JENNIFER MACK v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, ETC. (TEACHERS' PENSION AND ANNUITY FUND) ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2780-20
JENNIFER MACK,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
TEACHERS' PENSION AND
ANNUITY FUND,
Respondent-Respondent.
__________________________
Argued August 2, 2022 – Decided August 24, 2022
Before Judges Geiger and Rose.
On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the Teachers'
Pension and Annuity Fund, Department of the
Treasury.
Richard A. Friedman argued the cause for appellant
(Zazzali, Fagella, Nowak, Kleinbaum & Friedman,
attorneys; Richard A. Friedman, of counsel and on the
briefs; Sheila Murugan, on the briefs).
Brian D. Ragunan, Deputy Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Acting
Attorney General, attorney; Sookie Bae-Park,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Brian D.
Ragunan, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Jennifer Mack, a former teacher and school administrator, appeals from
an April 26, 2021 final decision of the Board of Trustees (Board) of the
Teachers' Pension and Annuity Fund (TPAF), denying her application for
ordinary disability retirement benefits. The Board rejected the findings of an
administrative law judge (ALJ), who determined Mack was totally and
permanently disabled from her employment under N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4, when she
left her administrative position with the Delran Board of Education (Delran) in
October 2015. Because we agree with the Board that Mack failed to establish
her disabling condition was the reason she left Delran, we affirm.
I.
We summarize Mack's contentions, which are largely undisputed, from
the record before the ALJ. Mack began her teaching career in 1998 and
thereafter worked for various school districts. Pertinent to this appeal, in
August 2014, Mack commenced employment as a Delanco elementary school
principal for the 2014-15 school year. Mack supervised all the school's
employees.
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According to Mack, in late March 2015, the Delanco superintendent
informed Mack she was not "a good fit" for the position, and likely would not
be renewed if she chose not to resign. Mack resigned but had difficulty
completing the academic year. At some point, a Board member confirmed
rumors Mack had heard that the "real reason" she was non-renewed was her
sexual orientation. Because Mack believed she was "looked upon differently,"
her "competence level was extremely deteriorated." Mack experienced panic
attacks, lethargy, anxiety, and depression. She was withdrawn at work and in
her personal life. Mack sought treatment from her general practitioner, and
was prescribed antidepressant medication.
In July 2015, after completing her contract with Delanco, Mack became
the student services director for the Delran, where she remained employed
until October 2015. Mack's self-esteem diminished, and her depression and
anxiety worsened. Mack was often emotional at work.
Mack testified she left Delran because she suffered from depression and
was unable "to keep up" with her responsibilities. She testified that she felt
sick, lost sleep, cried, and had a "sick-to-[her]-stomach feeling" that she "just
. . . couldn't do it anymore." In sum, Mack claimed she "was ill."
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Mack's September 20, 2015 resignation letter painted a different picture.
Mack commenced the letter, stating: "After much consideration, I have
decided that this position, Director of Student Services, does not fit well with
my professional strengths or allow me to serve students and teachers in a
capacity that is at the core of what I love about being an Educational Leader."
The remaining two paragraphs make no mention of her illness. According to
the letter, Mack's resignation was effective in sixty days.
Nine days later, on September 29, 2015, Mack supplemented her
resignation letter, advising her final day with Delran would be October 13.
Mack claimed: "This is due to a medical [leave of absence] that I am taking
which will be in effect th[r]ough the remainder of my sixty days with the
district." At the hearing, Mack explained she used her remaining sick time so
she could "receive maybe two more paychecks before [she] was technically
done with the district."
In January 2016, Mack accepted a six-month part-time position with the
Burlington County Juvenile Detention Facility as a site supervisor. While
employed at the detention facility, Mack's symptoms continued unabated, and
she continued taking her prescribed medications. Mack testified she was
"minimally . . . able to do the job because the job was so minimal compared to
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[her prior employment]." However, in June 2016, before her contract ended,
Mack was hospitalized and never returned to work.
On July 27, 2017, Mack applied for TPAF ordinary disability retirement
benefits. Following her examination by Daniel B. LoPreto, Ph.D., in June
2018, the Board denied Mack's application, finding pursuant to N.J.A.C. 17:1 -
6.4, she "w[as] not totally and permanently disabled at the time [she] left
employment with Delran . . . in October 2015." Mack appealed and the matter
was transferred to the Office of Administrative Law as a contested case.
During the two-day hearing before the ALJ, Mack testified consistently
with her account summarized above. She also presented the testimony of two
Delran colleagues – an assistant principal, and a learning disability teacher
consultant – who corroborated Mack's testimony that she was outwardly
depressed while employed at Delran. Mack did not present the testimony of a
treating mental health professional. Instead, each side called an expert, who
examined Mack for the purposes of this action: Mack called Daniel B. Gollin,
M.D., an expert in psychiatry; the Board called Dr. LoPreto, an expert in
psychology. The ALJ also considered documentary evidence presented by
both parties, including their experts' reports.
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During the hearing, Mack's disability was not in dispute; at issue was the
onset of her disability. Not surprisingly, the experts' opinions diverged on thi s
issue.
Dr. Gollin's October 18, 2019 psychiatric evaluation of Mack consisted
of an interview to gather her medical, psychiatric, and life history, and a
simultaneous examination to observe her behavior. He testified in some detail
about Mack's account of her depressive symptoms. Dr. Gollin also reviewed
records from Mack's prior treating doctors. He diagnosed Mack as meeting the
DSM-51 criteria for bipolar II disorder.
Dr. Gollin opined Mack "became disabled around the time . . . she was
not renewed for her contract [with] Delanco . . . [e]ven though she worked in
Delran for some short period [thereafter]." He based his opinion on Mack's
"failure to really be able to succeed at the job [with] Delran and her
continuously worsening mental state during the entire time." He testified that
her mental state "clearly deteriorated, commencing at the point where she was
departing from Delanco, and it had a pretty steady downwards trajectory until
the point that she was hospitalized."
1
Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (5th ed. 2013).
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On cross-examination, Dr. Gollin acknowledged he "couldn't say with an
exact date" when Mack was disabled and that much of his opinion was based
on Mack's self-reporting. When pressed as to whether he considered
"objective evidence," Dr. Gollin responded, he "d[idn't] know that there [wa]s
any objective results other than [his] observations of her"; "her ability to tell
the story"; "and her ability to pay attention during the interview, or her ability
to recall some of the specifics."
By contrast, Dr. LoPreto testified his examination of Mack consisted of
"three parts": "the record review"; "the face-to-face examination"; and "the
administration of psychological testing." As part of his evaluation, Dr.
LoPreto administered the forensic Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI),
which utilizes "validity scales" to ensure the accuracy of the test results. He
opined Mack's scores showed some "minimization of problems," which meant
"her results may [have] underestimate[d] the degree of distress that she [wa]s
experiencing" at the time of the examination. Mack's "clinical profile was
totally within the normal limits; there was no significant elevations on the
scales measuring anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, obsessive compulsive
disorder, and major depression."
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Based on his review of Mack's medical records and his evaluation, Dr.
LoPreto concluded she "was totally and permanently disabled from performing
the material duties of her job." Dr. LoPreto's diagnosis was "major depressive
disorder, recurrent, severe, without psychotic features, and generalized anxiety
disorder, which [wa]s consistent with some of the diagnoses rendered by her
treatment providers in 2016 and 2017."
However, Dr. LoPreto differed from Dr. Gollin regarding the onset of
Mack's disability, opining "things kind of came crashing down in June [2016],
. . . when the disability got to the point where she needed to be hospitalized."
To support his opinion, Dr. LoPreto cited the April 2016 report of Mack's
treating health center, "when the diagnosis changed to major depression" under
the DSM-5.
Dr. LoPreto also cited Mack's job search after she left Delran, during
which time she was not "involved in any kind of intensive inpatient treatment"
and "[wa]s being stabilized by her outpatient provider" as further evidence she
did not have a psychological disability. He noted Mack "was successful in
finding employment with the juvenile center in November and that job began
in January [2016]." He opined that Mack left her employment with Delran in
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October 2015 due to "job dissatisfaction at the time, as stated in her
[September 20, 2015] letter."
The ALJ concluded Mack proved "her mental health conditions were
disabling by October 2015." Finding "[t]he evidence d[id] not support a
finding that [Mack] departed Delran simply because she sought a career
change," the ALJ determined Mack was entitled to ordinary disability
retirement benefits. Although the ALJ found both experts credible, she
determined Dr. Gollin's ultimate opinion "was based on a fulsome review of all
relevant facts and considerations." On the other hand, the ALJ concluded Dr.
LoPreto's assessment was based on a lack of documentation, including that he
did not have Mack's resignation letters when he interviewed her. The ALJ also
found Dr. LoPreto "did not ask [Mack] direct questions about her reasons for
leaving her three jobs or whether she was able to perform her job duties ."
The Board rejected the ALJ's recommendation and, specifically, her
findings as to the credibility of the experts. Noting Dr. Gollin "is not Board-
certified," the Board found the doctor "failed to rely on any objective testing
and instead focused almost exclusively on Ms. Mack's own self-reporting and
his own observations." The Board further found, unlike Dr. LoPreto who is
Board-certified, Dr. Gollin "did not reference the [PAI]," and "acknowledged
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that objective measures of a psychiatric disability were not present in Ms.
Mack's case."
The Board also rejected the ALJ's finding that Mack's continued
employment at the juvenile detention center "was distinguishable from her
employment as a school administrator because it was 'less taxing and required
considerably less work.'" Instead, the Board found Mack's supervisory work at
both jobs involved similar duties and, as such, she was not totally and
permanently disabled pursuant to our Supreme Court's decision in Richardson
v. Board of Trustees, Police & Firemen's Retirement System, 192 N.J. 189,
195 (2007) (holding an applicant is not permanently and totally disabled if the
applicant "can continue to work in some other capacity").
Finally, the Board noted the ALJ failed to consider Mack's September
20, 2015 resignation letter, which was submitted nearly two years prior to her
application and "said nothing about her psychological condition." The Board
therefore denied Mack's application for disability benefits. This appeal
followed.
On appeal, Mack primarily argues the Board's decision "is not supported
by the substantial, credible evidence in the record," and that the ALJ correctly
determined she was totally and permanently disabled when she left Delran in
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October 2015. Mack maintains she is therefore entitled to ordinary disability
retirement benefits. We disagree.
II.
Our role in reviewing the final decision of an administrative agency is
limited. Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27
(2011). We defer "to an administrative agency's exercise of its statutorily
delegated responsibilities." Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J. 163, 171 (2014). We
"should not disturb an administrative agency's determinations or findings
unless there is a clear showing that (1) the agency did not follow the law; (2)
the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; or (3) the decision was
not supported by substantial evidence." In re Virtua-West Jersey Hosp.
Voorhees for a Certificate of Need, 194 N.J. 413, 422 (2008).
Our public pension systems are "bound up in the public interest and
provide public employees significant rights which are deserving of
conscientious protection." Zigmont v. Bd. of Trs., Tchrs.' Pension & Annuity
Fund, 91 N.J. 580, 583 (1983). Because "pension statutes are 'remedial in
character,'" they are "'liberally construed and administered in favor of the
persons intended to be benefited thereby.'" Klumb v. Bd. of Educ. of
Manalapan-Englishtown Reg'l High Sch. Dist., 199 N.J. 14, 34 (2009) (quoting
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Geller v. N.J. Dep't of Treasury, Div. of Pensions & Annuity Fund, 53 N.J.
591, 597-98 (1969)). Nonetheless, an employee has only the rights and
benefits provided by those statutes and their enabling regulations. Francois v.
Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys., 415 N.J. Super. 335, 349 (2010). The
Board acts in a fiduciary capacity with the obligation to serve the best interests
of the pension fund and all its beneficiaries, not just the member seeking the
benefit. Mount v. Trs. of Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys., 133 N.J. Super. 72, 86 (App.
Div. 1975).
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:66-39(b), a TPAF member is eligible for
ordinary disability retirement benefits where "[t]he physician . . . designated
by the board . . . [conducts] a medical examination of [the member] . . .
certified to the board that the member is physically or mentally incapacitated
for the performance of duty and should be retired." See also N.J.A.C. 17:1-
6.4. We have interpreted the statute to mean the applicant must have left her
position due to the disability. In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4, 17:1-7.5 &
17:1-7.10, 454 N.J. Super. 386, 399 (App. Div. 2018).
An applicant must prove "she has a disabling condition and must
produce expert evidence to sustain this burden." Bueno v. Bd. of Trs., Tchrs.'
Pension & Annuity Fund, 404 N.J. Super. 119, 126 (App. Div. 2008); see also
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Patterson v. Bd. of Trs., State Police Ret. Sys., 194 N.J. 29, 50-51 (2008)). "A
teacher with a disabling mental condition may qualify for ordinary disability
retirement benefits." Bueno, 404 N.J. Super. at 126.
Relying on N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c), Mack argues the Board could not
reject the ALJ's credibility findings without first concluding those findings
were arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by the evidence. As
we have stated, however, N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c) does not apply to expert
witnesses. ZRB, LLC v. N.J. Dep't of Env't Prot., Land Use Regul., 403 N.J.
Super. 531, 561 (App. Div. 2008). The ALJ's credibility determinations in the
present matter involved the expert witnesses' conflicting testimony about the
onset of Mack's disability, not lay witness testimony. As such, the mandates
of N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c) did not apply.
Rather, the Board articulated specific reasons for crediting Dr. LoPreto's
testimony over that of Dr. Gollin. The Board explained Dr. Gollin did not
base his decision on objective evidence, such as the PAI, as did Dr. LoPreto.
Instead, the Board found Dr. Gollin's opinion was based primarily on Mack's
"self-reporting and his own observations."
Moreover, Dr. Gollin could not opine as to a specific date or event that
triggered Mack's disability, testifying instead it was "around the time" her
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Delanco contract was not renewed. Nonetheless, Dr. Gollin acknowledged
Mack continued working for Delanco for a "short period" afterward. On the
other hand, Dr. LoPreto concluded Mack did not become functionally impaired
until April 2016, in accordance with her treating physician's report, or June
2016, when she was hospitalized.
Given our limited standard of review, Russo, 206 N.J. at 27, we
conclude the Board's denial of Mack's ordinary disability retirement benefits
was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, and "is supported by sufficient
credible evidence on the record as a whole," R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D). To the extent
not addressed, Mack's remaining contentions lack sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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