MICHELLE RUTKOWSKI v. MARIO REYES (FD-16-1668-03, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding ,upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3339-19
MICHELLE RUTKOWSKI,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MARIO REYES,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Argued May 25, 2022 – Decided July 14, 2022
Before Judges Whipple, Geiger and Susswein.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Passaic County,
Docket No. FD-16-1668-03.
Richard Kotkin argued the cause for appellant.
Respondent has not filed a brief.
PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals from a January 30, 2020 Family Part order denying his
motion to reduce his unpaid child support balance by making a modification of
his child support obligation retroactive to January 16, 2016—the date on which
he purportedly filed a pro se motion while incarcerated in federal prison. 1 The
trial court denied defendant's latest motion, characterizing the plain language of
his January 16, 2016 filing as a motion to "discharge" his support arrears, not to
modify or suspend child support during a period of imprisonment as authorized
by Halliwell v. Halliwell, 326 N.J. Super. 442, 457–58 (App. Div. 1999). It is
not disputed that had defendant phrased his January 16, 2016 request as a motion
to modify or suspend, rather than to discharge, he would be entitled to the relief
he now seeks. After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that in these
circumstances, defendant's unartful request to discharge his child support debt
should be construed to impliedly include a request to suspend or modify. We
therefore reverse and remand for the trial court to apply the September 24, 2018
modification of defendant's child support obligation retroactive to January 16,
2016 and to recalculate his arrears accordingly.
I.
We need only briefly summarize the relevant facts and procedural history,
which we discern from the record. On January 16, 2016, defendant filed a pro
1
We note that defendant has since been released from federal custody and is
represented in this appeal by counsel.
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se motion concerning his child support arrears. Defendant was incarcerated in
federal prison at Fort Dix, so the motion was mailed by prison authorities on his
behalf. However, defendant received no response nor any indication the motion
was filed or received at all.
On July 17, 2018, defendant was released from incarceration to the
custody of a halfway house. That same day, defendant filed a motion to "vacate
and/or modify" the existing child support order, seeking retroactive effect dating
to his initial filing. A hearing was convened on September 24, 2018, after which
the Family Part judge (initial judge or court) reduced defendant's weekly child
support obligation to $63, plus $10 toward his arrears balance of $29,678.39, for
a total of $73 due weekly, effective July 17, 2018. Defendant requested the
initial judge to vacate the arrears that had accumulated since the January 2016
filing. The initial judge denied that request, but did so without prejudice,
providing that "if the [defendant] can find his proof for the [c]ourt that he
previously tried to file an application for modification" on January 16, 2016,
during the period of defendant's incarceration, "he may refile an application and
the [c]ourt may preserve the filing date and amend the [retroactive] date of this
[modification] order."
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On April 29, 2019, defendant, now represented by counsel, contacted the
Federal Bureau of Prisons pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),
5 U.S.C. § 552, seeking proof that defendant had filed a motion on or about
January 16, 2016. On May 23, 2019, defendant received by mail a response
signed by the Regional Counsel for the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The response
included a single-page photocopy entitled "UNIT OUTGOING—
CERTIFIED/SPECIAL/LEGAL MAIL" showing that, via prison staff,
defendant had mailed something to the Office of Child Support on January 16,
2016.
On November 4, 2019, defendant filed a new motion requesting the court
to "vacate and/or modify" the September 24, 2018 order retroactive to January
16, 2016, and to adjust his arrears accordingly. Attached to the motion was a
certification, signed by defendant, which read, "I respectfully request that the
[c]ourt enter an order vacating my entire arrearage of child support of
$29,673.39." Defense counsel included an additional certification that stated
defendant was seeking the court to vacate the entire arrears amount.
On January 15, 2020, a different Family Part judge (trial judge) convened
a hearing to determine whether the photocopied prison mail log satisfied the
initial court's requirement to make the effective date of the September 24, 2018
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order retroactive to January 16, 2016. As proof that he had mailed a motion on
or about January 16, 2016, defendant produced the one-page excerpt from prison
legal/certified mail log, indicating that defendant had given a prison staff
member a legal document to be mailed to the Child Support Office on January
16, 2016. The photocopied page also included defendant's prison ID number,
and the signatures of defendant and the prison officer. Although the mail log
excerpt showed that something had been mailed on the relevant date, it did not
indicate what the envelope actually contained.
As proof of the actual filing, defendant provided to the trial court what he
claimed was a copy of the document that had been mailed on his behalf by prison
authorities. That document states in pertinent part: "Petitioner Mario Willie
Reyes, respectfully submit[s] this motion for request for discharging payment
of his child support, due to him being in federal custody here at Fort Dix . . . ."
After hearing arguments, the trial court determined that defendant had
presented
an undated application . . . requesting a discharge of
child support. [The log showed] a mailing [had been
sent] in 2016 to child support, [but] no specifics as to
what the mailing was. We don't have a copy of the
actual mailing. We don't have a filed copy of anything.
Again, we don't have any dates as far as this is
concerned.
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The trial judge acknowledged that defendant had produced a copy of "the
[motion] that allegedly he sent from [federal prison]." However, even accepting
that copy as proof of the filing mailed on January 16, 2016, the trial court noted,
"as far as this [c]ourt is concerned[,] . . . [what defendant produced] was a
motion for discharge or elimination, termination of the child support obligation
. . . ."
In rejecting defense counsel's argument that the pro se letter should be
interpreted as a request to modify defendant's support obligation during the
period of his incarceration, the trial judge noted, "[b]ut that's not what it says.
It doesn't say 'modify,' counsel. What's in front of me if I'm to accept this and
I'm accepting it is for discharging payment 2 of his child support due to him being
in federal custody." The trial judge concluded that the language of the letter
was clear: "[d]ischarge means discharge." "[R]eading th[e] application for what
it is, and . . . the [j]udge's court order back on September 24[], 2018 for what it
is," the judge found that the January 2016 motion was could not be reasonably
interpreted as "a modification application when clearly it states[—]whether he
did this alone or with somebody else[—i]t's for discharge of the payment. He
wants the payments to stop. He's in prison. He wants it to stop."
2
See infra note 3.
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However, in an abundance of caution, the trial court decided to relist the
"matter . . . for [January 30, 2020] in order for the [c]ourt to confer with the
[initial] . . . judge [who] . . . presided over this application back on September
the twenty-fourth of 2018[,]" to ascertain, specifically, what "proof" the initial
judge required to modify the effective date.
On January 30, 2020, the trial judge confirmed that she had spoken with
the initial judge and that her earlier interpretation of his order was c orrect.
Based on the plain language of the letter defendant had produced, the trial judge
"[concluded] that the [January 2016] discharge application was just that, a
discharge application and not a modification . . . ." Accordingly, the trial court
denied defendant's request to apply the September 24, 2018 reduction in child
support retroactive to January 16, 2016.
This appeal followed. Defendant raises the following contentions for our
consideration:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED AND REFUSED TO
FOLLOW THE LAW OF THE CASE AS THE
APPELLANT PROVIDED OVERWHELMING
PROOF THAT HE PREVIOUSLY TRIED TO FILE
AN APPLICATION FOR MODIFICATION AND HIS
APPLICATION FOR VACATION AND/OR
MODIFICATION FOR CHILD SUPPORT
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[ARREARAGES] MUST RELATE BACK TO
JANUARY 16, 2016.
II.
We believe the critical issue before us is not what the initial judge
intended for defendant to prove but rather whether the January 16, 2016 letter 3
functionally serves as a request to modify or suspend defendant's child support
obligations during his imprisonment, and not just a request to eliminate all
arrears that had theretofore accrued. Before we begin our analysis, we
acknowledge certain basic legal principles that inform our decision.
As a general proposition, the scope of appellate review of a Family Part
judge's decision of whether to grant or deny an application to modify child
support is narrow. Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 282–83 (2016);
Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998). We review such decisions for abuse
of discretion. We accord deference to Family Part judges due to their "special
jurisdiction and expertise" in family law matters. Cesare, 154 N.J. at 413. We
are bound by the judge's findings after a trial so long as they are "supported by
adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Id. at 411–12. We therefore will not
3
Like the trial court, we will assume that the letter produced by defendant for
the January 15, 2020 hearing is a copy of the actual filing that was mailed on
defendant's behalf by federal prison authorities on or about January 16, 2016.
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disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions unless convinced they are "so
manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with" the evidence presented. Id. at
412. However, challenges to legal conclusions, as well as a trial judge's
interpretation of the law, are subject to our de novo review. Est. of Hanges v.
Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 382–83 (2010). We add that, in this
case, the trial court's decision was not based on a credibility assessment but
rather the interpretation of the literal text of a pro se letter-pleading.
Debts accrued through unpaid child support arrears may not be
discharged. Lynn v. Lynn, 91 N.J. 510, 516 n.1 (1982); see also Dunbar v.
Dunbar, 190 U.S. 340 (1903) (holding that a debt for the support of children is
not dischargeable). It is not disputed, however, that the rule recognized in
Halliwell would have permitted defendant's support obligation to be suspended
upon his request, and the amount of arrears to be recalculated after his release.
326 N.J. Super.at 457–58 ("[I]n cases where the obligor has been sentenced to a
lengthy period of incarceration and has no assets, [courts may] defer any action
on the obligor's motion" to suspend the weekly support obligation, then
determine obligor's support obligation and arrears upon defendant's release,
retroactive to the date of the obligor's initial motion.)
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We add that defendant's "status as a pro se litigant in no way relieve[d]
[him] of [his] obligation to comply with . . . court rules . . . ." Venner v. Allstate,
306 N.J. Super. 106, 110 (App. Div. 1997). A litigant who chooses to represent
himself is "presumed to know, and [is] required to follow, the statutory law of
this state." Tuckey v. Harleysville Ins. Co., 236 N.J. Super. 221, 224 (App. Div.
1989). The fact of self-representation, in other words, does not relieve defendant
from the normal operation of the law.
However, we do not believe that we are foreclosed entirely from
accounting for an inmate's pro se status in interpreting his pleadings. While we
appreciate the trial court's focus on the "plain language" of defendant's request,
we also recognize that an inmate's pro se letter may not be written with the
precision we would expect of a counselled pleading. We add that while pro se
litigants are not excused from adherence to substantive legal or procedural rules,
strict compliance "may not be pursued at the expense of the failure by the court
system to perform its function of dispensing substantial justice on the merits."
Rubin v. Rubin, 188 N.J. Super. 155, 150 (App. Div. 2014); cf. R. 1:1-2
(instructing that the rules of procedure are to be construed to secure a just
determination, simplicity in procedure, and fairness in administration). It
remains "fundamental that the court system is obliged to protect the procedural
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rights of all litigants and to accord procedural due process to all litigants."
Rubin, 188 N.J. Super. at 159. Indeed, it is not uncommon in Family Part that
pro se litigants do not know exactly what to ask for, and thus sometimes phrase
their prayers for relief unartfully. Sometimes, that will prompt the judge to
clarify their applications and, as appropriate, allow them to amend those requests
to comply with governing legal principles. See Ridge at Back Brook, LLC v.
Klenert, 437 N.J. Super. 90, 99 (App. Div. 2014).
We note in this regard that, in this instance, no timely action was taken on
whatever was mailed from federal prison on or about January 16, 2016. It is not
clear from the record whether the mailing from the prison was lost. But had that
motion been heard and denied on the grounds that it sought impermissible relief,
that is, the total elimination of existing child support arrearages, see Lynn, 91
N.J. at 516 n.1, it is conceivable that defendant, while still incarcerated, would
have had an opportunity to file an amended or replacement motion seeking the
relief expressly authorized by Halliwell.
In these circumstances, we interpret the January 16, 2016 letter to include
an implied request to suspend accumulation of child support debt during a period
of incarceration. The fact that defendant asked unartfully for more than the law
permits—total elimination of his child support debt—does not mean that he did
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not also ask for that to which he was entitled by law, that is, the relief authorized
by Halliwell.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to make the
September 24, 2018 order modifying child support obligations retroacti ve to
January 16, 2016, and to recalculate the arrears that defendant owes. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
Reversed and remanded.
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