STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. JHAVAL D. RANDOLPH (17-01-0034, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0692-19
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JHAVAL D. RANDOLPH, a/k/a
JAVAL RANDOLPH and
JHAVAL D. RANDOLPH JR,
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________
Submitted February 2, 2022 – Decided July 29, 2022
Before Judges Gilson and Gooden Brown.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Union County, Indictment No. 17-01-0034.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Daniel S. Rockoff, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
William A. Daniel, Union County Prosecutor, attorney
for respondent (Joseph M. Nielsen, Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
On January 17, 2017, a Union County grand jury returned a two-count
indictment charging defendant with third-degree possession of a prohibited
weapon, namely a sawed-off shotgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(b) (count one); and
third-degree unlawful possession of a loaded weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(c)(2)
(count two). After defendant's motion to suppress the shotgun seized without a
warrant was denied, and the State's motion to admit defendant's confession to
police was granted, defendant entered an open-ended guilty plea to both counts
of the indictment. Once the trial court denied defendant's subsequent appeal of
the prosecutor's rejection of his application for a Graves Act waiver pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.2, defendant was sentenced to concurrent five-year prison
terms, each with a three-and-one-half-year parole disqualifier, pursuant to the
Graves Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c).1
1
"The 'Graves Act' is named for Senator Francis X. Graves, Jr., who sponsored
legislation in the early 1980s that imposed a mandatory minimum term of
imprisonment and parole ineligibility on defendants convicted of certain
predicate crimes committed while in possession of a firearm." State v.
Rodriguez, 466 N.J. Super. 71, 87 n.1 (App. Div.), leave to appeal denied, 247
N.J. 234 (2021). "The term 'Graves Act' now refers to all firearms offenses that
carry a mandatory minimum sentence." Ibid.A-0692-19
2
A memorializing judgment of conviction was entered on August 28, 2019,
from which defendant now appeals, raising the following points for our
consideration:
POINT I
BECAUSE OFFICERS ARRESTED . . . DEFENDANT
AND SEARCHED HIS BAG WITHOUT PROBABLE
CAUSE OR ANY VALID EXCEPTION TO THE
WARRANT REQUIREMENT, THIS COURT
SHOULD REVERSE THE DENIAL OF THE
SUPPRESSION MOTION.
POINT II
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE
ARBITRARY AND DISPARATE DENIAL OF
DEFENDANT'S N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.2 APPLICATION
FOR A WAIVER OF A 3.5-YEAR MINIMUM
PRISON SENTENCE.
Having reviewed the arguments advanced in light of the record and governing
legal principles, we affirm.
I.
We recite only those facts relevant to the issues raised on appeal. We
glean these facts from the evidentiary hearing conducted on February 2, 2018,
during which the State produced two witnesses, Detectives Louis Figueiredo and
Carmen Giannetta, both members of the Elizabeth Police Department (EPD)
Narcotics Unit. Defendant did not testify or call any witnesses.
A-0692-19
3
Figueiredo testified that on September 8, 2016, he received a tip from a
confidential informant (CI) that a "short" "black male" by the name of "Jay" in
his "early 20s . . . was going to be in the area of the [Broad Street] train station,
and he was going to have [controlled dangerous substances] on him." Figueiredo
stated he had previously worked with the CI and recounted that the CI was
reliable because his previous information had provided the basis for ten o ther
drug-related arrests.
Figueiredo explained that based on the tip, in the early afternoon of
September 8, 2016, he "went to the area of the train station, and . . . set up . . .
surveillance" accompanied by other EPD and Union County Prosecutor's Office
detectives. According to Figueiredo, officers were "scatter[ed] throughout" "the
whole surrounding area of the train station," "to try to cover as much of the area
as possible," while he and another detective conducted surveillance from a car
that was "parked in the lot . . . next to the courtyard" of the train station.
During the surveillance, Figueiredo was in continuous communication
with the CI via "[t]ext messages." The CI informed Figueiredo that "Jay" was
"already at the train station," "on a bicycle," and "wearing red sneakers, blue
jeans, [a] red t-shirt, . . . and . . . a backpack." Figueiredo confirmed that he saw
A-0692-19
4
a man with "[a] black backpack" "fitting that physical description" "circling the
courtyard area . . . on [a] bike." The individual was later identified as defendant.
Figueiredo testified that defendant "rode his bike near the tunnel that leads
to Broad Street," at which point he dismounted his bike and "nervously looked
around" while frequently checking his cell phone. According to Figueiredo,
defendant then "walked over to some stairs that lead to the abandoned
tracks, . . . looked around some more, . . . took off his backpack, . . . placed it
on the steps, . . . turned around and . . . walked away," "towards the tunnel that
leads to the platforms." Figueiredo said once defendant "enter[ed] . . . the tunnel,
[they] los[t] sight of him."
Detective Giannetta, one of Figueiredo's back-up officers at the train
station, also observed defendant "place[] the backpack down on the . . . stairs."
According to Giannetta, approximately "five minutes" later, another detective
"pick[ed] up the backpack" and brought it to Giannetta. Giannetta opened the
backpack and saw a loaded "sawed-off shotgun" inside, with "[t]he handle . . .
taped up." The information was then relayed to Figueiredo.
Figueiredo testified that "[f]rom the time . . . defendant left the backpack
to the time that the officers retrieved the backpack," he did not "lose sight of the
backpack"; "it remain[ed] in the location that it was in"; and defendant did not
A-0692-19
5
"come back to the backpack." After the discovery of the sawed-off shotgun,
Figueiredo "informed . . . the assisting units," who "attempted to locate
[defendant]." Officers found defendant "on the steps to the nort hbound
platform" and placed him under arrest. Figueiredo stated that the backpack was
not visible from where defendant was arrested on the northbound platform.
Following defendant's arrest, he was taken to the police station where
Giannetta administered his Miranda2 rights. Defendant waived his rights and
voluntarily gave a statement, during which he admitted that he had brought a
shotgun in his backpack to the train station. Defendant also stated he went to
the train station to sell "some weed" to someone he had met on Facebook but he
had "no weed" and intended to "just . . . take the [person's] money."
In support of his motion to suppress the search and seizure of the backpack
and its contents, defendant argued he did not abandon his backpack, the
information from the CI was not sufficient to establish probable cause to search
the backpack, and no exigent circumstances existed at the time. In opposition
to the State's motion to admit his statement to police, defendant argued that the
waiver of his Miranda rights was not knowingly and intelligently given.
2
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
A-0692-19
6
The judge denied defendant's suppression motion in an order entered on
February 13, 2018. In a written opinion, the judge determined Figueiredo was
credible, as his testimony was "corroborated by a credible witness, photographs
and . . . [d]efendant's videotaped statement." The judge also found Giannetta to
be "entirely credible," noting that "[h]e testified in a direct and forthright manner
without evidence of prevarication," and "[h]is testimony conformed to the
evidence and common sense." Thus, the judge made factual findings consistent
with the detectives' testimony.
The judge then determined that defendant had abandoned the backpack
and thus had no standing to challenge its search and seizure, explaining:
(1) Defendant walked away from the backpack and
proceeded to the railroad boarding platforms at the
station; (2) in doing so, he took no steps to conceal the
backpack or otherwise prevent its discovery by anyone;
(3) the backpack was out of his sight and control when
he went to the train platforms; (4) the area in question
was a busy train station during mid-day; and, (5) there
is nothing in the facts and circumstances to indicate that
[d]efendant was going to return to the backpack. Said
differently, [d]efendant relinquished both possession
and control over the backpack when he left it in an
unconcealed location in a busy public place.
The judge further noted that even if defendant had standing to challenge
the search, his actions "in leaving his backpack on the steps and walking to the
distant train platform invoked the community caretaker role of the police,"
A-0692-19
7
"excus[ing] the warrant requirement." Additionally, the judge found the State
"established, beyond a reasonable doubt, a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
waiver by . . . defendant" and granted the State's motion to admit defendant's
statement at trial.
Following the adjudication of the motions, defendant pled guilty to both
counts in the indictment, indicating that prior to sentencing, he would appeal the
prosecutor's denial of his request for a Graves Act waiver to permit a reduced
sentence pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.2. On March 26, 2019, during oral
argument on defendant's waiver motion, defendant argued that under State v.
Alvarez, 246 N.J. Super. 137 (App. Div. 1991), the State's rejection constituted
a "patent and gross abuse of discretion," warranting judicial intervention in
securing the waiver. Additionally, defendant claimed the State's failure to
extend a Graves Act waiver plea offer contradicted the Attorney General
guidelines pertaining to first time Graves Act offenders. 3
3
The Attorney General has issued a directive that channels the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion when deciding whether a Graves Act mandatory
minimum sentence should be waived pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.2. See
Directive to Ensure Uniform Enforcement of "Graves Act" (Oct. 23, 2008, as
corrected Nov. 25, 2008) (Directive).
A-0692-19
8
In support, defendant cited ten specific Union County cases where the
State had granted a Graves Act waiver to illustrate that the State treated other
similarly situated defendants differently. Defendant also asserted,
"[m]eaningful judicial review . . . require[d] disclosure of the State's cumulative
file of Graves waiver decisions."
The State countered that the Graves waiver was properly considered by
two different First Assistant Prosecutors and subsequently denied by both based
on the facts of the case and defendant's history. Additionally, the State
distinguished all ten Graves waiver cases defendant relied on in his attempt to
show that he was treated differently than similarly situated defendants. The
State conceded, however, that neither the denial nor the reasoning was ever
reduced to writing and provided to defendant. Consequently, the judge
adjourned the proceedings and ordered the State to provide a statement of
reasons denying defendant's Graves Act waiver request as required by State v.
Benjamin, 228 N.J. 358 (2017).
In accordance with the judge's order, the prosecuting attorney provided a
letter to defendant and the court dated March 27, 2019, explaining the reasons
for the denial. In the letter, the prosecutor outlined the charges and recounted
the circumstances of defendant's arrest. The prosecutor also explained that she
A-0692-19
9
took into consideration "defendant's juvenile record," "the nature and
circumstances of th[e] case," the weight of the evidence, and the applicable
"aggravating and mitigating factors" set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and (b).
The prosecutor concluded, "while defendant is a youthful offender with no adult
criminal history, he is no stranger to the criminal justice system," and his "prior
robbery adjudications, along with the nature and circumstances of this case, and
the type of loaded firearm possessed, together with the State's strong proofs, "
justified denying defendant a Graves Act waiver.
On April 4, 2019, the parties returned for oral argument, after which the
judge denied defendant's waiver motion. The judge found that of the ten cases
cited by defendant as comparable or more severe than his case, only nine were
relevant to the court's analysis and each case was distinguishable from
defendant's case. The judge also determined that "the State . . . did consider all
relevant aggravating and mitigating factors and . . . did not act contrary to law."
The judge concluded that defendant had failed to show arbitrary or disparate
action by the State in denying defendant's request. Further, the judge found that
defendant was not entitled to discovery of the State's cumulative file on Graves
Act waiver decisions because as the Benjamin Court concluded, "there [were]
A-0692-19
10
sufficient procedural safeguards in place for meaningful judicial review of a
prosecutor's waiver decision." 228 N.J. at 375. This appeal followed.
II.
In Point I, defendant advances two arguments in support of his claim that
the judge erred in denying his motion to suppress the backpack and shotgun.
First, defendant claims that the judge erred in finding the officers had probable
cause to arrest him based on the CI's uncorroborated tip. Second, defendant
claims that the judge erred in finding defendant had abandoned his backpack
and therefore lacked standing to challenge the search.
In evaluating a trial judge's ruling on a suppression motion, our review of
the judge's factual findings is "exceedingly narrow." State v. Locurto, 157 N.J.
463, 470 (1999). We must defer to those factual findings "so long as those
findings are supported by sufficient evidence in the record." State v. Hubbard,
222 N.J. 249, 262 (2015); see also State v. Nelson, 237 N.J. 540, 551 (2019)
(same). In particular, we defer to the trial judge's assessments of credibility,
given the judge's ability to make "observations of the character and demeanor
of witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the
record." Locurto, 157 N.J. at 474. Based on that standard, the trial judge's
findings should be overturned "only if they are so clearly mistaken 'that the
A-0692-19
11
interests of justice demand intervention and correction.'" State v. Elders, 192
N.J. 224, 244 (2007) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)). By
contrast, the trial judge's interpretation of the law and the legal "consequences
that flow from established facts" are reviewed de novo. State v. Gamble, 218
N.J. 412, 425 (2014).
Here, we are satisfied the judge's factual findings are amply supported by
the record. As to the judge's legal conclusion, defendant claims the judge erred
when he found defendant had abandoned his backpack and thus lacked standing
to challenge the search. As a result, he contends the sawed-off shotgun
confiscated from this unconstitutional seizure must be suppressed. We disagree.
The United States and New Jersey Constitutions guarantee that
individuals shall be free from "unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const.
amend. IV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7. "Generally, a warrantless search or seizure is
invalid absent a showing that it 'falls within one of the few well-delineated
exceptions to the warrant requirement.'" State v. Alessi, 240 N.J. 501, 517
(2020) (quoting State v. Mann, 203 N.J. 328, 337-38 (2010)).
Where property has been abandoned "a defendant will not have standing
to object to the search or seizure of" that property. State v. Johnson, 193 N.J.
528, 548-49 (2008). Stated differently, "the abandonment of property strips a
A-0692-19
12
person of standing to challenge a search." Id. at 547. "To that extent, abandoned
property falls within an exception to the warrant requirement," and "the State
bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence" that the
property is abandoned. State v. Brown, 216 N.J. 508, 528-29 (2014).
"For the purposes of standing, property is abandoned when a person, who
has control or dominion over property, knowingly and voluntarily relinquishes
any possessory or ownership interest in the property and when there are no other
apparent or known owners of the property." Johnson, 193 N.J. at 549. "To act
voluntarily is to act with a free and unconstrained will, a will that is not
overborne by physical or psychological duress or coercion." State v. Carvajal,
202 N.J. 214, 226 (2010). "To act knowingly is to act with a conscious
understanding of what one is doing." Ibid.Where items are discarded in response to an illegal seizure, that evidence
is not abandoned, and remains subject to suppression. State v. Tucker, 136 N.J.
158, 172 (1994). As the Tucker Court explained:
"Property is not considered abandoned when a person
throws away incriminating articles due to the unlawful
actions of police officers." Thus, where a person has
disposed of property in response to a police effort to
make an illegal arrest or illegal search, courts have not
hesitated to hold that property inadmissible.
A-0692-19
13
[Ibid. (quoting 1 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.6(b) at 471-72 (2d ed.
1987)).]
Guided by these principles, we agree with the judge's legal conclusion that
defendant abandoned the backpack. The evidence supports the judge's
determination defendant knowingly and voluntarily relinquished any possessory
or ownership interest he may have had in the backpack when he left it on the
steps near the "old tracks" of a public train station in the middle of the afternoon
and walked away, heading "towards the tunnel that [led] to the platforms."
Further, because there were no other apparent or known owners of the property,
and the police did not confront or accost defendant before he discarded the
backpack, defendant's action constituted abandonment. Tucker, 136 N.J. at 172.
As a result, defendant had "no right to challenge the search and seizure of that
property." Johnson, 193 N.J. at 548.
The judge rejected the State's claim that "because the officers had
probable cause to arrest [defendant] based on the [CI's] information," the search
of defendant's backpack was a search incident to arrest. As such, we need not
address defendant's contention regarding the sufficiency of the CI's tip. Also,
in light of our decision that defendant abandoned his backpack and had no
standing to object to its search or seizure, we need not address defendant's
A-0692-19
14
argument that the judge erred in applying "the community caretaking exception
to the warrant requirement" and we offer no opinion on that determination.
III.
In Point II, defendant contends the judge erred in denying his appeal to
overturn the prosecutor's "arbitrary and capricious" rejection of a Graves Act
waiver under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.2. In support, defendant asserts he was "only
accused of non-violent, third-degree possession; he had no prior adult felony
convictions; and he was out on bail for years pending sentencing without ever
being accused of any new crimes." Defendant further argues that the
prosecutor's rejection deprived him of "due process and equal protection of the
laws" as compared to the treatment afforded "similarly-situated" as well as more
egregious offenders. In that regard, defendant relies on the summaries of ten
firearm prosecutions provided to the trial court to show disparity and
discrimination in the extension of Graves Act waivers.4
4
Defendant originally submitted ten cases for the trial court to consider in
assessing whether there was a disparity in Graves Act waivers granted by the
State in other cases. On appeal, defendant submits an additional ninety-two
cases to this court to highlight his position. However, "a reviewing court will
not consider evidentiary material which is not in the trial court's record." Mount
Olive Complex v. Twp. of Mount Olive, 340 N.J. Super. 511, 527 (App. Div.
2001) (citing R. 2:5-4(a)); certif. granted, cause remanded, 174 N.J. 359 (2002);
see also State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 19 (2009) ("The jurisdiction of appellate
A-0692-19
15
The Graves Act requires a mandatory term of imprisonment for
individuals convicted of various firearm-related crimes. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c).
The Act specifically requires that "[t]he term of imprisonment shall include the
imposition of a minimum term" which "shall be fixed at one-half of the sentence
imposed by the court or [forty-two] months, whichever is greater." Ibid.The Graves Act, however, contains an "'escape valve' to the mandatory
sentence requirements." Alvarez, 246 N.J. Super. at 139. This "escape valve"
provides:
On a motion by the prosecutor made to the
[A]ssignment [J]udge that the imposition of a
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment under [the
Graves Act] for a defendant who has not previously
been convicted of an offense under [the Graves
Act], . . . does not serve the interests of justice, the
[A]ssignment [J]udge shall place the defendant on
probation . . . or reduce to one year the mandatory
minimum term of imprisonment during which the
defendant will be ineligible for parole. The sentencing
court may also refer a case of a defendant who has not
previously been convicted of an offense under [the
Graves Act] to the [A]ssignment [J]udge, with the
approval of the prosecutor, if the sentencing court
believes that the interests of justice would not be served
by the imposition of a mandatory minimum term.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.2.]
courts . . . is bound[] by the proofs and objections critically explored on the
record before the trial court by the parties themselves.").
A-0692-19
16
"[W]ritten guidelines exist to channel prosecutorial discretion" in
evaluating waiver applications. Benjamin, 228 N.J. at 372. These guidelines,
outlined in the Directive, instruct prosecutors "contemplating a waiver to
'consider all relevant circumstances concerning the offense conduct and the
offender,' such as applicable aggravating and mitigating circumstances under
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1." Benjamin, 228 N.J. at 369 (quoting Directive at 12). Should
the prosecutor decide not to approve the waiver, a defendant "may move before
the [A]ssignment [J]udge or designated judge . . . for a . . . hearing as to whether
the prosecutor's rejection or refusal is grossly arbitrary or capricious or a patent
abuse of discretion." Alvarez, 246 N.J. Super. at 147 (quoting State v. Cengiz,
241 N.J. Super. 482, 497-98 (App. Div. 1990)). A defendant "must make a
showing of arbitrariness constituting an unconstitutional discrimination or
denial of equal protection constituting a 'manifest injustice,'" and the
Assignment Judge or designee must determine if a hearing is warranted "in the
interests of justice." Id. at 148-49.
The interest of justice standard requires the court to consider whether "the
sentence reflect[s] the Legislature's intention" because "the severity of the crime
[is] the most single important factor in the sentencing process." State v.
Megargel, 143 N.J. 484, 500 (1996). The court "must consider the nature of and
A-0692-19
17
the relevant circumstances pertaining to the offense," including "facts personal
to the defendant" such as the "defendant's role in the incident to determine the
need to deter him from further crimes and the corresponding need to protect the
public from him." Id. at 500-01. The judge must identify "any reasons,
compelling or otherwise," as to why the interest of justice standard applies. Id.
at 503. In that regard, "courts must 'view the prosecutor's decision through the
filter of the highly deferential standard of review.'" State v. Waters, 439 N.J.
Super. 215, 237-38 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting State v. Wallace, 146 N.J. 576,
589 (1996)).
Here, in denying defendant's application to overturn the prosecutor's
rejection of a Graves Act waiver, the judge designated to hear waiver
applications concluded defendant failed to carry his heavy burden to establish
"a patent and gross abuse of discretion" on the part of the prosecutor. Critically,
the judge pointed out that the prosecutor adhered to "the Attorney General
Guidelines for waiving the Graves Act"; "did not act contrary to law"; and
"consider[ed] all relevant aggravating and mitigating factors" set forth in
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1. Specifically, the judge noted that the prosecutor found
aggravating factors three and nine and no mitigating factors. See N.J.S.A.
2C:44-1(a)(3) ("[t]he risk that . . . defendant will commit another offense");
A-0692-19
18
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9) ("[t]he need for deterring . . . defendant and others from
violating the law").
The judge explained that while defendant "ha[d] not met [his] burden" for
a hearing, nonetheless, she had conducted a "fairly comprehensive hearing
because the [c]ourt . . . [had] reviewed a number of cases cited by . . .
defen[dant,]" and had considered the State's "explanations" in distinguishing
those cases from defendant's. After painstakingly discussing the cases cited by
defendant, the judge concluded, while "there were some similarities in some of
the cases . . . , defendant's case . . . is different," in that "he left a loaded . . .
sawed-off shotgun in a train station in an area clearly . . . accessible to the
public." The judge acknowledged that while "no one was hurt," "[t]he potential
harm, including serious injury or death to a member of the public, [was]
significant in this case." Therefore, according to the judge, "[t]his case . . . is
unlike any of the cases cited by . . . defendant . . . to support defendant's request
for a hearing."
The judge also acknowledged the State's strong proofs, as well as the fact
that defendant's request was "submitted to" and "denied" by two "different
[F]irst [A]ssistant [P]rosecutor[s]." Further, the judge "agree[d] with the State's
finding of [a]ggravating [f]actors [three] and [nine]" and found no "competent,
A-0692-19
19
credible evidence" to support the mitigating factors urged by defendant. The
judge stated although defendant "did not have an adult criminal record" and was
twenty-three-years-old at the time of the offense, he had "two prior adjudications
for second-degree robbery" in "2009 and 2010." Additionally, in 2010 and 2011,
defendant "was adjudicated delinquent for shoplifting" and "failure to make
lawful disposition," respectively. The judge noted that although defendant was
placed on probation, he violated probation.
The judge also considered "the nature" of the offense and its "relevant
circumstances," recognizing "defendant was in possession of a loaded sawed-
off shotgun, loaded being one issue and second being a . . . sawed-off shotgun
which no one can possess legally." Moreover, the judge reasoned, not only did
defendant possess a "sawed-off shotgun at a train station but . . . defendant
admitted that he was there to commit additional criminal conduct," namely a
drug sale. Accordingly, the judge denied defendant's waiver request, finding
that "[u]nder the circumstances of th[e] case the interests of justice d[id] not
demand that the State provide an offer under the . . . statute."
We agree with the judge's cogent and well-reasoned decision and reject
defendant's arguments that the denial was discriminatory, inconsistent with the
Attorney General's Directive, or arbitrary and capricious. "On the contrary, we
A-0692-19
20
are satisfied that the judge's robust review and analysis were sound, and fulfilled
the role contemplated in Benjamin, to 'ensure[] that prosecutorial discretion is
not unchecked.'" State v. Andrews, 464 N.J. Super. 111, 124 (App. Div. 2020)
(quoting Benjamin, 228 N.J. at 373).
Affirmed.
A-0692-19
21