IN THE MATTER OF CZEZRE ADAMS (NEW JERSEY CIVIL SEVICE COMMISSION) ( 2022 )


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  •                              NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-2618-20
    IN THE MATTER OF CZEZRE
    ADAMS, CITY OF NEWARK,
    POLICE DEPARTMENT.
    ___________________________
    Submitted September 13, 2022 – Decided September 19, 2022
    Before Judges Geiger and Susswein.
    On appeal from the New Jersey Civil Service
    Commission, Docket No. 2020-1661.
    Fusco & Macaluso, PC, attorneys for appellant Czezre
    Adams (Giovanna Giampa, on the brief).
    Kenyatta K. Stewart, Corporation Counsel, City of
    Newark, Department of Law, attorney for respondent
    City of Newark Police Department (Dorian Smith,
    Assistant Corporation Counsel, on the brief).
    Matthew J. Platkin, Acting Attorney General, attorney
    for respondent New Jersey Civil Service Commission
    (Steven M. Gleeson, Deputy Attorney General, on the
    statement in lieu of brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Appellant Czezre Adams appeals from a final decision of the Civil Service
    Commission (CSC) upholding his removal from employment as a City of
    Newark Police Department (NPD) police officer. We affirm.
    We take the following facts from the record.            Adams began his
    employment as an NPD police officer in 2014. In May 2019, J.B. 1 contacted
    Adams through Adam's Twitter account. Adams directed J.B. to speak to him
    through his other Twitter account (the second account). Adams did not identify
    himself as a police officer on this second account. They agreed to meet at J.B.'s
    home later that evening. They engaged in a consensual sexual encounter and
    Adams took photographs and videos of the encounter with J.B.'s consent. The
    pictures and videos were then shared between the two, at J.B.'s request, on an
    application called WhatsApp. J.B. requested that Adams not post the videos on
    Twitter and Adams responded that he would not share the videos.
    On June 4, 2019, J.B. saw the photographs and videos posted on Adam's
    second Twitter account. The posts did not include J.B.'s face but he knew it
    depicted him. J.B. sent Adams a message reiterating that he did not want the
    images posted or shared on Twitter and stated, "I expected you to respect what
    I asked this wasn't cool." Adams responded that he "completely forgot until I
    1
    We refer to the victim by initials to protect his privacy. See R. 1:38-3(c)(12).
    A-2618-20
    2
    read our text" and said he deleted the posted images. J.B. then asked if Adams
    posted the photos or videos to OnlyFans 2 and Adams replied that he had not.
    J.B. asked Adams to "[p]lease delete everything from [his] phone."
    In subsequent texts, J.B. explained that he was not looking to be shown
    engaging in such activities on Adams's social media account, but Adams
    responded that J.B. "came knocking at [his] door" and indicated that J.B. was
    the one that originally sought out Adams. J.B. testified that he broke off
    communication with Adams soon after.
    J.B. monitored Adams's Twitter page and discovered that Adams had
    reposted videos of their sexual encounter. On September 12, 2019, J.B. reported
    Adams's page to Twitter, which responded by making the account unavailable
    for violating its social media policy.
    On September 13, 2019, J.B. spoke with NPD Lieutenant Andy Rivera to
    file a Professional Standards complaint against Adams. J.B. claimed that Adams
    posted their sexual encounter without his permission. J.B. also contacted the
    Essex County Prosecutor's Office and spoke with an assistant prosecutor in the
    2
    The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that "OnlyFans is a website
    where an individual creates a site, including videos, pictures, or other content.
    A user or subscriber would have to sign up for access and log into the website
    to view its full content."
    A-2618-20
    3
    Special Victims Unit. J.B. was told that his allegations would not be pursued as
    a criminal matter and that he could file a civil complaint against Adams.
    J.B. posted on his Twitter account that he was being harassed by a police
    officer who had videotaped their sexual encounter and published the videos
    online. J.B. testified that he knew that he was being recorded when he and
    Adams had sex. In response to J.B.'s tweets and reporting to Newark, Adams
    posted a series of tweets on his original Twitter page. Adams tweeted, "[J.B.],
    really didn't want to go down this route but I thought the situation was dead, but
    clearly it's not, so . . . here we go." Another tweet read: "Your clock is ticking.
    I sent you my warning." Adams continued to tag J.B. publicly in threatening
    and discouraging messages while tweeting directly or replying to other user's
    comments about the feud. Adams had the final say in the back and forth by
    posting, "so you want to keep these lies up after I gave you fair warning? I have
    nothing but time today. Just because you changed your settings [so that] only
    those following can see your posts don't mean I don't have what I need. Yes,
    I'm pulling up." Finally, Adams stated: "Now we can keep this going because
    I have time[,] or you can do what I asked and I'll let you have the little dignity
    you have left to stay intact."
    A-2618-20
    4
    J.B. later learned of yet another Twitter account (the third account) that
    also had an image of the sexual encounter between Adams and J.B. The account
    included a link to an OnlyFans account that used the same name as the OnlyFans
    account that was on Adams's Twitter account before it was deactivated. J.B.
    explained that OnlyFans required payment to see the videos posted on that page
    and he did not sign up to view them.
    Specific to Adams's ownership of an OnlyFans account, Lt. Rivera
    explained that having such a pay-per-view account is considered a form of
    outside employment. Police officers are forbidden from making any profit from
    outside employment unless it is disclosed to the Department. Adams did not
    submit an outside employment form for the JustKash account linked to him. Lt.
    Rivera further testified that police are held to a higher standard, and that they
    are not supposed to profit from sexually explicit videos or similar activities.
    J.B. testified that he emailed Adams on October 24, 2019, stating that he
    was hurt by Adams posting the video and wanted to protect his privacy. Adams
    denies receiving the email. When the men later spoke, J.B. reiterated that he did
    not want to have intimate photos and videos posted on Twitter.
    The NPD issued a Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action (PNDA) to
    Adams on October 8, 2019, which charged him with violating N.J.A.C. 4A:2-
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    5
    2.3(a)(6), Conduct Unbecoming a Public Employee, and the following NPD
    rules and regulations: Chapter 3:1.1, Conduct in Public and Private 3; Chapter
    4:2.6, Obscene, Immoral or Offensive Material 4; Chapter 3:1.1, Conduct in
    Public and Private 5; Chapter 18:25, Acts of Immorality 6; Chapter 18:28,
    3
    Chapter 3:1.1 states: "Police officers in both private and public shall conduct
    themselves so as to avoid impugning the reputation of the Department. They
    shall maintain the dignity and integrity of their office through the exemplary
    obedience to all Rules and Regulations; the maintenance of respect for the
    welfare and rights of all citizens; the courteous and objective enforcement of
    laws without favor or prejudice, and the recognition that police service is a
    public trust requiring dedication to ideals and ethics of the highest degree."
    4
    Chapter 4:2.6 states: "Except in the discharge of police duty, police officers
    shall not knowingly write, print, copy, distribute, transport, store, or possess any
    writings, records, recordings, or pictures which contain obscene, immoral,
    offensive, or defamatory matter."
    5
    Chapter 3:1.1 states: "Police officers in both private and public shall conduct
    themselves so as to avoid impugning the reputation of the Department. They
    shall maintain the dignity and integrity of their office through the exemplary
    obedience to all Rules and Regulations; the maintenance of respect for the
    welfare and rights of all citizens; the courteous and objective enforcement of
    laws without favor or prejudice, and the recognition that police service is a
    public trust requiring dedication to ideals and ethics of the highest degree."
    6
    Chapter 18:25 states: "Division members shall not commit acts of immorality,
    indecency or lewdness."
    A-2618-20
    6
    Misconduct Generally. 7 Adams was also charged with violating NPD General
    Order 15-02.8
    Adams pled not guilty at the November 13, 2019 departmental hearing
    and waived his right to have his case heard by the NPD's trial board. On
    December 3, 2019, the NPD upheld the charges levied against Adams and issued
    a Final Notice of Disciplinary Action (FNDA) terminating Adams's employment
    with the NPD effective November 13, 2019.
    Adams appealed his removal to the CSC. The appeal was transferred to
    the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) as a contested case and assigned to an
    ALJ, who conducted a two-day hearing. The NPD called J.B. and Lt. Rivera as
    7
    Chapter 18:28 states: "Any violation or offense not properly chargeable
    against a Department member under any other Rules of Discipline shall be
    charged under Rule No. 18."
    8
    Order 15-02 states that in order to maintain "professionalism, honesty, and
    integrity," the NPD implemented "guidelines to address the conduct and the
    appearance of personnel, on and off duty, while utilizing social media outlets"
    to ensure members "use discretion in a manner to not discredit, defame, or
    disrespect the department." The order defines "speech" to include photographs
    and videos. The order provides that "members are not to engage or participate
    in speech containing obscene or sexually explicit language, images, acts,
    statements, or other forms of speech that ridicule, malign, disparage, or
    otherwise express bias against any race, religion, ethnicity, economic status,
    protected class, or social status of an individual." Finally, the order requires that
    members not engage in "speech involving themselves . . . that would reflect
    behavior reasonably considered reckless or irresponsible."
    A-2618-20
    7
    witnesses and Adams testified on his own behalf. Following the receipt of
    written submissions, the ALJ issued an initial decision on March 4, 2021, which
    upheld all charges except violation of NPD Rules and Regulations and Chapter
    18:28 Misconduct Generally.
    Four additional discipline appeals filed by Adams from major discipline
    issued by the NPD on November 13, 2019, were pending before the OAL. Those
    appeals, which involved unrelated charges, were from suspensions of fifteen
    days, forty-five days, ninety days, and thirty days, respectively.
    The first suspension was for Adams's alleged conduct relating to a
    September 21, 2018 motor vehicle accident, involved identifying himself as a
    police officer, failure to maintain appropriate insurance, and providing false
    information during an investigation.        The second suspension related to an
    October 31, 2018 incident during which Adams was rude to a 911 caller. The
    third suspension was for "unprofessional language with a caller and his failure
    to create an assistance assignment in the system" on November 25, 2018. The
    fourth suspension followed Adams's June 4, 2019 actions "in not following
    several orders and speaking in an unprofessional, profane manner."
    The ALJ found J.B.'s testimony was "credible and persuasive concerning
    the multiple social media posts of the sexual encounter on Adams's . . . Twitter
    A-2618-20
    8
    account without [J.B.'s] consent and prior request not to do so." The ALJ noted
    that J.B. admitted that his tweet stating that he did not consent to the taping was
    "inaccurate," but he maintained "that he never agreed to Adams's use of their
    sexual pictures or videos on social media." J.B. also testified credibly that
    Adams's tweets suggested "physical violence" and that Adams called him on
    October 7, 2019, "from an unknown caller number and threatened to sue J.B."
    In contrast, the ALJ found Adams's testimony "that he did not post or use
    the images from the sexual encounter after June 4, 2019," was not credible. The
    ALJ found there was a link between the second Twitter account and Adams and
    that he posted images of the May 30, 2019 sexual encounter on June 4 and
    September 12, 2019, without J.B.'s consent. "However, the evidence did not
    establish that the Twitter account references or depicts Adams's employment as
    a police officer." In addition, the ALJ noted that Adams denied creating the
    third Twitter account, the photo associated with that account "does not reveal
    Adams's face or otherwise identify Adams[,]" and the NPD presented no other
    information or records "connecting Adams to the account." The ALJ therefore
    found that the evidence did not demonstrate that the third Twitter account
    "belong[ed] to Adams or that he earned money by posting images or videos from
    the May 30, 2019 sexual encounter."
    A-2618-20
    9
    The ALJ concluded "that a preponderance of the credible evidence"
    showed that Adams violated NPD Rules 3.1-1, 4:2-6, 18:25, and Order 15-02
    "by recording and later posting sexually explicit content on his social med ia
    account without [J.B.'s] consent on more than one occasion."          She found
    Adams's actions "reflected irresponsible behavior on social media in violation
    of Order 15-02" and that "Adams violated N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(6) because
    Adams's conduct is incompatible with the high degree of integrity and respect
    expected of all police officers." Because the violations of Rules 3.1-1, 4:2-6,
    and 18:25 were upheld, the ALJ concluded that "Adams did not violate 18:28
    for actions or conduct not covered by other rules or regulations."
    Following the receipt of additional submissions regarding progressive
    discipline, the ALJ considered the appropriate level of discipline. Regarding
    the relevance of Adams's other disciplinary appeals, the ALJ recognized Adams
    incurred no prior discipline in the five years preceding the charges in this case
    and those involved in the other four pending appeals. However, "consideration
    of pending disciplinary appeals is appropriate in determining the penalty here."
    "Further, the pending appeals note significant offenses within a short period and
    include a maximum suspension of ninety days." Even so, "the nature of the
    A-2618-20
    10
    offenses does not suggest a specific pattern of misconduct other than perhaps a
    disrespectful attitude."
    While the misconduct occurred off-duty, the ALJ noted that Adams's
    conduct violated multiple rules, a departmental order, and a CSC regulation. In
    addition, Adams "showed a lack of respect for [J.B.'s] privacy and welfare." The
    ALJ nevertheless found the misconduct to be "mostly a private matter between
    two adults without sufficient evidence of a crime or direct involvement with
    Adams's position as a police officer."
    The ALJ declined to bypass progressive discipline, found termination to
    be "unreasonably harsh," and reduced the penalty to a 180-day suspension. The
    NPD filed written exceptions to the initial decision.
    The CSC "considered the ALJ's initial decision" and undertook "an
    independent evaluation of the record." On April 7, 2021, the CSC issued a final
    administrative action that adopted the findings of fact contained in the initial
    decision, rejected the ALJ's recommendation to modify the removal to a 180-
    day suspension, and upheld the removal.
    The CSC recounted the charges, the ALJ's findings, and noted that its
    review of the appropriate penalty was de novo. The CSC decided that the "only
    appropriate penalty" was "removal from employment."
    A-2618-20
    11
    The CSC noted "that where the underlying conduct is of an egregious
    nature, the imposition of a penalty up to and including removal is appropriate,
    regardless of an individual's disciplinary history." That is so because "some
    disciplinary   infractions   are   so   serious   that   removal   is   appropriate
    notwithstanding a largely unblemished prior record."         The CSC found that
    Adams's "actions are clearly sufficiently egregious to support the penalty of
    removal without consideration of progressive discipline."
    The CSC concluded that the ALJ's comments regarding free speech were
    misplaced and irrelevant because J.B. did not consent to the posting of the video.
    It emphasized that the primary basis for the discipline was that Adams violated
    J.B.'s trust and right to privacy by posting the video on more than one occasion
    without J.B.'s consent. The CSC considered the repeated public posting of the
    video to be "wholly inappropriate" and "outrageous," and was exacerbated by
    Adams's other communications with J.B., which were deemed to be "actual or
    veiled threats."   It found this conduct to be "the definition of conduct
    unbecoming a public employee[,]" and was "even more egregious" because
    police officers are held to a higher standard of conduct. The CSC explained that
    police officers are special employees tasked with enforcing and upholding the
    law while exercising "good judgment in [their] relationship with the public." To
    A-2618-20
    12
    that end, police officers "must present an image of personal integrity and
    dependability in order to have the respect of the public." It found that Adams
    "certainly violated [these] standards."
    The CSC further explained that even if progressive discipline did apply,
    the ALJ's analysis was flawed. The ALJ found that Adams had "no prior
    discipline . . . in the nearly five years before the pending charges or charges in
    this case." The CSC disagreed, noting that Adams was hired in 2015 and had
    incurred four major disciplinary actions during the year preceding the current
    charges. Indeed, Adams was suspended for fifteen days in September 2018. He
    was thereafter suspended for thirty days, forty-five days, and ninety days before
    incurring the present charges.
    In any event, the CSC concluded that "[a] [p]olice [o]fficer with four
    major disciplines in such a short time period cannot seriously expect that the
    fifth serious infraction that warrants major discipline would carry any penalty
    short of removal." The fact that the four prior major disciplinary actions
    involved dissimilar misconduct was not determinative. "More important [was]
    the fact that [Adams] had demonstrated a consistent pattern of misconduct that
    cannot be tolerated given the above standards imposed upon [p]olice [o]fficers."
    Therefore, even if Adams's "current infractions were not so egregious to support
    A-2618-20
    13
    removal absent the application of progressive discipline, it would find that
    applying that standard, removal is the only appropriate penalty."
    This appeal followed. Adams raises the following arguments:
    POINT ONE
    THIS HONORABLE COURT SHOULD REVERSE
    THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION'S DECISION
    TO NOT ADOPT THE ALJ'S DECISION AND
    REMOVE APPELLANT, BECAUSE THE DECISION
    WAS MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN, ARBITRARY,
    CAPRICIOUS AND UNREASONABLE, AND NOT
    SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD, AS APPELLANT'S
    CONDUCT WAS NOT EGREGIOUS ENOUGH TO
    WARRANT TERMINATION.
    POINT TWO
    THIS HONORABLE COURT SHOULD REVERSE
    THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION'S DECISION
    TO NOT ADOPT THE ALJ'S DECISION AND
    REMOVE APPELLANT, BECAUSE THE CITY OF
    NEWARK FAILED TO PROVE APPELLANT'S
    DISCIPLINE BY PREPONDERANCE OF THE
    EVIDENCE IN THE UNDERLYING HEARING.
    POINT THREE
    THIS HONORABLE COURT SHOULD REVERSE
    THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION'S DECISION
    TO NOT ADOPT THE ALJ'S DECISION AND
    REMOVE APPELLANT, BECAUSE THE DECISION
    WAS MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN, ARBITRARY,
    CAPRICIOUS, IN FINDING THAT EVEN IF
    PROGRESSIVE DISCIPLINE WAS FOLLOWED,
    A-2618-20
    14
    THERE WOULD BE SUFFICIENT PRIOR
    DISCIPLINE TO REMOVE THE APPELLANT.
    When an employee appeals to the CSC from major disciplinary action, the
    appointing authority bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the
    evidence, Atkinson v. Parsekian, 
    37 N.J. 143
    , 149 (1962).
    Judicial review of final agency decisions is limited. Allstars Auto Grp.,
    Inc. v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 
    234 N.J. 150
    , 157 (2018) (citing Russo v.
    Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 
    206 N.J. 14
    , 27 (2011)). Decisions
    "made by an administrative agency entrusted to apply and enforce a statutory
    scheme" are reviewed "under an enhanced deferential standard."             E. Bay
    Drywall, LLC v. Dep't of Lab. & Workforce Dev., ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2022) (slip
    op. at 14) (citing Hargrove v. Sleepy's, LLC, 
    220 N.J. 289
    , 301-02 (2015)). "We
    are bound to defer to the agency’s factual findings if those conclusions are
    supported by the record." 
    Id.
     at ___ (slip op. at 14-15) (citing Carpet Remnant
    Warehouse, Inc. v. Dep't of Lab., 
    125 N.J. 567
    , 587 (1991)). We will not disturb
    the determination of the Commission absent a showing "that it was arbitrary,
    capricious or unreasonable, or that it lacked fair support in the evidence, or that
    it violated legislative policies expressed or implicit in the civil service act."
    Zimmerman v. Sussex Cnty. Educ. Servs. Comm'n, 
    237 N.J. 465
    , 475 (2019)
    (quoting Campbell v. Dep't of Civ. Serv., 
    39 N.J. 556
    , 562 (1963)). "When an
    A-2618-20
    15
    agency's decision meets those criteria, then a court owes substantial deference
    to the agency's expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field." In re
    Herrmann, 
    192 N.J. 19
    , 28 (2007). "Deference controls even if the court would
    have reached a different result in the first instance." 
    Ibid.
    A reviewing court is not, however, "bound by [an] agency's interpretation
    of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue." Allstars, 234 N.J. at
    158 (alteration in original) (quoting Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. T.B., 
    207 N.J. 294
    , 302 (2011)). The party challenging the administrative action bears the
    burden of demonstrating that the agency's action was arbitrary, capricious, or
    unreasonable. Lavezzi v. State, 
    219 N.J. 163
    , 171 (2014).
    Applying these principles, we affirm substantially for the reasons
    expressed by the CSC in its final decision. We add the following comments.
    Our careful review of the record convinces us that the ALJ's credibility
    determinations were supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record,
    as were the ALJ's and CSC's determinations that Adams committed the
    disciplinary infractions for which his removal was sustained. The NPD satisfied
    its evidential burden of proving Adams committed the disciplinary infractions
    by a preponderance of the evidence. We are further convinced that the penalty
    of removal was warranted and not "so disproportionate to the offense, in light
    A-2618-20
    16
    of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness." In re
    Carter, 
    191 N.J. 474
    , 484 (2007) (quoting In re Polk, 
    90 N.J. 550
    , 578 (1982)).
    Adams can hardly claim that the principle of progressive discipline should
    be applied to downgrade the penalty for his misconduct since Adams obviously
    did not have "a substantial record of employment that is largely or totally
    unblemished by significant disciplinary infractions." Herrmann, 
    192 N.J. at 33
    .
    Instead, his four prior major disciplinary actions during his relatively short
    tenure as a NPD police officer evidences "a consistent pattern of misconduct
    that cannot be tolerated given the . . .[standards] imposed upon [p]olice
    [o]fficers." The CSC correctly concluded that Adams's extensive disciplinary
    record militated strongly in favor of a more serious penalty, not a lesser penalty.
    Moreover, the theory of progressive discipline is not "a fixed and
    immutable rule to be followed without question. Instead, [our Supreme Court
    has] recognized that some disciplinary infractions are so serious that removal is
    appropriate notwithstanding a largely unblemished prior record." Carter, 
    191 N.J. at 484
    .
    The CSC found that standing alone, the present charges were sufficiently
    egregious to warrant removal, regardless of Adam's prior disciplinary history.
    We agree. Adam's repeated misconduct, coupled with his threatening statements
    A-2618-20
    17
    to J.B., fell far below the stricter standard of conduct to which police officers
    are held. See In re Phillips, 
    117 N.J. 567
    , 576-77 (1990) (explaining that police
    officers are held to a higher standard of conduct than other public employees);
    In re Att'y Gen. L. Enf't Directive Nos. 2002-5 & 2020-6, 
    465 N.J. Super. 111
    ,
    147 (App. Div. 2020) (same), aff'd as modified, 
    246 N.J. 462
     (2021); Twp. of
    Moorestown v. Armstrong, 
    89 N.J. Super. 560
    , 566 (App. Div. 1965) (stating
    that "a police officer is a special kind of public employee" whose "primary duty
    is to enforce and uphold the law" and "to exercise tact, restraint and good
    judgment in his relationship with the public"). This higher standard of conduct
    applies to police officers even when off-duty. Phillips, 
    117 N.J. at 577
    ; In re
    Emmons, 
    63 N.J. Super. 136
    , 140 (App. Div. 1960).
    The seriousness of Adams's misconduct is reflected by the Legislature's
    enactment of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-9(c), which prohibits knowingly
    disclos[ing] any photograph, film, videotape, recording
    or any other reproduction of the image, taken in
    violation of [N.J.S.A. 2C:14-9(b)], of: (1) another
    person who is engaged in an act of sexual penetration
    or sexual contact; (2) another person whose intimate
    parts are exposed; or (3) another person's
    undergarment-clad intimate parts, unless that person
    has consented to such disclosure.
    A-2618-20
    18
    Violating N.J.S.A. 2C:14-9(c) is a third-degree crime.9 "Every police officer
    has an inherent duty to obey the law." State v. Stevens, 
    203 N.J. Super. 59
    , 65
    (Law Div. 2010). Indeed, "[t]he obligation to obey the criminal laws of this
    state . . . is a responsibility imposed upon everyone in society." State v. Hupka,
    
    407 N.J. Super. 489
    , 511 (App. Div. 2009), aff'd, 
    203 N.J. 222
     (2010).
    The fact that the Essex County Prosecutor's Office decided not to
    prosecute Adams for violating N.J.S.A. 2C:14-9 does not lessen the nature and
    seriousness of his misconduct. "Where the conduct of a public employee which
    forms the basis of disciplinary proceedings may also constitute a [crime], the
    absence of a conviction, whether by reason of nonprosecution or even acquittal,
    bars neither prosecution nor finding of guilt for misconduct in office in the
    disciplinary proceedings." Phillips, 
    117 N.J. at 575
     (quoting Sabia v. City of
    Elizabeth, 
    132 N.J. Super. 6
    , 12 (App. Div. 1974)).
    To the extent we have not specifically discussed any remaining arguments
    raised by Adams, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion
    in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
    Affirmed.
    9
    We emphasize that the fact these were same sex sexual encounters has no
    bearing on the seriousness of the misconduct.
    A-2618-20
    19