993) ("'A prosecutor is not permitted to cast unjustified aspersions' on
defense counsel or the defense." (quoting State v. Lockett, 249 N.J. Super.
428, 434 (App. Div. 1991))).
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Defendant's false statements to police on the day of the incident were
undoubtedly fair game for cross-examination and summation commentary.
The Court has said "whether the asserted inconsistencies by a defendant are
between two or more statements or between a statement and testimony at trial,
the State may seek to impeach the validity of those statements." State v.
Tucker, 190 N.J. 183, 190 (2007). The "use of such evidence [is limited] to
issues of credibility and not substantive evidence on the issue of defendant's
guilt or innocence." Id. at 191 (citing State v. Brown, 190 N.J. 144, 158
(2007)). The court is required to give a limiting instruction, which it did not
do here. Ibid.; see Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Credibility — Defendant's
Statements at or Near Time of Arrest (To Be Used Only When Defendant
Testifies)" (approved June 21, 2020).
Our point is that while the prosecutor was entitled to draw the jury's
attention to defendant's false statements to police when assessing the
credibility of defendant's trial testimony, he was not permitted to tip the scale
in the State's favor by repeatedly telling jurors that defendant's trial testimony
was not worthy of belief because defendant lied before, was lying again and
was, simply put, therefore a liar. Nor was it permissible to tell the jury that it
must believe a liar — defendant — in order to credit claims of self-defense or
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defense of others and passion/provocation manslaughter. The State always
bore the burden to disprove those defenses whether or not defendant testified.
Because there were no objections to the summation at trial, the
prosecutor's attack went unabated. And, given the lack of any objections, the
only close issue is whether the prosecutor's impropriety justifies reversal. See,
e.g., State v. Smith, 212 N.J. 365, 407 (2012) (noting the absence of any
objection indicates defense counsel "perceived no prejudice") (citing State v.
Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 576 (1999)). We think it does.
It was undisputed there was mutual combat in this case. Both Skinner
and Williams testified that Walker stopped the car at some point either because
someone hit the car or threw something at the car. Both said Walker got out of
the car, approached the others and a fight ensued, initially with Ketler, but
soon joined by defendant. Neither Skinner nor the other State's witnesses saw
defendant stab either man. Williams clearly said defendant stabbed him in the
abdomen, but he did not see defendant stab Walker. In short, defendant's
credibility as to the circumstances of the stabbing was the critical issue at trial.
The Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) apply to assistant prosecutors.
See, e.g., Marshall, 123 N.J. at 237 (applying RPC 3.4 to criticize the
prosecutor's references to matters not supported by the evidence at trial); see
also RPC 3.8 (setting forth special responsibilities of the prosecutor). RPC
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3.4(e) specifically prohibits an attorney in trial to "assert personal knowledge
of facts in issue . . . or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the
credibility of a witness, . . . or the guilt or innocence of an accused."
Additionally, we evaluate the prosecutor's repeated assertions that
defendant lied during his testimony, and his decision to go one step further and
call defendant a "liar" several times during his summation, with recognition of
the special role of the prosecutor, and the additional weight accorded that role
in the eyes of the jury. See Wakefield, 190 N.J. at 437 (noting "improper
suggestions, insinuations, and, especially, assertions of personal knowledge
[by the prosecutor] are apt to carry much weight against the accused when they
should properly carry none" (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88
(1935))). In this case, the prosecutor's improper summation comments compel
reversal.
III.
Even if we accord undue prejudicial effect to the prosecutor's
summation, there were other trial errors that, combined with the prosecutorial
impropriety, compel reversal. See, e.g., State v. Blakney, 189 N.J. 88, 97
(2006) (holding improper summation comments, together with defective
limiting instructions, resulted in harmful error compelling reversal).
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The judge charged the jury on the substantive elements of murder and
passion/provocation manslaughter as to Walker's death, and attempted murder,
attempted passion/provocation manslaughter and aggravated assault as to
Williams, including principles of accomplice liability. The judge then charged
the jury regarding the weapons offenses but omitted entirely that portion of the
model charge for possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose that deals
with the lawful use of a weapon for a protective purpose. See State v. Kille,
___ N.J. Super. ___, ___ (App. Div. 2022) (slip op. at 16–17) (reversing
conviction for possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose because judge
failed to provide instructions on protective purpose).
The judge then told the jury, "The indictment charges [defendant] with
murder and attempted murder." Using the model jury charge, he explained
self-defense and defense of another, but he never told the jury it also should
consider those affirmative defenses if or when it considered the lesser-included
charge of passion-provocation manslaughter.
We agree that having acquitted defendant of Walker's murder, it was
imperative for the jury to understand the very same principles of self -defense
and defense of another applied to their consideration of the lesser-included
manslaughter offense. It was plain error for the judge to omit specific
instructions advising the jury that it should consider the affirmative defenses
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as to all the lesser-included offenses. See State v. Gentry, 439 N.J. Super. 57,
67 (App. Div. 2015) ("Where there is sufficient evidence to warrant a self -
defense charge, failure to instruct the jury that self-defense is a complete
justification for manslaughter offenses as well as for murder constitutes plain
error.").
The failure to charge the jury with that portion of the model charge
dealing with use of a weapon for a protective purpose when providing
instructions on defendant's possession of the knife for an unlawful purpose was
also plain error. Kille, slip op. at 16–17.
The combination of errors in this case, together with the prosecutor's
improper summation, require reversal of defendant's convictions. In light of
our disposition, we need not consider the balance of defendant's arguments,
including his claims of errors in the sentence.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
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